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ARGUMENTATION   AND 
DEBATE 


BY 
JAMES  MILTON  O'NEILL 

PROFESSOR   OF   RHETORIC   AND   ORATORY   IN   THE 
UNIVERSITY   OF   WISCONSIN 

CRAVEN  LAYCOCK 

DEAN  OF  THE  FACULTY  OF  DARTMOUTH  COLLEGE 
AND 

ROBERT  LEIGHTON  SCALES 

SOMETIME  INSTRUCTOR  IN   ENGLISH   IN   DARTMOUTH   COLLEGE 


Nm  fork 

THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

1923 

AU  rights  r«serpe4 


*  *  *  * 
•    •  •  • 


COPYKIQHT,   1917 

By  the  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 
Set  up  and  electrotyped.     Published  July,  1917. 


J7^Ji-/ 


TO 

CHARLES  FRANCIS  RICHARDSON 

TEACHER,  COLLEAGUE 

AND 

FSIEND. 


572144 


WISDOM 

Viscount  Morley,  Chancellor  of  Victoria  University,  at  the  recent  opening 
of  the  John  Morley  Chemical  Laboratory  given  to  that  institution  by 
Mr.  Carnegie,  said  that  he  sometimes  thought  he  would  like  to  set  an  ex- 
amination on  the  subject,  "What  is  an  Educated  Person?"  For  himself,  he 
said,  he  would  "put  at  the  very  top  the  qualification  that  any  educated 
man  or  woman  should  know  what  is  evidence,  should  know  when  a  thing  is 
proved  and  when  it  is  not  proved."  Moreover,  added  the  eminent  English 
literary  and  political  critic,  "The  educated  person  should  know  how  many 
interpretations  the  same  verbal  proposition  would  fairly  bear,  what  weight 
was  to  be  attached  to  rival  authorities."  This  is  an  extremely  interesting 
dictum,  one  that  will  especially  interest  the  scientist  with  his  loyalty  to  the 
scientific  and  inductive  method,  and  the  lawyer  with  his  traditions  of  care- 
ful weighing  of  evidence. 

— Editorial,   The  Boston  Herald. 


PREFACE 

This  volume  is  the  result  of  a  complete  re-writing  of 
Argumentation  and  Debate  as  published  by  Laycock  and 
Scales  in  1904.  It  has  seemed  to  me  that  the  original  text 
contained  the  clearest  and  most  orderly  explanation  of  the 
subject  ever  published.  It  was  felt,  however,  that  this  text, 
in  common  with  all  other  texts  in  argumentation,  was  not 
sufficiently  thorough  for  college  and  university  classes.  A 
text  which  would  go  more  deeply  into  the  methods  and  pre- 
cepts which  argumentation  has  borrowed  from  logic,  law, 
rhetoric,  and  oratory,  has  been  greatly  needed  for  some  time. 
This  volume  is  the  result  of  an  attempt  to  meet  that  need. 
How  well  this  purpose  has  been  accomplished  you  who  read 
and  use  this  book  must  judge. 

This  book  has  been  prepared  in  the  hope  that  it  will  serve 
as  a  text  to  be  carefully  studied,  considered,  and  discussed 
by  college  and  university  classes  in  academic  courses  in 
argumentation  and  debate.  Within  this  field  the  aim  has 
been  the  broadest  possible  one.  The  purpose  of  the  particu- 
lar classes  for  which  it  has  been  written  should  be  thorough- 
going intelligence  in  regard  to  argumentation  and  debate,  not 
merely  platform  efficiency  in  this  field.  Platform  efficiency 
is  not  to  be  decried,  but  it  should  come  after  and  be  based 
upon  thoroughgoing  intelligence,  and  should  not,  in  academic 
class  rooms,  be  made  an  independent  end  to  the  exclusion 
of  this  broader  and  more  fundamental  educational  aim. 
Such  being  its  purpose,  this  volume,  is,  of  course,  submitted 
as  equally  useful  in  classes  working  either  in  oral  or  in  written 
argumentation  or  in  both.  The  fundamental  principles  of 
argumentation  are  identical  in  both  forms.  Certain  special 
adaptations  for  oral  presentation  are  particularly  considered 
in  Part  III,  Debate. 

ix 


X  PREFACE 

In  regard  to  the  content  and  method  of  certain  chapters, 
a  word  of  explanation  may  be  due.  In  the  first  place  it  was 
decided  that  considerable  material  showing  the  relation  of 
argumentation  to  other  fields,  particularly  to  those  of  law 
and  logic,  should  be  included  in  this  volume.  I  have  long 
desired  that  my  classes  should  have  more  complete  and  more 
authoritative  explanations  of  our  relations  with  these  fields 
than  I  have  been  able  to  find  in  previous  text-books  on  argu- 
mentation, and  I  know  that  I  am  not  alone  in  this.  Most 
teachers  of  argumentation  and  debate  probably  desire  that 
their  students  shall  have  backgrounds  and  foundations  in 
the  subjects  comparable  to  those  furnished  students  in  other 
departments  of  the  curriculum.  Such  backgrounds  and 
foundations  will  make  it  possible  for  the  student  of  argu- 
mentation to  relate  this  work  intelligently  to  his  work  in 
logic,  law,  English  composition,  etc.  And  particularly  thej'' 
will  enable  him  to  take  the  results  of  this  work  with  him  to 
his  work  in  all  other  courses  and  into  his  thinking  and  acting 
in  everyday  life.  Having  decided  to  include  material  of  this 
sort  (such  as  is  particularly  found  in  the  chapters  dealing 
with  Evidence,  Kinds  of  Arguments,  and  Fallacies),  the 
question  arose  as  to  the  manner  in  which  such  material  should 
be  introduced.  It  was  decided  that  the  use  of  many  direct 
quotations  from  recognized  authorities  in  these  several  fields 
would  be  the  most  frank,  most  accurate,  most  authoritative, 
and  on  the  whole  most  satisfactory  method.  It  is  for  this 
reason  that  the  readers  will  find  an  unusual,  though  under 
the  circumstances  I  trust  not  an  undue,  amount  of  direct 
quotation  from  other  writers,  in  this  text. 

Throughout  the  text  an  effort  has  been  made  to  systematize 
and  organize  the  material  to  be  presented  in  such  a  manner 
that  from  the  table  of  contents  to  the  individual  paragraphs 
of  each  and  every  chapter,  the  relation  of  one  part  to  every 
other  part  would  be  made  clear.  It  is  recognized  that  the 
difference  in  conditions  under  which  instruction  in  argumen- 
tation is  given  in  different  institutions,  will  probably  make 


PREFACE  xi 

it  necessary  for  some  teachers  to  omit  some  portions  of  this 
text.  If  particular  classes  wish  to  skip  certain  sections  (such 
as  a  part  or  the  whole  of  the  chapters  on  the  Kinds  of  Argu- 
ments, or  Fallacies)  this  may  very  easily  be  done.  A  brief 
summary  of  the  section  omitted,  and  a  statement  of  its  rela- 
tion to  the  other  parts  of  the  book  may  very  easily  be  made 
by  the  teacher.  It  has  been  felt  desirable  that  as  far  as  the 
limits  of  a  single  volume  permitted,  a  complete  statement  of 
the  doctrines  and  principles  that  may  be  included  within 
the  field  of  argumentation  should  be  given,  but  given  in  such 
a  manner  that  individual  teachers  may  make  such  adapta- 
tions as  the  time  allowed  or  the  previous  preparation  of  the 
students  may  seem  to  make  advisable. 

A  glance  at  the  pages  of  this  book  will  make  it  evident 
that  I  am  indebted  to  a  great  many  writers  in  the  various 
fields  with  which  argumentation  is  concerned.  I  have  tried 
to  give  accurate  credit  and  documentation  in  every  instance 
in  which  I  have  consciously  drawn  from  the  work  of  those 
who  have  gone  before  me.  A  complete  bibliography  of  the 
publications  to  which  reference  is  made  in  this  text  is  pub- 
lished in  the  appendix,  and  here  I  wish  to  express  my  thanks 
and  obligations  to  all  the  writers  whose  works  are  listed  in 
that  place. 

In  addition  I  wish  to  express  my  appreciation  of  the  help- 
ful suggestions  and  criticism  which  I  have  received  while 
preparing  this  manuscript  from  Professors  J.  A.  Winans  of 
Cornell  University,  J.  S.  Gaylord  of  Winona  Normal  School, 
W.  C.  Shaw  of  Dartmouth  College,  C.  H.  Woolbert,  formerly 
of  the  University  of  Illinois,  Dean  H.  W.  Ballantine  of  the 
University  of  Illinois  Law  School,  and  Dr.  H.  M.  Kallen  of 
the  Department  of  Philosophy  of  the  University  of  Wis- 
consin. 

J.  M.  ON. 
The  University  of  Wisconsin, 

May,  1917. 


PREFACE 

{To  the  original  hook  by  Lay  cock  and  Scales) 

The  growing  recognition  of  the  importance  of  Argumenta- 
tion as  a  separate  subject  of  study  in  American  colleges,  and 
the  increasing  emphasis  which  is  put  upon  the  necessity  for 
a  proper  method  of  presenting  it,  are  probably  due  to  the 
appreciation  of  two  facts.  In  the  first  place,  it  is  coming 
to  be  acknowledged  that  Argumentation  is  a  peculiar  art, 
distinct  from  all  others.  Many  of  its  principles  are  derived 
from  the  fundamental  elements  of  other  arts  and  sciences. 
Formal  logic,  rhetoric,  oratory,  and  the  rules  of  court  pro- 
cedure all  contribute  to  it  of  their  precepts;  but  though  it  is 
thus  composite  in  nature,  it  is  essentially  a  unified  art,  de- 
manding investigation  for  its  own  sake.  Furthermore,  it  is 
realized  that  argumentative  skill  does  not  belong  exclusively 
to  any  one  profession  or  class  of  men.  To  know  how  to  argue 
is  necessary  not  alone  for  the  lawyer  or  the  publicist,  but 
equally  for  the  preacher,  the  scientist,  the  business  man,  or, 
indeed,  for  any  one  who  may  wish  to  influence  the  opinions 
or  actions  of  his  fellows;  it  is  a  power  which  every  educated 
man  should  have  an  opportunity  to  acquire.  With  these 
requisites  in  mind,  the  authors  have  made  it  their  purpose, 
taking  these  component  elements  from  their  various  sources, 
to  develop  from  them  a  body  of  principles,  by  the  study  and 
practice  of  which  the  student  may  gain,  so  far  as  possible,  the 
ability  to  create  or  control  the  beliefs  of  others. 

Any  one  seeking  by  argumentation  to  influence  the 
thoughts  or  acts  of  another  must  employ  either  the  written 
symbol  or  the  spoken  word.  In  this  day  of  the  newspaper, 
the  magazine,  and  the  essay  much  of  the  most  potent  argu- 
mentation comes  from  the  pen  or  the  public  press,  so  that 

xiii 


xiv  PREFACE 

the  needs  of  the  hour  call  for  training  in  the  written  form. 
On  the  other  hand,  there  is  a  large  class  of  students,  who  are 
in  search  of  training  for  the  court  room,  the  deliberative 
assembly,  or  the  platform.  Consequently,  the  requisites  of 
both  these  kinds  of  presentation  must  be  recognized  in  any 
treatment  of  the  art  as  a  whole.  Accordingly,  with  a  view 
to  these  requirements,  the  following  plan  has  been  adopted 
in  presenting  the  subject.  The  work  is  divided  into  two  parts : 
the  first  contains  a  discussion  of  the  general  principles  of 
argumentation,  applicable  alike  to  written  and  to  spoken 
discourse;  the  second  part  is  devoted  to  the  setting  forth 
of  certain  additional  precepts  peculiar  to  oral  debate.  Finally, 
realizing  that  a  thorough  mastery  of  the  subject  can  come 
only  from  continued  practice,  the  authors  have  given,  in  the 
Appendix,  a  brief  outline  of  the  methods  of  instruction  which 
they  have  found  to  be  most  serviceable,  and  have  ventured  a 
few  suggestions  which  may  prove  helpful  in  supplementing 
the  study  of  the  text. 

C.  L. 

R.  L.  S. 
Hanover,  N.  H., 
May  30,  1904. 


CONTENTS 

PART  I.    INTRODUCTORY 


PAGE 

1.  Definitions  and  Relations 1 

PART  11.    ARGUMENTATION 

A.  INVENTION 

2.  The  Proposition IS 

3.  The  Burden  of  Proof 33 

4.  The  Issues 42 

B.  SELECTION 

5.  Gathering  Material 68 

6.  Evidence 80 

7.  Kinds  of  Arguments 114 

8.  Fallacies 170 

C.  ARRANGEMENT 

9.  General  Principles  of  Arrangement 197 

10.  Brief  Drawing  and  Outlining 208 

D.  PRESENTATION 

11.  Persuasion 249 

12.  The  Introduction 298 

13.  The  Discussion 322 

14.  The  Conclusion 334 

15.  Refutation 344 

PART  III.    DEBATE 

16.  The  Nature  of  Debate 367 

17.  The  Main  Speeches 392 

18.  Rebuttal  Speeches 420 

19.  Delivery 430 

XV 


xvi  CONTENTS 

APPENDIX 

PAGE 

A.  Bibliography 445 

B.  Pleading 449 

C.  Judges'  Ballot  with  Instructions 452 

D.  Rules  for  Legal  Brief  Drawing 454 

E.  1.  Material  for  a  Short  Brief 457 

2.  Material  for  a  Long  Brief 459 


ARGUMENTATION  AND   DEBATE 


ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

PART  I.    INTRODUCTORY 
CHAPTER  1 

DEFINITIONS  AND   RELATIONS 

OUTLINE 

A.  Argumentation  defined. 

B.  Fundamental  importance. 

C.  Universal  and  indispensable. 

D.  Twofold  nature. 

E.  Conviction  alone. 

F.  Persuasion  alone. 

G.  Four  processes: 

1.  Invention. 

2.  Selection. 

3.  Arrangement. 

4.  Presentation. 

H.  No  distinct  dividing  line. 

I.    Debate  defined. 

J.    Argumentation  and  logic. 

K.  Argumentation  and  the  forms  of  composition. 

L.  Sources  of  argumentation: 

1.  Law. 

2.  Logic. 

3.  Rhetoric. 

4.  Oratory. 

A.  Argumentation  defined.  Argumentation  is  the  art  of 
influencing  others,  through  the  medium  of  reasoned  dis- 
course, to  believe  or  act  as  we  wish  them  to  believe  or  act. 

B.  Fundamental  importance.  Belief  is  an  element  which 
is  most  truly  fundamental  in  the  ability  of  man  to  grow 

1 


2  ARbbME^'TA'nON  AND  DEBATE 

and  in  his  power  to  create.  It  is  the  beliefs  of  the  individual 
about  religion,  about  politics,  and  about  society,  which  de- 
termine his  attitude  toward  men  and  events,  and  which 
govern  his  Actions  in  the  affairs  of  life.  Moreover,  a  man's 
belief  is  rarely,  if  ever,  entirely  original.  His  creed  is  wrought 
out  of  the  ideas  of  priests  and  prophets;  his  political  prin- 
ciples are  made  up  of  materials  taken  from  economists  and 
statesmen;  his  social  tendencies  are  influenced  by  the  theories 
of  philosophers  and  reformers;  and  in  all  his  conceptions, 
far  more  than  he  can  realize,  he  is  influenced  by  the  opinions 
of  his  daily  companions.  So  that  the  revelation  of  truth 
and  the  establishment  of  justice  in  human  affairs,  must  de- 
pend largely  upon  the  power  of  those  who  stand  at  any  time 
for  what  is  true  and  just,  to  control  the  convictions  of  their 
fellows  and  so  to  make  them  see  the  best  and  seek  after  it. 
What,  then,  of  the  art  whose  work  it  is  to  influence  others  to 
believe  or  to  act?  Must  it  not  be  respected  and  cultivated 
as  the  embodiment  of  much  that  is  worthiest  in  human 
thought  and  action? 

C.  Universal  and  indispensable.  But  argumentation  is 
worthy  of  respect  and  study,  not  simply  because  of  its  funda- 
mental importance,  but  also  because  it  is  so  nearly  universal 
and  indispensable.  We  find  its  uses  made  manifest  in  almost 
every  branch  of  affairs.  In  the  legislative  assembly  the  strug- 
gles of  parties  are  settled  and  policies  of  government  are 
worked  out  by  argument;  in  the  courtroom  it  is  argument 
which  advances  the  conflicting  claims  of  individuals,  pro- 
tects their  rights  and  privileges,  and  guides  the  regulation 
of  the  duties  of  the  citizen  to  the  State;  in  faculty  meetings, 
fraternity  meetings,  mass  meetings,  men  must  argue  in  order 
to  weigh  one  course  of  action  against  another;  in  the  meeting 
room  of  the  directors  of  a  corporation,  it  is  by  argument  that 
its  members  come  to  decisions  as  to  what  is  honorable  and 
what  is  expedient;  and,  wherever  in  the  home  or  on  the 
street  men  differ  about  their  private  concerns,  they  argue 
to  adjust  their  differences  and  to  find  the  truth.     Indeed, 


DEFINITIONS  AND  RELATIONS  3 

wherever  active-minded  men  with  opinions  meet,  there  is 
sure  to  be  argumentation. 

D.  Twofold  nature.  It  has  long  been  the  custom  of 
writers  on  argumentation  to  speak  of  its  twofold  nature — 
its  relation  to  reason  on  the  one  hand  and  to  emotion  on  the 
other.  The  subject  has  been  divided  into  considerations  of 
principles  that  have  to  do  with  reason — ^principles  of  convic- 
tion, and  those  that  have  to  do  with  emotion — ^principles  of 
persuasion.  Conviction  has  been  defined  as  an  appeal  to 
the  intellect  and  persuasion  as  an  appeal  to  the  will. 

Now  modern  psychologists  are  telling  us  that  this  old  divi- 
sion is  not  an  essential  or  fundamental  one,  that  in  ultimate 
psychological  analysis  conviction  and  persuasion  are  the 
same,  that  these  terms  represent  properly  only  a  difference 
of  emphasis  in  methods  of  approach  to  the  whole  personality, 
that  the  real  appeal  is  to  the  person  as  a  whole,  and  that 
psychologically  there  is  no  difference  between  winning  assent 
to  a  thesis  dealing  with  an  unemotional  matter  of  fact,  and 
winning  assent  to  a  proposition  dealing  with  contentious 
policies  and  deep  prejudices. 

These  developments  of  modern  psychology  give  rise  to  the 
question,  "Shall  students  of  argumentation  now  drop  this  old 
division  and  pay  no  further  attention  to  long  recognized 
principles  of  conviction  and  persuasion?'*  The  answer  is, 
"No";  and  in  this  answer  the  psychologists  concur. 

For  practical  purposes  it  is  well  to  use  this  old  distinction 
to  differentiate  the  types  of  cases  or  types  of  approach  in  cases 
which  have  to  do,  first,  mainly  with  gaining  the  assent  of  the 
whole  personality  to  such  a  proposition  as,  "A  straight  line  is 
the  shortest  distance  between  two  points,"  and,  second, 
mainly  with  such  propositions  as,  "Resolved:  that  National 
Prohibition  by  Federal  Amendment  is  desirable."  We  have 
to  deal  in  argumentation  with  all  sorts  of  propositions  rang- 
ing from  those  to  be  carried,  if  at  all,  by  clear  and  sound 
reason  based  on  facts — ^mere  questions  of  fact  in  which  human 
likes  and  dislikes  are  not  enlisted,  to  propositions  of  policy 


4  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

which  touch  the  prejudices  and  passions  very  deeply.  Be* 
tween  these  two  extremes  we  find  all  grades  of  mixture. 

It  is  thought  worth  while  for  practical  purposes  to  continue 
to  call  work  oh  the  former  a  work  of  conviction,  and  work  on 
the  latter  a  work  of  persuasion,  to  label  an  appeal  to  the 
"whole  personality"  which  calls  principally  for  a  considera- 
tion of  the  weight  of  evidence  and  the  strength  of  inference  as 
an  appeal  to  the  intellect  or  "conviction,"  and  to  label  an  ap- 
peal to  the  "whole  personality"  which  calls  for  a  considera- 
tion of  personal  likes  and  dislikes,  desires  and  prejudices — of 
the  duties,  virtues,  or  happiness  of  oneself  or  others — to  label 
this  sort  of  approach  an  appeal  to  emotions  or  "persua- 
sion." And  when  we  speak  of  argumentation  which  is  aimed 
at  belief  we  mean  mere  acceptance — intellectual  agreement. 
When  we  speak  of  argumentation  which  aims  at  action  we 
mean  gross  action,  behavior,  conduct — not  simply  mental 
action  which  is,  of  course,  present  in  the  acceptance  of  behef 
or  intellectual  assent. 

Successful  argumentation  practically  always  deals  with 
both  aspects.  Almost  all  important  propositions  on  which 
men  differ  are  such  that  both  intellectual  and  emotional  con- 
siderations have  to  be  met.  Beliefs  are  used  as  a  basis  for 
action. 

Winans'  discusses  the  distinction  between  conviction  and 
persuasion  in  the  following  excellent  paragraphs : 

"  It  is  convenient  to  use  the  word  persuasion  when  we  come 
to  treat,  of  influencing  conduct.  The  word  is  not  without 
difficulties,  since  usage  varies;  yet  there  seems  to  be  no  good 
substitute.  A  review  of  the  authorities  justifies  us  in  accept- 
ing tentatively  Whateley's  ^  definition  of  the  word:  'Persua- 
sion, properly  so  called,  i.  e.,  the  art  of  influencing  the  will.* 
To  influence  the  will  is  identical  with  influencing  the  conduct, 
and  includes  inducing  or  checking  single  acts  or  affecting  a 
prolonged  course  of  conduct;  but,  as  we  shall  use  the  term 
persuasion,  it  is  not  limited  to  inducing  physical  acts,  but 
I  Winans,  pp.  249-250.  2  p^ge  128. 


DEFINITIONS  AND  RELATIONS  5 

includes  changing  the  mental  attitude  by  removing  preju- 
dice, bringing  about  a  fair-minded  attitude  toward  a  person, 
a  willingness  to  consider  a  proposition,  or  a  desire  to  accept 
it.  The  term  is  broad  enough  to  include  conviction,  but  we 
shall  for  convenience  use  the  latter  term  to  designate  the 
process  of  *  Bringing  any  one  to  recognize  the  truth  of  what 
he  has  not  before  accepted.  .  .  . '  ^ 

"Those  to  whom  the  term  persuasion  means  inducing  to 
believe  usually  distinguish  it  from  conviction  by  saying  that 
to  persuade  is  to  secure  belief  by  rather  emotional  methods, 
while  to  convince  is  to  use  logic  and  reasoning.  So  The  Stand- 
ard Dictionary  says  persuade  means  *to  induce  to  believe 
willingly.*  Here  we  have,  probably,  a  hint  of  why  the  words 
convince  and  persuade  have  been  confused.  To  induce  a  man 
to  believe  it  is  often  necessary  to  make  him  willing  to  consider 
the  proposition  at  all,  to  remove  prejudice  and  induce  a  will- 
ingness to  believe.  Now  this  is  a  matter  of  emotional  atti- 
tude, and  changing  emotional  attitude  is  included  in  the 
proper  work  of  persuasion.  In  this  position  I  have  the  sup- 
port of  Baker's  Principles  of  Argumentation,  in  which  it  is 
said  (p.  7) :  *  Conviction  aims  only  to  produce  agreement  be- 
tween writer  and  reader;  persuasion  aims  to  prepare  the  way 
for  the  process  of  conviction  and  to  produce  action  as  the 
result  of  conviction.'" 

E.  Conviction  alone.  By  the  force  of  reasoning,  by  the 
use  of  simple  fact  and  logic,  a  man  may  make  others  see  that 
this  or  that  statement  is  justified,  that  this  or  that  argument 
is  logical,  or  even  that  the  whole  idea  he  is  contending  for  is 
true;  but  it  does  not  follow  that  he  has  made  them  accept  as 
guides  of  conduct  the  propositions  he  advances.  In  order 
to  make  them  fully  accept  his  views  of  the  matter  or  agree 
to  act  as  he  wishes,  the  arguer  must  also  make  them  desire 
to  carry  out  his  thesis  by  affecting  their  emotions. 

"Nothing  would  seem  to  be  a  plainer  lesson  of  experience 
than  that  we  mortals  often  leave  undone  those  things  we 
^  New  English  Dictionary. 


6  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

know  we  ought  to  do,  and  do  those  things  we  know  we  ought 
not  to  do;  yet  this  truth  is  constantly  ignored  by  speakers, 
and  with  bad  results.  This  truth  is  proverbial:  *The  spirit  is 
willing,  but  the  flesh  is  weak;'  Video  meliora  proboque;  deter- 
iora  sequor.  Certain  knowledge  that  lack  of  exercise  is  ruining 
one's  health  does  not  necessarily  drive  one  out  of  doors;  yet 
one  does  not  for  a  moment  believe  that  one's  work  or  pleasure 
is  worth  the  cost.  There  must  be,  then,  more  than  intel- 
lectual acceptance  of  truth  to  secure  action. 

"It  may  seem  absurd  to  insist  upon  such  a  truism  as  that 
men  do  not  always  act  in  accordance  with  judgment;  but  I 
write  out  of  memory  of  class-room  struggles.  When  regard- 
ing a  cold,  barren,  tactless  speech  I  have  asked,  *What  ele- 
ments of  persuasion  does  this  contain?'  I  have  received  the 
answer,  *Does  it  not  prove  my  claim?  What  more  is 
needed?'  Apparently  I  have  appeared  a  shocking  cynic 
when  I  have  suggested  that  men  are  not  always  governed 
by  pure  reason."^ 

The  weakness  of  any  argumentative  effort  which  consists 
only  of  conviction,  i.  e.,  an  appeal  to  the  reason,  is  this:  that, 
though  the  person  addressed  may  understand^  he  may  not 
really  be  in  any  way  affected  because  the  impulses  which  give 
force  to  his  inmost  convictions,  and  which  stimulate  him  to 
action,  may  not  have  been  reached.  Of  course,  in  those  cases 
in  which  there  is  no  persuasion,  which  are  in  nature  cases  for 
pure  conviction,  as  demonstrations  in  geometry,  we  must 
not  look  for  anything  else.  What  has  been  said  refers  to 
the  weakness  of  relying  on  pure  conviction  in  cases  that  have 
persuasive  possibilities — that  seek  to  affect  human  conduct. 

F.  Persuasion  alone.  The  results  of  an  almost  wholly 
emotional  appeal  are  usually  no  more  satisfactory  than  those 
of  a  simple  intellectual  demonstration.  It  is  seldom  an  ad- 
vantage for  a  speaker  to  stimulate  the  moving  impulses  of  his 
audience  unless  he  can  hold  them  in  control;  for  he  may  find 
he  has  set  free  a  force  that  is  as  likely  to  act  to  his  detriment 
^  Winans,  p.  251. 


DEFINITIONS  AND  RELATIONS  7 

as  to  his  benefit.  Then,  too,  he  will  probably  find  that  the 
effect  of  his  appeal  is  but  fleeting  and  unreliable;  he  will  find 
his  hearers  are  stirred  only  to  shallow  and  passing  excitement, 
and  that  calm  deliberation  will  reveal  the  unsubstantial 
nature  of  the  argument  and  so  leave  their  permanent  beliefs 
unaffected.  The  proportion  of  emphasis  on  conviction  and 
persuasion  as  these  terms  are  here  used,  will,  in  any  par- 
ticular case,  depend,  of  course,  upon  the  circumstances; 
in  a  college  debate  very  often  little  persuasion  is  sufficient; 
the  campaign  orator  uses  a  great  deal.  Both,  however,  are 
necessary  in  all  effective  argumentation  which  aims  at  in- 
fluencing human  behavior. 

G.  Four  processes.  Whatever  the  relative  importance 
of  conviction  and  persuasion,  there  are,  in  every  piece  of 
argumentative  work  four  indispensable  processes:  (1)  to 
find  out  just  what  you  want  to  establish;  (2)  to  gather 
the  materials  needed  for  the  proofs;  (3)  to  arrange  these 
materials;  (4)  to  present  them  in  good  rhetorical  or  oratori- 
cal form.  For  convenience  we  may  name  these  four  proc- 
esses (covered  in  Part  II  of  this  book)  respectively  (1)  In- 
vention, (2)  Selection,  (3)  Arrangement,  and  (4)  Presentation. 

1.  Invention  consists  in  determining  upon  those  ideas 
in  the  truth  of  which  the  speaker  or  writer  wishes  to  make 
his  hearers  or  readers  believe.  No  man  can  hope  to  influence 
the  beliefs  of  others,  unless  he  first  has  in  his  own  mind  (a) 
an  exact  idea  of  the  beliefs  he  wishes  to  inculcate,  (b)  a  clear 
conception  of  the  points  of  fact  he  must  establish  to  convmce 
his  readers  or  hearers.  Under  this  head  we  study  proposi- 
tions, burden  of  proof,  and  issues. 

2.  Selection  consists  in  choosing  from  all  the  sources  of 
human  knowledge  those  facts  and  inferences  that  will  serve 
to  establish  the  ideas  determined  upon.  Of  all  the  evidence 
and  arguments  that  may  be  found  on  any  question,  the  ar- 
guer  can  use  and  wishes  to  use  a  comparatively  small  amount. 
He  must  sort  this  small  amount  out  of  the  mass  of  available 
material  with  the  utmost  care.    His  success  must  depend  in 


8  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

great  degree  upon  his  tact  and  good  judgment  in  choosing 
those  materials  that  will  appeal  strongly  to  the  minds  and 
hearts  of  those  he  seeks  to  influence.  Here  we  take  up 
gathering  material^  evidence,  kinds  of  arguments^  and  fallacies. 

3.  Arrangement  consists  in  organizing  these  selected 
materials  in  such  a  way  as  to  secure  the  maximum  effect  upon 
the  beliefs  or  actions  of  the  persons  addressed.  However 
valuable  the  facts  or  appeals  chosen  for  use  may  be,  their 
efficiency  will  depend  largely  upon  the  plan  in  accordance 
with  which  they  are  utilized.  They  cannot  be  presented 
clearly  or  forcibly  unless  they  are  brought  into  proper  rela- 
tions with  each  other  and  with  the  whole  proof.  Under  ar- 
rangement we  consider  general  principles  of  arrangement  and 
briefing  and  outlining. 

4.  Presentation  consists  in  putting  the  materials  into 
good  rhetorical  or  oratorical  form,  in  effectively  communi- 
cating their  force  to  others  by  means  of  a  good  use  of  thought 
and  language.  To  convey  to  another  the  ideas  invented, 
selected,  and  arranged,  demands  a  many-sided  skill.  In 
written  argument  it  calls  for  the  application  of  the  principles 
of  rhetoric;  in  spoken  argument  it  calls  for  speaking  ability 
and  skill  in  persuasion;  in  debate  it  calls  for  the  peculiar  pow- 
ers of  resource  and  adaptability  which  the  circumstances  of 
this  form  of  controversy  demand.  Here  we  study  persuasion, 
the  introduction,  the  discussion,  the  conclusion,  and  refuta- 
tion. 

H.  No  distinct  dividing  line.  Of  course  there  are  no  dis- 
tinct lines  of  demarcation  between  these  various  processes: 
in  any  piece  of  argumentation  the  progress  is  continuous, 
from  the  first  conception  of  the  ideas  to  be  considered  to  the 
final  presentation.  Any  separation  of  it  into  parts  must  be 
more  or  less  arbitrary.  It  is  attempted  in  this  book  only 
because  it  may  help  in  presenting  some  of  the  fundamental 
principles  with  greater  clearness. 

I.  Debate  defined.  Debate  is  a  direct  oral  argumenta- 
tive contest  between  two  opposing  sides,  on  a  definite  ques- 


DEFINITIONS  AND  RELATIONS  9 

tion,  at  a  definite  time.  It  is  a  specialized  form  of  argumen- 
tation and  requires  special  knowledge  and  skill  not  required 
in  other  forms  of  argument.  A  good  argumentative  essayist 
is  not  necessarily  a  good  debater.  A  man  who  can  write  and 
memorize  and  deliver  a  good  argumentative  address  is  not 
necessarily  a  good  debater.  The  latter  must  have  all  the  skill 
of  the  former,  and  in  addition  he  must  know  how  to  conduct 
his  case  on  the  platform.  He  must  know  the  rules  of  the 
game,  and  must  be  able  to  meet  the  many  situations  in  offense 
and  defense  as  they  arise  in  the  contest.  In  Part  III  of  this 
volume,  which  is  devoted  to  debate,  we  consider  the  nature 
of  debate,  the  main  speeches,  the  rebuttal  speeches,  and  delivery. 

Before  undertaking  a  detailed  study  of  Argumentation  it 
will  be  well  to  have  clearly  in  mind  the  relation  of  argumenta- 
tion, not  only  to  debate,  but  also  to  other  subjects,  especially 
logic,  and  the  forms  of  composition. 

J.  Argumentation  and  logic.  Argumentation  has  been 
defined  as  the  art  of  influencing  others,  through  the  medium 
of  reasoned  discourse,  to  believe  or  to  act  as  we  wish  them  to 
believe  or  act.  "Logic  may  be  defined  as  the  science  of 
thought,  or  as  the  science  which  investigates  the  process  of 
thinking."  ^  "Logic  is  suflSciently  defined  for  our  purposes 
if  we  say  that  it  is  the  science  of  proof  or  evidence.'*  ^  "Logic 
may  be  most  briefly  defined  as  the  Science  of  Reasoning.  It 
is  more  commonly  defined,  however,  as  the  Science  of  the 
Laws  of  Thought,  and  some  logicians  think  it  is  the  Science 
of  the  Formal,  or  of  the  Necessary  Laws  of  Thought."  ^ 
"  Much  discussion  of  a  somewhat  trifling  character  has  arisen 
upon  the  question  whether  Logic  should  be  considered  a 
science  only,  an  art  only,  or  both  at  the  same  time  .  .  .  but 
it  seems  substantially  correct  and  suflScient  to  say,  that  logic 
is  a  science  in  so  far  as  it  merely  investigates  the  necessary 
principles  and  forms  of  thought,  and  thus  teaches  us  to  un- 
derstand in  what  correct  thinking  consists;  but  that  it  be- 
comes an  art  when  it  is  occupied  in  framing  rules  to  assist 
*  Creighton,  p.  1.  2  Bode,  p.  4.  ^  Jevons,  p.  1. 


10  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

persons  in  detecting  false  reasoning.  A  science  teaches  us 
to  know  and  an  art  to  do,  and  all  the  more  perfect  sciences 
lead  to  the  creation  of  corresponding  useful  arts."  ^  There 
is  then  a  distinct  difference  between  argumentation  and  logic 
as  the  latter  is  usually  defined.  It  is  near  the  truth  to  say 
that  logic  is  the  science  of  which  argumentation  is  the  corre- 
sponding art.  Logic  teaches  us  to  know,  argumentation  to  do. 
Logic  helps  us  to  understand  the  laws  of  thought,  argumenta- 
tion helps  us  to  make  other  people  agree  with  what  we  think. 
K.  Argumentation  and  the  forms  of  composition.  Argu- 
mentation is  usually  classified  as  one  of  the  four  forms  of 
composition — narration,  description,  exposition,  argumen- 
tation. It  is  probably  useful  from  the  standpoint  of  the 
teaching  of  English  composition  to  have  this  label  for  a 
composition  that  seeks  to  prove  a  definite  proposition,  but 
it  is  not  accurate  to  conceive  of  argumentation  as  simply  one 
of  the  four  forms  of  composition.  The  art  of  argumentation, 
of  influencing  the  beliefs  and  actions  of  others  by  reasoned 
discourse,  rests  upon  much  beside  the  principles  of  composi- 
tion.^ Of  the  four  processes  treated  in  this  book  two  only  are 
concerned  with  these  principles,  and  these  two  are  con- 
cerned with  much  else.  The  man  who  would  do  satisfactory 
work  in  argumentation  must  be  skilled  in  description,  narra- 
tion, and  exposition;  and  he  must  have  in  addition  a  knowl- 
edge of  logic,  skill  in  gathering  and  testing  evidence,  and  in 
brief  drawing,  a  knowledge  of  various  methods  of  procedure 
(for  the  most  part  borrowed  from  the  law),  along  with  skill 
in  using  them,  and,  in  most  cases,  ability  in  public  speaking. 
It  is  probably  true,  moreover,  that  most  descriptive,  narra- 
tive, and  expository  writing  is  designed  for  the  eye  and  is  to 
be  read,  and  not  heard  by  the  ear.  The  opposite  is  true  in 
regard  to  argumentation.  Practically  all  great  arguments 
are  speeches,  and  even  when  argumentation  is  designed  for 
print  rather  than  oral  delivery,  as  in  controversial  articles, 
editorials,  etc.,  the  best  effect  is  gained  by  writing  as  if  for 
^  Jevons,  p.  5. 


DEFINITIONS  AND  RELATIONS 


11 


an  audience  with  the  hearer  and  the  opponent  always  in  mind. 
What  might  be  called  a  "speech  style"  or  "oral  style"  is  al- 
ways preferable  in  argumentation  and  is  practically  always 
used  in  good  argumentation.  So  the  worker  in  argumenta- 
tion, whether  oral  or  written,  should  be  well  versed  in  all  that 
goes  to  make  effective  speaking.  In  the  words  of  Professor 
Alien,  "These,  then,  are  the  problems  we  have  to  consider: — 
the  use  of  the  universal  laws  of  reasoning,  the  development  of 
the  habit  of  analysis  and  of  unprejudiced  methods  of  investi- 
gation, the  secret  of  cloar  and  rapid  expression  of  intellectual 
processes,  and  the  art  of  adapting  one's  material  to  his  hearers 
so  as  to  win  their  favor  and  affect  their  conduct.  Clearly 
the  art  that  involves  all  this  is  of  no  mean  order."  ^  Clearly, 
also,  an  art  that  involves  all  this  is  more  than  a  subdivision 
of  the  art  of  composition. 

L.  Sources  of  argumentation.  The  following  table 
shows  approximately  the  sources  of  the  rules,  principles, 
doctrines,  methods,  devices,  etc.,  which  taken  together  make 
up  the  subject-matter  of  a  thorough  course  in  argumenta- 
tion. Notice  that  some  of  the  topics  may  be  traced  back  to 
more  than  one  of  the  four  great  ancestors  of  argumentation: 
Law,  Logic,  Rhetoric  or  English  Composition,  and  Oratory 
or  Public  Speaking. 


1.  Law 

2.  Logic 

3.  Rhetoric 

4.  Oratory 

Burden  of  Proof 

Propositions 

Kinds  of  Arguments 

Voice 

Presumptions 

Presumptions 

General  Principles 

Platform 

Issues 

Issues 

of  Composition: 

skill 

Evidence 

Evidence 

Unity, 

Technique     of 

Briefing 

Kinds  of  Arguments 

Coherence, 

Debate 

Refutation 

Fallacies 

Emphasis, 

Oral  Style 

Procedure 

Refutation 

Outlining 

Sentence  Structure 
Refutation 

Persuasion 

Persuasion 

^Art  of  Debate,  p.  9. 


PART  II.    ARGUMENTATION 

SECTION  A.     INVENTION 
CHAPTER  2 

THE   PROPOSITION 

OUTLINE 
I.  The  Theory  of  Propositions 

A.  Subjects  must  be  propositions. 

B.  Definition. 

C.  Necessity  of  having  a  proposition  in  all  sorts  of  situationSc 

1.  Club. 

2.  Court  of  law. 

3.  Assembly. 

4.  Public  discussions. 

D.  Advantage  to  hearer  and  speaker. 

E.  Not  always  expressed. 

F.  Classification. 

1.  Fact. 

2.  Policy. 

n.  Formulating  the  Proposition 

A.  The  problem  of  formulating  the  proposition. 

B.  The  process  of  formulating  the  proposition. 

1.  Finding  the  real  question. 

a.  Study  origin. 

b.  Analyze  ideas. 

2.  Formulating  the  tentative  proposition. 

3.  Testing  this  proposition. 

a.  Definitions. 

b.  Summary  of  definition. 

4.  Comparing  and  adjusting. 

C.  These  steps  not  to  be  taken  mechanically. 

13 


14  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

III.  Characteristics  of  Good  Propositions  for  Debate 

A.  A  list  of  desirable  characteristics : 

1.  Assertion. 

2.  Single. 

3.  Unambiguous. 

4.  Unprejudiced. 

5.  As  concrete  and  specific  as  possible. 

6.  Burden  of  proof  on  affirmative. 

7.  As  brief  and  simple  as  possible. 

8.  Debatable. 

9.  Interesting. 

I.    The  Theory  of  Propositions 

A.  Subjects  for  argumentation  must  be  propositions. 
In  this  important  particular,  argumentation  differs,  in  addi- 
tion to  the  things  mentioned  in  the  last  chapter,  from  any  of 
the  other  kinds  of  rhetorical  composition.  In  any  of  the  three 
other  forms,  we  may  have  for  our  subject  a  simple  word  or 
phrase,  denoting  merely  some  general  concept  existing  in 
the  mind,  which  we  wish  to  portray  for  our  reader.  If  we 
wish  to  write  a  narrative,  we  may  choose  some  such  subject 
as  "The  Battle  of  Manila,"  or  "An  Ascent  of  the  Jungfrau." 
For  an  exposition  we  might  well  select  such  a  topic  as  "The 
New  York  Clearing  House,"  or  "Forest  Fires;  Their  Cause 
and  Their  Prevention," — these  phrases  would  make  excellent 
titles  for  compositions  of  this  nature;  but  in  argumentation 
such  terms  would  be  wholly  valueless. 

To  take  an  example :  suppose  a  student  desiring  to  write 
an  expository  discourse  should  determine  on  the  title,  "The 
Tariff  Bill  of  1913."  This  would  be  a  worthy  subject;  he 
could  in  his  composition,  treat  briefly  of  the  history  of  tariff 
legislation,  explain  the  economic  principles  involved,  give 
the  particulars  in  which  this  bill  differs  from  earlier  bills, 
especially  its  immediate  predecessor,  tell  what  its  advocates 
and  opponents  claimed  as  to  its  probable  effect,  and  perhaps 
discuss  the  method  of  its  administration,  thus  making  of 


THE  PROPOSITION  15 

the  whole  an  exposition  of  the  nature  and  workings  of  this 
bill.  But  as  the  subject  of  an  argumentative  effort  this  term 
would  be  useless,  for  it  does  not  suggest  anything  definite  to 
be  proved  or  disproved ;  it  does  not  state  any  belief  which  the 
writer  wishes  his  reader  to  accept.  In  an  argument  on  this 
subject  the  author  might  discuss  any  one  of  a  dozen  ideas  or 
beliefs;  he  might  argue  for  or  against  this  particular  bill; 
that  a  high  protective  tariff  would  be  a  benefit  to  the  people 
of  the  United  States;  that  tariff  for  revenue  only  is  unwise. 
If  his  argument  is  to  be  effective,  he  must  determine  in  ad- 
vance what  idea  or  belief  he  is  to  uphold  or  attack.  The  sub- 
ject of  his  argument  will  be  a  statement  of  the  particular 
idea  or  belief  with  which  he  is  concerned.  But  a  belief  or  an 
opinion  cannot  be  accurately  expressed  in  a  word  or  a  phrase. 
It  demands  a  complete  statement,  a  full  sentence.  To  use 
more  technical  language,  we  cannot  argue  a  term;  we  must 
have  a  proposition. 

B.  Definitions.  "A  term  is  so  called  because  it  forms 
one  end  (Latin  terminus)  of  a  proposition,  and  strictly  speak- 
ing it  is  a  term  only  so  long  as  it  stands  in  the  proposition. 
But  we  commonly  speak  of  a  term  or  a  name  meaning  any 
noun,  substantive  or  adjective,  or  any  combination  of  words 
denoting  an  object  of  thought,  whether  that  be  ....  an  in- 
dividual thing,  a  group  of  things,  a  quality  of  things,  or  a 
group  of  qualities."  ^  "Any  word  or  group  of  words  which 
serves  to  point  out  any  imaginable  subject  of  discourse  is 
looked  upon  as  a  name  or  term."  ^  "A  complete  assertion  or 
statement  consists  of  two  terms  and  a  copula,  and  when  then 
expressed  it  forms  a  proposition."  ^  "A  proposition  is  the 
expression  in  words  of  an  act  of  judgment."  *  "A  judgment 
is  a  mental  assertion  of  some  thing  as  true  or  untrue,  while 
a  proposition  is  the  expression  of  a  judgment  in  words.  A 
proposition  therefore  is  a  sentence."  ^ 

^  Jevons,  p.  17.  '  Jevons,  p,  16. 

2  Bode,  p.  7.  4  Creighton,  p.  78. 

^  Bode,  p.  52. 


16  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

To  illustrate:  "The  Single  Tax,"  "Co-education,"  "Mt. 
Washington,"  "The  Relation  of  Church  and  State,"  are  all 
terms.  These  expressions  might  well  serve  as  the  subjects  of 
narrations,  descriptions,  or  expositions.  No  one  of  them  could 
serve  as  the  basis  of  an  argument.^  Before  we  can  argue  we 
must  have  a  judgment,  an  opinon,  a  belief,  expressed  in  words 
— that  is  a  proposition.  "  Co-education  should  be  abolished  at 
X  (or  adopted  at  Y),"  "The  Single  Tax  is  preferable  to  the 
general  property  tax,"  are  propositions. 
N  C.  The  necessity  of  having  a  proposition  in  all  sorts  of 
situations  in  which  people  argue  should  be  kept  carefully 
in  mind. 

^"  1.  In  a  club  there  was  once  assigned  as  the  topic  of  an 
evening's  debate,  "William  Pitt's  Place  in  Enghsh  History." 
A  few  of  the  disputants  spoke  of  his  parliamentary  abilities, 
of  his  power  as  an  orator  and  political  leader;  others  gave 
their  attention  to  a  consideration  of  his  statesmanship,  com- 
mending his  foreign  policy  or  criticising  his  selfishness  and 
unscrupulousness;  others  commented  on  his  personality  and 
his  private  life;  and  so,  each  speaker  looked  at  the  subject 
from  his  own  point  of  view,  and  no  one  endeavored  to  prove 
or  disprove  any  particular  proposition.  The  discussion  was 
in  many  ways  interesting,  but  as  a  debate  the  evening's  work 
was  a  failure;  no  one  had  been  induced  to  accept  any  definite 
belief  about  the  subject,  and  no  conclusion  had  been  estab- 
lished. In  order  to  turn  the  discussion  into  a  debate,  the  sub- 
ject should  have  taken  some  such  form  as:  Resolved,  that 
William  Pitt  was  the  greatest  parliamentary  leader  of  the 
eighteenth  century;  or,  William  Pitt's  conduct  of  Irish 
affairs  was  detrimental  to  the  interests  of  the  Irish  people. 
The  disputants  made  the  mistake  of  trying  to  argue  a 
Jterm. 

2.  In  a  court  of  law  we  find  a  system  in  sharp  contrast  to 

^  Of  course  we  can  argue  about  the  meaning  of  a  term.  We  can  express  our 
belief  as  to  what  the  term  "The  Single  Tax"  means,  and  argue  that  prop- 
osition. 


THE  PROPOSITION  17 

the  method  of  this  historical  club.  Here  it  is  necessary  that 
the  deliberations  accomplish  definite  results.  There  must 
be  no  waste  of  time  or  energy,  and  the  end  of  it  all  must  be 
a  settlement  of  the  question  presented  for  consideration. 
With  these  purposes  in  mind,  the  court  of  law  demands  that 
whenever  a  question  is  brought  before  it,  "pleadings'*  be 
made  and  that  these  pleadings  "shall  set  forth  with  certainty 
and  with  truth  the  matters  of  fact  or  of  law,  the  truth  or 
falsity  of  which  must  be  decided  to  decide  the  case."  In 
other  words,  the  court  demands  that  any  man  who  would 
argue  before  it  must,  before  he  begins  his  demonstration, 
make  a  clear  and  unmistakable  proposition,  stating  the  things 
that  he  intends  to  prove  true  or  false. 

3.  In  a  deliberative  assembly,  such  as  the  house  of  repre- 
sentatives, the  proposition  would  be  found  expressed  in  the 
form  of  some  bill  or  resolution.  In  board  meetings,  faculty 
meetings,  society  meetings,  mass  meetings,  etc.,  the  proposi- 
tion usually  exists  in  the  form  of  a  motion  from  the  floor. 
The  presiding  oflScer  should  see  to  it  that  a  complete  motion 
covering  the  question  in  hand  be  phrased  and  presented  to 
the  assembly,  and  that  all  discussion  be  confined  to  the 
particular  proposition  before  the  house.  y 

4.  In  general  public  discussions  a  speaker  should  always     V 
have  a  definite  proposition  for  each  and  every  speech  that  he 
makes.    This  is  well  brought  out  by  Professor  Foster  in  the 
following  paragraph: 

"Every  political  campaign  shows  the  need  of  definite 
propositions  for  debate.  In  Maine,  in  the  fall  of  1906,  some 
of  the  speakers  had  no  definite  proposition,  but  launched 
with  vehemence  upon  the  topic  of  the  Prohibitory  Law. 
Stripped  of  all  the  confusing  verbiage,  invective,  and  humor, 
some  of  the  speeches  of  the  Democrats  could  be  reduced  to 
the  contention,  'Prohibition  does  not  prohibit';  and  some  of 
the  speeches  of  the  Republicans  could  be  reduced  to  the 
contention,  *  Temperance  is  a  great  virtue.'  As  these 
speeches  were  not  concerned  with  debatable  issues,  there 


18  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

was  no  debate.     Argumentation  demands  a  complete  prop- 
osition." ^ 

D.  Advantage  to  hearer  and  speaker.  The  making  of  a 
proposition  is  of  great  advantage  to  the  reader  or  hearer  in 
enabHng  him  to  understand  the  discussion  and  get  some  real 
fruit  from  it.  But  it  is  no  less  an  advantage  to  the  writer  or 
speaker.  In  the  first  place,  if  he  does  not  know  the  exact 
proposition  at  issue,  he  is  almost  sure  to  waste  time  and  effort, 
and  to  confuse  his  audience,  in  arguing  about  matters  that 
are  wholly  outside  the  real  question,  and  in  proving  things 
that  are  "beside  the  point."  Then  again,  he  must  know  the 
proposition  in  order  to  understand  the  position  taken  by  his 
opponent,  and  so  be  able  to  refute  him.  The  proposition  is 
simply  a  statement  of  the  position  which  the  writer  or 
speaker  must  establish  or  overthrow,  and  he  cannot  expect 
to  be  successful,  either  in  positive  proof  or  in  refutation, 
unless  he  understands  just  what  is  the  work  necessary  for 
him  to  do. 

E.  Propositions  are  not  always  expressed.  While  the 
proposition  should  always  be  phrased  by  the  writer  or  speaker 
before  he  prepares  his  argument,  it  may  be  expressed  or  not 
as  the  circumstances  seem  to  require.  Sometimes  it  may  be 
advisable  not  to  state  the  proposition  at  the  outset.  This  is 
often  true  when  one  is  preparing  to  address  a  "hostile"  au- 
dience or  to  write  for  a  circle  of  readers  whose  present  preju- 
dices and  beliefs  are  known  to  be  opposed  to  the  writer's  po- 
sition. In  such  a  case  it  is  well  to  use  as  a  title  sl  term  (State 
wide  prohibition)  or  the  question  form  ("Is  state  wide  prohi- 
bition advisable.'^")  and  disclose  your  position  only  after  you 
have  carefully  prepared  the  way.  For  an  oral  debate  the 
proposition  should  always  be  expressed,  and  in  the  form  of  a 
resolution:  "Resolved:  that  state  wide  prohibition  should  be 
adopted  in  Wisconsin." 

F.  Classifications  of  propositions  may  be  drawn  up  in 
many  ways.    Hyslop  ^  gives  six  main  divisions  and  nineteen 

1  Foster,  p.  3.  2  p^ge  121. 


THE  PROPOSITION  19 

subdivisions.  But  a  consideration  of  the  classifications  made 
in  the  science  of  logic  would  not  have  great  practical  value  to 
a  student  of  the  art  of  argumentation.  Some  writers  ^  in  the 
latter  field  have,  however,  classified  propositions  as  (1)  prop- 
ositions of  fact  and  (2)  propositions  of  policy.  A  proposi- 
tion of  policy  deals  with  the  question,  "Ought  this  to  be 
done?"  A  proposition  of  fact  deals  with  the  question, 
"Is  this  true?  "  A  proposition  of  fact  aims  at  belief,  a  propo- 
sition of  policy  aims  at  action.  Therefore  unmixed  ques- 
tions of  fact,  as  propositions  in  geometry,  are  settled  largely 
by  impersonal  convictions;  questions  of  policy  tend  more  and 
more  to  be  matters  for  persuasion  mainly  as  we  get  further 
from  fact  towards  matter  of  mere  personal  likes  and  dislikes. 
In  argumentation  we  may  try  to  influence  others  to  belief 
or  act.  Usually  we  try  to  do  both.  Most  actions  are  based 
on  beliefs  and  most  beliefs  influence  actions.  By  establishing 
a  certain  fact  or  certain  facts  to  the  satisfaction  of  a  given 
audience  (that  is  by  both  convincing  and  persuading)  we 
influence  them  to  act  as  we  desire.  But  since  most  argu- 
ments of  policy  rest  upon  questions  of  fact,  since  many  ques- 
tions can  be  so  phrased  as  to  fit  either  type  without  altering 
materially  the  nature  of  the  case,  and  since  the  work  to  be 
done  in  finding,  phrasing,  supporting,  or  attacking,  is  prac- 
tically the  same  for  both  kinds  of  propositions,  it  is  hardly 
worth  while  to  try  to  make  much  of  this  classification.  It  is 
wise,  however,  to  decide,  among  other  things,  whether  we 
are  arguing  facts  (as  such)  or  policies,  before  planning  our 
argument.  A  student  should,  moreover,  consider  this  in 
connection  with  choosing  propositions  for  contest  debating;^ 
and  in  the  affairs  of  real  life  we  should  avoid  trying  to  settle 
by  discussion  questions  of  fact  that  should  be  investigated 
rather  than  argued. 

1  See  Pattee,  pp.  20-22,  and  Gardiner,  pp.  12-26. 

2  See  post,  characteristics  of  good  propositions  (debatable),  p.  30. 


20  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

II.  Formulating  the  Proposition 

So  far  we  have  been  considering  the  nature  of  propositions 
in  general  and  the  necessity  of  having  a  proposition  in  order 
to  have  an  argument.  We  now  turn  to  the  practical  consider- 
ation of  how  to  formulate  the  particular  proposition  we  need 
from  the  mass  of  ideas  to  be  found  in  any  general  field. 

A.  The  problem  of  formulating  the  proposition  when  one 
is  not  definitely  formulated  for  us,  is  an  exceedingly  important 
and  often  very  difficult  task.  Stephen  on  Pleading  ^  opens 
with  this  significant  sentence:  "In  the  course  of  administer- 
ing justice  between  litigating  parties,  there  are  two  succes- 
sive objects, — to  ascertain  the  subject  for  decision,  and  to 
decide."  In  practicing  general  argumentation  under  any  and 
all  circumstances  we  should  keep  in  mind  these  '*two  succes- 
sive objects."  We  should  agree  on  what  is  to  be  decided 
before  we  proceed  to  decide  it.  We  should  follow  the  instruc- 
tive example  of  the  courts  in  fixing  on  the  proposition  to  be 
decided,  before  we  get  confused  by,  and  confuse,  the  evidence 
and  argument  available  in  the  general  field  of  the  discussion. 
This  is  as  true  in  arguments  on  politics,  literature,  and  re- 
ligion around  the  fire  or  at  the  dinner  table,  as  of  other  dis- 
cussions in  legislature  or  courtroom.  Let  us  first  analyze 
our  differences  as  a  distinct  step,  before  advancing  to  attack 
or  defend.  If  this  is  done  much  argument  will  be  saved. 
Agreements  will  come  with  understanding.  It  is  not  always 
easy  to  determine  just  what  is  the  question  really  in  issue, 
but  it  is  easier  before  the  argument  starts  than  after.  It 
may  be  obscured  by  the  words  of  the  discussion;  it  may  be- 
come confused  with  other  kindred  but  different  questions;  it 
may  be  separated  with  difficulty  from  the  general  problem 
that  embraces  it.  Then  again  it  is  often  difficult  to  put  the 
question  into  words  after  it  is  found.  Looseness  in  expres- 
sion, ambiguity,  the  failure  to  know  the  true  acceptations  of 
the  words  in  the  proposition,  are  mistakes  fruitful  in  possibil- 
^  Williston's  edition,  p.  1. 


THE  PROPOSITION  21 

ities  of  serious  error.  The  writer  must  know  how  to  find  out 
what  it  is  he  wants  to  prove  and  how  to  express  himself  in 
such  a  way  that  there  can  be  no  question  as  to  his  exact 
meaning. 

B.  The  process  of  formulating  the  proposition  naturally 
divides  itself  into  four  steps:  (1)  Finding  out  what  is  the 
real  quesiion,  i.  e.,  the  facts  and  ideas,  the  truth  or  falsity  of 
which  must  be  decided  to  decide  the  question.  (2)  Formulat- 
ing the  question  in  words.  After  the  facts  in  issue  have  been 
determined,  they  must  be  tentatively  expressed  in  the  form 
of  a  complete  statement.  (3)  Testing  this  statement  by  a 
definition  of  its  terms  to  find  out  just  what  it  means  as  it 
stands.  (4)  Comparing  the  meaning  of  the  statement  so 
expressed  with  the  meaning  of  the  real  question.  If  the  state- 
ment thus  formulated  does  not  express  just  what  is  intended, 
it  must  be  modified  until  it  does.  Whatever  the  circum- 
stances, these  four  steps,  though  they  are  usually  so  inter- 
mingled as  not  to  seem  like  separate  operations,  will  always  be 
helpful  in  finding  or  testing  the  true  proposition. 

1.  Finding  the  real  question.  The  student  starting  out 
in  his  search  after  the  proposition  will  usually  find  that  it 
exists  originally  in  his  mind  in  the  shape  of  some  problem 
of  a  general  nature.  This  problem,  probably,  is  of  too  vague 
and  indefinite  a  character  to  be  a  fit  topic  for  an  argumenta- 
tive effort.  In  order  to  develop  from  it  a  suitable  proposition, 
it  must  be  narrowed  down  and  restricted  within  the  bounds 
of  some  concrete  and  particular  proposition.  The  work, 
then,  of  determining  on  the  exact  question  to  be  discussed  is 
largely  the  work  of  selecting  out  of  a  broad  and  general  field 
some  single,  concrete,  and  limited  phase  of  the  whole  prob- 
lem. In  performing  the  work  of  this  first  step  there  is  no 
exact  rule  or  method  for  all  cases.  Sometimes  it  may  be  neces- 
sary for  the  disputant-to-be  to  examine  the  contents  of  his 
own  mind.  More  often  it  becomes  desirable  to  do  a  consider- 
able amount  of  preliminary  reading  and  investigation  in 
connection  with  the  search.     But,   whatever  the  circum- 


22  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

stances,  the  "narrowing  down"  process  is  essentially  the 
same,  and  there  are  certain  steps  that  are  always  serviceable. 
In  the  first  place,  it  is  generally  helpful  (a)  to  consider  the 
conditions  under  which  the  question  arose.  If  the  WTiter  will 
understand  just  how  he  came  to  be  interested  in  the  problem 
he  has  in  his  mind,  he  will  be  able  to  see  more  clearly  just 
what  is  the  phase  of  it  with  which  he  is  most  concerned  and 
which  he  desires  to  discuss;  or,  if  he  is  investigating  the  prob- 
lem by  the  reading  of  books  or  current  magazines,  the  mat- 
ters really  in  issue  will  take  more  definite  form  in  proportion 
as  he  understands  the  circumstances  that  generated  them  and 
brought  them  into  discussion.  In  the  second  place,  after  gain- 
ing a  comprehension  of  the  origin  of  the  question,  it  remains 
for  him  (b)  to  analyze  the  ideas  embraced  within  the  general 
problem  as  it  exists  in  his  own  mind  or  in  the  minds  of  others. 
Then  he  is  ready  to  select  the  parts  he  wishes  to  consider  and 
classify  them  in  such  a  manner  that  the  result  shall  be  a 
single,  distinct,  and  definite  proposition. 

To  take  an  example:  Let  us  suppose  that  a  student  in 
want  of  a  debatable  proposition  finds  himself  interested  in 
"The  labor  problem."  He  cannot  argue  "the  labor  prob- 
lem " ;  it  is  merely  a  term,  and  is  too  vague  and  indefinite  an 
idea.  He  must  "narrow  it  down."  To  do  this,  he  first  con- 
siders the  origin  of  the  question  (or  the  origin  of  his  interest 
in  the  question).  He  finds  perhaps,  that  his  interest  has 
been  aroused  by  some  magazine  article  discussing  compulsory 
arbitration  as  a  cure  for  strikes,  or  by  some  comment  among 
his  friends  on  the  incorporation  of  labor  unions.  Having 
gone  thus  far,  it  remains  for  him  to  analyze  his  ideas  and  so 
reduce  the  question  still  farther.  Is  it  in  the  United  States 
that  he  thinks  labor  unions  should  be  incorporated.'^  Further, 
does  he  believe  they  ought  to  be  incorporated  under  State 
laws  or  under  Federal  laws.'*  Does  he  want  to  consider  only 
the  incorporation  of  the  unions,  or  does  he  wish  to  discuss 
the  kindred  question  of  the  desirability  of  a  compulsory  arbi- 
tration law.^    And  so  he  goes  on,  interrogating  his  own  mind, 


THE  PROPOSITION  23 

until  he  hits  upon  the  exact  phase  of  the  labor  problem  that 
he  wishes  to  discuss.    He  has  discovered  the  "real  question." 

2.  Formulating  the  tentative  proposition.  Having  found 
the  real  question  he  formulates  a  proposition,  perhaps  as 
follows,  "Resolved:  that  in  the  United  States  labor  unions 
should  be  compelled  to  incorporate  under  Federal  laws."  But 
this  is  only  a  part  of  the  task;  the  question  still  remains: 
Is  this  the  proposition?  Does  it  contain  the  ideas  the  student 
has  in  mind.''  The  statement  thus  made  must  be  tested  to  see 
if  it  expresses  just  what  the  writer  intends. 

3.  Testing  this  proposition  as  first  formulated  is  very- 
important.  A  carelessly  constructed  sentence  may  result 
in  the  making  of  a  proposition  which  is  very  far  from  the 
embodiment  of  the  writer's  ideas.  And  this  carelessness 
may  have  very  serious  results.  A  false  grammatical  con- 
struction or  the  choice  of  a  wrong  word  may  mean  the  differ- 
ence between  victory  and  defeat,  between  having  one's 
ideas  accepted  and  having  them  rejected.  To  avoid  these 
dangers,  care  must  be  taken  that  each  word  of  the  statement, 
and  the  statement  as  a  whole,  shall  represent  one's  ideas  as 
accurately  as  possible.  Failure  to  understand  the  exact 
meaning  of  a  given  proposition  is  often  shown  in  the  class 
room. 

For  example,  take  a  discussion  of  the  question:  "  Re- 
solved :  that  labor  unions  in  the  United  States  are  detrimental 
to  the  industrial  interests  of  the  country."  In  a  debate  on 
this  proposition,  the  affirmative  admitted  that  the  principle  of 
the  organization  of  labor  was  right,  and  that  labor  unions 
ought  to  exist  in  some  form;  "but,"  they  said,  "labor  unions 
to-day  are  detrimental  because  they  inflict  certain  injuries 
on  the  consumer  and  the  employer,  by  such  means  as  strikes, 
the  limitation  of  output,  the  uniform  wage  scale,"  etc.  The 
negative  said,  in  substance,  "We  admit  that  labor  unions 
declare  strikes,  and  that  strikes  are  bad;  we  admit  that  the 
unions  sometimes  limit  output;  but  we  contend  that  on  the 
whole  the  unions  are  not  detrimental,  because  the  industrial 


24  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

conditions  would  become  worse  if  they  did  not  exist  at  all." 
Clearly  the  two  sides  did  not  meet  at  all  in  the  discussion. 
They  were  arguing  two  different  questions.  The  affirmative 
was  arguing  whether  or  not  the  policies  and  principles  of  the 
unions  at  that  time  were  such  as  to  do  greater  injury  than 
good  to  industry;  the  negative  was  arguing  the  question 
whether  or  not  labor  ought  to  be  organized  at  all.  The  confu- 
sion arose  from  a  failure  to  find  out  what  the  proposition  really 
meant.  It  meant  either  the  one  thing  or  the  other,  but,  in  the 
same  debate,  it  should  not  mean  both.  The  discussion  could 
not  bring  about  any  result  till  it  had  been  settled  what  was 
the  true  interpretation  of  the  question.  The  disputants  had 
found  a  proposition,  but  not  the  proposition.  Each  word  that 
may  be  at  all  ambiguous  must  be  examined  and  its  true 
meaning  discovered.  The  grammatical  structure  of  the  sen- 
tence and  the  relation  of  the  words  to  each  other  must  be 
investigated,  in  order  to  be  sure  of  the  rightful  interpretation 
to  be  put  upon  the  statement  as  a  whole. 

a.  Definition.  This  work  of  testing  the  meaning  of  the 
proposition  may  be  called  definition.  The  word  "definition" 
suggests  a  simple  and  easy  task.  "Look  in  Webster  or  the 
Standard  Dictionary ,  and  work  is  done.'*  But  this  is  a  mis- 
take. Sometimes  the  statement  is  so  simple  that  very  little 
effort  is  necessary  to  be  sure  of  its  meaning.  But  often  the 
proper  testing  of  a  proposition  is  a  long  and  complicated 
process.  To  take  an  example:  Suppose  a  student  is  trying 
to  prepare  for  an  intercollegiate  debate  a  question  having 
to  do  with  the  preservation  of  the  "independence"  of  some 
nation.  He  starts  out  to  define  the  word  "independence." 
He  first  consults  W^ehster's  Dictionary,  and  he  finds  there 
this  definition:  "Exemption  from  reliance  on  others  or  con- 
trol by  them."  This  definition  seems  to  fit  his  idea;  but  if 
he  is  wise  he  will  not  accept  it.  The  definition  is  valueless. 
The  dictionary  merely  gives  the  acceptation  of  the  word  in 
its  general  usage.  This  question  of  the  independence  of  a 
nation  is  a  question  of  international  relations,  and  the  term 


THE  PROPOSITION  25 

"independence**  is  a  technical  term  in  the  code  of  the  law  of 
nations.  "  Independence,"  then,  must  have  the  special  mean- 
ing given  it  in  international  law. 

The  student  must  seek  this  special  meaning.  He  may 
look  in  some  larger  dictionary,  which  will  explain  the  term 
in  its  technical  interpretation.  Probably  he  will  directly 
consult  the  international  law  authorities  themselves.  In 
Lawrence's  Principles  of  International  Law,  p.  Ill,  he 
would  find  the  following:  "Independence  may  be  defined  as 
the  right  of  a  state  to  manage  all  its  affairs,  whether  external 
or  internal,  without  interference  from  other  states,  as  long 
as  it  respects  the  corresponding  right  possessed  by  each  fully 
sovereign  member  of  the  family  of  nations." 

This  would  surely  seem  to  be  a  final  definition.  But  if  the 
student  should  go  into  a  debate  with  that  as  his  understand- 
ing of  the  word,  he  would  probably  meet  with  an  unpleasant 
surprise.  If  he  should  carry  his  investigation  further,  he 
would  find  that  there  are  exceptions  to  the  rule  laid  down  in 
the  definition,  exceptions  that  are  really  a  part  of  the  rule  of 
law.  He  will  find  that  one  nation  or  a  group  of  nations  may 
directly  interfere  in  the  external  or  internal  affairs  of  another 
nation  without  violating  that  nation's  rights  of  independence, 
provided  the  intervening  nations  are  interfering  in  order  to 
protect  their  own  rights  of  sovereignty.  He  would  find  fur- 
ther that  the  theory  of  independence  permits  a  nation,  even 
when  its  own  sovereign  rights  are  not  endangered,  to  interfere 
in  the  affairs  of  another  nation  and  restrict  the  exercise  of 
some  of  its  natural  rights  of  sovereignty,  provided  the  re- 
strictions imposed  are  of  a  certain  limited  nature  as  to  their 
extent  and  duration.  These  exceptions  are  as  important 
as  the  so-called  "definition"  itself.  In  fact,  the  debate,  if 
well  argued,  would  probably  turn  on  the  truth  of  these  ex- 
ceptions and  their  application  to  the  question. 

An  understanding  of  the  true  meaning  of  this  word  "in- 
dependence" could  only  be  found  by  this  painstaking  in- 
vestigation.   No  less  careful  or  less  thorough  definition  could 


26  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

have  disclosed  the  import  of  the  word;  and  this  accurate 
knowledge  was  indispensable  in  order  to  make  the  proposi- 
tion of  any  real  value. 

b.  Summary  of  steps  in  definition.  In  the  case  of  nearly 
every  such  definition,  the  same  method  has  to  be  pursued. 
First,  find  its  ordinary  acceptation.  Second,  determine 
whether  it  may  have  any  meaning  that  is  technical  or  in  any 
way  peculiar.  If  it  does  have  such  a  peculiar  meaning,  the 
definition  must  be  sought  in  the  exposition  of  some  writer 
who  will  explain  this  special  interpretation.  If  it  is  a  term 
in  science,  go  to  the  speciahst  in  that  science;  if  a  political 
phrase,  go  to  the  statesman  or  historian;  if  a  legal  term,  go  to 
the  jurist.  Third,  even  after  the  definition  is  obtained  from  a 
good  authority,  consider  the  questions :  Are  the  terms  of  this 
definition  that  I  have  found  exact?  Are  there  any  exceptions 
to  the  general  statement  .^^  The  exceptions  sometimes  de- 
stroy the  rule. 

4.  Comparing  and  adjusting  results  of  other  steps.  For 
the  fourth  and  last  step  it  remains  simply  to  compare  and 
adjust  the  results  of  the  first  three  steps.  If  the  work  of 
definition  shows  the  statement  as  originally  formulated  to  be 
inaccurate  or  ambiguous,  if  it  is  found  that  the  tentative  prop- 
osition does  not  express  the  ideas  that  the  author  intended 
it  to  express,  then  the  statement  must  be  changed  till  it  finally 
does  put  the  real  question  into  words,  clearly  and  accurately. 

C.  These  steps  are  not  to  be  taken  mechanically.  It 
must  not  be  supposed  that  they  are  mutually  exclusive,  set 
off  by  hard  and  fast  lines,  and  always  to  be  followed  rigidly 
one  after  the  other  in  the  order  given.  They  represent  rather 
an  analysis  of  the  process  one  should  follow  in  framing  a 
proposition  under  the  most  diflScult  circumstances.  They 
show  the  maximum  of  work  to  be  done.  In  ordinary  practice 
they  run  together,  and  we  phrase  propositions  usually  per- 
haps without  taking  all  of  these  steps.  This  process  is  of- 
fered here  as  a  guide  for  the  most  difficult  cases,  and  as  a 
testing  and  checking  device  in  all  cases.     As  much  of  this 


THE  PROPOSITION  27 

process  should  be  followed  in  each  instance  as  is  needed  to 
insure  the  correct  statement  of  the  proposition. 

III.   Characteristics  of  Good  Propositions  for  Debate 

A.  A  list  of  desirable  characteristics  ^  or  qualities  of  good 
propositions  for  debate  will  help  us  to  test  ready  made 
resolutions  for  debate.  We  do  not  formulate  from  a  general 
field  all  of  the  propositions  on  which  we  have  to  work  either 
in  courses  in  argumentation  or  in  our  business  and  political 
activities.  Many  of  them  are  given  to  us  by  others.  More- 
over, many  of  the  subjects  on  which  we  do  formulate  proposi- 
tions are  of  such  a  nature  that  the  processes  we  have  been 
discussing  do  not  have  to  be  worked  out  in  detail.  It  is 
therefore  worth  while  to  have  such  a  list  in  order  that  we  may 
have  a  simple  series  of  tests  by  which  to  judge  all  proposi- 
tions, our  own  and  those  of  other  people.  Such  tests  are 
particularly  needed  for  propositions  for  formal  debate. 

1.  Assertion.  A  proposition  for  debate  should  be  phrased 
in  the  form  of  an  assertion,  not  a  question.  This  is  necessary 
in  order  to  get  a  clean-cut  statement  of  the  position  of  the 
affirmative.  It  prevents  ambiguity  and  makes  possible  an 
accurate  placing  of  the  burden  of  proof.  "Resolved:  that 
the  city  of  X  should  install  a  water  system  using  the  water 
of  Lake  A."  Not,  *' Should  the  city  of  X  use  the  water  of 
Lake  A?" 

2.  Single.  A  proposition  should  be  single,  not  double. 
The  error  must  be  avoided  of  combining  two  separate  ideas  in 
one  proposition;  two  questions,  closely  akin  to  one  another 
but  really  distinct  from  each  other,  may  easily  become  con- 
fused and  be  carelessly  joined  together  in  a  single  statement. 
For  example,  students  sometimes  devise  such  propositions 
as,  "Resolved:  that  a  high  protective  tariff  is  hostile  to  the 
economic  interests  of  the  United  States,  and  reciprocal  trade 
relations  should  be  established  with  the  Dominion  of  Can- 

^  For  similar  lists  see  Foster,  p.  12,  Keteham,  pp.  13  and  20. 


\-r 


28  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

ada;"  or,  "Resolved:  that  labor  unions  are  detrimental  to 
industry,  and  they  should  be  compelled  to  incorporate." 
Now  in  each  of  these  propositions  there  are  two  problems 
presented;  these  problems  are  similar  in  the  nature  of  the 
ideas  contained  in  them,  but  the  issues  to  be  determined  are 
very  different.  The  proofs  necessary  to  establish  the  fact 
that  labor  unions  are  detrimental  to  industry  are  not  at  all 
the  same  proofs  required  to  show  that  they  should  be  com- 
pelled to  incorporate;  so  that  the  attempt  to  combine  in  one 
demonstration  what  are  really  two  distinct  proofs  must 
result  in  confusion.  We  may  handle  each  of  these  questions 
separately,  but  we  cannot  hope  to  treat  both  successfully 
in  one  debate.  Consequently,  in  formulating  our  statements 
for  debate,  we  must  be  sure  not  only  to  have  a  proposition, 
but  to  have  a  single  proposition. 

3.  Unambiguous.  A  proposition  should  be  unambiguous. 
Avoid  ambiguous,  general  terms  capable  of  a  number  of 
different  meanings — Civilization,  church,  progress,  conser- 
vatism. Use  the  most  specific,  most  definite,  most  limited 
term  possible  in  each  case.  For  example,  in  the  proposition : 
"Resolved:  that  the  judiciary  should  be  (or  should  not  be) 
independent  of  the  will  of  the  people,"  what  is  meant  by 
"judiciary,"  "independent,"  "the  will  of  the  people".^ 
Until  definite  meanings  have  been  agreed  upon  for  all  of 
these  terms  (and  preferably  substituted  for  the  original  am- 
biguous terms  in  the  proposition)  there  can  be  no  discussion 
worth  while. 

4.  Unprejudiced.    A  proposition  should  be  unprejudiced. 

he  question  must  not  be  begged  by  a  phraseology  that  as- 
sumes the  point  to  be  proved.  "  Resolved :  that  the  undesir- 
able Japanese  should  be  excluded."  "Resolved:  that  the  in- 
efficient lecture  system  should  be  abolished."  "Resolved: 
that  the  barbarous  conduct  of  the  Bulgarian  troops  should  be 
condemned."  The  italicised  words  are  all  question  begging 
epithets  which  practically  cover  the  point  at  issue.  Avoid  all 
descriptive  expressions  of  praise  or  blame.     Colorless  ex- 


THE  PROPOSITION  29 

pressions  which  serve  simply  to  identify  or  define  should  be 
used  exclusively  in  phrasing  propositions. 

5.  Concrete  and  specific.  The  proposition  for  debate 
should  be  as  concrete  and  specific  as  possible.  This  rule  is 
qualified  somewhat  because  one  cannot  accurately  say  that 
all  propositions  for  debate  should  be  concrete  and  specific. 
If  the  case  presents  for  discussion  an  abstract  or  general 
proposition,  there  is  no  reason  why  such  discussion  should 
not  be  had,  but  every  proposition  for  debate  should  be  as 
concrete  and  specific  as  the  circumstances  of  the  discussion 
permit. 

6.  Burden  of  proof  on  aflBlrmative.  The  burden  of  proof 
should  be  on  the  affirmative.  This  general  principle  which  is 
universally  true,  should  replace  the  rules  of  thumb  contain- 
ing half  truths  in  regard  to  the  negative  statements  and  the 
word  "not."  It  makes  no  difference  whether  the  proposition 
is  worded  negatively  or  contains  the  forbidden  word  "not," 
so  long  as  the  affirmative  of  the  proposition  as  worded  has 
the  burden  of  proof.  ^  The  burden  of  proof  actually  rests 
upon  the  side  advocating  a  change,  or  opposing  the  existing 
order.  The  presumption  is  with  "things  as  they  are"  where- 
ever  there  is  well-ordered  discussion.  Wherever  there  is 
debating  which  pays  proper  attention  to  logical  sequence  and 
economy  of  time  and  attention,  the  attack  of  the  one  op- 
posing the  present  and  advocating  the  new,  is  always  ad- 
vanced before  the  defense  of  the  established  order  (or  a 
counter  proposition  or  remedy)  is  brought  forward.  So  that 
in  phrasing  a  proposition  for  debate,  in  order  not  to  go  astray 
on  this  point,  the  only  thing  that  is  necessary  is  to  inquire 
which  side  is  advocating  the  new,  and  opposing  the  existing 
situation;  then  so  word  our  proposition  that  that  side  will 
have  the  affirmative.  Often  changing  situations  require  dif- 
ferent wordings  of  propositions  due  to  the  fact  that  the  ac- 
tual presumption  may  change  from  side  to  side  with  changing 
conditions.     For  instance,  a  few  years  ago  the  proposition 

^  See  oh.  3  on  "Burden  of  Proof." 


30  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

"Resolved:  that  United  States  Senators  should  be  elected  by 
popular  vote,"  was  well  worded.  Now  this  proposition  is 
badly  worded  because  the  burden  of  proof  actually  lies  upon 
the  negative,  and  the  presumption  is  with  the  aflSrmative. 
Therefore,  to-day  the  proposition  should  read,  "Resolved: 
that  United  States  Senators  should  be  elected  by  the  Legis- 
latures of  the  several  states,"  or  some  other  wording  which 
places  the  burden  of  proof  upon  the  affirmative,  and  requires 
the  affirmative  to  advocate  a  change  from  the  existing  order. 

7.  Brief  and  simple.  A  proposition  for  debate  should  be 
as  brief  and  simple  as  possible.  This  rule  is  also  qualified  be- 
cause brevity  and  simplicity  should  always  be  sacrificed  to 
accuracy.  It  sometimes  happens  that  we  are  debating  a 
proposition  which  deals  with  a  situation  so  complex  that  a 
long  and  complex  proposition  is  needed  to  set  forth  with 
accuracy  our  opinion  in  regard  to  this  situation.  All  we  can 
do  is  to  strike  out  every  superfluous  word,  and  to  have  as 
brief  and  simple  a  statement  as  will  allow  us  to  say  accurately 
what  we  wish  to  say. 

8.  Debatable.  A  proposition  for  debate  should  be  de- 
batable; By  that  we  mean  that  it  should  be  two-sided. 
To  speak  more  accurately,  a  proposition  is  debatable  when 
it  is  such  that  it  permits  an  intelligent  difference  of  opinion, 
after  the  important  facts  which  underlie  it  have  been  set 
forth.  We  must  avoid  propositions  which  should  be  settled 
by  definite  tests,  or  measurements,  or  investigation,  rather 
than  by  discussion.  For  instance,  do  not  debate  the  ques- 
tion of  a  horse's  weight;  weigh  the  horse.  Do  not  debate 
whether  or  not  the  price  of  a  certain  commodity  has  risen 
25%  in  the  last  decade;  refer  to  trustworthy  reports  and  find 
out  whether  or  not  this  is  true.  This  means  practically.  Do 
not  debate  pure  questions  of  fact  when  it  is  possible  by  investi- 
gation to  determine  the  truth  so  accurately  that  intelligent  men 
cannot  differ  after  the  results  of  the  investigation  become  known. 
Important  questions  of  policy  are  practically  always  good 
questions  for  debate.    Certain  questions  which  are  questions 


THE  PROPOSITION  31 

of  fact,  but  which  cannot  be  settled  accurately  by  simple 
investigation,  such  as  questions  concerning  the  origin  of  the 
earth,  the  origin  of  life,  the  descent  of  man,  etc.,  may  also 
be  excellent  questions  for  debate.  Useless,  of  course,  for 
the  purpose  of  debate  are  all  propositions  stating  mere  per- 
sonal taste  or  opinion  which  is  based  upon  elements  that  are 
hard  to  weigh  and  measure,  or  which  involve  comparisons 
that  must  rest  either  upon  such  elements  or  upon  simple 
definition.  For  instance :  "  Resolved :  that  Lake  Y  is  the  most 
beautiful  lake  in  America."  '*  Resolved:  that  law  is  a  nobler 
profession  than  medicine."  "Resolved:  that  James  Whit- 
comb  Riley  was  a  great  poet." 

9.  Interesting.  Propositions  for  debate  should  be  inter- 
esting. This  applies  of  course  more  particularly  to  public 
contest  debates.  The  affairs  of  actual  life  require  us  often  to 
debate  whatever  propositions  come  up  for  discussion  regard- 
less of  whether  or  not  we  are  interested  in  them;  and  we  do 
not  propose  to  say  that  committees,  courts,  and  legislatures 
should  refrain  from  taking  up  any  but  interesting  questions. 
But  for  contest  debating  and  practice  debating,  particularly  if 
the  debaters  want  the  advantage  of  a  live  audience,  we  should 
give  some  attention  to  choosing  propositions  that  will  be 
generally  interesting  to  the  debaters  and  to  the  audience 
that  we  wish  to  attract. 


EXERCISE.    CHAPTER  2 

THE   PROPOSITION 

1.  Properly  phrase  as  good  propositions  for  debate  six  propo- 

sitions of  fact  and  six  of  policy. 

2.  Phrase  good  propositions  on  some  phase  of  each  of  the 

following  subjects  (these  terms  need  not  necessarily  be 
used  in  the  proposition):  Woodrow  Wilson;  Theodore 
Roosevelt;  Co-education;  College  Entrance  Require- 
ments; Minimum  Wage;  Mexico;  Foreign  Trade;  Liquor 


32  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

Regulation;  English  Composition;  Inter-collegiate  Ath- 
letics. 

3.  Bring  to  class  three  argumentative  newspaper  editorials, 

clipped  from  the  recent  press,  preferably  from  the  col- 
lege paper,  with  a  properly  phrased  proposition  of  your 
own  for  each,  which  embodies  as  accurately  as  possible 
the  thesis  of  each  editorial. 

4.  Hand  in  a  list  of  ten  poorly  worded  propositions  for  debate, 

taken  from  lists  of  propositions  in  text-books,  pamphlets, 
bibliographies,  etc.,  indicating  the  defects  in  each,  and 
giving  the  proper  re-wording. 

5.  Hand  in  a  well- worded  proposition  on  some  important 

subject  of  interest  to  you,  on  which  you  will  work  during 
the  whole  semester,  and  which  will  be  referred  to  here- 
after as  the  subject  for  your  "original  forensic." 

Note:  Lists  of  propositions  ready  worded  for  debate  are  omitted  from  this 
book  because  it  is  felt  that  each  class  can  better  work  out  its  own  proposi- 
tions according  to  the  suggestions  of  this  chapter.  Subjects  for  propositions 
can  easily  be  obtained  by  reading  the  editorials  of  the  daily  press,  or  looking 
through  recent  or  current  numbers  of  such  periodicals  as:  Current  Opinion, 
The  Review  of  Reviews,  North  American  Review,  The  Forum,  The  Literary 
Digest,  The  New  Republic,  Colliers,  The  Nation,  etc. 


CHAPTER  3 

THE  BURDEN   OF   PROOF 

OUTLINE 

A.  The  problem  of  the  burden  of  proof. 

B.  In  legal  procedure. 

C.  The  shifting  of  the  burden  of  proof. 

D.  Counter  propositions. 

E.  Two  propositions  at  once. 

F.  The  burden  of  rebuttal. 

G.  Summary. 

1.  Burden  of  proof  always  on  the  actual  aflBrmative,  never 

shifts. 

2.  Actual  affirmative  is  the  one  who  wants  a  change. 

3.  Actual  affirmative  and  nominal  affirmative  must  coincide. 

4.  Affirmative  prima  facie  case  creates  for  negative  a  burden 

of  rebuttal. 

5.  Burden  of  rebuttal  may  shift  from  side  to  side  during  the 

debate. 
H.  Presumptions. 

1.  Of  law. 

a.  Conclusive. 

b.  Disputable. 

2.  Of  fact. 

A.  The  problem  of  the  burden  of  proof/  in  common  with 
many  other  specific  problems  of  general  argumentation,  can 
best  be  studied  by  investigating  its  treatment  in  legal  proce- 
dure; for  it  is  in  the  law  that  practical  reasoning  has  received 
most  attention  and  reached  its  highest  development.     It 

^  For  an  exhaustive  and  authoritative  discussion  of  this  whole  subject, 
see  Thayer's  Preliminary  Treatise  on  Evidence  at  the  Common  Law,  Chap- 
ter IX.    Boston:  Little,  Brown,  and  Co.,  1898. 

33  ) 


34  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

seems  to  us  wise  to  give  a  separate  chapter  to  this  problem, 
and  to  try  to  present  a  clear  and  complete  statement  of  the 
burden  of  proof  in  law  and  in  general  argumentation.  If 
close  attention  were  paid  in  argumentation  outside  the  court- 
room as  well  as  in  legal  trials  to  such  matters  as  burden  of 
proof,  burden  of  rebuttal,  prima  fade  case,  types  of  negative 
cases,  etc.,  much  confusion,  disorganized  bickering,  and  fu- 
tile disputing  would  be  avoided.  These  doctrines  are  sim- 
ple to  understand,  easy  to  apply,  and  should  be  adhered 
to  in  all  argumentation  which  has  any  serious  purpose 
whatever. 

B.  In  legal  procedure.  The  expression  "burden  of 
proof"  in  law  is  used  in  two  different  and  distinct  meanings, 
and  is  also  used  by  some  people  in  a  confused  way  to  repre- 
sent both  meanings  without  discrimination.  First.  It  is 
used  to  represent  the  "risk  of  the  proposition,"  the  burden 
upon  that  party  to  the  controversy  who  will  lose  if  nothing  is 
done.  It  is  the  burden  of  making  good  his  claim  which  rests 
upon  the  one  who  starts  an  action,  who  demands  a  change 
from  the  existing  situation.  This  is  the  true  meaning  of 
"burden  of  proof,"  and  is  the  only  proper  meaning  of  that 
term  outside  of  law  courts.  Second.  In  law,  however,  a 
different  meaning  is  also  recognized.  The  term  "burden  of 
proof"  is  sometimes  used  to  mean  the  duty  of  "going  forward 
with  evidence  or  argument"  at  any  given  time.  Thus,  if  the 
plaintiff  who  has  the  burden  of  proof  in  the  first  instance, 
makes  out  a  prima  facie  case,  the  defendant  must  bestir 
himself  in  opposition  to  the  aflfirmative,  or  accept  defeat. 
In  these  circumstances,  he  is  said  to  have  a  duty  to  go  for- 
ward with  either  evidence  or  argument.  If  he  accomplishes 
this  successfully,  then  the  duty  of  going  forward  is  once  again 
upon  the  affirmative  or  plaintiff.  This  duty  or  burden  is 
clearly  quite  distinct  from  the  original  risk  of  the  proposition, 
of  making  good  his  claim,  which  is  upon  every  man  who  goes 
into  a  court  with  a  claim  of  any  kind.  Third.  There  is,  as 
we  have  said,  a  confused  and  undiscriminating  use  of  the 


THE  BURDEN  OF  PROOF  35 

expression  "burden  of  proof"  to  cover  either  or  both  of  these 
concepts. 

C.  The  shifting  of  the  burden  of  proof  has  long  bepn  a 
vexed  question  in  argumentation.  It  is  clear  from  what  we 
have  said  above  that  the  burden  of  proof  in  its  first  and  most 
legitimate  meaning,  that  of  the  "risk  of  the  proposition" 
which  is  carried  by  the  party  to  the  controversy  who  demands 
a  change,  can  never  shift.  Since  this  is  the  only  meaning  that 
the  expression  "burden  of  proof"  should  have  in  general 
argumentation,  it  is  proper  to  say  that  the  burden  of  proof 
never  shifts.  The  duty  of  going  forward  with  evidence  or 
argument  at  any  given  time,  of  course,  may  shift  from  time 
to  time  in  the  course  of  the  trial  or  discussion.  But  the 
proper  term  to  apply  to  this  shifting  burden  is  neither  "bur- 
den of  proof"  nor  "duty  of  going  forward,"  but  ''burden  of 
rebuttal.**  This  "burden  of  rebuttal "  may  shift.  For  example, 
the  burden  of  proof  rests  with  the  plaintiff  or  the  affirmative 
who  comes  into  court  (or  into  a  legislature,  before  a  mass 
meeting,  a  board  of  directors,  or  other  assembly,  or  con- 
ference) demanding  or  recommending  a  change  in  the  exist- 
ing situation.  He  necessarily  takes  the  responsibility  of 
showing  that  such  a  change  ought  to  be  made.  Before  any- 
one can  be  required  to  show  why  such  a  change  should  not 
be  made,  the  plaintiff  or  the  affirmative  must  make  out  a 
prima  facie  case.  A  prima  facie  case  is  one  of  sufficient 
strength  to  win  if  it  is  not  refuted.  Suppose  the  affirmative 
makes  out  such  a  case.  Then  the  negative  has  a  "burden 
of  rebuttal."  He  has  not  a  burden  of  proof.  His  essential 
responsibility  is  only  to  ^counteract  the  influence  of  the 
prima  facie  case  of  the  affirmative.  If  he  does  this  the  burden 
of  rebuttal  may  be  said  to  shift  to  the  affirmative,  and  if  the 
affirmative  successfully  answers  the  negative,  the  burden  of 
rebuttal  is  once  again  upon  the  negative  and  the  prima  facie 
case  stands  still  unanswered.  If  we  will  keep  in  mind  these 
two  expressions,  "  burden  of  proof  "  and  "  burden  of  rebuttal " 
and  use  them  always  as  here  defined,  there  will  be  no  more 


36  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

confusion  in  regard  to  burden  of  proof.     These  terms  will 
be  used  in  this  way  throughout  this  book. 

D.  Counter  propositions.  Whenever  the  answer  of  the 
negative  takes  the  form  of  a  counter  proposition^  (in  law  an 
"affirmative  defense")  the  negative,  of  course,  becomes  es- 
sentially an  affirmative,  and  has  the  burden  of  proof  on  the 
new  proposition.  For  example,  if  in  a  first  degree  murder 
case  the  answer  of  the  defense  is  not  that  the  accused  did  not 
kill  the  deceased,  but  that  the  accused  was  insane  at  the  time, 
this  constitutes  a  counter  proposition.  For  the  time  being  the 
question  at  issue  is  not,  "Resolved:  that  A  is  guilty  of  mur- 
der in  the  first  degree,"  but,  "Resolved:  that  A  is  (or  was  at 
the  time  in  question)  insane."  On  this  proposition  the  origi- 
nal defense  becomes  the  affirmative.  The  accused  is  pre- 
sumed to  be  sane  until  the  contrary  is  established.  The 
original  prosecution  becomes  the  negative,  and  seeks  to 
prevent  the  establishment  of  the  fact  of  insanity.  Here, 
clearly,  there  is  no  shifting  of  the  burden  of  proof.  There  is 
a  new  proposition  with  a  burden  of  proof  of  its  own,  and  this 
burden  is  on  the  new  affirmative,  and  never  shifts. 

E.  Two  propositions  at  once.  There  is  one  type  of  dis- 
cussion in  which  there  are  really  two  affirmatives,  two  nega- 
tives, and  two  burdens  of  proof;  really  two  propositions  to  be 
decided  in  the  same  case.  Such  is  the  situation  when  we  have 
a  case  of  direct  comparison  between  two  claims  neither  of 
which  has  any  presumption  in  its  favor.  This  is  the  case  when 
it  has  been  decided  that  a  certain  thing  shall  be  done  but  the 
choice  between  two  plans  has  not  yet  been  made.  Suppose 
it  is  decided  that  a  canal  shall  be  built  between  A  and  B.  The 
only  question  is  whether  the  canal  will  be  built  on  the  X 
route  or  the  Y  route.  A  commission  is  appointed  to  decide, 
and  the  advocates  of  the  two  routes  appear  before  the  com- 
mission to  debate.  Here  there  is  really  no  affirmative,  no 
negative,  no  burden  of  proof  as  regards  the  big  issue.  It  is 
a  question,  and  cannot  be  stated  as  a  resolution  placing  a  bur- 

^  See  Types  of  Negative  Cases,  eh.  16. 


THE  BURDEN  OF  PROOF  37 

den  on  one  unless  we  frame  a  counter  proposition  placing  the 
burden  on  the  other.  But  if  the  X  route  has  been  adopted, 
then  the  presumption  is  in  its  favor  and  the  advocates  of  the 
Y  route  have  the  burden  of  proof  to  show  that  the  Y  route 
is  better  than  the  X  route. 

F.  The  burden  of  rebuttal.  This  term  was  invented  by 
Dean  H.  W.  Ballantine.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  its  use  will 
become  universal.  Its  general  acceptance  will  lend  accuracy 
and  clearness  to  what  has  heretofore  been  a  confused  and 
troublesome  situation  both  in  law  and  general  argumenta- 
tion and  debate.    Says  Dean  Ballantine, 

''Professor  James  Bradley  Thayer  was  the  first  to  demon- 
strate clearly  the  inaccuracy  of  the  common  expression  that 
the  burden  of  proof  *  shifts,'  and  to  elaborate  the  distinction 
between  the  burden  of  proof  in  the  sense  of  *duty  to  estab- 
lish,' which  never  shifts,  and  what  is  awkwardly  termed 
*the  duty  of  going  forward  with  the  evidence,'  which  does 
have  the  characteristic  referred  to  as  'shifting.'  It  is  sug- 
gested that  what  is  referred  to  as  the  burden  of  proof  in  this 
second  sense,  or  the  so-called  'duty  of  going  forward  with 
the  evidence,'  which  is  in  fact  not  a  duty  at  all,  ought  to  be 
christened  by  the  new  but  exact  name  of  'burden  of  rebuttaV 
When  the  plaintiff  makes  out  a  complete  'prima  facie  case, 
whether  with  the  aid  of  a  presumption  or  by  reasonable  and 
credible  evidence,  the  burden  of  proof  is  said  to  shift  to  the 
defendant.  This  use  of  the  phrase  is  very  inaccurate  and 
confusing.  What  is  meant  is  that  the  plaintiff,  having  es- 
tablished a  preponderance  in  favor  of  his  contentions,  has 
created  a  burden  of  rebuttal,  or  the  necessity  for  this  opponent 
to  meet  and  repel  his  prima  facie  case  by  evidence  of  equal 
weight.  This  may  be  accomplished  either  by  counter  proof 
and  refutation  of  one  or  more  of  the  essential  propositions  of 
the  plaintiff's  case,  or  by  the  defendant  assuming  the  laboring 
oar  and  making  affirmative  proof  of  new  propositions  of  his 
own  in  confession  and  avoidance.^  The  burden  of  proof  is 
^  See  Pleading,  Appendix  B. 


38  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

thus  sometimes  assumed  by  the  defendant,  but  the  need  for 
this  arises  only  after  the  plaintiff  has  made  out  by  evidence, 
presumptions,  or  admissions,  his  case  in  chief.  The  defendant 
may  have  the  choice  either  to  bear  the  burden  of  rebuttal  which 
has  been  created  by  the  plaintiff,  or  to  assume  the  burden  of 
proof  of  an  affirmative  defense,  as  where  the  defendant,  in- 
stead of  denying  the  due  execution,  shows  a  material  altera- 
tion in  the  note  sued  on,  and  then  the  plaintiff  in  turn  has 
either  to  deny  or  rebut  such  showing,  or  confess  and  avoid 
it  by  proof  of  circumstances  rendering  the  alteration  lawful 
or  excusable.  The  plaintiff  must  always  at  his  peril  maintain 
the  proof  of  his  own  contentions  at  the  required  height  and 
keep  them  good.  As  to  these  the  burden  never  shifts  from 
him  although  he  may  satisfy  it  from  time  to  time.  But  the 
burden  of  rebuttal  may  be  created  for  the  plaintiff  to  reply  to  the 
affirmative  propositions  of  the  defendant,  in  addition  to  the 
necessity  of  restoring  his  own  contentions.  Thus  the  center 
of  gravity,  or  the  preponderance  of  the  evidence,  may  shift 
from  the  plaintiff  to  the  defendant  or  back  again,  but  the 
burden  of  establishing  the  proposition  of  claim  or  defense  is 
always  with  the  same  party.  The  negative  is  safe  with  an 
even  balance  or  equilibrium  and  he  need  merely  rebut  or 
neutralize  his  adversary's  proof;  he  need  not  establish  a 
rebuttal  by  a  preponderance  of  evidence."  ^ 

G.  Summary:  1.  The  burden  of  proof,  then,  always 
rests  upon  the  actual  affirmative.  2.  The  affirmative  is  the 
party  who  will  lose  if  no  evidence  or  argument  is  offered — 
if  nothing  is  done.  The  affirmative  is  the  dissatisfied  party, 
the  one  who  wants  a  change,  the  attacking  party.  3.  Care 
must  be  taken  that  propositions  be  so  phrased  that  the  actual 
affirmative  and  nominal  affirmative  coincide,  that  the  af- 
firmative of  the  proposition  is  actually  taken  by  the  one  up- 
holding the  burden  of  the  controversy.  "The  obligation  of 
proving  any  fact  lies  upon  the  party  who  substantially  as- 

^  H.  W.  Ballantine,  The  Apportionment  of  Proof  and  the  Burden  of  Rebuttal. 
Law  Notes,  Dec,  1912,  p.  168. 


THE  BURDEN  OF  PROOF  39 

serts  the  affirmative  of  the  issue."  ^  For  example  in  the 
question:  "Resolved:  that  in  the  United  States  private  own- 
ership of  railroads  is  preferable  to  national  ownership,"  the 
negative  advocates  a  radical  change.  The  negative  "sub- 
stantially asserts  the  affirmative  of  the  issue."  So  the  neg- 
ative has  the  burden  of  proof,  and  is  under  obligation  to 
present  evidence  or  argument  before  the  affirmative  can 
properly  be  called  on.  If  nothing  is  done  the  affirmative 
wins.  This  of  course  is  all  wrong.  The  error  is  in  the  word- 
ing of  the  proposition.  It  must  be  changed  so  that  the  real 
burden  of  proof  will  rest  on  the  affirmative  side.  This  can 
be  done  by  transposing  the  words  "private"  and  "national." 
Then  the  affirmative  is  the  attacking  party,  the  dissatisfied 
party,  the  one  who  loses  if  nothing  is  done.  4.  When  the  af- 
firmative has  carried  its  burden  of  proof  sufficiently  to  establish 
a  prima  facie  case,  it  has  created  for  the  negative  a  burden  of 
rebuttal.  5.  The  burden  of  rebuttal  (a  more  accurate  term 
than  *the  duty  of  going  forward  with  argument  or  evidence') 
may  shift  from  side  to  side  during  the  conduct  of  the  debate. 

H.  Presumptions  of  one  kind  or  another  are  so  often 
mentioned  in  connection  with  the  burden  of  proof  that  it  is 
well  to  state  briefly  the  common  usage  of  this  term  in  law; 
in  order  that  we  may  know  accurately  what  we  are  doing 
when,  in  general  argumentation,  we  attempt  to  use  this  term 
in  a  way  analogous  to  its  legal  usage.  In  order  to  set  forth 
with  accuracy  and  authority  the  statement  of  the  theory 
of  presumptions  in  English  law,  we  quote  the  following 
from  an  article  in  the  English  Law  Magazine,  volume  6,  p.  348, 
October,  1831.  This  article  Professor  Thayer  quotes  ^  and 
characterizes  ^  as  "The  best  consideration  of  the  subject  of 
presumption  known  to  me." 

"Presumptions  are  commonly  divided  by  writers  on  Eng- 
lish law,  into  two  classes,  namely,  presumptions  of  law,  and 
presumptions  of  fact. 

^  Greenleaf,  p.  93.  ^  p^d  Treatise,  pp.  539ff.  Appendix. 

'  Thayer,  pp.  313,  footnote. 


40  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

"1.  Presumptions  of  law  are  of  two  kinds,  a.  FirsU 
conc/MSi>e  or  imperative  presumptions,  that  is,  legal  rules  not 
to  be  overcome  by  any  evidence  that  the  fact  is  otherwise. 
Thus  by  the  statute  of  limitations,  a  simple  contract  debt, 
not  kept  up  in  certain  specified  manners,  is  extinguished  after 
a  lapse  of  six  years,  nor  can  it  be  recovered  by  proving  that 
the  sum  due  has  never  been  paid.  .  .  .  Again,  a  sane  man 
is  presumed  to  contemplate  the  probable  consequences  of  his 
own  acts;  and  this  presumption  is  conclusive,  nor  may  he 
rebut  it  by  showing  that  in  fact  he  did  not  foresee  them.  .  .  . 
b.  Second,  *  disputable  or  rebuttable  presumptions  are  def- 
initions of  the  quantity  of  evidence,  or  the  state  of  facts, 
sufficient  to  make  out  a  prima  facie  case;  in  other  words,  of 
the  circumstances  under  which  the  burden  of  proof  [burden  of 
rebuttal]  lies  on  the  opposite  party.  Of  this  very  extensive 
class  of  presumptions  a  few  examples  will  suffice.  Thus,  a 
man  is  presumed  innocent  until  he  is  proved  guilty;  that  is,  if 
a  man  is  charged  with  a  crime,  he  is  not  bound  to  prove  that 
he  did  not,  but  his  accuser  is  bound  to  prove  that  he  did  com- 
mit it.  (In  cases  of  homicide,  however,  if  it  merely  appears 
that  one  man  has  killed  another,  he  is  presumed  to  be  guilty 
of  murder,  unless  such  evidence  is  produced  as  will  either  re- 
duce the  offense  to  manslaughter,  or  entirely  remove  its  crim- 
inality, by  justifying  or  excusing  it.)  ^ 

"2.  Presumption  of  fact  has  a  totally  different  meaning 
from  presumption  of  law;  and  refers  not  to  propositions,  but 
to  arguments — not  to  assuming,  but  inferring.  When  evi- 
dence is  offered  which  can  only  be  brought  to  bear  on  the 
matter  at  issue  by  a  process  of  reasoning,  the  inference  is 
termed  a  presumption  of  fact.  The  statement  on  which  this 
inference  is  founded  is  termed  presumptive  evidence}  .  .  . 
If  the  witness  or  documents  attest,  not  the  fact  to  be  proved, 
but  something  from  which  that  fact  may  be  inferred,  the  evi- 
dence is  said  to  be  presumptive  or  indirect.    [The  distinction 

1  Footnote  by  Thayer,  p.  541. 

2  See  Circumstantial  Evidence,  ch.  6. 


THE  BURDEN  OF  PROOF  41 

between  positive  and  presumptive  evidence  is  most  correctly 
stated  by  Mr.  Bentham.  *  Evidence  (says  he)  is  direct, 
positive,  immediate,  when  it  is  of  such  a  nature,  that  (ad- 
mitting its  accuracy)  it  brings  with  it  a  beHef  of  the  thing  to 
be  proved.  Evidence  is  indirect,  or  circumstantial,  when  it 
is  of  such  a  nature  that  (admitting  its  accuracy)  it  leads 
to  a  belief  of  the  thing  to  be  proved  only  by  way  of  induc- 
tion (i.  e.,  (deduction),  reasoning,  inference.' — Treatise  on 
Evidence  by  Dumont,  186n.]  ^  A  presumption ,_therefQre« 
injthis  sense,  or  a  presumption  of  fact,  can  only  mean  an. 
argument  or  inference;  and  presumptive  evidence  is  not 
evidence  taken  by  itself,  but  only  because,  joined  to  some 
other  general  proposition,  it  tends  to  prove  a  certain  con- 
clusion. Thus,  when  it  is  said  that,  where  a  person  was  found 
standing  over  a  wounded  man  with  a  bloody  sword  in  his 
hand,  there  is  a  presumption  (or  it  may  be  probably  inferred) 
that  the  one  stabbed  the  other;  the  fact  that  the  man  was 
found  with  a  bloody  sword  has,  in  itself,  apart  from  its 
consequence,  no  weight;  but  it  tends  to  determine  the  ques- 
tion at  issue,  who  stabbed  the  wounded  man.  So,  if  the  date 
of  a  man's  birth  be  at  issue,  and  it  is  proved  that  he  died 
in  a  certain  year  at  a  certain  age,  his  age  and  the  time  of  his 
death  are  in  themselves  indifferent;  but  they  are  data  to 
determine  the  year  of  his  birth.  .  .  . 

"Natural  presumptions,  or  presumptions  of  fact,  are  not 
properly  opposed  to  legal  or  artificial  presumptions;  but  are 
arguments  founded  on  presumptive  or  circumstantial  evi- 
dence, which  is  opposed  to  direct  or  positive  evidence.  Pre- 
sumptive evidence  being  that  which  tends  to  prove  the  fact 
at  issue,  or  from  which  the  fact  at  issue  may  be  inferred; 
while  direct  evidence  establishes  the  fact  at  issue  itself 
without  any  process  of  reasoning." 

^  Footnote  by  Thayer,  p.  547. 


CHAPTER  4 

THE    ISSUES 

OUTLINE 

I.  Theory  of  Issues 

A.  Issues  defined. 

B.  Examples. 

1.  In  law. 

2.  In  general  discussion. 

C.  Terminology. 

1.  In  law. 

2.  In  general  argumentation. 

a.  Potential. 

b.  Admitted. 

D.  Necessity  of  knowing. 

E.  Issues  and  proposition. 

F.  Issues  and  burden  of  proof. 

1.  Affirmative  and  negative. 

2.  Counter  proposition. 

3.  Winning  or  losing. 

G.  Issues  and  conviction  and  persuasion. 
H.  Number  and  form  of  issues. 

I.    Issues  and  partition. 
J.    "Stock  issues." 

II,  Finding  the  Issm^ 

A.  Think. 

B.  Study. 

1.  History. 

a.  Origin. 

b.  Present  status. 

2.  All  phases. 

3.  Both  sides. 

42 


THE  ISSUES  43 

C.  Exclude. 

1.  Mutually  admitted  matter. 

2.  Irrelevant  matter. 

3.  Unimportant  matter. 

4.  Indirect  matter. 

D.  Select. 

1.  Points  which  meet  tests  of  C. 

2.  Vital  points. 

I.    The  Theory  of  the  Issues 

A.  Issues  defined.  The  issues  are  the  inherently  vital 
points,  elements,  or  sub-propositions,  aflSrmed  by  the  affirma- 
tive and  denied  by  the  negative,  upon  the  establishment  of 
which  depends  the  establishment  of  the  main  proposition. 
They  are  the  ultimate,  irreducible,  essential  matters  of  fact 
or  of  principle  (law)  upon  which  the  conclusion  of  the  ques- 
tion hinges.  They  are  not  simply  "important  main  points" 
or  "points  on  which  there  is  a  clash  of  opinion."  They  are 
the  smallest  possible  divisions  of  crucial  points,  each  one  of 
which  the  affirmative  must  establish  in  order  to  establish  the 
proposition. 

B.  Examples.  Before  explaining  further  let  us  illustrate 
this  by  concrete  examples  from  law  and  general  argument. 

1.  In  law.  First  let  us  say  for  example  that  A  is  accused 
of  the  crime  of  burglary  at  common  law.  Now  this  crime 
has  five  essential  elements,  (1)  breaking,  and  (2)  entering 
(3)  a  dwelling  (4)  at  night,  (5)  with  felonious  intent.  There 
are  in  the  firstj^ace  five  issues  here.  The  State  (affirmative) 
must  prove  /alUfive.  They  are  all  vital.  If  the  defense 
(negative)  prevents  the  affirmative  from  establishing  any 
single  point  beyond  any  reasonable  doubt,  the  case  of  the 
affirmative  fails.  Then  the  defendant  is  not  guilty  of  bur- 
glary. He  may  be  guilty  of  a  number  of  other  things,  but 
that  is  another  story.  The  defendant  may  admit  that  he 
broke  and  entered  a  dwelling  at  night,  but  deny  that  it  was 
done  with  felonious  intent — say  he  did  it  to  put  out  a  fire. 


44  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

The  affirmative  has  established  (or  gained  an  admission  of) 
four  of  the  five  necessary  points,  but  the  whole  case  falls. 
No  affirmative  case  can  stand  after  the  loss  of  a  single  issue. 
Any  point  which  the  affirmative  can  fail  on,  and  still  estab- 
lish the  case  cannot  he  an  issue,  though  it  may  be  very  impor- 
tant. Importance  is  not  enough — an  issue  is  vital  in  the 
strictest  sense  of  that  word. 

2.  In  general  discussion.  Let  us  take  an  example  in  a 
general  field  of  discussion  in  which  the  issues  are  not  deter- 
mined for  us  by  technical  legal  definition.  Suppose  a  propo- 
sition advocating  the  adoption  of  a  "single  tax"  system  in 
some  city,  state,  or  nation.  The  issues  are  the  specific  prop- 
ositions that  the  affirmative  would  have  to  prove  to  Ihe 
satisfaction  of  a  competent  board  of  judges  in  order  to  show 
that  the  particular  single  tax  system  they  advocate  ought 
to  be  adopted.  Suppose  there  are  three  such  sub-questions 
that  the  affirmative  must  answer  satisfactorily,  in  order  to 
establish  the  proposition,  for  instance,  (1)  Is  the  present 
system  unsatisfactory?  (2)  Will  the  new  system  raise  suffi- 
cient revenue.'^  (3)  Will  it  do  this  with  substantial  justice 
(i.  e.,  without  evils — those  complained  of,  or  others  as  bad)? 
If  careful  investigation  should  show  that  these  are  the  issues 
of  the  particular  proposition  under  discussion,  the  affirmative 
must  prove  all  of  them  in  order  to  establish  its  case.  If  the 
negative  shows  that  the  claims  of  the  affirmative  on  any  one 
of  the  three  points  are  unfounded,  the  case  fails,  the  negative 
wins.  If  the  present  system  is  satisfactory — no  abuses — no 
shortcomings — no  evils — is  it  possible  to  win  a  case  for  a 
new  system?  If  a  tax  system  (old  or  new)  will  not  raise  suffi- 
cient revenue,  it  is  no  good.  What  will  be  sufficient  will,  of 
course,  vary  in  different  circumstances — but  this  question, 
of  the  results  to  be  obtained  is  always  vital  in  such  a  question, 
always  an  issue — if  jth.e- negative  fights  on  it.  And  if  the  new 
system  will  not  remove  present  evils — or  will  introduce  others 
just  as  bad  or  worse — then  it  is  no  good.  So  if  the  negative 
blocks  the  affirmative  on  a  single  issue  the  affirmative  loses. 


THE  ISSUES  45 

C.  Terminology.  Since  there  is  considerable  confusion 
in  regard  to  issues  in  argumentation,  and  since  various  kinds 
of  issues  are  sometimes  mentioned  in  either  law  or  general 
argument,  it  may  be  well  to  consider  the  uses  of  the  word 
with  its  appropriate  modifiers  in  each  field. 

1.  In  law.  Our  theory  of  issues  in  general  discussion  is 
borrowed  from  legal  procedure.^  We  shall,  therefore,  start 
with  a  lawyer's  statement  of  the  theory  of  issues  in  law. 
Professor  W.  C.  Robinson  gives  the  following  statement  in 
his   Forensic   Oratory:"^ 

"Every  cause,  civil  or  criminal,  consists  of  one  or  more 
propositions,  either  of  fact  or  law,  aflSrmed  by  one  side  and 
denied  upon  the  other.  If  but  a  single  proposition  is  affirmed, 
the  issue  is  a  simple  one,  and  the  denial  is  as  comprehensive 
as  the  affirmation.  Where  two  or  more  propositions  are 
affirmed,  the  denial  may  extend  to  all,  resulting  in  a  complex 
issue,  or  it  may  be  confined  to  one,  and  constitute  a  simple 
issue.  In  trespass  quare  clausum,  for  example,  the  plaintiff 
must  affirm  possession  in  himself,  and  an  unlawful  entry  by 
the  defendant.  The  defendant  may  deny  the  entry  or  the 
possession,  thus  tendering  a  single  issue,  or  by  a  general  de- 
nial he  may  raise  a  complex  issue,  and  put  the  plaintiff  upon 
proof  of  both.  Again,  in  burglary  the  commonwealth  affirms 
that  the  defendant  broke  and  entered,  in  the  night  season, 
with  felonious  intent,  into  the  dwelling  of  another.  A  gen- 
eral denial  creates  a  complex  issue,  ...  on  each  of  which 
the  commonwealth  must  establish  its  position  beyond  a 
reasonable  doubt.  Or  the  defendant  may  in  fact,  if  not  in 
form,  rest  his  defense  upon  a  single  issue  .  .  .  and  success- 
fully maintaining  this,  attain  the  same  result  as  if  .  .  . 
[all]  had  been  decided  in  his  favor. 

"Each  of  these  primary  issues  may  in  its  turn  contain 

other  [subordinate]  issues,  either  simple  or  complex,  whose 

determination  is  essential  to  the  decision  of  the  issue  which 

includes  them;  and  under  these  still  lesser  issues  may  be 

1  See  Pleading,  Appendix  B.  2  p^ges  62,  63. 


46  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

found,  until  the  whole  cause  may  be  made  to  rest  upon 
some  single  indivisible  fact,  or  on  some  simple  dictum  of  the 
law.  This  single  fact  or  dictum  then  becomes  the  actual 
issue  in  the  cause,  the  only  matter  in  dispute,  the  final  test 
of  legal  obligation.  Thus,  in  the  charge  of  burglary,  the 
defendant  may  deny  the  breaking,  on  the  ground  that  the 
door  by  which  he  entered  was  ajar,  and  on  this  fact  alone  the 
question  of  his  guilt  or  innocence  depends.  Or  in  a  trespass, 
if  the  defendant  justifies  his  entry  for  that  he  was  an  officer 
duly  serving  civil  process,  and  this  be  met  with  an  allegation 
that  his  entry  was  upon  the  Sabbath  before  the  setting  of  the 
sun,  the  entire  cause  may  be  reduced  to  the  question  as  to 
the  moment  when  defendant  entered  on  the  plaintiff's  land. 

"Whenever  the  issue  can  be  thus  simplified  and  con- 
centrated in  one  single  proposition,  the  labor  both  of  the 
advocate  and  of  his  auditors  is  rendered  short  and  easy. 
Confusion  and  obscurity,  as  far  as  is  ever  possible,  are  thereby 
excluded.  The  relevancy  of  the  proof  is  clearly  seen  and  the 
idea  of  legal  obligation  is  easily  developed  and  applied.  Jus- 
tice as  well  as  the  true  interest  of  both  parties,  therefore,  re- 
quires that  the  cause  should  be  presented  to  its  arbiters  with 
issues  as  few  and  as  well  defined  as  the  nature  of  the  contro- 
versy will  permit.  The  discovery  of  this  last,  decisive  issue 
is  the  first  duty  of  the  advocate.  This  constitutes  the  cause. 
This  is  the  only  proper  subject-matter  of  the  oration.  The 
ideas  which  lead  his  hearers  to  decide  it  in  his  favor  are  all 
with  which  he  need  concern  himself.  If  he  can  induce  them 
to  agree  with  him  on  this,  his  cause  is  won;  if  not,  his  cause 
is  lost." 

2.  In  general  argumentation.  These  primary  and  sec- 
ondary issues  are  found  in  all  argumentation.  The  use  of 
them  in  the  law  courts  differs  slightly  from  their  use  in 
argumentation  elsewhere  in  this:  in  a  court  the  primary 
issues  are  declared  and  set  forth  in  the  pleadings,  before  the 
real  argument  begins;  whereas  in  ordinary  argumentation  the 
finding  and  explaining  of  these  primary  issues  may  be  part 


THE  ISSUES  47 

of  the  debate  itself.  But  under  all  circumstances  these  issues 
and  the  method  of  finding  them  are  essentially  the  same. 
The  primary  issues  in  both  cases  must  be  sought  first.  The 
primary  issue  in  law  is  close  to  the  potential  issue  in  general 
argumentation,  but  in  the  latter  whenever  we  can  break  up  a 
primary  issue  into  say  three  points,  each  of  which  is  still 
vital,  then  we  have  three  potential  issues  and  will  have  to 
establish  all  of  them  as  actual  issues  if  the  negative  fights  on 
them.  The  outcome  of  the  argument  may  depend  almost 
entirely  on  the  establishment  of  some  one  or  more  of  the  sub- 
ordinate issues;  as,  for  instance,  the  question  of  whether  a 
dooB  was  slightly  ajar,  or  the  time  of  day  at  which  a  thing 
was  done,  or  the  trustworthiness  of  a  witness.  But  the  signif- 
icance of  any  such  subordinate  issue  is  derived  from  the  fact 
that  it  affirms  or  denies  one  of  the  primary  issues,  so  that  its 
bearing  and  importance  cannot  be  understood  until  one 
knows  the  primary  issue  which  it  serves  to  establish.  The 
primary  issues,  then,  must  be  found  first.  If  in  general  ar- 
gumentation we  keep  a  clear  distinction  between  "issues  of 
fact"  and  "issues  of  principle"  paralleling  the  law's  distinc- 
tions between  issues  of  fact  and  of  law,  we  will  save  consider- 
able time  and  avoid  much  confusion.  In  general  argument 
the  term  "issues"  is  usually  employed  instead  of  "complex 
issue." 

For  the  purposes  of  general  argumentation  it  seems  better 
not  to  use  the  term  "subordinate  issue."  In  this  freer  field 
in  which  we  are  not  bound  by  the  legal  systems  of  procedure 
and  rules  of  evidence,  the  problem  is  to  find  the  (primary) 
issues  or  issue,  and  then  proceed  to  attack  and  defend  with 
whatever  witnesses,  evidence,  and  arguments  are  available 
under  the  circumstances  of  the  particular  case.  The  broader 
term  "partition"  better  suited  to  general  argumentation 
renders  the  use  of  the  term  "subordinate  issues"  unnecessary 
and  undesirable.  In  this  book,  then,  the  term  "the  issues" 
will  be  used  to  designate  the  actual  issues — the  smallest  divi- 
sion of  points  that,  from  the  very  nature  of  the  problem,  the 


48  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

affirmative  must  establish  to  establish  the  proposition,  and 
which  the  negative  refuse  to  admit. 

a.  "  Potential  issues.**  The  potential  issues  are  always 
the  same  in  the  same  question;  they  exist  independently  of 
the  wills  of  the  disputants;  they  are  to  be  discovered,  not 
invented  or  chosen.  They  are  the  points  that  are  so  vital 
that  they  must  be  established  or  admitted  in  order  to  estab- 
lish the  proposition.  The  "potential"  issues — the  points 
that  will  have  to  be  proved  by  the  affirmative  unless  admitted 
by  the  negative — exist  in  the  very  nature  of  the  proposition, 
— and  are  always  the  same  in  the  same  proposition.  They 
are  always  the  same  for  affirmative  and  negative,  always  the 
same  for  every  affirmative  and  every  negative,  on  a  given 
proposition.  Their  discovery  results  from  a  thorough  analy- 
sis of  the  proposition. 

Of  course,  if  propositions  vary  in  any  way,  the  potential 
issues  may  vary.  "Resolved:  that  the  commission  form  of 
government  should  be  adopted  in  Chicago,"  is  not  necessarily 
the  same  proposition  as,  "Resolved:  that  the  commission 
form  of  government  should  be  adopted  in  Dayton,  Ohio."  In 
these  cases  the  potential  issues  may  or  may  not  be  the  same. 
But  if  on  a  certain  evening  twenty  debates  are  held  in  the  city 
of  Chicago  on  the  first  resolution,  the  potential  issues  will  be 
the  same  for  all  debates  and  for  both  teams  in  each  debate. 

b.  "  Admitted  issues."  Any  "potential  issues"  which 
the  negative  will  admit  may  for  convenience  be  called  "ad- 
mitted issues."  These,  of  course,  drop  out  of  the  contro- 
versy. Admitted  matter  obviously  cannot  be  an  actual 
issue.  The  issues  are  the  inherently  vital  points  that  are 
controverted  by  the  negative.  In  general  argumentation 
what  might  be  an  issue  if  it  were  denied,  falls  back  into  the 
class  of  "admitted  matter"  when  it  is  admitted,  and  ceases 
to  be  of  importance  in  the  discussion. 

For  instance :  If  in  a  given  action  possession  in  A  and  entry 
by  B  are  the  points  on  which  the  proposition  must  rest,  and 
one  is  admitted,  then  the  other  constitutes  the  sole  issue  in 


THE  ISSUES  49 

that  contest.  So  if  the  basic  vital  points  in  a  proposal  for  the 
adoption  of  a  certain  scheme  of  taxation  are  (a)  the  elimina- 
tion of  present  evils,  (b)  the  raising  of  sufficient  revenue,  and 
(c)  the  working  of  justice  to  all  classes,  (that  is,  not  bringing 
in  new  evils) — if  these  are  the  foundations  and  the  negative 
admits  (a),  then  the  issues  are  (b)  and  (c).  If  the  negative 
admits  (a)  and  (b)  then  the  issue  is  (c). 

D.  The  necessity  of  knowing  the  issues  cannot  be  over- 
estimated. Without  an  understanding  of  them  the  proposi- 
tion is  nothing  more  than  a  name.  Argument  on  any  ques- 
tion implies  some  difference  of  opinion;  it  means  that  there 
are  certain  ideas  affirmed  by  one  side  and  denied  by  the 
other.  The  proposition  is  merely  an  expression  of  this  clash 
of  opinion,  and  an  understanding  of  its  meaning  depends 
entirely  upon  a  comprehension  of  the  points  of  conflict. 
If  the  writer  would  prove  his  proposition,  he  must  prove  these 
critical  points.  Moreover,  the  value  of  his  materials  depends 
upon  their  relation  to  these  points;  any  evidence  that  gives 
a  direct  and  substantial  support  to  these  vital  facts  is  valua- 
ble; whatever  does  not  bear  directly  on  these  facts  is,  at 
best,  of  secondary  importance.  If  a  disputant  makes  a  mis- 
take in  finding  these  critical  points  on  which  the  discussion 
must  be  based,  he  may  well  waste  his  time  in  proving  some 
fact  that  will  not  help  him  after  it  is  proved,  or  he  may  be 
surprised  in  debate  by  attack  on  some  vital  point  which  he 
is  not  ready  to  defend.  This  danger  is  realized  and  guarded 
against  in  the  courts  of  law.  They  demand  that  the  issues 
shall  be  clearly  stated  in  the  beginning,  and  that  every 
piece  of  evidence,  whether  of  fact  or  of  law,  shall  have  a  di- 
rect and  evident  bearing  on  some  one  of  these  issues,  anything 
that  cannot  conform  to  this  test  being  declared  irrelevant 
and  being  excluded  from  consideration.  Then  again,  a 
speaker  or  writer  who  does  not  know  the  issues  will  probably 
confuse  his  readers  or  hearers  by  giving  them  a  false,  distorted 
view  of  his  case.  If  a  disputant  does  not  comprehend  just 
what  are  the  few  vital  points  of  his  case,  around  which  all  the 


50  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

lesser  facts  must  be  grouped,  his  proof  will  almost  certainly 
lack  the  unity  and  coherence  that  are  indispensable  for 
clearness  and  force  in  presentation. 

E.  Proposition  and  issues.  We  have  seen  in  the  pre- 
ceding chapter  that  in  order  to  have  intelligent  argumenta- 
tion, we  must  first  have  a  proposition.  The  proper  formulat- 
ing of  the  proposition  insures  that  we  have  one  single  question 
that  can  be  argued  directly  and  so  brought  to  a  definite 
conclusion.  This  proposition  thus  makes  clear  the  general 
position  which  the  disputant  must  argue  for  or  against.  But 
he  is  not  yet  ready  to  select  the  evidence  or  the  arguments 
with  which  to  support  his  contention.  He  has  merely  found 
the  field  of  battle.  Before  he  can  open  the  fight,  or  even  ar- 
range his  forces,  he  must  examine  the  ground  he  has  chosen, 
and  find  out  its  points  of  vantage  and  of  weakness.  The 
proposition  discloses  the  task  that  must  in  the  end  be  ac- 
complished, but  it  does  not  show  what  are  the  steps  neces- 
sary in  the  accomplishment,  or  just  what  method  may  be 
most  effective.  The  proposition  gives  a  single  question  for 
discussion;  but  even  in  any  such  single  question  there  are  in- 
numerable arguments,  points,  masses  of  evidence,  that  may 
be  brought  forward.  All  these  arguments  and  all  this  evi- 
dence cannot  be  used;  it  is  not  all  of  equal  value;  some  of  it 
will  have  such  a  direct  and  obvious  bearing  on  the  question 
that  it  must  have  great  weight;  but  much  of  it  will  have  such 
an  indefinite  and  remote  bearing  that  to  use  it  at  all  would 
be  a  waste  of  time.  Clearly,  then,  the  next  thing  for  the  dis- 
putant to  do  is  to  get  some  standards  by  reference  to  which  he 
can  determine  the  value  of  these  materials.  There  are  always 
certain  points  or  propositions  that  are  critical,  that  are  so 
vital  that  the  whole  question  must  hinge  on  them.  A  cen- 
tury and  a  half  ago,  John  Ward,  in  his  Systems  of  Oratory, 
said:  "But  in  all  disputes  it  is  of  the  greatest  consequence  to 
observe  where  the  stress  of  the  controversy  lies.  For,  without 
attending  to  this,  persons  may  cavil  about  different  matters, 
without  understanding  each  other  or  deciding  anything." 


THE  ISSUES  61 

In  any  discussion  the  "stress  of  the  controversy"  inevitably 
falls  upon  the  proving  or  disproving  of  a  few  points,  which 
are  the  center  and  soul  of  the  question :  only  as  those  who  have 
the  burden  of  proof  win  in  the  struggle  over  these  points 
can  they  win  the  whole  contest.  In  order,  therefore,  to  know 
what  proofs  to  use,  the  disputant  on  either  side,  must  first 
find  out  just  what  are  the  points  that  the  afiirmative  must 
establish  by  the  proofs  in  order  to  establish  the  proposition. 
These  points  are  the  issues. 

F.  Issues  and  burden  of  proof.  It  is  well  to  consider 
the  relation  of  the  theory  of  issues  to  various  aspects  of  the 
theory  of  burden  of  proof,  in  order  that  their  complete  har- 
mony may  be  clear  and  all  misunderstanding  avoided. 

1.  The  issues,  and  the  affirmative  and  negative.  The  af- 
firmative has  no  choice  in  regard  to  issues* — every  "potential 
issue"  which  the  negative  chooses  to  fight  on,  must  be  estab- 
lished. The  negative,  on  the  other  hand,  may  choose  among 
the  potential  issues  what  ones  to  admit  and  what  to  fight  on. 
In  law  this  choice  must  be  made  known  to  the  affirmative  in 
the  course  of  the  pleading,  so  that  a  suit  never  starts  without 
all  parties  knowing  the  issues  and  agreeing  as  to  what  the 
issues  are.  In  general  discussion  this  situation  should  be 
approximated  as  closely  as  possible.  Before  a  debate  starts, 
or  early  in  the  debate,  a  direct  clash  should  be  brought  about 
on  vital  points  that  are  left  after  all  admissions  have  been 
made.  The  affirmative,  of  course,  has  the  burden  of  proof  on 
each  issue.  Establishing  usually  means  "beyond  a  reason- 
able doubt"  or  by  "preponderating  evidence,"  so  the  nega- 
tive in  trying  to  block  a  case  seeks  to  raise  reasonable  doubts 
on  as  many  issues  as  possible,  and  usually  does  not  risk  every- 
thing on  fewer  issues  than  are  absolutely  necessary.  One 
man  may  doubt  on  one  issue  and  one  on  another,  so  it  is  well 
to  fight  on  as  many  as  offer  a  good  chance,  unless  one  can  be 
absolutely  sure  of  winning  on  fewer. 

2.  Issues  and  counter  proposition.  Sometimes  the 
negative  sets  up  a  substitute  or  counter  plan  or  proposition. 


52  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

When  this  is  the  case  the  negative  of  course  has  the  burden 
of  proof  as  to  its  plan.  The  issues  of  the  case  are  not  changed 
by  this  plan  of  defense.  If  the  substitute  does  not  offer  an 
obstacle  to  the  establishing  of  the  affirmative  side  of  the  is- 
sues it  is  a  waste  of  time  to  talk  about  it.  If  the  substitute 
can  be  so  presented  as  to  block  one  or  more  of  the  vital  points 
of  the  affirmative,  the  case  fails — the  negative  wins.  But 
the  substitute  may  not  have  won. 

For  example,  suppose  in  the  burglary  case  already  referred 
to  instead  of  confining  its  case  to  proving  unfounded  one  or 
more  of  the  five  accusations,  the  defense  simply  denies  them 
all  and  offers  evidence  that  proves  conclusively  that  B  com- 
mitted the  crime  in  question.  When  they  accuse  B  they  nec- 
essarily take  the  burden  of  proving  B  did  these  things.  But 
their  only  purpose  is  to  show  thereby  that  A  is  innocent. 
And  note  that  B  is  not  declared  guilty  as  the  result  of  this 
trial.  The  proposition  is  that  A  is  guilty.  The  affirmative 
have  failed  to  establish  their  case  either  by  having  been 
blocked  on  one  or  more  of  the  issues,  or  by  the  negative  offer- 
ing a  substitute.  But  the  substitute  did  not  vnn — not  in  thi? 
trial.  It  is  advanced  only  enough  to  show  that  the  claims  of 
the  affirmative  are  unfounded. 

Again  in  the  single  tax  illustration  already  given,  suppose 
that  the  negative  after  discovering  the  issues,  finding  out 
what  their  opponents  must  do  to  win,  decide  on  offering  a 
counter  proposition  instead  of  simply  attacking  these  issues. 
The  negative  claims  that  the  single  tax  system  should  not  be 
adopted  because  the  "classified  property  tax"  would  better 
meet  the  present  situation.  Now,  this  counter  proposition 
is  legitimate,  worth  while,  and  effective  only  if  it  meets  the 
issues  of  the  case  being  discussed.  Otherwise  it  is  simply 
arguing  beside  the  point,  evading  the  issue  rather  than  meet- 
ing it.  If  the  negative  can  show  by  comparison  with  the 
classified  property  tax  system  wherein  the  single  tax  system 
is  not  the  proper  method  by  which  to  eliminate  the  evils, 
yield  sufficient  revenue,  or  work  substantial  justice,  then  the 


THE  ISSUES  53 

negative  use  of  this  substitute  is  allowable  and  wise.  But  if 
it  does  not  meet  the  issues  in  the  original  proposition,  its 
use  is  neither  justifiable  nor  expedient. 

3.  The  issues  and  winning  or  losing.  In  what  we  have 
just  said  concerning  issues,  burden  or  proof,  and  winning  and 
losing,  we  have  had  in  mind  actual  cases  in  real  life,  not  con- 
test debates  before  judges  who  are  to  say  who  won  the  debate. 
All  that  has  been  said,  however,  applies  in  these  contest 
debates  exactly  as  it  does  in  a  law  court  or  political  campaign, 
except  the  remarks  on  winning  or  losing.  In  a  law  court,  in 
a  pohtical  campaign,  in  business,  in  science,  it  is  the  case 
that  is  being  passed  on.  The  decision  is  on  the  "  merits  of  the 
question,"  not  on  the  way  in  which  certain  advocates  handle 
the  case.  But  in  an  intercollegiate  debate,  for  instance,  the 
decision  should  go  always  on  the  skill  of  the  debaters,^  never 
on  the  strength  of  the  case  (except  in  so  far  as  this  is  indica- 
tive of  the  skill  of  the  debaters).  The  decision  to  mean  any- 
thing at  all  must  be  based  on  the  skill  shown  in  debating — 
not  on  the  strength  of  the  evidence  or  the  merits  of  the  case. 
A  debate  should,  of  course,  be  worked  out  and  presented  as 
though  the  decision  were  to  be  made  by  the  audience  or  jury 
or  judge  on  the  merits  of  the  case.  For  only  in  this  way  can 
the  contestants  show  their  real  ability  as  debaters,  but  the 
judges  should  know  enough  about  debating  to  render  a  de- 
cision on  ability  alone. 

G.  The  issues  and  conviction  and  persuasion.  The 
issues  are  the  points  that  will  have  to  be  established  by 
the  affirmative  in  order  to  convince  competent  judges  that 
their  plan  should  be  adopted.  The  issues  have  to  do  pri- 
marily with  conviction  rather  than  persuasion.  They  are 
the  basis  of  the  appeal  to  the  intellect.  The  work  of  persua- 
sion may  be  done  in  connection  with  proving  the  issues. 
In  selecting  evidence,  illustration,  phraseology,  the  emotional 
side  of  each  audience  (sentiments,  taste,  prejudices)  should 
always  be  kept  in  mind  as  one  of  the  guides  in  all  that  we  do. 
1  See  "Types  of  Decisions,"  eh.  16.    "The  Nature  of  Debate." 


54  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

But  in  discovering  the  issues  in  any  case,  we  must  consider 
only  the  intellectual  side  of  our  case — the  facts  and  the  jus- 
tifiable inferences  from  the  facts.  The  analysis  of  the  prop- 
osition to  find  the  issues  should  be  impersonal — not  done 
with  particular  audiences  or  judges  in  mind.  After  the  im- 
personal case  is  discovered  then  the  adjusting  of  it  to  any 
particular  tribunal  should  be  carefully  undertaken.  This, 
of  course,  means  paying  a  good  deal  of  attention  to  persua- 
sion. 

H.  Number  and  form  of  issues.  The  number  of  issues 
varies  necessarily  in  different  propositions.  There  are  not 
usually  more  than  three  or  four,  unless  in  some  technical 
or  legal  proposition  in  which  there  may  be  a  large  number. 
In  a  great  many  propositions  there  is  but  one  issue.  The  is- 
sues are  to  be  discovered.  Careful  analysis  will  reveal  them. 
We  cannot  decide  in  advance  to  "pick  out"  three  or  four 
issues.  We  may  find  three  or  four  and  we  may  find  but  one. 
When  we  have  found  the  number  of  points  that  may  be  is- 
sues from  the  nature  of  the  case,  our  next  step  is  to  find  out 
if  any  of  them  are  admitted.  If  so  we  place  them  in  the  in- 
troduction as  admitted  matter.  The  others  are  our  issues 
for  this  controversy. 

When  found  the  issues  should  be  expressed  in  such  question 
form  that  the  affirmative  will  answer  "Yes,"  and  the  nega- 
tive "No."  They  should  be  always  so  stated  in  a  brief,  and 
usually  so  stated  in  a  speech  or  written  argument.  Do  not 
say  "The  issue  is,  that  this  plan  will  be  financially  advan- 
tageous." Do  not  say  "The  issue  is,  *  What  will  be  the  finan- 
cial effect.?'"  The  proper  form  is:  "The  issue  is,  *Will  this 
plan  be  financially  advantageous?'"  This  represents  the 
clean-cut  question  that  must  be  answered — the  exact  point 
which  the  affirmative  affirms  and  the  negative  denies. 

I.  Issues  and  partition.  The  partition  consists  of  a  state- 
ment of  the  main  points  to  be  taken  up  in  the  discussion.  It 
is  an  enumeration  of  the  steps  to  be  taken  in  presenting  the 
case.    It  is  a  plan  of  campaign  determined  on  (and  usually 


THE  ISSUES  65 

announced)  in  advance.  The  partition  must  not  be  confused 
with  the  issues.  They  may,  it  is  true,  be  substantially  identi- 
cal, but  they  may  differ  widely.  There  may  be  one  issue  and 
four  points  in  partition — or  three  points  which  cover  the 
three  issues.  The  issues  must  all  be  vital  points.  The  points 
in  partition  must  all  be  important  but  not  necessarily  vital. 
If  a  single  issue  is  lost  the  case  fails.  One  or  more  points  in 
partition  may  be  lost  without  losing  the  case. 

Suppose  a  table  is  hanging  suspended  from  the  ceiling  by  a 
chain  of  three  links.  If  one  link  is  destroyed  the  table  falls. 
The  table  represents  "the  case,"  the  contention  of  the  affirm- 
ative; the  links  of  chain  represent  the  issues.  Suppose  the 
table  is  standing  on  five  legs.  One,  two,  or  three  legs  may 
be  removed  and  still  the  table  be  left  standing.  It  might  be 
that  four  legs  could  be  removed,  and  if  the  fifth  were  big 
enough,  and  placed  directly  in  the  center  of  the  table,  it  might 
hold  up  the  table,  especially  if  the  attack  on  it  were  very 
weak.  Here  the  table  again  represents  "the  case,"  and  the 
legs  represent  the  points  in  partition.  Or  suppose  two  armies 
are  contending  for  the  possession  of  a  given  territory,  the 
control  of  which  both  understand  must  depend  upon  the  oc- 
cupation of  two  particular  points  (the  issues),  a  pass  and  a 
certain  height  of  ground.  Now  there  are  various  positions 
which  the  two  opposing  forces  may  seize  and  hold,  and  vari- 
ous lines  of  attack  which  they  may  adopt,  depending  upon  the 
peculiar  habits  and  methods  of  the  respective  generals;  but 
these  positions  and  this  strategy  (the  partition)  are  valuable 
only  as  they  serve  to  give  the  command  of  these  two  critical 
points.  In  a  like  manner,  let  us  suppose  two  disputants  are 
arguing  the  questions :  "  Resolved :  that  the  army  canteen 
should  be  reestablished."  Now  the  settlement  of  this  ques- 
tion may  well  depend  upon  the  decision  of  two  issues;  namely, 
(1)  whether  the  canteen  is  beneficial  to  the  individual  soldier, 
and  (2)  whether  it  is  beneficial  to  the  army  as  a  whole.  A 
speaker  on  the  affirmative  might  in  his  argument  state  his 
intention  of  proving  three  points  as  follows:   (1)  that  the 


56  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

opinions  of  reliable  army  officers  are  favorable  to  the  canteen; 
(2)  that  the  number  of  arrests  for  drunkenness  increased 
when  the  canteen  was  abolished;  (3)  that  the  canteen  is 
beneficial  in  other  countries. 

These  three  points  may  be  well  chosen,  but  their  impor- 
tance must  be  derived  from  their  efficiency  in  establishing  the 
affirmative  side  of  the  two  issues  mentioned  above.  A  par- 
tition, then,  is  a  statement  of  the  points  the  arguer  intends 
to  prove;  the  issues  are  the  points  the  affirmative  must  prove 
in  order  to  prove  his  case.  If  the  points  of  the  partition  are 
well  chosen,  they  will  usually  correspond  closely  to  the 
issues;  but  they  may  be  entirely  different,  and  they  are  not 
in  any  case  necessarily  identical. 

J.  "  Stock  issues."  There  has  been  some  discussion 
recently^  in  regard  to  formulas  for  issues  or  "stock  issues'* 
that  can  be  applied  to  all  questions.  It  seems  obviously 
impossible  to  get  stock  issues  that  will  apply  to  all  different 
kinds  of  questions.  This  follows  from  the  very  nature  of  is- 
sues. But  in  regard  to  a  large  class  of  propositions  much 
used  in  contest  debate  a  certain  formula  may  be  used  as  a 
start  in  analysis.  We  refer  to  propositions  of  policy  having 
to  do  with  changes  in  necessarily  continuing  systems,  as 
taxation,  education,  railways,  water,  light  and  power  utili- 
ties, sanitation,  etc.  Here  are  problems  that  cannot  be 
dropped.  Here  are  enterprises  that  are  to  be  kept  going  on 
some  basis  or  other.  In  such  questions  we  may  well  start 
an  analysis  on  the  basis  of  two  "stock  issues."  The  phrase- 
ology may  differ — the  points  are  essentially  the  same.  Va- 
rious wordings  of  each  are  given: 

1.  Is  the  present  unsatisfactory?  Are  there  evils  in  the 
existing  situation.^  Is  there  a  cause  for  action.'*  Is  there  a 
disease?    Do  we  need  a  change?  etc. 

2.  Is    the    proposed   action   an    improvement?     Will   it 

1  See  The  Special  Issues,  by  J.  R.  Pelsma,  and  Formulas  for  the  Special 
Issue,  by  H.  B.  Gough,  The  Public  Speaking  Review,  Vol.  Ill,  No.  3  (Nov., 
1913),  pp.  1-8. 


THE  ISSUES  57 

cure  the  evils?  Is  this  the  action  we  should  take?  Is  this 
the  proper  remedy?     Is  the  proposed  change  the  right  one? 

New  systems  will  not  be  adopted  while  the  present  is 
satisfactory,  nor  unless  the  proposed  scheme  looks  like  a 
satisfactory  remedy  or  improvement.  So  the  man  with  a 
new  scheme  for  doing  something  that  is  to  continue  to  be 
done  on  some  scheme,  must  always  show  somehow  or  other 
(or  get  it  admitted)  that  there  is  something  wrong  and  his 
scheme  will  make  it  right. 

Why  then  are  these  not  really  the  exact  issues  in  all  such 
cases?  For  two  reasons  it  is  unsafe  to  accept  them  as  such. 
First,  because  analysis  may  show  a  more  specific  and  concrete 
wording  for  these  general  questions,  and  this  will  aid  in  many 
ways.  Second,  and  principally,  because  on  accurate  analysis 
it  may  be  found  that  one  of  these  questions,  especially  num- 
ber two,  will  break  up  into  say  three  questions,  each  of  which 
must  be  proved  by  the  affirmative.  So  each  is  an  issue, 
and  we  have  a  case  of  four  issues  instead  of  two.  For  exam- 
ple, suppose  the  proposition  deals  with  a  new  city  water  sys- 
tem. We  take  the  first  stock  issue  and  find  out  how  specifi- 
cally we  can  express  this.    It  results  in  one  question,  perhaps, 

(1)  Is  the  present  water  supply  insufficient?  Then  analysis 
of  the  situation  may  show  three  questions  each  of  which  must 
be  affirmatively  answered  or  the  whole  scheme  fails — These 
three  for  instance,   (1)   Is  the  proposed  supply  sufficient? 

(2)  Is  it  pure?  (3)  Can  we  afford  to  get  it?  So  in  this  case 
we  find  four  actual  issues,  instead  of  two.  If  the  negative 
block  one  of  the  four  the  affirmative  loses. 

Notice,  however,  that  it  is  not  sufficient  to  be  able  to  break 
up  a  big  question  into  three  or  four  small  ones;  each  small 
one  must  be  absolutely  vital,  or  it  is  no  issue.  For  instance, 
suppose  a  big  question  hit  upon  under  some  question,  to  be: 
Is  this  proposed  method  financially  advantageous?  Later 
it  is  found  that  this  is  to  be  settled  by  answering  these:  (a) 
Will  it  increase  the  sales?  (b)  Will  it  permit  cheaper  raw 
material?     (c)  Will  it  lower  the  cost  of  advertising?    Are 


58  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

these  the  issues?  Clearly  not,  because  each  is  not  necessarily 
vital.  The  affirmative  could  lose  one  (any  one)  and  win,  if 
the  total  left  were  enough.  It  is  the  total  result  of  these 
three  factors  taken  together  that  is  the  issue.  These  might 
well  be  main  points,  points  in  partition,  and  might  all  be  bit- 
terly fought,  but  they  are  not  issues.  The  big  question  of 
financial  advantage  which  these  go  to  prove  is  the  issue. 

II.  Finding  the^sues 

So  much  for  the  nature  of  the  issues.  We  now  have  to 
consider  the  problem  of  finding  them.  (While  we  usually 
refer  to  the  issues  rather  than  to  the  issue  it  must  be  re- 
membered that  often  we  have  but  one  issue.)  This  prob- 
lem varies  in  difficulty  under  different  propositions.  In 
many  propositions  the  issues  are  obvious.  All  we  need  to 
know  to  discover  them  is  the  nature  of  issues.  They  are  there 
in  sight;  we  have  only  to  recognize  them.  In  other  prop- 
ositions the  problem  of  analysis  is  a  long  and  difficult  one. 
For  such  cases  it  is  well  to  have  in  mind  specific  methods  or 
plans  of  action.  But  it  must  be  admitted,  and  always  re- 
membered, that  there  is  no  one  method  that  should  always  he 
applied  in  all  its  details  to  any  case  that  is  to  be  analyzed. 
The  steps  suggested  in  the  following  pages  should  be  taken 
in  any  case  as  far  as  is  necessary  to  discover  the  issues.  And 
tentative  issues  that  we  have  discovered,  or  points  claimed 
by  our  opponents  as  issues  may  be  tested  by  the  processes 
here  enumerated.  If  one  has  to  analyze  a  question  about 
which  he  knows  practically  nothing,  following  all  of  these 
steps  in  the  order  presented,  will  discover  the  issues.  But 
such  cases  occur  rarely.  The  right  thing  is  to  imderstand  the 
whole  system  and  use  whatever  part  of  it  seems  useful  in  any 
particular  case. 

A.  Think.  The  first  thing  to  do  in  any  case  is  to  think. 
This  must  always  be  done.  Careful  thinking  will  disclose 
the  issues  in  many  cases.    Think  the  proposition  over  from 


THE  ISSUES  59 

all  angles.  Ask  yourself  all  sorts  of  questions  about  it.  Who 
wants  thiis.^  Why.^  Whose  business  is  it.'^  Who  will  pay  for 
it.?  Who  will  suffer  by  it?  Who  will  profit  by  it?  What 
kind  of  question  is  it?  What  interests  are  at  stake?  Eco- 
nomic? Moral?  vEsthetic?  Social?  Political?  Commercial? 
Industrial?  Spiritual?  Educational?  Religious?  Literary? 
Artistic?  Which  one  of  these  terms,  some  of  which  are  over- 
lapping or  practically  synonymous,  best  characterizes  this 
question?  What  standards  within  this  field  must  we  be 
guided  by?  What  do  the  terms  used  mean?  How  many 
interpretations  could  possibly  be  put  on  this  proposition? 
Which  one  best  fits  the  particular  circumstances? 

B.  Study.  1.  History.  The  next  step,  and  one  that 
your  thinking  will  naturally  lead  you  to,  is  study.  If  we  do 
not  already  know  we  must  study  the  meanings  that  may  be 
attributed  to  the  terms  and  to  the  proposition  as  a  whole. 
As  issues  may  differ  with  different  propositions,  in  order  to 
find  our  particular  issues  we  must  learn  what  interpretation 
to  take  and  what  its  vital  points  are  by  studying  (1)  the  his- 
tory of  the  question  with  special  attention  to  (a)  its  origin 
and  (b)  the  occasion  for  the  present  discussion.  The  nature 
of  any  controversy  must  depend  largely  upon  the  circum- 
stances of  its  birth  or  the  causes  of  its  present  importance. 

The  following  is  an  excellent  illustration  of  finding  the 
issues,  taken  from  the  argument  by  Daniel  Webster  before 
the  Supreme  Court  in  the  case  of  Luther  vs.  Borden.  The 
events  that  gave  rise  to  this  case  occurred  in  Rhode  Island 
in  1841-42  and  were  what  was  popularly  known  as  the 
Dorr  Rebellion.    Mr.  Webster  began: — 

"It  is  well  known  that  in  the  years  1841  and  1842  political  agita- 
tion existed  in  Rhode  Island.  Some  of  the  citizens  of  that  State 
undertook  to  form  a  new  constitution  of  government,  beginning 
their  proceedings  toward  that  end  by  meetings  of  the  people,  held 
without  authority  of  law,  and  conducting  those  proceedings  through 
such  forms  as  led  them,  in  1842,  to  say  that  they  had  established 
a  new  constitution  and  form  of  government,  and  placed  Mr.  Thomas 


60  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

W.  Dorr  at  its  head.  ...  All  will  remember  that  the  state  of 
things  approached  if  not  actual  conflict  between  men  in  arms,  at 
least  the  'perilous  edge  of  battle.'  In  June,  1842,  this  agitation 
subsided.  The  new  government,  as  it  called  itself,  disappeared 
from  the  scene  of  action.  The  former  government,  the  Charter 
government,  as  it  was  sometimes  styled,  resumed  undisputed  control, 
went  on  in  its  ordinary  course,  and  the  peace  of  the  State  was 
restored. 

"But  the  past  had  been  too  serious  to  be  forgotten.  The  legis- 
lature of  the  State  had,  at  an  early  stage  of  the  troubles,  found  it 
necessary  to  enact  special  laws  for  the  punishment  of  the  persons 
concerned  in  these  proceedings.  It  defined  the  crime  of  treason, 
as  well  as  smaller  offences,  and  authorized  the  declaration  of  martial 
law.  .  .  .  This  having  been  done,  and  the  ephemeral  government 
of  Mr.  Dorr  having  disappeared,  the  grand  juries  of  the  State  found 
indictments  against  several  persons  for  having  disturbed  the  peace 
of  the  State,  and  one  against  Dorr  himself  for  treason.  This  in- 
dictment came  on  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  Rhode  Island  in  1844, 
before  a  tribunal  admitted  on  all  hands  to  be  the  legal  judicature 
of  the  State.  He  was  tried  by  a  jury  of  Rhode  Island,  above  all 
objection,  and  after  all  challenge.  By  that  jury,  under  the  instruc- 
tions of  the  court,  he  was  convicted  of  treason,  and  sentenced  to 
imprisonment  for  life. 

"Now  that  an  action  is  brought  in  the  courts  of  the  United  States, 
and  before  your  honors,  by  appeal,  ...  it  is  alleged  that  Mr.  Dorr, 
instead  of  being  a  traitor  or  an  insurrectionist,  was  the  real  gov- 
ernor of  the  State  at  the  time;  that  the  force  used  by  him  was 
exercised  in  defence  of  the  constitution  and  laws,  and  not  against 
them;  that  he  who  opposed  the  constituted  authorities  was  not 
Mr.  Dorr  but  Governor  King;  and  that  it  was  he  who  should 
have  been  indicted,  and  tried,  and  sentenced."  ^ 

2.  All  phases.  But  a  study  of  the  origin  and  history  of 
the  question  may  not  reveal  the  issues.  In  many  proposi- 
tions and  complicated  problems  we  must  go  further  and  study 
(2)  all  phases  of  the  present  situation.  Very  often  issues 
cannot  be  found  without  a  complete  understanding  of  the 
proposition  in  all  its  phases.  The  phase  that  is,  on  hasty 
1  The  Works  of  Daniel  Webster,  Vol.  VI,  pp.  217-219. 


THE  ISSUES  61 

judgment,  passed  over  as  seemingly  insignificant  often  de- 
velops with  careful  scrutiny  into  some  new  line  of  thought 
and  discloses  a  new  and  vital  issue.  We  must  not  consider 
the  economic  phase  of  the  question  to  the  exclusion  of  the 
ethical  or  aesthetic  phases.  If  a  question  has  a  moral  phase 
and  physical  phase,  an  educational  phase  and  a  political 
phase,  we  must  study  them  all.  Nothing  that  is  relevant 
can  safely  be  ignored,  however  much  it  may  seem  a  matter 
of  detail.  The  question  must  be  thoroughly  understood  in 
all  its  phases  before  any  attempt  is  made  to  state  the 
issues. 

3.  Both  sides.  Akin  to  this  study  of  all  the  phases  and 
points  of  view  is  the  necessity  of  studying  (3)  both  sides  of 
the  question.  With  a  knowledge  of  only  his  own  side,  a  dis- 
putant may  invent  some  points  that  he  decides  he  will  prove; 
but  he  cannot  know  the  real  issues.  The  issues  are  always 
the  points  on  which  there  is  a  conflict  of  opinion.  To  deter- 
mine where  this  conflict  is,  he  must  obviously  know  what  his 
opponents  maintain,  what  they  are  willing  to  admit,  and  what 
they  deny.  Consequently  there  is  nothing  that  will  help 
more  to  reveal  the  critical  points  in  any  discussion  than  to 
compare  the  arguments  advanced  by  the  conflicting  sides. 

C.  Exclude  (1)  Admitted  matter.  When  we  have  gained 
the  proper  knowledge  of  all  the  facts,  the  process  is  then  a 
process  of  exclusion  and  selection.  The  next  step  to  take 
then  is  to  exclude  (1)  admitted  matter.  Clearly,  if  both 
sides  admit  the  truth  of  a  certain  idea,  that  idea  cannot  be  a 
critical  point.  The  clash  of  opinion  cannot  arise  from  such 
a  point.  By  excluding  such  facts  as  these,  we  can  narrow  the 
material  down  to  the  significant  facts,  which  only  are  valua- 
ble. 

This  is  a  method  often  used  by  great  lawyers  and  delibera- 
tive orators.  Mr.  William  Wirt,  in  the  case  of  Gibbons  vs. 
Ogden,  finds  the  issues  of  the  case  by  first  excluding  the 
matters  that  may  be  admitted  by  either  side.  The  legislature 
of  New  York  had  granted  to  Robert  Fulton  and  others  cer- 


62  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

tain  exclusive  rights  of  navigation  on  the  waters  of  the  State. 
Mr.  Wirt,  in  his  speech,  was  endeavoring  to  prove  the  grant 
to  be  unconstitutional.    He  began : — 

"In  discussing  this  question,  the  general  principles  assumed  as 
postulates  on  the  other  side  may  be,  for  the  most  part,  admitted. 
Thus  it  may  be  admitted,  that  by  force  of  the  Declaration  of  Inde- 
pendence each  State  became  sovereign;  that  they  were,  then,  inde- 
pendent of  each  other;  that  by  virtue  of  their  separate  sovereignty 
they  had  each  full  power  to  levy  war,  to  make  peace,  to  establish 
and  regulate  commerce,  to  encourage  the  arts,  and  generally  to 
perform  all  other  acts  of  sovereignty.  I  shall  also  concede  that  the 
government  of  the  United  States  is  one  of  delegated  powers,  and 
that  it  is  one  of  enumerated  powers,  as  contended  for  by  the  counsel 
for  the  correspondent.  .  .  . 

"The  peculiar  rule  of  construction  demanded  for  those  powers 
may  also  be  conceded.  But  the  express  powers  are  to  be  strictly 
construed;  the  implied  powers  are  to  be  construed  liberally.  By 
this  it  is  understood  to  be  meant,  that  Congress  can  do  no  more 
than  they  are  expressly  authorized  to  do;  though  the  means  of  doing 
it  are  left  to  their  discretion,  under  no  other  limit  than  that  they 
shall  be  necessary  and  proper  to  the  end."  ^ 

It  is  often  a  help  when  we  cannot  know  the  minds  of  our 
opponents  to  ask  this  very  question:  Can  the  other  side 
afford  to  admit  this  fact?  It  was  in  this  way  that  Webster, 
in  the  famous  White  murder  trial,  established  one  of  his  is- 
sues in  the  face  of  the  contradictions  of  the  opposing  counsel. 

"The  counsel  say  that  they  might  safely  admit  that  Richard 
Crowninshield,  Jr.,  was  the  perpetrator  of  this  murder.  But  how 
could  they  safely  admit  that.?  If  that  were  admitted,  everything 
else  would  follow.  For  why  should  Richard  Crowninshield,  Jr., 
kill  Mr.  White.5^  He  was  not  his  heir,  nor  his  devisee;  nor  was  he 
his  enemy.  What  could  be  his  motive?  If  Richard  Crowninshield, 
Jr.,  killed  Mr.  White,  he  did  it  at  some  one's  procurement  who 
himself  had  a  motive.  And  who,  having  a  motive,  is  shown  to  have 
had  any  intercourse  with  Richard  Crowninshield,  Jr.,  but  Joseph 
1  9  Wheaton,  160. 


THE  ISSUES  63 

Knapp,  and  this  principally  through  the  agency  of  the  prisoner 
at  the  bar?  .  .  .  He  who  believes,  on  this  evidence,  that  Richard 
Crowninshield,  Jr.,  was  the  immediate  murderer  cannot  doubt  that 
both  the  Knapps  were  conspirators  in  that  murder.  .  .  .  The  ad- 
mission of  so  important  and  so  connected  a  fact  would  render  it 
impossible  to  contend  further  against  the  proof  of  the  entire  con- 
spiracy as  we  state  it." 

(2)  Irrelevant  and  (3)  unimportant  matter.  We  must  ex- 
clude from  the  material  in  which  we  will  find  the  issues  (though 
not  necessarily  from  any  use)  not  only  admitted  matter,  but 
also  (2)  irrelevant,  and  (3)  unimportant  matter.  There  are 
many  ideas  and  facts  that  are  commonly  associated  with 
the  proposition  which  do  not  really  have  any  logical  bear- 
ing on  it.  These  should  be  carefully  put  aside  at  the  out- 
set. Then  again,  there  are  many  other  facts  which  are  prop- 
erly embraced  within  the  meaning  of  the  question  which 
may  be  very  valuable  as  evidence  to  prove  other  facts,  but 
which  manifestly  are  not  important  in  themselves.  For 
instance,  in  a  civil  suit  for  damages  in  a  court  of  law  the 
honesty  or  the  intelligence  of  a  witness  might,  under  some 
circumstances,  become  very  significant,  the  establishment 
of  some  vital  point  depending  upon  his  reliability.  Yet  the 
character  of  this  witness  would  not  be  mentioned  in  the 
pleadings  as  one  of  the  issues,  for  his  credibility  is  not  im- 
portant in  itself,  but  only  because  of  its  effect  upon  some  other 
and  larger  point  in  the  case.  In  seeking  the  issues,  the  first 
step  should  be  to  exclude  such  facts  as  these,  which  are  mani- 
festly of  only  secondary  importance. 

The  following,  taken  from  Mr.  Jeremiah  S.  Black's  speech 
"In  Defence  of  the  Right  of  Trial  by  Jury,"  illustrates  the 
effective  use  of  this  method.  Here  the  speaker  found  his 
issues  by  the  exclusion  of  irrelevant  matter. 

"The  case  before  you  presents  but  a  single  point  and  that  an 
exceedingly  plain  one.  It  is  not  encumbered  with  any  of  those 
vexed  questions  that  might  be  expected  to  arise  out  of  a  great  war. 


64  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

You  are  not  called  upon  to  decide  what  kind  of  rule  a  military 
commander  may  impose  upon  the  inhabitants  of  a  hostile  country 
which  he  occupies  as  a  conqueror,  or  what  punishment  he  may  in- 
flict upon  the  soldiers  of  his  own  army  or  the  followers  of  his  camp; 
or  yet  how  he  may  deal  with  civilians  in  a  beleaguered  city  or  other 
place  in  a  state  of  actual  siege  which  he  is  required  to  defend  against 
a  public  enemy.  The  contest  covers  no  such  ground  as  that.  The 
men  whose  acts  we  complain  of  erected  themselves  into  a  tribunal 
for  the  trial  and  punishment  of  citizens  who  were  connected  in  no 
way  whatever  with  the  army  or  navy.  And  this  they  did  in  the 
midst  of  a  community  whose  social  and  legal  organization  had 
never  been  disturbed  by  any  war  or  insurrection,  where  the  courts 
were  wide  open,  where  judicial  process  was  executed  every  day 
without  interruption,  and  where  all  the  civil  authorities,  both 
State  and  National,  were  in  the  full  exercise  of  their  func- 
tions. .  .  . 

"Keeping  the  character  of  the  charges  in  mind,  let  us  come  at 
once  to  the  simple  question  upon  which  the  court  below  divided  in 
opinion:  Had  the  commissioners  jurisdiction,  were  they  invested 
with  legal  authority  to  try  the  relators  and  put  them  to  death  for 
the  offence  of  which  they  were  accused.^"  ^ 

4.  Indirect.  Furthermore  we  must  exclude  from  our 
issue  material,  regardless  of  its  general  relevancy  or  great 
importance,  all  (4)  indirect  matter  including  important 
subordinate  issues.  Every  important  and  relevant  fact  that 
is  denied  or  that  cannot  safely  be  admitted  is  not  necessarily 
one  of  the  issues.  It  may  be  a  subordinate  point,  important 
only  indirectly  because  the  proof  of  it  establishes  or  helps  to 
establish  some  larger  fact.  In  that  case  the  larger  fact,  that 
the  subordinate  fact  serves  to  prove,  is  one  of  the  issues. 
Usually  this  discrimination  between  the  issues  and  the  sub- 
ordinate points  is  not  diflScult.  The  issues  are  the  points  the 
proving  of  which  directly  proves  the  proposition  itself;  the 
proving  of  the  subordinate  points,  on  the  other  hand,  helps 
to  prove  some  larger  fact,  which  larger  fact  in  turn  serves  to 
prove  the  proposition.  The  issues  are  related  directly  to  the 
1  Great  Speeches  by  Great  Lawyers,  pp.  484,  485. 


THE  ISSUES  65 

proposition;  the  "  subordinate  issues,"  indirectly.  For  an  ex- 
ample, take  the  question:  "Resolved:  that  labor  unions 
should  be  compelled  to  incorporate."  In  the  consideration  of 
this  question  the  fact  would  be  emphasized  that  labor  unions 
had  very  rarely  broken  their  contracts  with  their  employers 
in  the  past.  This  would  clearly  be  only  a  subordinate  point. 
It  would  not  serve  to  establish  the  proposition  directly;  it 
would  be  significant  only  because  it  would  help  to  establish 
the  larger  fact,  that  there  was  no  occasion  (no  cause  for  ac- 
tion) for  compelling  the  unions  to  incorporate.  This  last- 
mentioned  point,  on  the  other  hand,  would  be  one  of  the 
issues;  it  would  be  a  vital  fact  not  admitted  by  the  opposing 
side,  on  which  there  was  a  clash  of  opinion,  and  it  would 
stand  in  direct  and  immediate  connection  with  the  prop- 
osition. 

D.  Select.  While  this  exclusion  has  been  going  on  we 
have  probably  been  selecting  at  the  same  time,  saving  out  the 
opposites  of  the  classes  of  points  we  have  excluded.  Our 
work,  then,  summed  up  positively,  has  been  to  select  (1) 
points  which  meet  the  test  of  C:  (a)  points  on  which  there 
is  a  direct  clash  of  opinion  (points  that  are  not  admitted — 
that  our  opponents  probably  will  not  admit),  (b)  relevant 
points,  (c)  important  points,  (d)  direct  (not  indirect  or  sub- 
ordinate) points.  Our  work  is  about  done.  These  points  are 
necessarily  few  and  may  constitute  the  issues  just  as  they 
stand.  There  is  one  test  which  will  determine  this.  Are  all 
of  these  points  vital  to  the  establishment  of  the  aflSrmative 
side  of  the  proposition?  We  must  select  only  vital  points, 
from  this  small  group.  Can  the  affirmative  side  be  estab- 
lished without  establishing  all  of  these  points.'^  If  so,  they 
are  not  all  issues.  If  the  affirmative  can  lose  a  point  and  still 
prove  its  case,  that  point  is  not  an  issue.  When  we  reach  this 
step  in  our  analysis  and  find  that  the  points  we  have  selected 
will  not  pass  this  final  test  the  difficulty  is  usually  that  the 
test  for  subordinate  points  and  indirectness  has  not  been 
strictly  applied,  and  that  we  have  three  or  four  points  under 


66  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

a  proposition  in  which  there  are  only  one  or  two  issues. 
What  we  need  is  a  point  or  two  that  will  group  these 
three  or  four  and  connect  them  to  the  proposition  in  a 
vital  way. 

Suppose  the  resolution  proposes  a  new  method  or  process 
in  manufacture,  in  which  there  is  no  question  of  ethics, 
politics,  social  justice,  or  any  such  phase  to  complicate  the 
issues,  and  suppose  you  have  narrowed  the  points  down  to 
three — the  new  process  will  lessen  the  cost  of  raw  material, 
will  make  unnecessary  the  paying  of  certain  royalties  now 
being  paid,  and  will  produce  a  valuable  by-product.  These 
points  have  passed  your  tests  of  importance,  relevance,  etc., 
and  are  all  emphatically  denied  by  your  opponents.  Are 
they  issues?  No;  they  are  points  in  partition.  There  is 
not  an  issue  among  them,  because  no  one  of  them  is  really 
vital.  Suppose  the  negative  shows  that  you  will  not  lessen 
the  cost  of  raw  material — that  this  will  remain  unchanged. 
But  you  succeed  in  proving  the  saving  on  royalties  and  the 
gaining  of  a  new  by-product.  Of  course  you  have  estab- 
lished your  case — that  the  process  should  be  adopted.  Or 
suppose  the  negative  wins  on  two  of  them  and  shows  no 
change  in  regard  to  them,  while  you  show  a  gain  on  one. 
Your  case  is  established.  These  cannot  then  be  issues.  Each 
issue  is  so  vital  that  if  the  affirmative  fails  to  establish  one  of 
them  the  case  fails.  The  difficulty  here  is  that  you  are  trying 
to  get  three  issues  where  there  is  only  one,  viz.,  would  this 
process  bring  a  financial  advantage.  This  is  the  issue.  To 
establish  the  fact  that  this  process  should  be  adopted  the 
affirmative  must  show  financial  advantage,  and  this  may  be 
shown  in  any  possible  way.  There  is  only  one  issue.  The 
difficulty  arose  from  not  applying  the  test  for  directness 
strictly  enough. 

Summary  of  method  of  finding  the  issues: 
A.  Think:  On  the  proposition,  its  possible  meaning,  all  its 
elements,  and  aspects,  to  the  limits  of  your  present 
knowledge. 


THE  ISSUES  67 

B.  Study:  1.  History  of  question,  with  especial  attention  to 

a.  Its  origin, 

b.  Present  occasion  for  discussion. 

2.  All  phases  of  question. 

3.  Both  sides . 

C.  Exclude: 

1.  Mutually  admitted  matter. 

2.  Irrelevant  matter. 

3.  Unimportant  matter. 

4.  Indirect  matter. 

D.  Select: 

1.  Points  which  meet  the  test  of  C. 

2.  Vital  points. 


EXERCISE.    CHAPTER  4 

THE  ISSUES 

1.  Give  the  potential  issues  on  each  of  three  propositions 

on  subjects  used  in  Exercise  1,  of  Chapter  2. 

2.  Indicate  under  each  of  the  propositions  mentioned  above 

which  "potential  issues"  you  would  admit  if  you  were 
in  charge  of  the  negative  case. 

3.  Phrase  propositions  and  under  each  give  the  most  accurate 

phraseology  possible  for  the  "stock  issues"  on  each 
of  the  following  subjects:  Military  Preparedness;  the 

Commission  Form  of  Government  for city; 

State  Universities. 

4.  Give  accurately  all  the  steps  in  analysis  leading  to  the 

final  statement  of  issues  in  the  proposition  for  your 
original  forensic. 


SECTION  B.    SELECTION 
CHAPTER  5 

GATHERING    MATERIAL 

OUTLINE 

A.  Invention  and  selection. 

B.  Importance  of  preliminary  reading. 

C.  Necessity  of  method. 

D.  A  note- taking  system. 

E.  Note-book  or  card  system. 

F.  The  card  form. 

G.  Accuracy  in  documentation. 
H.  What  to  look  for. 

1.  Both  sides. 

2.  Arguments  and  evidence.    ^ 
I.    Where  to  look. 

J.    What  plan  to  follow. 

1.  Newspaper  reading. 
.  2.  The  effective  method. 

a.  General  conditions. 

b.  Questions  in  dispute. 

c.  Details  of  evidence. 
K.  What  to  do :  assimilate. 

L.  The  way  to  assimilate  material. 

M.  Personality. 

N.  Conscious  practice. 

A.  Invention  and  selection.  In  the  discussion  of  the 
chapters  under  the  head  of  Invention  we  have  seen  how  a 
question  must  be  analyzed  in  order  (1)  to  understand  what  is 
the  real  proposition  to  be  established,  (2)  and  to  understand 
how  to  handle  the  burden  of  proof  in  regard  to  it,  and  (3)  to 
find  out  the  issues,  the  vital  ideas  or  matters  of  fact  which 
must  be  established  to  establish  this  proposition.    We  next 

68 


GATHERING  MATERIAL  69 

come  to  a  consideration  of  the  means  and  methods  to  be 
employed  in  the  work  of  advancing  or  opposing  the  establish- 
ment of  these  vital  points,  or  issues,  which  have  been  dis- 
covered. As  we  shall  see  later,  much  depends  on  the  methods 
by  which  we  arrange  our  material  and  present  it  to  the  reader 
or  hearer.  But  before  we  can  arrange  our  proofs  or  present 
them,  we  must,  obviously,  take  the  various  steps  in  the  proc- 
ess of  Selection,  and  so  get  the  exact  material  to  be  used. 
This  getting  of  material  naturally  divides  itself  into  two 
parts :  first,  the  gathering  of  material  by  preliminary  reading 
or  investigation;  and  second,  the  testing  of  the  material  we 
find,  and  the  selection  of  those  parts  that  will  best  serve  our 
purpose  in  a  given  case.  In  the  work  of  this  second  part  we 
will  be  aided  by  a  knowledge  of  evidence^  forms  of  arguments, 
and  fallacies — ^the  topics  treated  in  the  next  three  chapters. 
Of  course,  in  practice  these  steps  in  the  process  of  selection 
are  not  always  mutually  exclusive.  Usually  we  test  and  se- 
lect, using  our  knowledge  of  evidence,  arguments,  and  fal- 
lacies as  we  do  our  reading,  and  thus  we  choose  or  reject  our 
material  as  we  find  it  while  we  are  gathering  our  evidence 
together. 

B.  Importance  of  preliminary  reading.  All  argumen- 
tation which  involves  preparation  of  any  kind  involves  a 
considerable  amount  of  preliminary  reading.  The  amount 
varies;  but  in  most  serious  argumentative  work  the  time  thus 
spent  is  probably  greater  than  that  spent  in  all  the  other 
work  of  preparation  taken  together.  The  lawyer  spends  by 
far  the  greater  part  of  his  time  in  examining  witnesses,  docu- 
ments, and  authorities.  The  able  senator  or  representative 
preparing  for  debate  works  longest  and  hardest  in  the  col- 
lection of  facts  and  figures.  The  intercollegiate  debater 
labors  for  weeks  in  libraries  to  gather  the  materials  for  a 
twelve-minute  speech.  Surely  a  part  of  our  work  so  funda- 
mental and  so  arduous  is  worthy  of  the  most  careful  consid- 
eration. It  is  of  sufficient  importance  to  demand  that  we 
adopt  a  clear  and  effective  method  of  doing  it. 


70  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

C.  Necessity  of  method.  In  the  case  of  the  beginner  in 
argumentation,  it  must  be  admitted  that  a  great  deal  of  time 
is  wasted  here.  To  a  man  who  has  had  no  practical  experi- 
ence, there  does  not  seem  to  be  any  particular  need  of  method 
in  reading.  Newspapers,  magazines,  and  encyclopaedias  all 
seem  alike  as  long  as  he  can  find  in  them  anything  bearing 
on  the  question.  His  method  commonly  is  to  start  in  any- 
where and  read  as  long  as  he  can.  Inevitably  he  wastes 
many  hours  at  the  start  on  worthless  material,  and  later, 
to  make  up  the  time,  he  rushes  along  over  the  best  authori- 
ties with  careless  haste.  Again,  such  a  reader  does  not  really 
comprehend  or  assimilate  what  he  reads.  He  reaps  a  harvest 
of  quotations  from  here  and  there,  picks  out  a  few  points 
from  this  writer  and  that,  and  he  thinks  his  preparation  is 
complete.  This  inability  to  gather  material  intelligently 
is  a  serious  weakness.  A  rational  method  is  necessary.  There 
must,  of  course,  be  individuality  in  all  work  of  this  kind; 
personality  should  everywhere  be  cultivated  rather  than 
repressed.  But  the  principles  given  here  have  been  engen- 
dered by  common  experience  and  are  so  capable  of  universal 
application  that  every  man  should  follow  them  unless  he  is 
in  a  position  to  set  them  aside  deliberately  in  favor  of  other 
specific  principles  that  seem  better  fitted  to  his  particular 
needs.  They  must  not  be  violated  through  ignorance  or 
carelessness. 

D.  A  note-taking  system  must  be  used.  It  is  a  common 
mistake  for  a  student  to  trust  to  his  memory  the  safe-keeping 
of  the  ideas  that  he  finds,  with  the  almost  inevitable  result 
that,  when  called  for,  the  ideas  are  not  available.  They  either 
vanish  and  contribute  nothing  to  the  cause,  or  they  must 
be  sought  anew  at  some  future  time  at  the  cost  of  redupli- 
cated work.  Often  it  becomes  necessary  to  verify  some  idea 
that  has  been  suggested  by  some  magazine  article,  or  to  reen- 
force  it  with  some  good  authority,  and  the  chances  are 
strongly  against  the  probability  that  the  original  article 
can  be  found  again.     It  is  an  extraordinary  memory  that 


GATHERING  MATERIAL  71 

can  recall  such  a  reference.  Again,  it  is  not  always  possible 
to  tell  at  the  beginning  just  what  evidence  will  finally  be  val- 
uable. Facts  that  seem  trivial  at  the  moment  when  we 
read  them  may  turn  out  in  the  end  to  be  important.  But  if 
no  note  is  taken  of  them,  they  are  almost  surely  lost.  Against 
these  and  many  other  evils  there  is  but  one  safeguard.  A 
system  of  note-taking  must  always  be  used.  Facts,  ideas, 
arguments,  illustrations,  must  be  noted  down  in  substance, 
or  copied  as  full  quotations,  when  they  are  discovered. 

E.  A  note-book  or  a  card  system  may  be  used.  A  note- 
book is  perhaps  easier  to  carry  around,  offers  better  facilities 
for  copying  long  extracts  and  preserving  clippings,  etc.,  and 
binds  all  the  material  together  in  a  single  compact  volume. 
But  the  card  system  offers  great  advantages  in  sorting, 
testing,  organizing,  using,  and  filing  the  material  gathered. 
Unless  there  are  specific  reasons  arising  from  the  circumstancs 
of  a  given  case  for  using  a  note-book,  the  card  system  should 
be  used.  A  few  cards  only  need  be  available  for  each  day's 
reading.  The  accumulated  material  may  be  kept  carefully 
filed  away  in  one  place.  When  the  time  comes  for  drawing 
the  brief,  or  preparing  the  written  argument,  the  speech,  or 
the  debate,  the  cards  can  be  easily  sorted,  and  the  best 
material  can  be  quickly  selected  and  arranged  in  proper  order 
for  use.  All  the  material  gathered  on  a  given  subject  can  be 
properly  indexed  and  filed  away  for  use  at  any  future  time. 

F.  The  card  form  shown  here  is  recommended.  It  pro- 
vides for  accurate  recording  of  material,  authority  (writer 
or  speaker),  and  source  where  this  material  was  found.  The 
advantages  of  having  all  the  documentation  at  the  top  of  the 
card,  rather  than  at  the  bottom,  are  many.  This  makes  it 
easier  to  refer  to  the  cards  in  a  filing  case  or  card  index,  with- 
out loss  of  time  and  without  disturbing  the  whole  file.  This 
also  makes  it  easier  to  sort  and  handle  them  at  a  desk,  and 
they  are  much  more  convenient  for  use  on  the  platform  in 
actual  speaking  or  debate.  It  is  easy  to  preserve  permanently 
in  immediately  usable  condition  all  the  material  one  gathers 


72 


ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 


on  such  cards — ^and  the  store  may  grow  at  any  point  without 
disturbing  the  material  on  any  other  point.  Cards  may  be 
removed  or  added  on  any  sub-topic,  as  the  material  available 
changes  from  time  to  time.  On  the  face  of  the  card,  of  course, 
should  be  written  (or  pasted,  if  clippings  are  used)  either 
exact  quotations,  paraphrases  of  the  substance,  or  simply 
a  characterization  of  the  book,  article,  or  speech  referred 
to  at  the  top  of  the  card.  A  card  four  by  six  inches  is  very 
convenient;  but  a  larger  or  smaller  card  will  do  about  as  well. 


TOPIC 

AUTHORITY 

SOURCE 

Effect  on 
Workman  s  Health 

Dr.  John  Smith, 

Chairman  Blank 

Commission 

Oidlook,  Vol.  20, 
p.  123 

G.  Accuracy  in  documentation  ^  is  essential.  The  exact 
authority  and  source  should  always  be  recorded.  References 
to  a  "well  known  physician,"  a  "physician  writing  in  The 
Outlook'\  or  to  "  The  Outlook",  or  "  The  Outlook,  Vol.  20,"  are 
all  practically  worthless.  If  you  or  others  wish  later  to 
verify  the  reference  it  will  be  difficult  to  do  so  unless  the  orig- 
inal reference  is  exact.  If  you  quote  at  all,  quote  accurately, 
and  use  quotation  marks,  and  dots  to  indicate  any  words 
left  out.  Both  in  gathering  and  in  using  material  give  credit 
for  all  quotations,  expressions,  and  even  ideas  and  illustra- 
tions that  are  borrowed  directly  from  a  definite  source.  In 
gathering  material  it  is  well  to  copy  direct  quotations  very 
*  See  Documentation  and  Argument  from  Authority,  Ch.  6. 


GATHERING  MATERIAL  73 

freely.  But  in  the  process  of  making  up  your  case  you  should 
make  the  thought  of  most  of  the  quotations  a  part  of  your 
thought,  and  so  use  few  direct  quotations  in  the  presentation 
of  your  argument,  except  where  you  think  added  advantage 
comes  from  giving  the  exact  words  of  some  recognized  au- 
thority, on  the  subject  being  treated — as  for  instance  the 
quotations  in  this  text  from  well-known  writers  on  logic, 
law,  etc. 

Having  realized  the  necessity  of  making  an  investigation, 
and  having  adopted  a  method  of  note-taking,  the  student 
who  has  an  argument  to  prepare  may  then  well  ask  four 
questions :  What  shall  I  look  for?  Where  shall  I  look?  What 
plan  of  search  shall  I  follow?  What  shall  I  do  with  the 
material  1  gather? 

H.  What  to  look  for.  1.  Understanding  both  sides.  The 
broad  general  answer  to  this  first  question  is  that  the  investi- 
gator must  look  for  material  that  will  enable  him  to  under- 
stand both  sides  of  his  question.  To  know  both  sides  of  the 
question  thoroughly  is  of  great  value  in  all  stages  of  argu- 
mentation. In  the  first  place,  without  such  knowledge  a 
disputant  cannot  have  that  understanding  of  his  case  as  a 
whole  which  must  precede  the  intelligent  use  of  evidence  and 
arguments.  We  have  already  seen  that  the  first  step  in  prepa- 
ration, and  one  of  the  most  important  steps,  is  always  the 
finding  of  the  issues.  But  these  issues  cannot  be  found,  nor 
the  partition  arranged,  except  by  knowing  both  sides.  The 
issues  are  always  the  points  on  which  there  is  a  direct  clash  of 
opinion,  and  frequently  these  points  can  be  found  only  by 
comparing  the  assertions  of  the  opposing  parties  and  as- 
certaining just  where  these  assertions  are  contradictory. 
The  partition  is  a  statement  of  the  main  points  on  which  you 
are  to  base  your  attack  on  your  opponent's  case,  and  your 
defense  of  your  own  case  against  your  opponent's  attack. 
A  partition  arranged  without  knowledge  of  your  opponent's 
case  would  obviously  be  quite  useless.  Again,  a  disputant 
who  knows  only  the  arguments  on  his  own  side  of  the  case 


74  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

may  find  himself  helpless  when  confronted  with  some  unex- 
pected argument  of  his  opponent.  This  inability  to  meet  and 
repel  an  opponent  is  fatal  to  success  in  argumentation,  and  it 
must  be  guarded  against  in  preparation.  Such  arguments 
are  rarely  to  be  answered  by  inspiration.  Inspiration  is  not 
always  reliable.  The  necessary  knowledge  must  be^  gained 
before  the  actual  crisis  comes;  and  it  can  be  gained  only  by 
studying  the  other  side  of  the  question  and  considering  how 
any  attack  may  best  be  met. 

2.  Arguments  and  evidence.  A  more  specific  answer  to 
the  first  question  mentioned  above,  is  that  the  reader  must 
usually  look  for  two  classes  of  material,  which  might  be 
labeled  arguments  and  evidence.  First,  the  reader  should 
find  the  point  of  view,  the  opinion,  which  the  writer  of  any 
book  or  article  takes  of  his  subject  as  a  whole,  and  also  the 
points  which  he  seems  to  regard  as  the  critical  points  in  the 
case,  his  reasons  for  his  opinion,  his  arguments  pro  or  con. 

Second,  the  reader  should  look  for  evidence,  facts  stated, 
incidents  cited,  statistics  given,  illustrations  used,  or  any 
quotable  matter.  These  points  and  quotations  should  be 
noted  as  they  rise.  It  is  a  common  experience  of  a  beginner 
that  he  passes  over  some  idea  or  some  apt  quotation  without 
taking  note  of  it,  to  find  that  later  if  he  only  had  it  at  hand 
it  would  be  a  valuable  piece  of  evidence  or  a  strong  argument 
from  authority.  New  evidence  is  valuable  wherever  it  is 
found,  and  some  note  should  always  be  taken  of  it.  Opin- 
ions, on  the  other  hand,  are  usually  valuable  only  as  they 
come  from  some  writer  who  is  a  recognized  authority  on  the 
subject.  And  it  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  as  to  who  is 
a  recognized  authority  the  audience  is  always  the  final  judge. 
No  matter  how  great  the  knowledge  of  any  writer,  if  he  is 
unknown  to  the  audience  or  doubted  by  them,  the  quotation 
ceases  to  have  value  as  an  ''argument  from  authority." 
But  while  reading  the  words  of  a  writer  of  acknowledged 
standing,  the  note-book  should  be  freely  used.  The  quota- 
tion may  be  taken  down  in  full,  or  some  reference  may  be 


GATHERING  MATERIAL  75 

noted  to  the  place  where  it  is  found;  but  it  must  not  be  suf- 
fered to  escape  entirely. 

I.  Where  to  look.  The  question  "Where  shall  I  look?" 
will  probably  not  bother  many  students  in  colleges  and  uni- 
versities. Those  who  have  a  good  library  available  will 
turn  at  once  to  published  bibliographies,  card  indexes,  and 
such  monthly  and  annual  indexes  as  The  Readers  Guide, 
Poolers  Index,  and  The  Annual  Library  Index.  Those  who 
cannot  immediately  command  the  facilities  of  a  large  library, 
or  who  for  any  reason  want  more  specific  suggestions  on 
sources  of  material  for  argument,  should  write  to  University 
Extension  divisions,  public  libraries,  etc. 

J.  What  plan  to  follow.  The  question  of  a  plan  to  be 
followed  in  the  use  of  various  sources  demands  fuller  consid- 
eration. The  correct  principle  to  follow  is  undoubtedly  to 
read  from  the  general  to  the  specific.  A  lawyer  preparing  his 
case  for  court  begins  his  examination  of  witnesses  with  the 
examination  of  his  client.  With  his  story  as  a  foundation 
he  then  goes  on  to  seek  the  lesser  details  that  he  needs  to 
"fill  in"  his  case.  He  knows  that  to  begin  with  the  testi- 
mony of  his  lesser  witnesses  would  result  in  a  confusion  and 
waste  of  time.  He  might  find  that  the  testimony  he  had 
spent  hours  in  seeking  was  more  easily  found  elsewhere,  or 
that,  after  all,  it  was  of  no  service  to  the  cause  of  his 
client. 

1.  Newspaper  reading.  The  principle  applies  with  equal 
force  in  the  search  for  evidence  by  preliminary  reading  in 
general  argumentation.  For  example,  the  American  news- 
paper is  a  valuable  source  of  material.  Few  are  the  discus- 
sions where  it  cannot  be  used  with  effect,  if  it  is  used  properly. 
But  in  most  cases  it  should  be  handled  as  the  lawyer  would 
handle  the  witness  who  testified  that  the  defendant,  on  a 
certain  day  and  hour,  came  to  a  certain  livery  stable  and 
hired  a  certain  horse  and  carriage.  Such  evidence  might 
hang  a  man;  the  whole  question  of  the  guilt  of  a  murderer 
might  depend  on  the  identification  of  that  particular  horse 


76  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

and  carriage.  But  that  witness  is  not  the  first  to  be  examined; 
it  might  happen  that  his  testimony  had  no  bearing  on  the 
case.  The  newspaper  should  be  used  in  a  similar  way.  It  is 
valuable  as  a  means  of  corroboration;  it  may  be  valuable  as 
a  source  of  facts  for  the  support  of  some  vital  argument. 
But  it  should  rarely  be  read  first.  Various  dangers  arise 
from  such  premature  reading  of  the  newspaper.  In  the  first 
place,  it  would  often  mean  a  waste  of  time.  A  writer  of  ac- 
knowledged authority  on  a  particular  problem  will  put  into 
a  few  lines  the  substance  of  the  whole  of  a  pop^lar  newspaper 
editorial.  Again,  the  student  who  seeks  such  a  lesser  source 
first  will  find  that  he  has  spent  time  in  gathering  arguments 
and  facts  that  better  writers  easily  refute.  More  serious  still, 
an  investigator  will  often  get  from  such  a  doubtful  source 
false  impressions  that  later  reading  cannot  entirely  efface. 
The  work  of  preliminary  reading,  in  this  respect,  is  an  exact 
analogy  to  the  work  of  the  architect  or  the  contractor.  What 
kind  of  judgment  would  it  be  on  his  part  to  plan  his  roof  and 
windows  before  he  knew  the  size  of  the  house  or  the  general 
style  of  its  architecture.''  The  writer  who  goes  in  search  of 
newspaper  facts  before  he  knows  the  fundamental  conditions 
of  the  problem  in  hand  and  the  broad  outlines  of  his  case 
shows  no  better  judgment. 

2.  The  effective  method  is  to  begin  the  investigation 
with  the  reading  of  (a)  books  and  magazine  articles  that  give 
an  understanding  of  the  general  conditions  on  which  the 
question  is  founded.  The  understanding  so  gained  is  a 
touchstone  by  which  all  else  may  be  tested.  Next,  take  up 
(b)  magazine  articles  or  pamphlets  bearing  on  the  particular 
question  in  dispute.  By  this  time  the  main  ideas  on  which 
the  proof  must  be  founded  gradually  appear,  and  the  case 
as  a  whole  begins  to  assume  a  definite  form.  Finally,  make 
a  discriminating  use  of  (c)  such  sources  as  the  newspaper,  to 
get  details  of  evidence  still  needed  in  addition  to  that  alreadj' 
gathered  to  support  all  points  you  wish  to  prove.  It  is  only 
by  following  such  a  plan  of  reading  as  this  that  there  can  be 


GATHERING  MATERIAL  77 

secured  the  three  things  most  to  be  sought  in  the  work  of 
reading  prehminary  to  arrangement  and  final  presentation, 
viz.:  (a)  a  grasp  of  the  question  as  a  whole;  (b)  an  under- 
standing of  the  vitally  important  points  in  the  case;  and  (c) 
the  getting  of  evidence  that  is  relevant  and  reliable. 

K.  What  to  do :  assimilate.  Lastly  in  regard  to  the  step 
we  are  now  considering,  the  thing  to  do  with  the  material 
gathered  is  to  assimilate  it.  "Assimilation  is  the  process 
by  which  plants  and  animals  convert  food  into  the  various 
tissues  of  their  own  proper  substance.'*  When  a  man  eats, 
if  the  food  he  takes  is  properly  assimilated,  it  ceases  to  exist 
as  food  and  becomes  part  of  the  man  himself.  So  in  argu- 
mentation, assimilation  is  the  process  by  which  the  student 
converts  the  materials  gathered  from  all  sources  into  the 
fibers  of  his  own  finished  arguments.  We  have  stated  in  the 
preceding  section  that  the  first  thing  to  be  sought  in  the  read- 
ing of  any  book  or  article  is  the  point  or  points  which  the 
writer  regards  as  vital  in  the  case.  Merely  to  seize  upon  these 
ideas,  however,  and  force  them  bodily  into  the  proof  without 
change  of  form,  would  inevitably  produce  the  same  disastrous 
effects  that  would  ensue  if  a  man  should  eat  without  digestion. 
The  proof  would  be  weak  and  ill  formed.  It  would  be  a  mere 
jumble  of  facts  and  figures.  The  varied  and  inharmonious 
ideas  of  different  men  would  be  mixed  together  in  confusion. 
The  force  of  evidence  that  might  be  made  convincing  would 
be  spent  with  no  effect.  To  have  strength  and  vitality  in 
proof,  the  ideas  and  arguments  of  other  writers  and  thinkers 
must  be  so  fused  with  one  another  and  with  the  ideas  of  the 
student  himself,  that  the  final  product  bears  little  if  any  re- 
semblance to  any  one  of  the  parts  of  which  it  is  made;  it  is  not 
the  idea  of  this  book  or  that,  nor  the  idea  of  the  reader,  but  an 
indivisible  composite  of  all.  Like  the  body,  the  proof  is  made 
of  many  kinds  of  substances,  but  it  must  itself  be  new  and  a 
distinctive  unit. 

L.  The  way  to  assimilate  material.  There  is  but  one 
way  in  which  material  can  be  so  assimilated.     It  must  be 


IS  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

done  by  the  careful  and  constant  thought  of  the  reader  as  he 
progresses,  step  by  step.  When  one  starts  out  to  read  on  any 
subject,  he  nearly  always  has  in  his  own  mind  some  original 
conceptions  of  the  question.  In  the  first  place,  then,  he 
should  understand  just  what  these  conceptions  are.  Then, 
when  in  the  course  of  his  reading  he  finds  some  new  idea, 
some  new  argument,  he  should  carefully  compare  it  with  the 
contents  of  his  own  mind,  and  modify  his  own  conceptions 
accordingly.  The  ideas  that  result  will  not  be  those  he  has 
read,  nor  will  they  be  those  he  had  originally:  they  will  be 
new.  This  process  must  be  kept  up  unremittingly.  The 
material  cannot  be  stored  up  for  future  assimilation  any 
more  safely  than  a  man  could  postpone  the  digestion  of  his 
food.  Each  bit  of  material  must  be  understood,  compared, 
and  assimilated  when  it  first  is  discovered.  The  evidence 
gathered  in  this  way  ceases  to  exist  in  its  various  foreign 
forms.  The  ideas  no  longer  overlap  or  conflict  with  one  an- 
other. They  fall  into  their  proper  places  as  parts  of  one 
working  body. 

M.  Personality.  Such  a  method  also  gives  to  the  proof 
the  invaluable  quality  of  personality.  Complete  originality 
in  argumentation  is  very  rare.  The  most  effective  speech  or 
essay  often  contains  ideas  and  evidence  that  have  become 
time-honored  by  their  frequent  usage.  But  the  ideas  are  so 
altered  by  the  personality  of  the  author  that  they  are  made 
new.  They  take  on  fresh^fnrms  atiH  colors  and  gather  an 
original  force]  No  quality  is  more  valuable  to  charm  or 
interest  an  audience  than  this  quality  of  personality;  and  the 
personality  that  is  forceful  in  argumentation  is  always  at- 
tributable largely  to  the  power  of  assimilation. 

N.  Conscious  practice.  This  power  is  gained  only  by 
practice.  It  may  well  grow  into  an  unconscious  habit  of  mind ; 
but  the  creation  and  development  of  it  must  always  come 
from  conscious  self-training.  The  ability  to  assimilate  is, 
of  course,  engendered  and  strengthened  by  other  means  than 
preliminary  reading  in  argumentation.    But  nowhere  is  the 


GATHERING  MATERIAL  79 

application  of  the  power  more  practical  or  more  important; 
and  a  student  who  is  enteriner  upon  the  serious  pursuit  of 
argumentation,  however  truiy  he  may  possess  this  quality 
of  mind  in  general,  will  do  well  to  watch  himself  for  a  time, 
lest  he  fall  into  other  habits. 


EXERCISE.    CHAPTER  5 

GATHERING  MATERIAL 

1.  Hand  in  at  least  twelve  cards  of  notes  gathered  for  use 
in  your  original  forensic,  carrying  out  accurately  the 
suggestions  and  directions  for  note-taking  on  cards  given 
in  this  chapter. 


CHAPTER  6 

EVIDENCE 

OUTLINE 

I.  The  Nature  of  Evidence 

A.  Persuasion  and  conviction  in  evidence. 

B.  Proof. 

C.  Evidence. 

D.  Argument. 

E.  Evidence  in  law. 

F.  Evidence  in  general  argumentation. 

G.  Sources  of  evidence. 
H.  Prejudiced  witnesses. 

II.  The  Kinds  of  Evidence 

A.  Direct  or  circumstantial. 

B.  Written  or  unwritten. 

C.  Real  or  personal. 

D.  Original  or  unoriginal  (hearsay). 

E.  Pre-appointed  or  casual. 

F.  Positive  or  negative. 

G.  Ordinary  or  expert. 

1.  "Argument  from  authority." 

2.  Documentation  of  sources  not  argument  from  authority. 

III.  The  Tests  of  Evidence 

A.  Tests  of  the  quality  of  the  evidence  itself. 

1.  Consistent  with  human  nature? 

2.  Consistent  with  known  facts? 

3.  Consistent  with  itself? 

4.  Can  it  pass  the  hearsay  test? 

a.  In  law  courts. 

b.  In  general  argumentation. 

80 


EVIDENCE  81 

(I)  The  nature  of  the  evidence  itself. 

(II)  The  channel  through  which  it  comes. 
5.  Is  it  exceptionally  valuable? 

a.  Admissions  against  interest. 

b.  Casual  or  undesigned. 

c.  Negative. 

d.  Real. 

B.  Tests  of  the  sources  of  evidence. 

1.  Ordinary  ("fact")  witnesses. 

a.  Physically  qualified? 

b.  Mentally  qualified? 

(I)  Memory. 

(II)  Accuracy. 

(A)  Thoughtless  exaggeration. 

c.  Morally  qualified? 

(I)  Unduly  interested  in  case. 

(II)  General  moral  character. 

d.  Opportunity  for  getting  the  truth? 

2.  Expert  ("Opinion")  witnesses. 

a.  Opinion  evidence  needed? 

b.  Authority  qualified? 

c.  Authority  recognized? 

I.    The  Nature  of  Evidence 

A.  Persuasion  and  conviction  in  evidence.  We  now 
come  to  the  consideration  of  the  second  of  the  two  parts  in 
the  process  of  Selection,  viz.,  the  choosing  from  whatever 
materials  we  have  been  able  to  gather,  of  those  facts,  argu- 
ments, or  appeals  that  will  best  serve  our  purpose  in  the  case 
in  hand.  Here,  as  everywhere,  we  must  remember  the  dual 
nature  of  all  argumentation:  our  materials  must  be  judged 
and  chosen  in  accordance  with  the  standards  both  of  con- 
viction and  of  persuasion.  _  Persuasion,  requires  that  we 
consider  th^  nharpntpr^  intplligATio^,  and  personal  interest.^ 
of  our  audience  or  readers,  and  the  r»ireiir"gtQTi^Ac  \n  whif>li 
we  are  a^gni'^gr  ^''^  that  we  may  make  use  of  the  ideas  and 
methods  that  will  strike  most  directly  and  forcibly  upon. 


82  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

the  imflgi'nfltinn  anH  pppiiliar  pmntinn^;  nf  tlin^sP  we  .address. 

While  evidence  must  be  chosen  primarily  on  the  basis  of  its 
logical  sufficiency,  it  is  well  always  to  consider  also  its  per- 
suasive-possibilities. When  a  choice  is  possible  between  evi- 
dential facts,  witnesses,  groups  of  evidence,  or  methods  of 
proof,  that  which  will  have  the  more  persuasive  effect  should 
be  chosen.  But  persuasion  is  a  secondary  consideration  here. 
Nothing  can  be  good  evidence  that  does  not  qualify  as  a 
sound  basis  for  conviction.  Conviction  requires  that  we  un- 
derstand what  it  is  that  constitutes  the  inherent  strength  of 
the  various  kinds  of  proofs,  so  that  we  may  employ  evidence 
and  argument  that  will  seem  to  the  minds  of  others  to  be 
logically  strong  and  accurate.  Leaving  the  standards  of  per- 
suasion to  be  discussed  at  a  later  time,  let  us  now  turn  to  the 
question:  What  are  the  inherent  elements  of  strength  and  of 
weakness  in  the  various  kinds  of  proof.'* 

B.  Proof  is  the  name  used  to  designate  "^nything-whick 
serveSj_eitherjmmediatelyjor  mediately  to  (;'onvince  the  mind 
of  the  truth  or  falsity  of  any  fact  or  propositieft;^  .  . 
*  Proof  is  also  appHed  to  the  conviction  generated  in  the 
mind  by  proof  properly  so  called.""^^  "The  word  proof , 
...  is  applied  by  the  most  accurate  logicians,  to  tll^  ^ffprf.  _ 
of  evidence,  and  not  to  the  medium  by  which  truth  is  es- 
tablished." ^  There  is  then  substantial  authority  for  using 
the  word  to  designate  that  which  convinces  the  mind  or  the 
conviction  generated^the  effect  produced-  The  fact  that 
both  of  these  meanings  are  in  common  use  sbpuld  be  borne 
in  mind  by  all  students  of  argumentation.  It  may  save 
misunderstanding  in  debate.  Biit  constructively  it  is  of 
little  or  no  consequence  which  meaning  we  use.  The  "bur- 
den of  proof"  means  the  same  whichever  definition  is  used; 
and  in  our  work  under  either  we  must  consider  the  same  sub- 
divisions— (1)  evidence,  and  (2)  arguments. 

C.  Evidence.     "The  ^word  evidence  ...  is  applied  to 

that    which    tends    tn     rf>Tldfr    ^^^IrlArit     Cir    *^     jrnnnnnfn     j^w>m^ 

1  Best,  p.  5.  2  Greenleaf,  p.  3. 


EVIDENCE  83 

.  .  .  Evidence,  thus  understood,  lias  heen  well  definecjj — 
any  matter  of  fact,  the  effect,  tendency,  or  design  of  which  is. 
\(y  prnHiipp  in  the  Tnind  a.  persiiflsion.  affirmative  or  disaf- 
firmative.  of  the  exisf^npf^  nf  gome  other  mfltter  of  fnct.  The 
fact  sought   to   he  proved    is   termed   ^^^   *  principal   fgf>t*^ 

thefact  whichjPy^ds  to  establish    it,  ^\h^  nyirlAnti'^rjr  fi^^fft,*  ^ 

If  A.  is  the  *  principal  fact '  to  be  proved,  and  X  the  *  evi- 
dentiary fact,*  the  evidence  offered,  then  the  claim  that  X 
proves  A  is  an  argument.  This  distinction  should  be  kept  clear. 
"When  one  offers  *  evidence,'  ...  he  offers,  otherwise  than 
by  reference  to  what  is  already  known,  to  prove  a  matter 
of  fact  which  is  to  be  used  as  a  basis  of  inference  to  another 
matter  of  fact.  ...  In  giving  evidence  we  are  furnishing  to 
a  tribunal  a  new  basis  for  reasoning.  .  .  .  The  new  element 
thus  added  is  what  we  call  evidence."  ^  Evidence  then  con- 
sists of  all  the  matters  of  fact  that  may  be  used  in  the  generat- 
ing of  proof.  It  is  the  raw  material  from  which  the  fjnisjied 
product^  proof,  is  to  be  mqnufqjetured. 

D.  Argument,  in  its  restricted  meaning,  is  the  name 
used  to  designate  the  prnopsci  by  which,  from  knowing  the 
existence  of  one  fact,  or  a  certain  number  of  facts,  we  infer 
the  existence  of  other  facts.  This  meaning  of  the  word  "ar- 
gument" must  not  be  confused  with  other  meanings.  The 
word  may  be  used  to  refer  to  a  finished  discourse  as  a  whole; 
it  may  refer  to  an  entire  debate  or  discussion;  or,  as  here, 
it  may  mean  simply  a  single  process  of  reasoning.  There  is, 
perhaps,  no  better  definition  of  an  argument,  in  this  sense, 
than  Cardinal  Newman's  definition  of  reason,  as  "anyutroc- 

eSS    or    act    of    the    mind  bv  which,   frr>m    \rnr.xKT\n^  nn^    thin^ 

it  advances  on  to  know  another! "  To  continue  the  analogy 
of  manufacturing,  suggested  in  the  last  paragraph,  argument 
is  the  process  by  which  the  raw  material,  evidence,  is  turned 
into  the  finished  product,  proof. 

E.  Evidence  in  law.  Before  discussing  the  classifica- 
tion and  tests  of  evidence  in  general  argumentation,  we  should 

1  Best,  p.  6.  2  Thayer,  pp.  263,  264. 


84    '  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

have  clearly  in  mind  what  legal  evidence  means  as  distinct 
from  evidence  as  used  in  ordinary  discussion  outside  of  court 
trials.  We  should  know  the  fundamental  precepts  and  pur- 
poses of  the  law  of  evidence  in  order  to  understand,  and  to 
be  able  properly  to  apply,  whatever  borrowings  we  may 
make  from  this  division  of  legal  practice.  A  clear  under- 
standing of  the  law  of  evidence  will  show  us  why  evidence 
in  argumentation  outside  of  law  courts  should  not  be  rigidly 
subjected  to  the  legal  tests. 

The  law  of  evidence  concerns  itself  with  furnishing  to 
courts  matters  of  fact  for  their  use  in  arriving  at  judicial 
decisions  in  regard  to  questions  before  them.  In  discharging 
their  proper  functions  the  courts  of  law  are  not  engaged  in 
academic  discussions  nor  in  the  work  of  discovering  and  en- 
forcing abstract  truth  or  abstract  justice.  Their  purpose  is 
to  settle  disputes  and  award  justice  as  fairly  and  accurately 
as  may  be  under  the  limits  imposed  upon  them,  such  as  time, 
expense,  etc.,  and  by  the  use  of  such  instrumentalities  as  are 
available  for  their  employment.  The  law  of  evidence  has 
developed  to  meet  the  requirements  of  this  practical  situa- 
tion, and  is  not  a  set  of  rules  to  be  followed  outside  of  the 
courtroom,  by  those  working  upon  questions  which  are  not 
to  be  decided  in  courts  of  law. 

The  function  of  the  law  of  evidence  is  set  forth  as  follows 
by  Professor  Thayer:  ^ 

"  (1)  It  prescribes  the  manner  of  presenting  evidence;  as 
by  requiring  that  it  shall  be  given  in  open  court  by  one  who 
personally  knows  the  thing  appearing  in  person,  subject  to 
cross-examination,  or  by  allowing  it  to  be  given  by  deposition, 
taken  in  such  and  such  a  way;  and  the  like.  (2)  It  fixes  the 
qualifications  and  the  privilpgft  of  witnpsspsr  and  the  mf^df  ^^ 
examining  them.  (3)  And  chiefly,  it  determines,  as  among 
probative  matters,  matters  in  their  nature  evidential, — what 
classes  of  things  shall  not  be  received.  This  excluding  func- 
tion is  the  characteristic  one  in  our  law  of  evidence." 
1  Prel.  Treat.,  p.  264. 


EVIDENCE  85 

The  relevancy  of  a  piece  of  evidence  cannot  be  settled  by 
law.  Matters  are  relevant  or  not  according  to  the  tests  of 
logic  and  general  experience.  The  law  of  evidence  simply 
says  that  under  certain  circumstances  certain  relevant  evi- 
dence shall  not  be  admitted.  It  consists  of  a  set  of  excluding 
rules  which  exclude  certain  classes  of  relevant  evidence,  and 
consists  further  of  certain  exceptions  to  these  rules,  which 
admits  subdivisions  of  classes  of  evidence  excluded  by  the 
general  rules.  Strictly  legal  tests  of  evidence  are  not  tests  of 
logical  relevancy,  but  tests  of  legal  admissibility.  The 
grounds  upon  which  legal  admissibility  has  been  denied  to 
certain  classes  of  evidence  are  various.  Some  kinds  of  evi- 
dence are  thought  to  be  of  too  little  importance,  in  some  the 
connection  is  too  farfetched.  Some  kinds  of  evidence  are 
excluded  because  it  is  feared  their  effects  upon  the  juries 
would  not  be  salutary;  others  are  excluded  on  grounds  of 
general  public  policy,  etc.,  etc.  It  is  well  for  the  student  of 
general  argumentation  to  be  as  familiar  as  possible  with  the 
law  of  evidence  in  order  to  understand  what  use  may  prop- 
erly be  made  outside  of  the  courtrooms  of  suggestions  to  be 
drawn  from  rules  which  are  rigidly  enforced  in  the  courts 
themselves. 

F.  Evidence  in  general  argumentation.  In  brief  then, 
in  general  argumentation  we  may  have  good  evidence  that 
would  not  be  admitted  in  law  courts.  Relevancy,  logical 
sufficiencv,  is  what  we  demand  of  evidence  outside  of  courts. 
But  in  law  evidence  must  meet  this  test  and  then  also  meet 
the  requirements  of  the  law  of  evidence.  There  is  no  *'  law  of 
evidence"  as  such  outside  of  the  courts.  So  the  oft  heard 
statement  that  such  and  such  evidence  "would  not  be  ad- 
mitted in  any  court  in  the  country"  has  really  very  little 
force  if  the  discussion  is  being  carried  on  outside  of  a  court. 
The  rules  of  legal  evidence  have  to  do  mainlv  with  admissi- 
bility,, while  in  general  argumentation,  where  we  have  no 

rules     of     admissibil^^^y,     ^^     ^^^     /^/->|^pp|.r.Q^Tnn;n1y     TrritV.     «n1nl!^ 

vancy.    However,  while  we  do  not  exclude,  it  is  probably  well 


86  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

to  scrutinize  very  carefully  in  general  argumentation  evidence 
that  courts  have  thought  it  best  to  exclude  entirely  from  the 
consideration  of  juries.  In  order  to  be  able  to  do  this,  on 
the  one  hand,  and  to  be  ready,  on  the  other,  to  thwart  who- 
ever (either  in  ignorance  or  cunning)  tries  to  apply  in  general 
discussion  the  excluding  rules  of  the  law  courts,  it  is  well 
to  note  carefully  the  references  to  the  law  of  evidence,  and 
to  legal  procedure  which  are  given  in  this  book. 

G.  The  sources  of  evidence.  Evidence  which  seems 
on  its  face  to  be  credible,  consistent,  and  convincing  may  be 
rendered  of  no  account  by  an  exposure  of  weakness  in  the 
source  from  whence  it  comes.  The  sources  of  evidence  are 
three — persons,  document^,  and  things ._  Persons  are  of 
course  the  most  important  source.  The  testimony  of  persons 
may  of  course  be  written  as  well  as  spoken.  Not  all  written 
evidence  is  documentary.  Books,  magazine  articles,  etc., 
used  in  general  argumentation  should  be  used  as  the  personal 
testimony  of  their  authors.  When  a  writer  states  in  a  book 
that  a  certain  thing  is  true,  this  is  personal  testimony  that 
the  thing  is  true  and  documentary  evidence  that  he  stated 
that  it  was  true.  The  person  behind  all  personal  testimony 
should  be  tested  alike  in  written  and  oral  evidence.  As  the 
term  is  used  in  this  book  "witness"  covers  both  "speaker" 
and  "writer."  It  may  be  said,  however,  that  written  testi- 
mony is  less  likely  to  contain  such  errors  as  are  due  to  simple 
thoughtlessness.  But  in  all  cases  the  sources  of  evidence 
should  be  carefully  examined.  If  it  can  be  shown  that  the 
statements,  however  plausible,  are  mere  careless  assertions 
of  unrehable  persons,  or  that  the  testimony  was  given  with 
some  dishonest  motive,  its  value  is  gone.  So  it  is  alwavs. 
necessary  in  selecting  one*s  own  proof  or  in  attacking  the 
proof  of  an  opponent  to  know  what  kinds^,  witnesses  give 
good  evidence,  and  what  kinds  bad  evidence.  Looked  at 
from  the  viewpoint  of  the  sources  from  whence  the  evidence 
is  derived,  there  are  two  kinds  of  evidence :  (a)  Qidinary-esds. 
deiice,  and   (b)   expert  evidence.     There  are  certain  tests 


EVIDENCE  87 

that  may  be  applied  to  all  witnesses;  these  are  the  tests  of 
the  sources  of  ordinary  evidence.  Then  the  examination  of 
the  class  of  witnesses  known  as  "experts"  demands  the 
application  of  certain  additional  tests. 

H.  Prejudiced  witnesses.  Before  passing  on  to  a  con- 
sideration of  the  kinds  of  evidence  and  the  tests  of  evidence, 
it  may  be  well  to  state  what  the  function  of  the  witness  is, 
to  analyze  his  operations,  and  to  give  a  warning  concerning 
a  big  question  that  is  important  in  connection  with  the 
testimony  of  all  kinds  of  witnesses.  A  witness  has  to  gather 
impressions,  facts,  information,  and  then  present  these  to 
others.  He  must  learn  the  truth  and  tell  it.  A  good  vyitness 
must  be  capable  and  desirous  of  finding  out  or  receiving  the  truth, 
and  capable  and  desirous  of  reporting  the  truth.  The  big 
question  that  we  must  ask  in  regard  to  each  witness  is  "with 
what  prei>Hipe.  if  any^  Hops  Tip  InnV  upon  thft  matter  concern- 
ing which  he  is  testifying.?^". 

Prejudice,  bias,  self-interest,  personal  liking  for  one  thing 
and  dislike  for  another  affects  the  truth  finding  as  well  as  the 
truth  telling  of  many  men  who  are  desirous  of  finding  and  tell- 
ing nothing  but  the  truth.  It  is  to  a  great  extent  true  that 
men  (all  men — and  women — not  simply  the  less  intellectual) 
believe  what  they  want  to  believe.  They  are  not  capable 
of  finding  the  truth  in  regard  to  some  things  because  they 
look  at  these  things  through  colored  glasses,  j^^hat  many 
honest  men  see,  hear,  and  even  taste,  and  smell,  depends 
to  a  certain  extent  upon  th^ir  prpj^jHiVps  The  solution  of  the 
difficulty  thus  presented  is  not  to  yesnivp  npf  ^^r^  nc^  pmjia. 
diced  witnesses,  but  to  use  the  least  prejudiced  witnesses 
possible., To  decline  to  receive  or  accept  the  testimony  of 
prejudiced  witnesses  is  to  decline  all  testimony  on  most  of  the 
important  questions  of  the  day.  Of  course  there  are  many 
mere  questions  of  fact  in  which  prejudices  are  of  no  account. 
But  in  general  argumentation,  in  politics,  economics,  sociol- 
ogy, religion,  literature,  education,  etc.,  most  men  who  are 
discussing  questions,  writing  articles,  and  books,  have  def- 


88  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

inite  opinions,  beliefs,  interests,  and  prejudices.  This  does 
not  mean  that  we  must  disregard  what  they  testify  to,  but 
that  we  must  weigh  their  testimony  with  reference  to  their 
pre-conceived  notions,  and  always  listen  to  the  tejstirjioiiy^n 
hatk-^es.  Read  what  both  the  advocates  and  opponents  of 
a  certain  measure  find  in  the  facts  of  a  given  event,  and  then 
draw  your  own  conclusions  as  to  the  truth.  Do  not  try  to 
get  the  truth  concerning  something  from  those  who  are 
naturally  prejudiced  against  it,  and  do  not  accept  without 
comparison  with  the  statements  of  opponents  the  testimony 
concerning  something  of  those  who  are  naturally  prejudiced 
in  its  favor. 

II.  The  Kinds  of  Evidence 

Evidence  may  be  classified  in  a  number  of  ways.  Some  of 
the  divisions  made  are  more  or  less  arbitrary  and  there  is 
slight  disagreement  among  authorities,  especially  as  to  nomen- 
clature. It  is  well  worth  while,  however,  to  examine  the  com- 
moner classifications  and  definitions  at  least  to  the  extent 
of  learning  what  is  meant  by  the  terms  used. 

A.  Direct  or  circumstantial.  The  most  common  classi- 
fication of  evidence  is  into  (1)  direct  and  (2)  indirect  or  cir- 
cumstantial. *' Evidence  is  either  direct  or  indirect;  accord- 
ing as  the  principal  fact  follows  from  the  evidentiary — ^the 
factum  prohandum  from  the  factum  probans — immediately 
or  by  inference.  In  jurisprudence,  however,  direct  evidence 
is  commonly  used  in  a  secondary  sense;  viz.,  as  limited  to 
cases  where  the  principal  fact,  or  factum  prohandum,  is  at- 
tested direct  by  witnesses,  things,  or  documents."  ^ 

In  law,  then,  the  term  direct  evidence  is  usually  applied 
to  the  testimony  of  persons  who  declare  the  existence  of  the 
fact  in  issue,  speaking  from  their  own  personal  knowledge. 
The  important  factor  is  that  these  persons  testify  directly 
as  to  the  existence  of  the  fact  in  issue.  The  testimony  is 
required  to  be  based  on  their  own  personal  knowledge  by 
1  Best,  pp.  15,  16. 


EVIDENCE  89 

the  hearsay  rule.  The  evidence  would  still  be  direct  as 
distinct  from  circumstantial  if  the  information  were  second- 
hand or  "hearsay,"  but  since  as  such  it  would  normally  be 
inadmissible  in  a  law  court,  direct  evidence  in  law  is  defined 
in  terms  which  cover  direct  original  evidence.  "A  witness 
testifies  that  he  saw  A  inflict  a  mortal  wound  on  B,  of  which 
he  instantly  died;  this  is  a  case  of  direct  evidence."  ^  If  the 
witness  testified  that  C  told  him  that  he  (C)  saw  A  kill  B, 
the  evidence  would  still  be  direct  (i.  e.,  not  circumstantial) 
but  it  would  be  inadmissible  as  hearsay  in  law.  Outside  of 
law  courts,  however,  we  act  on  this  kind  of  direct  evidence 
every  day.  Indirect  or  circurastantial  evidence  ^  is  "  evidence 
of  some  other  fact,  or  facts,  from  which,  taken  singly  or 
collectively,  the  existence  or  nonexistence  of  the  particular 
fact,  or  facts,  in  question,  may  be  inferred  as  a  necessary 
or  probable  consequence."  ^  It  is  obviously  impossible  to 
classify  evidence  as  direct  or  circumstantial  until  we  know  the 
"fact  in  issue"  to  determine  which  this  evidence  is  advanced. 
If  it  immediately  affirms  or  denies  some  fact  from  which  an 
inference  is  made  to  the  "fact  in  issue,"  it  is  circumstantial. 

"  If  a  witness  testifies  that  a  deceased  person  was  shot  with 
a  pistol,  and  the  wadding  (used  in  this  pistol)  is  found  to  be 
part  of  a  letter  addressed  to  the  prisoner,  the  residue  of  which 
is  discovered  in  his  pocket,"  ^  that  is  indirect  or  circumstan- 
tial evidence.  From  the  existence  of  these  facts  the  jury  may 
infer  the  guilt  of  the  prisoner.  "*  Circumstantial  evidence  is 
either  conclusive  or  presumptive:  conclusive,  where  the  con- 
nection between  the  principal  and  evidentiary  facts — the 
factum  probandum  and  factum  prohans — is  a  necessary 
consequence  of  the  laws  of  Nature;  presumptive,  where  it 
only  rests  on  a  greater  or  less  degree  of  probability.  In 
practice  this  latter  is  termed  *  presumptive  evidence' — ob- 
viously a  secondary  sense  of  the  word;  for  direct  evidence  is 
in  truth  only  presumptive,  seeing  that  it  rests  on  a  presump- 

^  Greenleaf,  p.  17.  '  Hughes,  p.  1. 

*  See  Presumptions  of  Fact,  eh.  3.  *  Greenleaf,  p.  17. 


90  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

tion  of  the  accuracy  and  veracity  of  witnesses,  things,  oi 
documents.*'  ^ 

The  most  elective  proof  is  gained  by  the  use  of  these  two 
kinds  of  evidence  in  combination.  Direct  evidence  may  be 
untrustworthy  because  of  mistakes  in  the  observation  of  the 
witness  or  because  of  prejudice.  Circumstantial  evidence 
may  be  inconclusive  because  of  a  possible  ambiguity  in  the 
inferences  to  be  drawn  from  it.  But  when  the  two  kinds  are 
used  together,  each  confirming  the  other,  the  evidence  be- 
comes of  the  highest  possible  efficiency. 

B.  Written  or  unwritten.  With  respect  to  its  form,  we 
may  classify  evidence  as:  (1)  written,  ^"^   (^)  nn^-rittf^i^ 

In  the  r»^iirt  r>f  Inw  q  pr^ngj^prpblp  part  nf  thp  eviHpncp  is  UJXl 

written.  It  consists  of  the  spoken  testimony  of  witnesses, 
present  before  the  judge  or  jury.  In  fnrn^gl  dp^^^^^  ojco^Vir^T'^^ 
however,  the  evidence  is  largely  written.^  It  is  often  akin 
in  its  nature  to  the  spoken  testimony  of  the  courts,  in  that 
it  expresses  the  beliefs  of  different  persons  as  to  the  existence 
of  certain  facts.  But  the  persons  themselves  are  rarely 
present  to  express  their  beliefs  orally.  Their  opinions  are 
gathered  from  books,  magazines,  newspapers,  and  docu- 
ments. 

C.  Real  or  personal.  "Again,  evidence  is  either  (1) 
real  or  (2}_£ersmial.^    By  real  evidence  is  meant  evidence  of 

1  Best,  p.  16. 

2  See  p.  86.     The  Sources  of  Evidence,  this  chapter. 

^  "Stephen's  limitation  of  the  term  'evidence'  to  (1)  the  statements  of 
witnesses  and  (2)  documents  is  too  narrow.  When,  in  a  controversy  be- 
tween a  tailor  and  his  customer,  involving  the  fit  of  a  coat,  the  customer 
puts  on  the  coat  and  wears  it  during  the  trial,  as  in  Brown  vs.  Foster,  113 
Mass.  at  p.  137,  a  basis  of  inference  is  supplied  otherwise  than  by  reasoning 
or  statements,  whether  oral  or  written;  ^nd  it  seems  impossible  to  deny  to 
this  the  name  of  'evidence.' 

"It  is  what  Bentham  calls  'real  evidence,'  a  phrase  which  imports  a  very 
valuable  discrimination,  when  limited  to  that  which  is  presented  directly  to 
the  senses  of  the  tribunal.  It  is  not,  practically,  of  much  importance  when 
divided  further  into  'reported  real  evidence,'  etc.  Best  in  his  treatise,  has 
confused  the  topic  by  following  Bentham  into  this  sort  of  refinement,  over- 


EVIDENCE  91 

which  any  object  belonging  to  the  class  of  things  is  the  source, 
persons  also  being  included,  in  respect  to  such  qualities  as 
belong  to  them  in  common  with  things."  ^  Real  evidence  is 
obtained  when  weapons  or  wounds  are  exhibited  to  the  jury, 
or  fences  or  railroad  crossings  are  examined  by  them,  or  a 
person  whose  age  or  parentage  is  in  issue  appears  before  the 
jury  to  be  seen  by  them.  Real  evidence,  of  course,  cannot 
be  hearsay.  It  is  evidence  presented  directly  to  the  senses 
of  those  who  are  to  judge,  without  any  interpretation  by  a 
persog^  The  evidence  speaks  for  itself .  There  is  no** thought 
communication."  It  may  of  course  be  presented  to  any  of 
the  senses,  sight,  hearing,  taste,  smell,  etc. 

Personal  evidence  is  that  which  is  afforded  by  a  Jiuman 
agent,  either  in  the  way  of  discourse,  or  by  voluntary  signs 
(made  for  the  purpose  of  communicating  tb^i^g^^«)  Evi- 
dence gained  by  observation  (of  the  person  of  the  witness)_or 
that  afforded  by  involuntary  changes  of  countenance  and  de- 
portment comes  under  the  head  of  rpal  PvirJPT^pp^  When- 
ever a  witness  communicates  thought  to  a  judge  or  jury  either 
by  spoken  language  or  by  signs,  he  is  giving  personal  evidence; 
while  if  he  shows  the  jury  a  wound,  or  that  he  can  raise  his 
arm  by  raising  it  for  them  to  see,  he  is  giving  real  evidence. 

D.  Original  and  unoriginal.  A  division  of  evidence  that 
is  important  because  under  it  we  get  one  of  the  terms  (hear- 
say) that  we  hear  most  about  in  discussions  of  evidence,  is 
the  division  into  (1)  original  and  (2)  unoriginal  evidence. 
Original  evidence  is  that  **  which  has  an  independent  proba- 
tive force  of  its  own:  unoriginah  also  called  derivative, 
transmitted,  or  secondhand  evidence,  is  Jhat  which  derives 
its  force  from,  through,  or  under  some  other."  ^  Best 
gives  five  forms  of  unoriginal  evidence,  but  these  minute 
subdivisions  are  not  of  importance  to  the  student  of  general 

looking,  probabljs  for  the  moment,  the  fact  that  Bentham,  unlike  himself, 
was  engaged  in  a  philosophical  discussion  and  was  not  writing  a  law  book." 
Footnote,  Thayer,  pp.  263,  264. 

1  Best,  p.  16.  2  See  Ibid.  » Ibid.,  p.  17. 


92  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

argumentation.  For  us  it  is  substantially  correct  to  say  that 
iinofjgiy^fl,!  fvifl^nrr  mrnm  hcarmy  nrlHrnrni 

Hearsay  evidence  is  defined  by  Greenleaf  ^  as  "that  kind 
of  evidence  which  does  not  derive  its  value  solely  from  the 
credit  to  be  given  to  the  witness  himself,  but  rests  also  in 
part  on  the  veracity  and  competency  of  some  other  person. 
...  Its  extrinsic  weakness,  its  incompetency  to  satisfy  the 
mind  as  to  the  existence  of  the  fact,  and  the  frauds  that  may 
be  practised  under  its  cover,  combine  to  support  the  rule, 
that  hearsay  evidence  is  totally  inadmissible."  Hearsay 
evidence,  in  brief,  is  the  evidence  of  persons  who  testify  to 
the  existence  of  some  fact,  on  the  ground  that  they  have 
been  informed  of  its  existence  by  some  other  person.  Hearsay 
evidence,  of  course,  is  always  **  personal,"  never  '*real."  For 
the  exceptions  to  the  hearsay  rule  in  law  see  Best,  ch.  IV. ^ 

In  general  argumentation.  What  the  courts  exclude,  ar- 
gumentation elsewhere  should  treat  with  suspicion,  but 
should  not  necessarily  rule  out.  Courts  must  have  rules 
that  will  apply  to  all  alike.  But  we  are  not  so  bound  in  gen- 
eral argumentation.  Of  course,  the  hearsay  evidence  of  the 
ignorant,  the  careless,  the  vicious,  is  worthless.  Buthearsay 
evidence  coming  through  accurate,  trained  minds  may  be  of 
such  a^aracter  that  it  would  be  absurd  to  question  it  on 
the  ground  that  it  i«  |ipar«ay  Secondhand  evidence,  how- 
ever,  is  usually  less  convincing  than  original  evidence.  The 
testimony  may  be  too  many  stages  removed  from  the  fact 
itself.  An  audience  will  often  suspect  that  the  arguer  cannot 
or  dare  not  produce  the  original  authority.  Again,  it  is  too 
easily  overthrown.  If  a  reliable  witness  who  has  a  first-hand 
knowledge  can  be  brought  to  testify  to  any  fact  of  a  con- 
tradictory nature,  the  hearsay  evidence  is  immediately 
brought  to  the  ground. 

Care  must  be  taken  not  to  confuse  direct  and  original 
evidence.  If  A  testifies  that  B  said  that  he  saw  X  kill  Y, 
this  is  direct  but  hearsay.  If  A  testifies  that  he  saw  X  run- 
1  Pages  121,  122.  ^  pp,  434-444. 


EVIDENCE  93 

ning  away  from  the  scene  of  the  murder  of  Y  at  about  the 
time  Y  must  have  been  killed,  this  is  original  but  circum- 
stantial evidence  that  X  murdered  Y. 

E.  Pre-aPDointed  or  casuaL  Evidence  may  be  divided 
into  (1)  prp-nppointeH  evidence  and  (2)  casual  .evidence^ 
Wherever  "the  creation  or  preservation  of  an  article  of  evi- 
dence has  been,  either  to  public  or  private  minds,  an  object 
of  solicitude,  .  .  .  (viz.  in  the  view  of  its  serving  to  give 
effect  to  a  right,  or  enforce  an  obligation,  on  some  future 
contingent  occasion),  the  evidence  so  created  and  preserved 
comes  under  the  notion  of  pre-appointed  evidence."  ^ 
Deeds,  notes,  written  contracts,  etc.,  are  forms  of  written 
pre-appointed  evidence.  When  a  man  arranges  to  have 
certain  persons  witness  his  words  or  actions  in  order  -that 
they  majMystify  to  what  he  said  or  (\\(\,  we  have  unwritten, 
pre-appointed  e^ridence.  \Any  evidence  not  coming  under 
the  head  of  pre-appointed  evidence  is  casual  or  undesigned 
evidence.  It  is  evidence  that  has  been  neither  created  nor 
preserved  for  the  purpose  of  using  it  as  evidence  of  the  fact 
now  being  substantiated  by  it.  This  kind  of  evidence  con- 
sists of  testimony  given  by  persons  who,  when  they  gave  it, 
had  no  thought  that  it  would  ever  be  used  as  evidence  in  the 
case  in  question.  Speaking  for  another  purpose  a  person 
often  lets  fall  a  statement  that  is  merely  incidental.  The 
value  of  such  evidence  lies  in  its  freedom  from  the  suspicion 
of  any  hidden  motive.  It  is  ingenuous  and  presumably  hon- 
est. But  it  has  very  serious  weakness.  The  testimony  may 
well  have  been  careless.  The  witness,  thinking  the  assertion  of 
slight  importance,  may  have  been  indifferent  as  to  its  accuracy. 

Mr.  Webster,  in  the  following  selection  from  his  argument 
in  the  White  murder  trial,  enforced  the  value  of  some  of  his 
evidence  by  showing  that  it  was  undesigned: — 

*'Mr.  Southwick  swears  all  that  a  man  can  swear.  He  has  the 
best  means  of  judging  that  could  be  had  at  the  time.    He  tells  you 

*  Best,  p.  18,  quoted  from  2  Bentham  Jud.  Ev.,  435. 


94  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

that  he  left  his  father's  house  at  half-past  ten  o'clock,  and  as  he 
passed  to  his  own  house  in  Brown  Street,  he  saw  a  man  sitting  on 
the  steps  of  the  rope- walk;  that  he  passed  him  three  times,  and 
each  time  he  held  down  his  head,  so  that  he  did  not  see  his  face. 
That  the  man  had  on  a  cloak,  which  was  not  wrapped  around  him, 
and  a  glazed  cap.  That  he  took  the  man  to  be  Frank  Knapp  at  the 
time;  that,  when  he  went  into  his  house,  he  told  his  wife  that  he 
thought  it  was  Frank  Knapp;  that  he  knew  him  well,  having  known 
him  from  a  boy.  And  his  wife  swears  that  he  did  so  tell  her  when 
he  came  home.  What  could  mislead  this  witness  at  the  time?  He 
was  not  then  suspecting  Frank  Knapp  of  anything.  He  could  not 
then  be  influenced  by  any  prejudices.  If  you  believe  that  the 
witness  saw  Frank  Knapp  in  this  position  at  this  time,  it  proves  the 
case."  ^ 

F.  Positive  or  negative.  This  classification  is  important 
because  of  the  peculiar  nature  and  significance  of  what  has 
long  been  called  (especially  by  rhetoricians)  "negative  evi- 
dence." The  term  (1)  positive  evidence  is  rarely  used.  It  is 
needed  simply  to  balance  the  negative.  Positive  evidence  is 
all  actual  evidence.  (2)  Negative  evidence  is  the  term  applied 
to  a  significant  absence  of  evidence:  as  for  instance,  the  ab- 
sence of  signs  of  campfires,  as  evidence  that  campers  have  not 
preceded  you  along  a  certain  trail;  or  the  failure  of  a  member 
of  a  dinner  party  to  mention,  while  discussing  the  dinner 
later,  that  one  of  the  guests  died  at  the  table  of  heart  failure, 
as  evidence  that  this  did  not  happen. 

Such  negative  testimony,  or  the  testimony  of  silence — 
"the  failure  of  the  witness  to  mention  a  fact  so  striking  that 
he  must  have  noticed  it  had  it  occurred" — has  often  been 
mentioned  by  writers  on  argumentation  as  evidence  of  special 
value.  ^  The  legal  writers  on  evidence  make  statements 
that  seem  at  first  quite  contradictory.  "  Ordinarily  a  witness 
who  testifies  to  an  affirmation  is  entitled  to  credit  in  prefer- 
ence to  one  who  testifies  to  a  negative,  because  the  latter 

1  TheWarks  of  Daniel  Webster,  Vol.  VI,  p.  90. 

2  See  Baker  and  Huntington,  p.  131,  and  Genung,  Prac.  Rket.,  p.  410, 


EVIDENCE  95 

may  have  forgotten  what  actually  occurred,  while  it  is  im- 
possible to  remember  what  never  existed."  ^ 

"Our  old  lawyers  lay  down  broadly,  *It  is  a  maxim  in 
law  that  witnesses  cannot  testify  a  negative,  but  an  affirm- 
ative.' From  these  and  similar  expressions  it  has  been 
rashly  inferred,  and  is  frequently  asserted,  that  *a  negative 
is  incapable  of  proof,' — a  position  wholly  indefensible  if  un- 
derstood in  an  unqualified  sense.  Nothing  more  was  meant 
than  to  express  the  undoubted  truth  that,  in  the  ordinary 
course  of  things,  the  burden  of  proof  is  not  to  be  cast  on  the 
party  who  merely  denies  an  assertion.  The  ground  on  which 
this  rests  has  been  already  explained;  and  another  grave  ob- 
jection to  requiring  proof  of  a  simple  negative  is  its  indefi- 
niteness.  A  person  asserts  that  a  certain  event  took  place, 
not  saying  when,  where,  or  under  what  circumstances;  how 
am  I  to  disprove  that,  ajid  convince  others  that  at  no  time,  at 
no  place,  and  under  no  circumstances,  has  such  a  thing  oc- 
curred? The  utmost  that  could  possibly  be  done  in  most 
instances  would  be  to  show  the  improbability  of  the  supposed. 
event;  and  eventhiswould  usually  require  an  enormous 
mass  of  presumptive  evidence.  Hence  the  well-known  rule 
that  aj^mative  evidence  is  in  general  hetter_than  negative  evi- 
dence.  But  when  the  negative  ceases  to  be  a  simple  one, — 
l^Een  it  is  qualified  by  time,  place,  or  circumstance, — much 
of  this  objection  is  removed;  and  proof  of  a  negative  may 
very  reasonably  be  required  when  the  qualifying  circum- 
stances are  the  direct  matter  in  issue,  or  the  affirmative  is 
either  probable  in  itself,  or  supported  by  a  presumption, 
or  peculiar  means  of  proof  are  in  the  hands  of  the  party 
asserting  the  negative."  ^  These  statements  are  not  incon- 
sistent. The  legal  writers  make  these  remarks  usually  in 
connection  with  a  discussion  of  the  burden  of  proof.  All 
sound  thinkers  agree  that  the  affirmative  (the  affirmative 
on  the  substance  of  the  proposition,  regardless  of  form) 
has  the  burden  of  proof.  So  the  courts  insist  on  affirmative 
1  Greenleaf,  note  1.  p.  93.  «  Best,  pp.  262,  263. 


96  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

evidence,  and  do  not  require  proof  of  a  simple  negative  on 
account  of  its  indefiniteness.  But  when  we  have  a  simple, 
definite,  qualified  denial,  the  case  is  quite  different.  And  it 
is  only  in  regard  to  questions  sufficiently  qualified  in  time, 
place,  and  circumstance  that  rhetoricians  give  special  value 
to  negative  evidence  or  the  testimony  of  silence — the  ab- 
sence of  evidence  where  it  would  naturally  be  found  if  the 
statement  made  were  true. 

For  instance,  the  absence  of  a  man's  name  from  the  list  of 
students  published  in  a  college  catalogue  is  negative  evidence 
that  this  man  is  not  a  student  at  this  college.  The  failure 
of  the  newspapers  of  a  certain  city  for  the  month  of  May, 
1888,  to  mention  a  sensational  murder  trial  alleged  to  have 
been  held  in  that  city  during  that  month  is  negative  evidence 
that  no  such  trial  took  place.  If  we  fail  to  find  in  the  stand- 
ard biographies  of  a  man  any  reference  to  his  having  been 
elected  to  an  important  public  office,  it  is  safe  to  conclude 
that  he  never  was  so  elected.  The  strength  of  this  evidence 
is  similar  to  that  of  casual  evidence.  It  lies  in  the  difficulty 
of  "manufacturing"  or  manipulating  it.  The  absence  of 
evidence  to  support  a  claim  where  we  have  a  right  to  expect 
it  to  be  found  if  the  claim  is  true,  is  in  many  cases  more  con- 
vincing than  positive  assertions.  The  common  expression 
"If  that  were  true,  we  would  have  heard  about  it"  expresses 
the  universal  faith  in  negative  evidence. 

G.  Ordinary  or  expert.  Evidence  may  be  classified  as 
(1)  ordinary  and  (2)  expert.  Most  evidence  is  ordinary. 
This  term  covers  all  that  is  not  expert.  Expert  testimony 
strictly  speaking  is  called  in  law  "opinion  evidence"  and  in 
general  argumentation  "argument  from  authority."  These 
two  terms  cover  practically  parallel  things,  and  we  will  gain 
considerably  in  general  argumentation  if  we  understand  the 
legal  doctrine  of  "  opinion  evidence  "  and  follow  it  in  dealing 
with  "  argument  from  authority."  In  law  the  testimony  of  an 
"ordinary"  witness  is  not  always  limited  strictly  to  matters 
of  fact.    There  are  at  times  circumstances  under  which  an 


EVIDENCE  97 

ordinary  witness  is  allowed  to  testify  in  regard  to  matters 
of  opinion,  such  for  instance  as  his  opinion  regarding  the 
"character"  or  the  "sanity"  of  some  other  person.  Also, 
there  arise  at  times  in  law  trials  circumstances  under  which 
an  "expert'*  witness  testifies  as  to  matters  of  fact  rather  than 
to  matters  of  opinion.  For  instance,  an  expert  chemist 
might  very  well  testify  as  to  matters  of  fact  in  the  realm  of 
chemistry,  under  which  circumstances  he  could  not  be  called 
strictly  an  "  opinion  "  witness.  However,  the  expert  is  usually 
asked  to  interpret  facts  which  he  or  other  witnesses  estab- 
lish, and  this  interpretation  which  is  the  expert's  principal 
function  usually  is,  of  course,  opinion  evidence  in  law,  or 
argument  from  authority  in  general  argumentation. 

Professor  Thayer  ^  has  the  following  to  say  concerning  ex- 
pert witnesses: 

"What  is  their  function?  It  is  just  this,  of  judging  facts 
and  interpreting  them.  They  are  called  in  because ^  being  men 
of  skill,  they  can  interpret  phenomena  which  other  men  cannot, 
or  cannot  safely,  interpret.^  They  *  judge'  the  phenomena, 
the  appearances  or  facts  which  are  presented  to  them,  and 
testify  to  that  which  in  truth  these  signify  or  really  are;  they 
estimate  qualities  and  values.  We  say  that  they  testify  to 
opinion.  In  truth,  they  are  *  judging'  something,  and  testi- 
fying to  their  conclusion  upon  a  matter  of  fact.  It  is  perfectly 
well  settled,  in  our  law,  and,  as  it  would  seem,  elsewhere, 
that  such  opinions  or  judgments  are  merely  those  of  a  wit- 
ness; they  are  simply  to  aid  the  final  judges  of  fact,  and  not 
to  bind  them." 

The  ordinary  witness  testifies  that  a  certain  alleged  fact 
is  true  because  he  actually  observed  it  to  be  so;  the  expert 
testifies  that  the  same  alleged  fact  is  true  because  certain 
other  facts  exist,  and  his  peculiar  and  exceptional  knowledge 
justifies  him  in  inferring  the  existence  of  the  fact  in  question. 
The  ordinary  witness  in  a  law  court  is  not  allowed  to  express 
an  opinion  or  even  to  use  a  word  which  shows  his  opinion. 
1  Page  196.  2  jtaijcs  ours. 


98  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

He  must  state  what  he  saw,  heard,  etc.,  without  character- 
izing it  in  any  way.  Under  certain  circumstances  "experts" 
are  called  who  are  allowed  to  express  opinions — or  give  opin- 
ion evidence. 

To  take  a  simple  illustration,  the  question  is  whether  a 
certain  man  who  was  shot  and  killed  wore  a  certain  coat  on 
the  day  of  the  murder.  The  ordinary  witness  may  testify 
that  he  saw  the  deceased  near  the  place  of  the  murder  a  short 
time  before  the  deed,  and  that  he  was  wearing  the  coat  in 
question.  The  expert  finds  certain  stains  on  the  coat  and 
with  the  aid  of  his  exceptional  knowledge  of  chemistry,  he 
infers  that  the  stains  are  blood  stains  and  freshly  made. 
This  is  his  opinion.  He  is  allowed  to  give  this  opinion  to  the 
jury.  An  ordinary  witness  may  tell  the  jury  that  he  saw  A 
strike  B  in  a  certain  manner.  The  expert  can  tell  the  jury 
whether  such  a  blow  would  be  fatal  to  a  man  in  B's  condition. 
Clearly  in  these  cases  the  value  of  the  testimony  of  the  expert 
depends  upon  his  special  technical  skill.  This  is  always  the 
primary  test  of  expert  evidence:  Is  the  witness  possessed  of 
such  knowledge  that  he  will  draw  the  correct  conclusions 
from  the  facts  presented  to  him.?^  It  is  as  a  rule  only  when  the 
expert  is  dealing  with  questions  on  which  the  layman  cannot 
be  expected  to  draw  his  own  conclusions,  that  he  is  allowed  to 
give  opinion  evidence;  and  until  this  point  is  reached  he  is 
only  an  ordinary  witness,  regardless  of  his  position  or  repu- 
tation. 

"As  to  the  former  (opinion  evidence)  it  is  traceable  easily 
to  the  same  source  as  the  hearsay  rule.  ...  It  was  for  the 
jury  to  form  opinions,  and  draw  inferences  and  conclusions, 
and  not  for  the  witness.  He  was  merely  to  bring  in  to  the 
jury,  or  the  judge,  the  raw  material  of  fact,  on  which  their 
minds  were  to  work.  .  .  .  The  witness  was  not  to  say  that 
he  *  thought'  or  *  believed'  so  and  so:  it  was  for  the  jury  to 
say  what  they  thought  and  believed.  The  witness  must  say 
what  he  had  'seen  and  heard;'  ...  In  a  sense  all  testi- 
mony to  matter  of  fact  is  opinion  evidence,  i.  e.,  it  is  a  con- 


EVIDENCE  99 

elusion  formed  from  phenomena  and  mental  impressions. 
Yet  that  is  not  the  way  we  talk  in  courts  or  in  common  life. 
Where  shall  the  line  be  drawn  .^  When  does  matter  of  fact 
first  become  matter  of  opinion  ?  A  difficult  question ;  but  some 
things  are  clear.  There  are  questions  which  require  special 
training  and  knowledge  to  answer  them.  .  .  .  On  such 
questions,  then,  the  ordinary  jury  may  be  assisted  by  skilled 
witnesses,  who  give  their  opinions.  .  .  .  There  is  ground  for 
saying  that,  in  the  main,  any  rule  excluding  opinion  evidence 
is  limited  to  cases  where,  in  the  judgment  of  the  court,  it  will 
not  be  helpful  to  the  jury.  Whether  accepted  in  terms  or  not, 
this  view  largely  governs  the  administration  of  the  rule."  ^ 
Opinion  evidence,  then,  is  admissible  in  the  courtroom 
when  (a)  a  question  for  decision  is  such  that  to  answer  it 
requires  special  training,  skill,  ability,  or  experience — one 
which  the  ordinary  layman  is  unable  to  answer  without  the 
help  of  someone  who  is  specially  prepared  to  understand  such 
a  question,  (b)  an  expert  is  available  to  assist  the  jury  whom 
(c)  the  court  accepts  as  likely  to  be  helpful  to  the  jury  in 
arriving  at  the  decision. 

1.  Argument  from  authority.  In  general  argumentation 
as  we  have  said,  this  kind  of  evidence  is  what  is  known  as 
the  "argument  from  authority."  This  is  a  false  name,  for  it 
is  not  properly  an  argument, — ^i.  e.,  a  process  of  reasoning, — 
but  evidence.  It  consists  in  establishing  a  fact  by  quoting 
the  opinion  of  some  person  whose  knowledge  is  such  as  to 
jnt^lify  tV»^  aoppptanpo  nf  his  inferences  as  truthful.  Now  the 
legal  procedure  in  this  matter  should  be  followed  closely  in 
all  argumentation.  This  will,  among  other  things,  do  away 
with  one  of  the  most  stupid  and  harmful  of  the  bad  practices 
in  contest  debating — that  of  quoting  alleged  "authorities" 
on  all  sorts  of  questions,  (a)  The  people  quoted  are  usually 
not  authorities — not  experts — not  people  specially  qualified 
to  express  opinions  on  the  questions  discussed,  and  (b)  the 
questions  on  which  the  authorities  are  cited  are  not  questions 
1  Thayer,  p.  196. 


100  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

which  call  for  expert  testimony.  Very  often  they  are  plain, 
ordinary,  everyday  propositions  on  which  all  citizens  are  sup- 
posed  to  be  qualified  to  pass  judgment,  (c)  Moreover,  author- 
ities are  rushed  in  without  being  so  produced  as  to  be  accepted 
by  anyone  as  authorities  whose  opinions  might  be  helpful. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  a  distinguished  man  is  not 
necessarily  an  authority  on  any  question  on  which  he  has 
expressed  an  opinion.^  The  fact  that  a  man  is  a  distinguished 
scientist  gives  him  no  standing  as  a  critic  of  literature.  Suc- 
cess in  politics  does  not  make  a  man  an  authority  in  educa- 
tion. Dramatists  are  not  per  se  entitled  to  the  privileges 
of  opinion  witnesses  on  questions  of  sociology;  and  the  opin- 
ions of  famous  clergymen  in  the  field  of  economics  should 
usually  be  accorded  the  same  good  humored  disregard  that 
ought  to  greet  the  pronouncements  of  learned  economists 
on  questions  of  religion  and  theology.  We  are  not  saying  that 
a  man  should  have  no  opinions  except  in  his  special  field 
of  work — but  simply  that  the  fact  that  a  man  is  an  authority 
ii^one  field  does  not  make  him  an  authority  in  other  Helds. 

2.  Documentation  of  sources  ^  not  argument  from  au- 
thority. Care  should  be  taken  to  avoid  the  common  error  of 
treating  all  documentation  of  sources  and  identification  of 
witnesses  as  arguments  from  authority.  When  a  great  jurist 
is  quoted  as  saying  that  a  certain  law  was  passed  in  a  certain 
state  on  a  given  date,  he  is  an  ordinary  witness  to  be  tested 
precisely  as  the  farmer  who  testifies  in  regard  to  an  accident 
on  the  highway.  When  the  judge  is  quoted,  and  the  place 
where  his  statement  was  found  is  given,  the  witness  is  identi- 
fied, and  the  source  of  information  documented,  as  should 
usually  be  done;  but  there  is  no  expert  testimony  offered,  no 
opinion  evidence  given,  no  comment  from  authority  used.  We 
have  the  latter  situation  when  we  quote  the  judge  as  saying 
that  such  and  such  a  law  would  be  unconstitutional. 

The  following  is  an  example  of  argument  from  authority 

^  See  Argumentum  ad  verecundiam,  p.  193. 
2  See  Documentation  of  Sources,  eh.  5. 


EVIDENCE  101 

from  the  speech  by  Patrick  Henry  on  "The  Right  of  a  State 
during  the  Revolution  to  Confiscate  British  Debts."  In 
seeking  to  prove  that  the  confiscation  of  British  debts  is 
warranted  by  necessity,  he  says: — 

"The  necessity  being  great  and  dreadful,  you  are  warranted  to 
lay  hold  of  every  atom  of  money  within  your  reach,  especially  if  it 
be  the  money  of  your  enemies.  It  is  prudent  and  necessary  to 
strengthen  yourselves  and  weaken  your  enemies.  Vattel,  Book  3d, 
ch.  8,  sec.  138,  says:  'The  business  of  a  just  war  being  to  suppress 
violence  and  injustice,  it  gives  a  right  to  compel  by  force  him  who 
is  deaf  to  the  voice  of  justice.  It  gives  a  right  of  doing  against  the 
enemy  whatever  is  necessary  for  weakening  him,  for  disabling  him 
from  making  any  further  resistance  in  support  of  his  injustice,  and 
the  most  effectual,  the  most  proper  methods  may  be  chosen,  pro- 
vided they  have  nothing  odious,  be  not  unlawful  in  themselves,  or 
exploded  by  the  law  of  nature.'  Here  let  me  pause  for  a  moment  and 
ask  whether  it  be  odious  in  itself  or  exploded  by  the  law  of  nature 
to  seize  those  debts?"  ^ 

III.    The  Tests  of  Evidence 

Very  important  for  our  purposes  are  the  tests  to  be  applied 
to  determine 'the  value  of  evidence.  To  know  whothcr  a 
piece  of  evidence  is  strong  or  weak  is  essential  to  the  in- 
telligentconduct  of  a  cas£.  We  can  use  only  a  limited 
amount  of  all  that  we  gather.  Wg  m^st  have  the  power  to 
discriminate.  Then,  too,  we  must  know  what  is  strong 
enough  to  be  put  in  the  forefront  of  the  proof,  and  what  is 
so  weak  as  to  be  valuable  only  for  the  purpose  of  "filling 
in"  and  reenforcing  the  more  important  parts.  For  these 
purposes  we  have  two  vital  tests  of  evidence:  (A),  the  tesljoi- 
the  quality  of  the  evidence  itself,  and  (B) ,  the  test  of  thf  ^ni\^r.Rs. 
from  whence  it  emnes.  For  convenience  in  our  discussion, 
the  sources  of  evidence  will  be  referred  to  as  "witnesses." 

A.  Tests  of  the  quality  of  the  evidence  itself.     1.  Is 
the  evidence  consistent  with  human  nature  and  human  ex- 

^  Great  Speeches  by  Great  Lawyers,  p.  13. 


102  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

perience?  Any  man  properly  hesifcates  to  accept  as  a  fact 
anythiag  that  runs  contrary  to  his  own  past  experience  or  the 
experience  of  his-iellow-men.  To  make  him  beheve  in  any 
evidence  that  contradicts  the  behefs  of  his  life  and  his  habits 
of  thinking  requires  explanation,  enfoccement,  and  substan- 
tiation that  soon  become  an  argument  in  themselves,  and 
even  then  the  unqualified  acceptance  of  the  proof  may  be 
a  matter  of  doubt.  If  the  evidence  is  in  this  way  contrary  to 
ordinary  human  experience,  one  must  never  neglect  to  main- 
tain its  truthfulness  by  explaining  just  why  it  is  credible  and 
valuable.  Campbell,  in  his  Philosophy  of  Rhetoric  ^  expresses 
the  situation,  when  he  says:  "From  experience  we  learn  to 
confine  our  belief  in  human  testimony  within  the  proper 
bounds.  Hence  we  are  taught  to  consider  many  attendant 
circumstances  which  serve  ...  to  corroborate  ...  its  evi- 
dence. The  reputation  of  the  attester,  his  manner  of  address, 
the  nature  of  the  fact  attested,  the  occasion  of  giving  the  testi- 
mony, the  possible  or  probable  design  in  giving  it  and  several 
other  circumstances  have  considerable  influence  in  fixing  the 
degree  of  credibility."  Evidence,  then,  should  as  far  as  pos- 
sible be  consistent  with  ordinary  human  experience  and  the 
natural  course  of  affiairs.  If  it  is  of  any  extraordinary  nature, 
its  credibility  must  be  shown  before  it  will  be  of  value  or  effect. 
The  weakness  of  evidence  that  is  of  an  extraordinary  na- 
ture and  contrary  to  common  experience,  is  exposed  in  the 
following  selection  from  the  speech  by  John  Henry  North  in 
the  case  of  Rex  vs.  Forbes  and  others.  Mr.  North's  client 
was  charged  with  committing  criminal  assault  upon  the  Lord- 
lieutenant  of  Ireland.  Testimony  was  given  by  a  certain 
Dr.  M'Namara,  who  said  that  he  actually  saw  the  defendant 
hurl  a  bottle  at  the  Lord-lieutenant  in  a  public  theatre. 
Mr.  North  attacks  testimony  as  follows: — 

"The  Doctor  in  the  middle  gallery  sees  Handwich  in  the  third 
row  of  the  upper  one,  though  between  them  there  were  two  benches 

1  P.  77. 


EVIDENCE  103 

covered  with  people,  and  the  boarded  parapet  in  front  of  the  upper 
gallery  besides!  Through  all  these  obstacles  he  sees  him  in  that 
dark  corner  of  the  gallery  where  he  represents  him  to  be  placed; 
sees  him  fling  the  bottle,  and  is  now  able,  at  this  distance  of  time, 
to  identify  his  person.  The  bottle  itself  he  saw  in  what  he  learnedly 
calls  its  transit.  A  word  or  two  on  that  same  transit.  I  hold  it 
physically  impossible  that  a  bottle  could  have  taken  the  course 
described  by  Farrell  and  M'Namara,  from  the  upper  gallery  to 
the  stage,  without  being  observed  by  four  or  five  hundred  spec- 
tators. Just  think  what  the  theatre  is:  a  wide,  illuminated  area, 
whose  bounding  surfaces  are  studded  with  eyes  as  numerous  as 
those  of  Argus.  Not  a  square  inch  in  that  field  of  view  which 
was  not  painted  on  the  retina  of  some  one  eye  or  other  in  that  vast 
assembly.  Consider,  too,  the  time — the  interval  between  the  play 
and  farce — when  the  attention  of  the  audience  was  not  fixed  upon 
the  stage,  when  people  were  all  looking  about  them,  recognizing 
and  greeting  their  friends  and  acquaintances.  Was  there  no  one 
to  mark  this  bottle  but  Farrell,  M'Namara,  and  the  young  medical 
student.'  What,  not  one  giggling  girl  In  the  boxes,  glancing  round 
for  admiration!  not  an  operaglass  pointed!  no  fortunate  observer 
of  the  transit  but  the  astronomer  from  Ballinakill!  Is  all  this 
credible.^  But  this  is  not  all — voonders  upon  voonders,  as  the 
Dutchman  said  when  he  got  to  London — the  greatest  miracle  is 
to  come.  Down  comes  the  bottle,  thundering  from  the  upper 
gallery  to  the  stage,  and  falls  unbroken!"  ^ 

2.  Is  the  evidence  consistent  with  known  facts?  The  ne- 
cessity is  evident  of  avoidin^^ontradktion  betwsei^^ 
pieces  of  evidence  presented  in  \he.  proof,  or  b^^tw^en  pvidencp 
presented  and  other  well-^^ow^  fQr>tg  Its  discovery  by  an 
opponent  or  by  the  audience  will  ruin  all  confidence  in  the 
guilty  person.  The  mistake  of  adducing  evidence  that  is 
contradicted  by  the  commonly  known  or  easily  proved  facts 
of  the  question  is  illustrated  by  the  following  examples. 

A  few  years  ago  in  a  trial  of  a  civil  suit  the  defendant  was 
on  the  witness  stand.    He  was  seeking  to  establish  an  alibi. 
In  the  course  of  his  testimony  he  was  asked  to  tell  of  all  his 
^  Great  Speeches  by  Great  Latoyers,  p.  659. 


104  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

movements  and  doings  on  a  particular  day.  He  told  of  sev- 
eral purchases  he  had  made  in  the  stores  of  the  city,  of  his 
visit  to  a  barber's  shop,  and  of  various  other  incidents.  When 
this  testimony  was  finished,  the  examining  lawyer  stated  the 
simple  fact  that  the  day  in  question  had  been  the  day  of  the 
observance  of  President  William  McKinley's  burial.  E very- 
shop  and  store  had  been  closed.  The  testimony  was  not  to 
be  reconciled  with  the  facts  well  known  to  the  judge  and  the 
jury,  and  was  discredited. 

Webster  used  this  test  effectively  in  the  White  murder 
trial  to  overthrow  the  testimony  of  one  of  the  witnesses  of 
the  defence: 

"Balch  says,  that  on  the  evening,  whenever  it  was,  he  saw  the 
prisoner;  the  prisoner  told  him  he  was  going  out  of  town  on  horse- 
back, for  a  distance  of  about  twenty  minutes'  drive,  and  that  he 
was  going  to  get  a  horse  at  Osborn's.  This  was  about  seven  o'clock. 
At  about  nine,  Balch  says  he  saw  the  prisoner  again,  and  was  then 
told  by  him  that  he  had  had  his  ride,  and  had  returned.  Now  it 
appears  by  Osborn's  books,  that  the  prisoner  had  a  saddle-horse 
from  his  stable,  not  on  Tuesday  evening,  the  night  of  the  murder, 
but  on  the  Saturday  evening  previous.  This  fixes  the  time  about 
which  these  young  men  testify,  and  is  a  complete  answer  and  refuta- 
tion of  the  attempted  alibi  on  Tuesday  evening."  ^ 

3.  Is  the  evidence  consistent  with  itself?  Evidence  that 
contradicts  itself  is  of  course  the  worst  possible  kind.  Some 
answer  may  be  made,  some  explanation  given,  to  save  the 
situation  when  one's  evidence  is  shown  to  be  inconsistent 
with  human  experience  or  known  facts.  Is  human  experience 
correct  and  complete  in  regard  to  the  matter  in  question? 
Men  are  continually  accepting  beliefs  that  are  inconsistent 
with  the  experiences  of  their  fathers.  Are  the  known  facts 
really  known  or  only  supposed?  Has  there  been  a  mistake? 
Must  we  abandon  some  of  the  presumably  established  facts 
in  the  light  of  new  evidence?    But  when  our  evidence  has  an 

»  The  Works  of  Daniel  Webster,  Vol.  VI,  p.  83. 


EVIDENCE  105 

inconsistency  within  itself  we  cannot  escape  without  suffer- 
ing some  disadvantage.  We  cannot  go  outside  and  show  the 
error  is  on  the  other  side.  There  is  something  wrong  with  our 
own  evidence,  and  when  this  is  exposed  by  our  opponent 
our  cause  has  suffered  more  than  would  have  been  the  case 
had  we  failed  to  meet  any  other  test.  Inconsistency  in  the 
disputant  himself  is  unpardonable.  So,  when  Oppius  was 
charged  with  defrauding  the  soldiers  of  their  pensions, 
Cicero  refuted  the  charge  by  proving  that  the  same  persons 
charged  Oppius  with  a  design  to  corrupt  the  army  with  his 
extravagant  gifts  and  liberality.  So  a  man  who  in  explaining 
irregularity  in  regard  to  advertising  a  certain  function,  based 
part  of  his  case  on  the  fact  that  a  large  crowd  was  neither 
expected  nor  desired  because  the  patronage  was  a  fixed  and 
assured  one,  and  based  a  second  part  of  his  case  on  the  as- 
sertion that  he  had  to  do  what  was  done  in  order  to  catch  the 
public  and  get  as  large  an  attendance  as  was  desired,  lost 
greatly  in  the  minds  of  the  judges  when  this  inconsistency 
was  pointed  out. 

4.  Can  the  evidence  pass  the  "  hearsay  "  test?  a.  In  the 
law  courts,  of  course,  hearsay  evidence  is  ruled  out  unless  it 
comes  under  one  of  the  recognized  exceptions  to  the  hearsay 
rule.  (See  Best  On  Evidence.)  ^  But  it  is  well  to  note  that  evi- 
dence may  be  hearsay  and  therefore  inadmissible  if  offered  to 
prove  one  thing,  and  original  evidence  and  admissible  if  offered 
to  prove  another.  Evidence  is  inadmissible  as  hearsay  only 
when  offered  as  evidence  of  the  thing  stated — of  the  truth 
of  the  remark  made.  For  instance,  W  testifies,  "I  heard  J 
say  to  B  'the  horse  is  sound.'  "  This  is  hearsay  evidence  if 
offered  to  prove  that  the  horse  was  sound.  It  is  original  evi- 
dence if  offered  to  prove  that  J  warranted  the  horse. 

b.  In  general  argumentation,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  hearsay 
evidence  is  often  good.  The  question  here  is  (1)  whether  the 
evidence  itself  is  of  such  a  nature  that  it  may  be  safely  passed 
from  person  to  person  with  substantial  accuracy,  and  (2) 

1  Pp.  434-444. 


106  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

whether  or  not  the  channel  through  which  the  evidence 
comes  is  satisfactory.  The  reasons  for  excluding  hearsay  at 
all  are:  no  chance  for  cross-examination  of  witness,  witness 
not  under  oath,  the  opportunity^  of  someone  in  the  chain  not 
saying  what  he  meant,  or  someone  not  understanding  cor- 
rectly what  was  said.  When  by  the  mental  and  moral  char- 
acter of  the  persons  forming  the  channel,  and  by  the  definite, 
clean-cut  nature  of  the  evidence  itself,  these  objections  are 
met,  the  fact  that  the  evidence  is  hearsay  amounts  to  very 
little.  For  instance,  we  would  give  little  credence  to  a  village 
story,  vague  "undocumented"  rumor,  or  neighborhood 
gossip,  in  regard  to  the  behavior  of  newcomers  to  a  neighbor- 
ing estate — people  who  would  naturally  be  misunderstood  and 
mistrusted  by  many  of  the  villagers.  But  if  the  dean  of  X 
College  announced  in  faculty  meeting  that  the  dean  of  Y 
College  had  said  that  the  president  of  Y  had  telephoned  that 
the  governor  had  just  vetoed  a  certain  bill,  the  hearsay 
evidence  would  be  accepted  and  acted  upon  without  question. 

5.  Is  the  evidence  of  a  kind  that  is  exceptionally  valuable? 
Under  this  head  it  is  well  to  mention  four  kinds  of  evidence 
that  have  special  value.  We  should  keep  these  in  mind 
when  testing  evidence — either  our  own  or  our  opponents'. 

a.  Admissions  and  declarations  against  interest.  These  are 
the  terms  given  in  the  courts  to  the  testimony  of  persons 
contrary  to  what  their  own  concern  in  the  cause  woukLeug- 
^gest-v  This  testimony  is  there  regarded  as  of  such  importance 
and  so  free  from  doubt  that  secondhand  evidence  of  such 
statements  is  made  admissible,^  contrary  to  the  general 
rule  excluding  all  hearsay  evidence.  When  people  make 
deliberate  statements  to  their  own  disadvantage  the  state- 
ments are  usually  true,  when  people  deliberately  lie  it  is 
because  they  think  the  lie  is  to  their  advantage.  Sometimes 
the  admission  or  declaration  is  made  when  the  person  is  aware 
of  its  damaging  nature;  sometimes,  when  unaware.  Such 
testimony  is  ordinarily  reliable;  but  there  are  exceptions. 
1  See  Best,  p.  440. 


EVIDENCE  107 

If  the  statement  is  made  by  a  person  unconscious  of  its 
effect  on  his  own  interests,  we  must  be  sure  that  it  was  not 
made  carelessly,  or  under  the  influence  of  an  intent  to  gain 
some  other  end.  If  it  is  a  deliberate  admission  or  confession, 
there  may  have  been  some  hope  of  reward  that  led  the  wit- 
ness to  suffer  a  lesser  evil  for  a  greater  gain;  or  the  statement 
may  have  been  given  under  compulsion.  In  either  case  its 
value  is  gone.  But  the  presumption  is  always  in  favor  of  the 
trustworthiness  of  this  kind  of  evidence.  To  take  an  exam- 
ple: a  statement  by  any  "protected"  manufacturer  that  the 
tariff  duties  were  too  high — if  such  a  thing  were  possible — 
would  be  a  worthy  bit  of  evidence.  But  if  it  could  be  proved 
that  he  was  about  to  embark  in  some  new  enterprise  where 
the  tariff  could  not  help  him,  that  his  purpose  was  the  de- 
struction of  some  greater  rival,  or  that  he  was  in  the  hire  of  a 
political  manager,  its  force  would  be  destroyed. 

b.  Casual  or  undesigned  evidence.  This  kind  of  evidence, 
whose  character  has  already  been  discussed,  is  specially  val- 
uable because  of  its  freedom  from  suspicion. 

c.  Negative  evidence.  Negative  evidence  has  also  been  fully 
explained.  It  is  a  third  type  that  is  generally  considered 
especially  valuable  because  it  cannot  be  easily  manufactured 
or  "doctored."  It  is  difficult  to  tamper  with  an  absence  of 
evidence.  Though  sometimes,  of  course,  the  significant  ab- 
sence may  be  artificially  brought  about. 

d.  Real  evidence.  If  the  nature  of  the  controversy  is  such 
as  to  permit  the  use  of  real  evidence  this  sort  (already  dis- 
cussed) is  of  course  much  better  than  personal  evidence  to 
the  same  effect.  When  one  can  exhibit  the  condition  of  a 
wound,  the  ill  fit  of  a  coat,  the  dangerous  condition  of  a  bridge 
or  railroad  crossing,  such  exhibition  will  be  better  than  oral 
descriptions  of  these  things. 

B.  Tests  of  the  sources  of  evidence.  1.  Tests  of  ordi- 
nary— "  fact " — witnesses. 

a.  Is  the  witness  physically  qualified?  Most  human 
knowledge  comes  through  the  avenues  of  the  five  senses,  and 


108  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

it  is  from  the  information  so  received  that  we  get  evidence. 
Clearly,  then,  the  physical  powers  of  a  witness  may  have 
great  influence  upon  his  reliability.  If  a  witness  is  color- 
blind, his  testimony  that  green  signal  lights  were  displayed 
at  the  time  and  place  of  a  railroad  accident  must  be  ignored. 
However,  this  test  is  not  very  common  outside  of  the  court- 
room. The  writers  that  furnish  the  materials  of  student 
debate  and  of  ordinary  disputation  everywhere  are  usually 
beyond  the  reach  of  such  examination,  and  their  testimony 
is  not  commonly  of  such  a  nature  that  it  makes  much  dif- 
ference whether  they  are  blind,  or  deaf,  or  otherwise  un- 
fortunate physically.  But  whenever  phj^sical  weakness  may 
have  any  possible  effect  on  the  testimony,  the  test  should  be 
rigorously  applied.  It  is  one  of  the  most  effective  of  all 
possible  tests,  for  such  a  defect  in  a  witness  is  conclusive 
against  his  testimony. 

b.  Is  the  witness  mentally  qualified?  More  important 
for  the  purposes  of  general  argumentation  than  the  test  of 
physical  endowment  is  the  test  of  mental  powers. 

(I)  Memory.  The  test  of  the  memory  of  a  witness  is  ap- 
plicable everywhere.  In  the  courts,  it  is  a  part  of  the  "stock 
in  trade"  of  a  cross-examiner.  In  ordinary  argument  it  is 
less  significant.  A  defective  memory  is  damaging,  because 
it  raises  a  strong  presumption  of  error  in  the  statement  of 
testimony.  If  the  witness  cannot  remember  things  in  general, 
it  is  probable  that  he  cannot  clearly  remember  about  the 
particular  fact  in  question.  His  impressions  will  probably 
be  vague  and  indistinct,  and  so  his  statements  will  be  un- 
reliable. 

In  the  White  murder  trial,  Webster  used  this  test  in 
attacking  a  witness  of  the  defence: — 

"Mr.  Burchmore  says,  to  the  best  of  his  belief,  it  was  the  evening 
of  the  murder.  x\fterwards  he  attempts  to  speak  positively,  from 
recollecting  that  he  mentioned  the  circumstance  to  William  Peirce 
as  he  went  to  Mineral  Spring  on  Fast-day.    Last  Monday  morning 


EVIDENCE  109 

he  told  Colonel  Putnam  he  could  not  fix  the  time.  This  witness 
stands  in  a  much  worse  plight  than  either  of  the  others.  It  is  difii- 
cult  to  reconcile  all  he  has  said  with  any  belief  in  the  accuracy  of 
his  recollections."  ^ 

(II)  Accuracy  of  statement.  The  accurate  use  of  words 
and  phrases  is  not  by  any  means  universal.  We  shall  treat 
later  of  the  different  kinds  of  "liars";  but  many  mistakes  of 
verbal  expression  are  wholly  undesigned.  Provincial  phrases, 
personal  peculiarities  in  speech,  a  tendency  toward  exaggera- 
tion, may  often  lead  a  witness  to  say  what  he  does  not  really 
mean.  In  getting  written  evidence,  to  avoid  the  mistake  of 
misunderstanding  the  witness,  the  real  import  of  the  tes- 
timony should  be  gathered  from  the  evidence  as  a  whole 
rather  than  from  the  exact  words  of  any  particular  sentences. 
Witnesses  who  are  habitually  inaccurate  must,  of  course,  be 
treated  with  suspicion.  There  are  many  writers  whose  prac- 
tice it  is  to  deal  in  generalities  and  bold  over-statements. 
If  a  man  has  a  reputation  for  that  style  of  writing,  his  tes- 
timony is  of  little  or  no  value;  and,  in  any  case  his  credibility 
is  liable  to  question. 

(A)  Thoughtless  exaggeration.  Accidental  or  thoughtless 
exaggeration  is  very  common  in  oral  testimony,  and  arises 
from  habits  of  mind  in  the  witness.  Some  men  have  an 
irresistible  inipulse  to  *'make  things  big,"  like  Falstaff,  with 
his  "eleven  men  in  buckram."  Intentional  exaggeration  is 
simply  one  kind  of  deliberate  lying.  A  witness  who  exag- 
gerates can  best  be  exposed  by  investigating  his  accuracy  in 
other  instances.  Collins  ^  uses  this  test  in  his  argument  to 
prove  that  Swift  was  not  married  to  Esther  Johnson,  when, 
in  speaking  of  one  of  the  witnesses,  a  certain  Dr.  Madden,  he 
says:  "Of  Madden  it  is  sufficient  to  say  that  in  temper  and 
in  blood  he  was  half  French,  half  Irish;  and  that  as  a  writer 
he  is  chiefly  known  as  the  author  of  a  work  wilder  and  more 

»  The  Works  of  Daniel  Webster,  Vol.  VI,  p.  83. 

2  Jonathan  Swift,  by  J.  C.  Collins,  ch.  VI,  pp.  146-157. 


110  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

absurd  than  the  wildest  and  most  absurd  of  Whiston's 
prophecies  and  Asgill's  paradoxes."  If  a  witness  habitually 
exaggerates,  none  of  his  statements  can  be  accepted  at  their 
face  value. 

c.  Is  the  witness  morally  qualified?  Deliberate  perver- 
sion of  the  truth  implies  some  motive.  With  an  expert  the  mo- 
tive is  most  often  that  of  pride.  One  expert  is  opposed  to 
another  in  some  court  trial  or  perhaps  on  some  economic 
question.  Each  feels  that  his  reputation  depends  on  the 
overthrow  of  his  rival.  Consequently,  though  they  may  be- 
gin with  the  most  honest  intentions,  they  yield  to  the  de- 
mands of  the  occasion,  their  testimony  degenerates  into  a 
spirited  argument,  and  exaggeration  and  misrepresentation 
are  bred.  With  an  ordinary  witness  the  motive  is  some  in- 
terest in  the  question  at  issue.  He  feels  some  sympathy  with 
the  parties  most  deeply  involved  in  the  outcome,  or  he  him- 
self has  some  interest  in  the  question  at  issue. 

A  witness  must  be  tested  with  these  possible  weaknesses  in 
view,  in  two  respects:  (I)  Is  he  unduly  interested  in  the  out- 
come? and  (II)  What  is  his  general  moral  character?  This 
second  test  is  significant,  because  it  tells  us  to  what  extent 
the  witness  would  permit  unworthy  motives  to  influence  his 
words.  A  reputation  for  low  moral  character  in  a  witness 
makes  his  testimony  of  little  or  no  value. 

This  test  is  one  of  the  most  conimon  in  the  courts.  Rufus 
Choate  gave  a  good  illustration  of  its  effectiveness  in  his 
speech  in  the  Dalton  divorce  case.  While  attacking  one  of 
the  leading  witnesses  of  the  pfaintiff,  he  said: — 

"I  begin,  therefore,  with  the  foundation  witness  in  this  case, 
John  H.  Coburn,  and  I  respectfully  submit  to  you,  that  tried  by 
every  test  of  credibility  which  the  law  recognizes,  on  your  oaths 
you  are  bound  to  disbelieve  him.  It  is  not  that  a  laugh  can  be 
raised  against  Coburn  or  his  testimony — that  is  nothing;  it  is  that, 
according  to  those  tests  which  are  founded  on  the  longest  and 
widest  experience  the  law  deems  satisfactory  to  show  whether  a 
jury  can  safely  believe  or  not,  he  is  not  to  be  believed.    I  submit. 


EVIDENCE  111 

then,  that  John  H.  Coburn  is  not  an  honest  man,  and  is  not,  there- 
fore, entitled  to  be  heard  in  so  dehcate  a  work  as  bringing  every 
word  my  cHent  spoke  on  that  evening  to  her  husband;  he  is  not  an 
honest  man,  and  I  put  it  on  your  solemn  oath  to  you,  that  there 
is  not  a  mian  on  that  jury  who,  on  the  exhibition  of  John  H.  Coburn, 
would  intrust  him  to  carry  a  bundle  worth  five  dollars  from  this 
courthouse  to  the  depot."  ^ 

d.  Did  the  witness  have  an  opportunity  for  getting  the 
truth?  This  is  an  obvious  and  important  test.  If  the  situa- 
tion or  experience  of  the  witness  has  been  such  that  he  has  not 
had  a  chance  to  observe  the  existence  of  the  facts  to  which 
he  testifies,  and  to  observe  them  closely  and  carefully,  his 
statements  are  clearly  untrustworthy.  In  the  courts  it  is  a 
common  method  of  impeaching  testimony  to  show  that  a 
witness  was  too  far  distant  from  the  scene  to  see  clearly,  that 
he  did  not  have  time  to  observe  carefully,  or  that  he  did  not 
arrive  in  season. 

This  test  is  of  first  importance  in  all  kinds  of  argumentation. 
Innumerable  are  the  writers  who  are  ready  to  venture  the 
most  positive  statements  on  the  foundation  of  a  few  weeks' 
investigation,  or  who  carelessly  make  bold  assertions  of  some 
general  truth,  when  they  have  observed  only  a  few  phenom- 
ena, and  when  those  they  have  observed  are  as  likely  as  not 
to  have  been  exceptional  or  sporadic  in  nature.  It  is  not 
uncommon  that  an  author  or  a  traveller  visits  such  a  conn- 
try  as  Russia  for  a  few  months  or  a  year,  and,  on  his  return, 
writes  articles  or  a  book  on  Russian  society,  Russia's  political 
methods,  and  her  economic  prospects.  Now,  such  a  man  is 
not  to  be  criticised  for  writing  in  the  magazines  or  publishing 
a  book;  his  narrative  may  well  be  interesting.  But,  as  ev- 
idence^ his  statements  and  prophecies  generally  amount  to 
nothing;  Russian  society  and  politics  cannot  be  analyzed  in 
a  month.  Again,  how  often  we  find  newspaper  writers  and 
pamphleteers  giving  the  most  emphatic  testimony  to  defects 

*  Great  Speeches  by  Great  Lawyers^  p.  307. 


112  ARGUMENTATION   AND  DEBATE 

in  methods  of  colonial  administration  by  their  own  govern- 
ment, when  they  have  never  ventured  beyond  the  borders  of 
their  home  states.  Their  earnestness  may  be  good  and  their 
patriotism  commendable,  but  their  testimony  is  worthless. 
The  opportunities  for  observation  are  insufficient  to  make 
good  evidence. 

2.  The  tests  of  the  sources  of  expert  evidence.  This  in 
general  argumentation  is  testing  the  authorities  in  "argu- 
ments from  authority."  The  "authority"  used  for  the  pur- 
pose of  such  argument  or  such  evidence  as  this  must  bear 
three  special  tests: 

a.  Is  the  case  such  as  to  make  the  introduction  o[_pjnnion 
evidence^arguments  fnmL^aijIhnrify  warrantnhlp.  ?  Do  not 
offend  your  audience  by  giving  the  opinions  of  alleged 
authorities  on  questions  on  which  the  facts  are  available  and 
understandable  to  any  intelligent  man.  Do  not  ask  A  to  be- 
lieve a  thing  because  B  believes  it,  when  A's  opinion  is  just 
as  good  as  B's.  No  authorities,  no  matter  how  good,  should 
be  used  in  questions  to  settle  which  opinion  evidence  is  not 
needed. 

h.  Is  the  witness  possss^sdj^-the  knowledge-and  experience 
necessary  to  justify  his  acceptance  as  an  expert  in  the  matter 
in  question.? 

c.  Is  his  authority  recognized  by  the  audience  or  reader? 
However  great  the  knowledge  or  skill  of  an  expert,  if  his  great- 
ness is  unknown  to  the  hearer  or  reader,  the  effect  of  quoting 
him  will  be  a  mere  "flash  in  the  pan."  The  audience  or 
reader  will  see  in  the  pretended  "authority"  nothing  more 
than  a  meaningless  name,  and  so  will  ignore  his  statement 
The  disputant  must  always  be  sure  that  the  worth  of  his 
expert  is  accepted;  and  if  there  may  be  any  doubt,  his  first 
duty  is  to  establish  for  him  a  satisfactory  reputation. 


EVIDENCE  113 


EXERCISE.    CHAPTER  6 

EVIDENCE 

1.  Give  an  example  of  an  item  of  evidence  which  shall  be 

personal,  circumstantial,  and  original. 

2.  Give  an  example  of  an  item  of  evidence  which  shall  be 

negative,  real,  circumstantial,  and  ordinary. 

3.  Give  an  example  of  an  item  of  evidence  which  shall  be 

direct,  unwritten,  hearsay,  personal,  and  casual. 

4.  Give  an  example  of  an  item  of  evidence  which  shall  be 

negative,  real,  casual,  and  circumstantial. 

5.  Hand  in  a  clipping  or  copy  of  an  argument  from  current 

newspapers,  magazines,  lectures,  or  text-books,  contain- 
ing an  argument  from  authority. 

6.  On  evidence  drawn  from  the  sources  mentioned  in  number 

five,  containing  ordinary  evidence,  apply  all  of  the  tests 
applicable  to  it,  stating  the  results,  and  your  final  opin- 
ion as  to  the  value  of  the  evidence. 


CHAPTER  7 

KINDS  OF  ARGUMENTS 

OUTLINE 

I.  In  Logic 

A.  Deduction. 

B.  Induction. 

1.  Real  process  of  inference  the  same. 

2.  Object:  necessary  connection  according  to  some  general 
principle. 

3.  Mutual  dependence. 

4.  Kinds  of  induction: 

a.  Perfect. 

b.  Imperfect. 

5.  Methods  of  induction. 

a.  Agreement. 

b.  Difference. 

c.  Joint  method. 

d.  Residues. 

e.  Concomitant  variations. 

C.  The  syllogism. 

1.  The  special  rules  of  the  syllogism. 

2.  Definitions. 

3.  Sorites. 

4.  Inferences  in  quantitative  relations. 

5.  Enthymemes. 

6.  The  nature  of  syllogistic  reasoning. 

7.  The  weakness  of  the  syllogism  in  general  argumentation. 

n.  In  Rhetoric 

A.  Antecedent  probability. 

1.  Effect  to  cause  not  a  part  of  a  priori  argument. 

2.  Methods  of  attack. 

114 


KINDS  OF  ARGUMENTS  115 

a.  Connection  complete? 

b.  Cause  adequate? 

c.  Other  causes  present? 

d.  Substitute  argument? 

B.  Sign. 

1.  Effect  to  cause. 

a.  Methods  of  attack. 

(I)  Some  other  cause? 

(II)  Cause  capable? 

(III)  Connection  complete? 

2.  Effect  to  effect. 

a.  Methods  of  attack. 

(I)  Those  already  given — used  in  combination, 

3.  Association  of  phenomena  in  past. 

a.  Association  of  phenomena  and  generalization. 

b.  Methods  of  attack. 

(I)  Cases  too  few? 

(II)  Contrary  cases? 

(III)  Inconsistent? 

C.  Example. 

1.  Generalization. 

a.  Illustrative  and  argumentative  examples. 

b.  Methods  of  attack. 

(I)  Fair  specimens? 

(II)  Large  enough  part  of  field? 

2.  Analogy. 

a.  Figurative  analogy. 

b.  Literal  analogy. 

(I)  Generalization  from  a  single  instance. 

c.  Summary. 

d.  Methods  of  attack. 

(I)  Those  of  generalization  for  literal. 

(II)  False  analogy  for  figurative. 

3.  Cause  and  effect  in  example. 

I.  In  logic.  Forms  of  arguments  are  classified  and 
studied  mainly  from  two  points  of  view — Logic  and  Rhetoric. 
The  difference  already  referred  to  between  formal  logic 
and  argumentation  is  strongly  marked  in  the  methods  em- 


116  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

ployed  by  each  in  the  treatment  of  the  kinds  of  arguments, 
or,  as  the  term  is  in  logic,  of  '*  inferences."  Logic  explains 
the  different  ways  in  which  the  mind  may  work  in  making 
an  inference  or  reasoning.  Its  purpose  is  to  teach  us  to  under- 
stand our  own  thought  processes.  In  rhetoric  or  argumenta- 
tion the  purpose  in  discussing  the  methods  of  inference,  or 
"the  kinds  of  arguments,"  is  to  make  clear  the  rules  that 
must  be  followed  in  order  to  make  arguments  that  will  be 
valuable  for  the  purpose  of  convincing  and  persuading 
others.  It  is  not  the  mind  of  the  speaker  or  writer  that  must 
be  satisfied  in  argumentation,  but  the  mind  of  the  hearer  or 
reader.  For  this  purpose  the  necessity  of  knowing  the 
various  kinds  of  arguments  that  may  be  used  is  twofold; 
it  is  necessary  (1)  in  order  to  be  able  to  select  and  use  the 
arguments  that  will  be  valuable  in  constructing  one's  own 
proof,  and  (2)  in  order  to  be  able  to  attack  the  proofs  of  an 
opponent.  In  addition  to  these  particular  and  practical  ad- 
vantages arising  from  a  knowledge  of  the  forms  of  argument, 
logical  and  rhetorical,  there  seems  to  be  a  more  general  and 
less  definitely  practical  reason  for  studying  all  of  the  matters 
discussed  in  this  chapter.  That  is  that  anyone  tvho  is  trained 
in  argumentation  should  be  familiar  with  the  vocabulary  of 
argument  whether  he  ever  makes  practical  use  of  it  or  not.  One 
who  has  had  college  or  university  training  in  argumentation 
ought  to  be  able  to  understand  the  logical  terms  and  methods 
here  presented  when  they  are  used  by  others — even  if  he 
does  not  care  to  use  them  himself.  With  these  purposes  in 
mind,  let  us  see  what  the  logicians^  can  do  to  help  us.    Before 

^  In  presenting  material  drawn  from  Logic  in  this  chapter  and  in  the 
chapter  on  Fallacies,  it  has  been  thought  much  better  for  many  reasons  to 
let  the  logicians  speak  for  themselves.  The  following  discussion  is  therefore 
taken  almost  entirely  from  the  standard  text-books  of  recognized  authorities 
on  logic  (Jevons,  Creighton,  Bode,  Hibben,  Hyslop,  Sidgwick).  Great  care 
has  been  exercised  in  choosing  material  that  will  best  serve  the  purposes  of 
students  of  argumentation.  In  all  cases  of  quotations  of  any  length,  permis- 
sion to  use  them  has  been  obtained  from  the  publishers,  and  has  been  ac- 
knowledged elsewhere.    Here  again  I  express  my  thanks.    J.  M.  O'N. 


KINDS  OF  ARGUMENTS  111 

considering  the  kinds  of  arguments  as  usually  given  in  rhet- 
oric or  argumentation  we  should  understand  what  logic 
has  to  say  on  the  same  subject  under  the  heads  of  deduction, 
induction,  and  the  syllogism. 

A.  Deduction.  "There  are  two  directions  in  which 
inference  or  reasoning  may  proceed.  We  may  begin  with 
certain  facts  or  principles  which  are  already  known,  or  are 
assumed  to  be  true,  and  proceed  to  show  that  some  result 
necessarily  follows  from  them.  Thus  we  might  infer  that  if 
the  draughts  of  a  stove  are  closed  so  that  the  supply  of  oxygen 
is  lessened,  the  fire  will  burn  slowly;  or  from  the  relative 
positions  and  revolutions  of  the  planets,  that  an  eclipse 
of  the  sun  will  take  place  on  a  specified  day  and  hour.  This 
method  of  reasoning  is  known  as  Deduction.  It  proceeds, 
as  we  have  seen,  from  premises  to  conclusion.  ...  In 
deductive  reasoning  the  particular  case  is  always  brought 
under  some  general  law  or  principle,  which  is  already  known 
or  assumed  as  true.  Socrates  is  known  to  be  mortal,  because 
as  a  man  he  falls  under  the  general  law  that  all  men  are  mortal, 
the  closing  of  the  draughts  is  a  case  of  lessened  supply  of 
oxygen,  and,  therefore,  in  accordance  with  the  general  law, 
a  case  of  slow  burning.  A  deductive  inference  shows  what 
are  the  results  of  the  application  of  a  general  law  to  particular 
facts  or  instances.  It  proceeds  downwards,  as  it  were,  from 
the  general  law  to  its  consequences. 

B.  Induction.  "In  Induction,  on  the  contrary,  the 
procedure  is  just  the  opposite  of  this.  We  begin  with  par- 
ticular phenomena,  and  try  to  discover  from  them  the  law 
or  principle  which  unites  them.  Certain  facts  are  observed 
to  happen  together,  and  the  problem  is  to  find  the  ground  or 
explanation  of  this  connection.  Inductive  inference  is  thus 
a  process  of  reading  the  general  law  out  of  the  particular 
facts.  It  is  an  insight  into  the  nature  of  the  whole  or  system, 
based  upon  a  careful  examination  of  the  parts.  *  Yesterday 
the  smoke  tended  to  fall  to  the  ground,  and  it  rained  in  the 
afternoon.*     These  two  facts  may  simply  be  observed  a 


118     '  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

number  of  times  without  any  thought  of  their  connectioa 
But  intelligence  asks:  Why  should  they  happen  in  conjunc- 
tion? And  to  answer  this  question,  we  must  begin  by  ana- 
lyzing the  facts  in  our  possession.  When  the  smoke  falls  to 
the  ground,  the  atmosphere  must  be  lighter  than  usual;  this 
is  the  case  when  it  contains  a  great  deal  of  moisture;  but  when 
the  atmosphere  is  in  this  condition,  it  usually  tends  to  dis- 
charge its  moisture  in  the  form  of  rain;  therefore  we  have 
the  general  law  which  enables  us  to  show  that  the  behavior 
of  the  smoke  and  the  rain  yesterday  were  not  only  accident- 
ally conjoinedy  but  essentially  connected. 

1.  Real  process  of  inference  the  same  in  deduction  and 
induction.  "Deduction  and  Induction,  then,  are  both 
forms  of  inference,  but  the  starting-point  and  mode  of  pro- 
cedure of  the  one  is  different  from  that  of  the  other.  Conse- 
quently, it  is  not  unusual  to  speak  of  them  as  two  kinds  of 
reasoning  which  are  quite  distinct  and  independent  of  each 
other.  It  is,  however,  important  to  avoid  this  popular  error, 
and  to  remember  that  the  real  process  of  inference  is  in  each 
case  the  same.  The  essence  of  inference,  as  has  been  shown, 
consists  in  the  fact  that  it  exhibits  the  manner  in  which  par- 
ticular facts  are  connected  together  into  a  system  or  whole}  And 
this  end  is  achieved  both  by  Deduction  and  Induction.  In 
the  former  case,  the  general  law  of  connection — what  we 
may  call  the  nature  of  the  system  within  which  the  partic- 
ulars fall — is  known,  and  we  argue  from  this  as  to  the  nature 
and  relations  of  the  various  parts  which  fall  within  it.  We 
have  the  common  thread  which  unites  the  various  facts  in  our 
hand,  and  following  it  out  are  able  to  show  its  application 
in  determining  the  nature  of  events  which  have  not  yet 
come  within  the  range  of  our  experience.  Knowing  the  law 
of  gravity,  for  example,  one  could  infer  deductively  what 
momentum  a  ball  weighing  one  pound  must  necessarily  have 
after  falling  one  hundred  feet.  It  would  not  be  necessary 
actually  to  measure  the  momentum  of  the  falling  body  in 
^  Italics  ours. 


KINDS  OF  ARGUMENTS  119 

this  particular  case,  but  it  could  be  shown  to  be  the  neces- 
sary result  of  the  general  law.  What  the  deductive  inference 
shows  to  us,  is  the  way  in  which  a  general  principle  or  law 
of  connection  runs  through  a  group  of  facts,  and  constitutes 
them  a  real  or  organic  whole.  The  same  insight  is  reached 
by  inductive  inference,  although  the  starting-point  is  en- 
tirely different.  As  we  have  already  seen,  induction  begins 
by  observing  that  certain  phenomena  are  frequently  con- 
joined, and  attempts  to  discover  some  law  or  principle  which 
will  make  the  fact  of  their  connection  intelligible. 

2.  Object:  necessary  connection  of  facts  according  to 
some  general  principle.  "It  is  usual  to  say  that  in  induc- 
tion we  go  from  the  particular  facts  to  the  general  law.  The 
following,  however,  would  be  a  more  correct  form  of  state- 
ment: Before  the  inference,  we  observe  that  a  number  of 
phenomena  occur  together,  but  do  not  know  whether  this 
conjunction  is  necessary  or  not;  or,  if  we  assume  that  it  is 
necessary,  we  do  not  understand  why  it  should  be  so.  As  a 
result  of  the  inductive  inference,  we  gain  an  insight  into  the 
necessary  connection  of  the  observed  phenomena,  and  also 
understand  the  principle  according  to  which  the  latter  are 
united.  What  we  really  obtain  through  an  inductive  infer- 
ence is  not  only  a  general  law,  but  also  a  perception  of  its 
concrete  application  to  particular  phenomena.  This  being 
so,  it  is  clear  that  Induction  and  Deduction  are  not  two  differ- 
ent kinds  of  inference.  Inference  always  implies  an  effort  on 
the  part  of  the  mind  to  see  how  phenomena  are  necessarily  con- 
nected according  to  some  general  principle.^  And,  in  carrying 
out  this  purpose,  the  mind  must  begin  with  the  knowledge 
which  it  already  possesses.  When  the  general  law  of  con- 
nection is  known,  and  the  object  is  to  discover  the  nature  of 
some  particular  fact,  the  method  of  procedure  is  deductive. 
But,  when  the  problem  by  which  we  are  confronted  is  to  read 
out  of  the  facts  of  sense-perception  the  general  law  of  their 
connection,  the  method  of  inference  which  must  be  employed 

*  Italics  ours. 


120  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

is  that  of  induction.  But  from  whatever  point  we  set  out, 
and  whatever  may  be  the  immediate  object  of  the  inference, 
the  result  is  always  the  same — an  insight  into  the  necessary 
connection  of  facts  according  to  some  general  principle."  ^ 

3.  Mutual  dependence.  "  While  considering  the  distinc- 
tions between  induction  and  deduction,  we  must  not  over- 
look their  mutual  dependence.  We  cannot  proceed  in  deduc- 
tion irrespective  of  induction,  because  the  universal  upon 
which  the  deductive  process  is  based  arises  in  the  majority 
of  cases  from  a  previous  induction.  It  is  true  that  the  uni- 
versal term  may  be  in  a  proposition  that  is  known  a  prioriy 
as  the  axioms  of  geometry  and  certain  space  and  time  postu- 
lates; but  a  very  small  proportion  of  major  premises  can  be 
said  to  have  such  an  origin,  and  their  resulting  conclusions 
have  very  slight  material  significance.  Deduction  that 
reaches  other  than  purely  abstract  and  formal  conclusions 
must  rest  upon  induction  for  the  material  to  form  its  prem- 
ises. ...  On  the  other  hand,  induction  is  dependent  upon 
deduction;  for  we  cannot  reason  from  particular  instances  to 
a  universal  proposition,  unless  we  assume  as  the  basis  of  the 
whole  inductive  process  some  postulate  which  has  real  uni- 
versal significance.  Otherwise,  we  reach  only  a  high  degree 
of  probability,  but  not  necessity;  a  rude  generalization,  but 
not  universality.  When  we  assert  some  such  general  state- 
ment as  this,  that  arsenic  always  acts  as  a  poison,  we  have 
based  the  universal  character  of  the  proposition  upon  an 
underlying  postulate  that  is  understood  even  though  it  is  not 
expressed,  such  as  the  uniformity  of  nature,  that  under  identi- 
cal conditions  we  always  look  for  identical  effects.  This  is 
referred  to  at  this  point  merely  to  illustrate  the  deductive 
basis  of  induction."  ^ 

4.  Kinds  of  induction.  "There  are  three  different  ap- 
plications of  the  term  *  Induction,*  which  are  generally  as- 
sumed to  mean  the  same  thing.  To  explain  what  they  are 
we  have  to  produce  the  usual  divisions  of  the  subject,  which 

1  Creighton,  pp.  329-333.  2  Hibben,  pp.  173-173. 


KINDS  OF  ARGUMENTS  121 

are  the  so-called  kinds  of  induction.  They  are  (a)  'Perfed 
Induction*  and  (b)  'Imperfect  Induction.*  The  first  meaning 
of  the  term  applies  to  the  first  kind,  and  the  other  two  are 
modifications  of  what  is  implied  in  imperfect  induction.  We 
would  not  suspect  a  difference  of  meaning  from  this  general 
fact  alone,  but  if  we  examine  carefully  the  illustrations  chosen 
to  describe  the  nature  of  the  process  as  thus  distinguished 
into  different  kinds,  we  shall  discern  very  clearly  the  great 
differences  of  real  meaning  attaching  to  the  term.  Thus 
*  Perfect  Induction'  is  simply  an  enumeration  of  the  particulars 
which  form  a  class.  It  is  the  process  which  characterized 
the  method  of  Socrates  in  reaching  his  definitions,  and  which 
Aristotle  remarked  was  a  new  method  compared  with  the  ar- 
gumentation of  his  predecessors.  An  example  of  perfect  in- 
duction is  the  following:  *  Mercury  revolves  on  its  axis;  so 
do  Venus,  the  Earth,  Mars,  Jupiter,  Saturn,  and  Neptune. 
But  these  are  all  the  planets,  and  therefore  all  the  planets 
revolve  on  their  axes."  Although  this  is  stated  in  the  form 
of  reasoning,  it  is  not  reasoning  at  all.  This  fact  is  apparent 
in  the  nature  of  the  conclusion,  which  is  that  "  All  the  planets 
revolve  on  their  axis,"  not  on  the  axis  of  Mercury,  although 
the  same  thing  would  be  true  if  we  had  said  "  on  the  axis  of 
Mercury."  But  the  special  proof  of  its  not  being  a  case  of 
reasoning  is  in  the  fact  that  the  so-called  conclusion  is  merely 
a  universal  statement  of  what  had  been  enumerated  in  detail 
in  the  premises.  We  are  supposed  to  have  observed  the  in- 
dividual fact  that  *'  Mercury  revolves  on  its  axis,"  and  then 
again  that  "  Venus  revolves  on  its  axis,"  and  so  on  through- 
out the  entire  number  of  planets.  Hence  when  we  say,  *' All 
the  planets  revolve  on  their  axes,"  we  but  universalize  our 
particular  observations — ^we  use  the  terms  "all  planets"  as 
an  economical  device  to  avoid  repeating  the  proper  name  of 
each  planet.  But  we  do  not  infer  anything,  or  reason  from 
one  proposition  to  another.  We  do  not  establish  any  new 
connections  of  thought  by  the  process,  as  we  do  in  syllogistic 
reasoning,  .  .  .  but  we  only  generalize  what  we  had  observed 


122  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

in  detail.  It  is  precisely  the  same  with  all  enumerations  ol 
individuals  or  particulars  into  a  whole  or  class  with  a  gen- 
eral name  denoting  those  enumerations  only.  They  may  be 
called  "  Inductions  "  if  we  choose  so  to  name  them;  but  they 
are  not  reasoning.  They  are  only  generalizations  as  opposed 
to  or  distinct  from  reasoning,  while  the  term  "  Induction,'*  as 
now  used  by  logicians,  denotes  a  process  of  inference  or  reason- 
ing of  some  kind.  It  is  quite  generally  agreed  since  the  time 
of  Bacon  that  the  so-called  "  Perfect  Induction"  is  not  properly 
called  "  Induction,"  because  it  is  not  a  mode  of  reasoning. 
It  has  been  the  name  for  the  Socratic  process  of  obtaining 
universal  conceptions  and  definitions.  But  the  contingencies 
of  the  growth  of  knowledge  and  the  demand  of  a  method 
which  would  take  the  place  of  the  Aristotelian  Logic  sug- 
gested the  term  "  Inductive"  as  opposed  to"  Deductive,"  and 
the  rejection  of  "  Perfect  Induction"  on  the  ground  that  it  was 
not  ratiocinative  in  its  nature,  implied  that  Induction  must 
be  a  process  of  reasoning  in  order  to  compare  it  with  Deduc- 
tion. 

"This  second  general  meaning  is  the  more  important  of 
the  two,  and  was  called  *  Imperfect  Induction'  because  the 
conclusion  contained  more  than  the  premises.  Thus  if  I  had 
inferred  that  *A11  the  planets  revolve  about  their  axes,' 
from  the  mere  fact  that  one  of  them  did  so,  I  should  have 
drawn  an  inductive  inference.  I  should  not  in  this  case  have 
merely  generalized  the  particulars  of  my  observation  or  ex- 
perience, but  have  conjectured  or  inferred  that  what  was 
true  of  one  case  would  turn  out  to  be  true  of  all  the  objects 
known  upon  other  grounds  to  belong  to  the  same  class. 
But  this  conclusion  has  no  definite  certainty  such  as  the  mind 
desires,  and  hence  to  give  this  conjecture  greater  probability 
I  must  vary  my  observation  of  facts  in  connection  with  the 
several  planets,  and  find  whether  they  agree  or  disagree  with 
my  supposition.  If,  for  instance,  I  observed  that  certain  of 
them  presented  an  absolutely  invariable  appearance,  such 
as  a  particular  spot  always  in  sight  and  in  the  same  place, 


KINDS  OF  ARGUMENTS  123 

the  fact  would  be  at  least  a  presumption  against  the  supposi- 
tion of  the  planet's  axial  revolution.  On  the  other  hand,  if 
the  spot  presented  certain  regular  changes  of  position  and 
periodical  disappearance  and  reappearance,  the  fact  would 
be  in  favor  of  the  hypothesis.  This  mode  of  repeating  and 
varying  observations  or  experiments  in  the  case  of  the  ex- 
perimental sciences,  according  to  certain  methods,  which  are 
called  the  *  Method  of  Agreement,'  the  *  Method  of  Difference,' 
the  *  Method  of  Concomitant  Variations,'  etc.,  has  been  called 
the  Inductive  Method  in  general,  as  a  mode  of  ascertaining 
certain  truths  in  a  manner  quite  distinct  from  the  ordinary 
syllogistic  and  deductive  reasoning.  This  is  the  third  mean- 
ing of  the  term,  with  which  a  theory  of  Induction  has  to 
reckon.^" 

5.  Methods  of  induction.  "We  have  now  to  consider 
such  methods  as  can  be  laid  down  for  the  purpose  of  guiding 
us  in  the  search  for  general  truths  or  laws  of  nature  among  the 
facts  obtained  by  observation  and  experiment.  Induction 
consists  in  inferring  from  particulars  to  generals,  or  detecting 
a  general  truth  among  its  particular  occurrences.  But  in 
physical  science  the  truths  to  be  discovered  generally  relate 
to  the  connection  of  cause  and  eflFect,  and  we  usually  call 
them  laws  of  causation  or  natural  laws. 

"  By  the  Cause  of  an  event  we  mean  the  circumstances  which 
must  have  preceded  in  order  that  the  event  should  happen. 
Nor  is  it  generally  possible  to  say  that  an  event  has  one  single 
cause  and  no  more.  There  are  usually  many  different  things, 
conditions  or  circumstances  necessary  to  the  production  of 
an  effect,  and  all  of  them  must  be  considered  causes  or  neces- 
sary parts  of  the  cause.  ... 

"By  an  antecedent  we  mean  any  thing,  condition,  or  cir- 
cumstance which  exists  before  or,  it  may  be,  at  the  same  time 
with  an  event  or  phenomenon.  By  a  consequent  we  mean  any 
thing,  or  circumstance,  event,  or  phenomenon,  which  is  dif- 
ferent from  any  of  the  antecedents  and  follows  after  theii 
1  Hyslop,  pp.  295-298. 


124  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

conjunction  or  putting  together.  It  does  not  follow  that  an 
antecedent  is  a  cause,  because  the  effect  might  have  hap- 
pened without  it.  Thus  the  sun's  light  may  be  an  antecedent 
to  the  burning  of  a  house,  but  not  the  cause,  because  the  house 
would  burn  equally  well  in  the  night.  A  necessary  or  indis- 
pensable antecedent  is  however  identical  ivith  a  cause,  being 
that  TNathout  which  the  effect  would  not  take  place. 

"The  word  phenomenon  will  also  be  often  used.  It  means 
simply  anything  which  appears,  and  is  therefore  observed 
by  the  senses;  the  derivation  of  the  word  from  the  Greek 
word  <t)at,v6iJL€vov,  that  which  appears,  exactly  corresponds  to 
its  logical  use. 

a.  Method  of  agreement.  "The  first  method  of  induc- 
tion is  that  which  Mr.  Mill  has  aptly  called  the  method  of 
agreement.  It  depends  upon  the  rule  that  *Jf  two  or  more 
ingtanpfis  nf  th^  ph^H^^^^^^  ^ipdf^|-,  inve5NtTgatinn  have  only 
one  circumstance  in  common,  the  circumstance  in  which  . 
alone  all  the  instances  agree,  is  the  cause  ^or  jeffect)  of  th&> 
given  j)henomenon.'  The  meaning  of  this  First  Canon  of 
inductive  inquiry  might,  I  think,  be  more  briefly  expressed 
by  saying  that  the  sole  invariable  antecedent  of  a  phenomenon 
is  probably  its  cause. 

"To  apply  this  method  we  must  collect  as  many  instances 
of  the  phenomenon  as  possible,  and  compare  together  their 
antecedents.  Among  these  the  causes  will  lie,  but  if  we  notice 
that  certain  antecedents  are  present  or  absent  without  ap- 
pearing to  affect  the  result,  we  conclude  that  they  cannot 
be  necessary  antecedents.  Hence  it  is  the  one  antecedent 
or  group  of  antecedents  always  present,  when  the  effect 
follows,  that  we  consider  the  cause.  For  example,  bright 
prismatic  colours  are  seen  on  bubbles,  on  films  of  tar  floating 
upon  water,  on  thin  plates  of  mica,  as  also  on  cracks  in  glass, 
or  between  two  pieces  of  glass  pressed  together.  On  examin- 
ing all  such  cases  they  seem  to  agree  in  nothing  but  the  pres- 
ence of  a  very  thin  layer  or  plate,  and  it  appears  to  make  no 
appreciable  difference  of  what  kind  of  matter,  solid,  liquid 


KINDS  OF  ARGUMENTS  125 

or  gaseous,  the  plate  is  made.  Hence  we  conclude  that  such 
colours  are  caused  merely  by  the  thinness  of  the  plates,  and 
this  conclusion  is  proved  true  by  the  theory  of  the  inter- 
ference of  light.  Sir  David  Brewster  beautifully  proved  in  a 
similar  way  that  the  colours  seen  upon  Mother-of-pearl  are 
not  caused  by  the  nature  of  the  substance,  but  by  the  form 
of  the  surface.  He  took  impressions  of  the  Mother-of-pearl 
in  wax,  and  found  that  although  the  substance  was  entirely 
different  the  colours  were  exactly  the  same.  And  it  was 
afterwards  found  that  if  a  plate  of  metal  had  a  surface  marked 
by  very  fine  close  grooves,  it  would  have  iridescent  colours 
like  those  of  Mother-of-pearl.  Hence  it  is  evident  that  the 
form  of  the  surface,  which  is  the  only  invariable  antecedent 
or  condition  requisite  for  the  production  of  the  colours  must 
be  their  cause.  .  .  . 

b.  Method  of  difference.  "The  second  method  of 
induction  which  we  will  now  consider  is  known  as  the 
Method  of  Difference.  It  is  stated  in  Mr.  Mill's  Second 
Canon  as  follows : — 

"  *If  an  instance  in  which  the  phenomenon  under  investiga- 
tion occurs,  and  an  instance  in  which  it  does  not  occur,  have 
every  circumstance  in  common  save  one,  that  one  occurring 
only  in  the  former;  the  circumstance  in  which  alone  the  two 
instances  differ,  is  the  effect,  or  the  cause,  or  an  indispensable 
part  of  the  cause,  of  the  phenomenon.* 

**  In  other  words,  we  may  say  that  the  antecedent  which  is 
invariably  present  when  the  phenomenon  follows,  and  in- 
variably absent  when  it  is  absent,  other  circumstances  re- 
maining the  same,  is  the  cause  of  the  phenomenon  in  those 
circumstances. 

"Thus  we  can  clearly  prove  that  friction  is  one  cause  of 
heat,  because  when  two  sticks  are  rubbed  together  they  be- 
come heated;  when  not  rubbed  they  do  not  become  heated. 
Sir  Humphry  Davy  showed  that  even  two  pieces  of  ice  when 
rubbed  together  in  a  vacuum  produced  heat  as  shown  by  their 
melting,  and  thus  completely  demonstrated  that  friction 


126  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

is  the  source  and  cause  of  the  heat.  We  prove  that  air  is  the 
cause  of  sound  being  communicated  to  our  ears  by  striking 
a  bell  in  the  receiver  of  an  air-pump,  as  Hawksbee  first  did  in 
1705,  and  then  observing  that  when  the  receiver  is  full  of 
air  we  hear  the  bell;  when  it  contains  little  or  no  air  we  do 
not  hear  the  bell.  We  learn  that  sodium  or  any  of  its  com- 
pounds produces  a  spectrum  having  a  bright  yellow  double 
line  by  noticing  that  there  is  no  such  line  in  the  spectrum  of 
light  when  sodium  is  not  present,  but  that  if  the  smallest 
quantity  of  sodium  be  thrown  into  the  flame  or  other  source 
of  light,  the  bright  yellow  line  instantly  appears.  Oxygen 
is  the  cause  of  respiration  and  life,  because  if  an  animal  be 
put  into  a  jar  full  of  atmospheric  air,  from  which  the  oxygen 
has  been  withdrawn,  it  soon  becomes  suffocated. 

"This  is  essentially  the  great  method  of  experiment  and  its 
utility  depends  upon  the  precaution  of  only  varying  one 
circumstance  at  a  time,  all  other  circumstances  being  maintained 
just  as  they  were.  .  .  . 

"Beautiful  instances  of  experiment  according  to  this 
method  are  to  be  found,  as  Sir  John  Herschel  has  pointed 
out,  in  the  researches  by  which  Dr.  Wells  discovered  the  cause 
of  the  dew.  If  on  a  clear  calm  night  a  sheet  or  other  covering 
be  stretched  a  foot  or  two  above  the  earth,  so  as  to  screen  the 
ground  below  from  the  open  sky,  dew  will  be  found  on  the 
grass  around  the  screen  but  not  beneath  it.  As  the  tempera» 
ture  and  moistness  of  the  air,  and  other  circumstances  ar< 
exactly  the  same,  the  open  sky  must  be  an  indispensable  an- 
tecedent of  dew.  The  same  experiment  is  indeed  tried  for 
us  by  nature,  for  if  we  make  observations  of  dew  during  two 
nights  which  differ  in  nothing  but  the  absence  of  clouds  in 
one  and  their  presence  in  the  other,  we  shall  find  that  the 
clear  open  sky  is  requisite  to  the  formation  of  dew. 

c.  Joint  method.  "  It  may  often  happen  that  we  cannot 
apply  the  method  of  difference  perfectly  by  varying  only  one 
circumstance  at  a  time.  Thus  we  cannot,  generally  speaking, 
try  the  qualities  of  the  same  substance  in  the  solid  and  liquid 


KINDS  OF  ARGUMENTS  127 

condition  without  any  other  change  of  circumstances,  be- 
cause it  is  necessary  to  alter  the  temperature  of  the  substance 
in  order  to  Hquefy  or  solidify  it.  The  temperature  might 
thus  be  the  cause  of  what  we  attribute  to  the  liquid  or  solid 
condition.  Under  such  circumstances  we  have  to  resort  to 
what  Mr.  Mill  calls  the  joint  method  of  agreement  and  differ- 
ence, which  consists  in  a  double  application  of  the  method  of 
agreement,  first  to  a  number  of  instances  where  an  effect 
is  produced,  and  secondly,  to  a  number  of  quite  different 
instances  where  the  effect  is  not  produced.  It  is  clearly  to 
be  understood,  however,  that  the  negative  instances  differ 
in  several  circumstances  from  the  positive  ones;  for  if  they 
differed  only  in  one  circumstance  we  might  apply  the  simple 
method  of  difference.  Iceland  spar,  for  instance,  has  a  curious 
power  of  rendering  things  seen  through  it  apparently  double. 
This  phenomenon,  called  double  refraction,  also  belongs  to 
many  other  crystals;  and  we  might  at  once  prove  it  to  be  due 
to  crystalline  structure  could  we  obtain  any  transparent 
substance  crystallized  and  uncrystallized,  but  subject  to  no 
other  alteration.  We  have,  however,  a  pretty  satisfactory 
proof  by  observing  that  uniform  transparent  uncrystallized 
substances  agree  in  not  possessing  double  refraction,  and  that 
crystalline  substances,  on  the  other  hand,  with  certain  excep- 
tions, which  are  easily  explained,  agree  in  possessing  the  power 
in  question.  The  principle  of  the  joint  method  may  be  stated 
in  the  following  rule,  which  is  Mr.  Mill's  Third  Canon: — 

" '  If  two  or  more  instances  in  which  the  phenomenon  occurs 
have  only  one  circumstance  in  common,  while  two  or  more 
instances  in  which  it  does  not  occur  have  nothing  in  common 
save  the  absence  of  that  circumstance;  the  circumstance  in 
which  alone  the  two  sets  of  instances  (always  or  invariably) 
differ,  is  the  effect,  or  the  cause,  or  an  indispensable  part 
of  the  cause,  of  the  phenomenon.'" 

"  I  have  inserted  the  words  in  parenthesis,  as  without  them 
the  canon  seems  to  me  to  express  exactly  the  opposite  of 
what  Mr.  Mill  intends.  .  .  . 


128  ARGUMENTATION   AND   DEBATE 

d.  Method  of  residues.  "  We  have  now  to  consider  a 
method  of  Induction  which  must  be  employed  when  several 
causes  act  at  once  and  their  effects  are  all  blended  together, 
producing  a  joint  effect  of  the  same  kind  as  the  separate 
effects.  If  in  one  Experiment  friction,  combustion,  compres- 
sion, and  electric  action  are  all  going  on  at  once,  each  of  these 
causes  will  produce  quantities  of  heat  which  will  be  added 
together,  and  it  will  be  difficult  or  impossible  to  say  how 
much  is  due  to  each  cause  separately.  We  may  call  this  a 
case  of  the  homogeneous  intermixture  of  effects,  the  name 
indicating  that  the  joint  effect  is  of  the  same  kind  as  the 
separate  effects.  It  is  distinguished  by  Mr.  Mill  from 
cases  of  the  heterogeneous  intermixture  of  effects,  where  the 
joint  effect  is  totally  different  in  kind  from  the  separate 
effects.  Thus  if  we  bend  a  bow  too  much  it  breaks  instead 
of  bending  further;  if  we  warm  ice  it  soon  ceases  to  rise  in 
temperature  and  melts ;  if  we  warm  water  it  rises  in  tem- 
perature homogeneously  for  a  time  but  then  suddenly  ceases, 
and  an  effect  of  a  totally  different  kind,  the  production  of 
vapour,  or  possibly  an  explosion  follows. 

"  Now  when  the  joint  effect  is  of  a  heterogeneous  kind  the 
method  of  difference  is  sufficient  to  ascertain  the  cause  of  its 
occurrence.  Whether  a  bow  or  a  spring  will  break  with  a 
given  weight  may  easily  be  tried,  and  whether  water  will 
boil  at  a  given  temperature  in  any  given  state  of  the  barom- 
eter may  also  be  easily  ascertained.  But  in  the  homogeneous 
intermixture  of  effects  we  have  a  more  complicated  task. 
There  are  several  causes  each  producing  a  part  of  the  effect, 
and  we  want  to  know  how  much  is  due  to  each.  In  this  case  we 
must  employ  a  further  Inductive  Method,  called  by  Mr.  Mill 
the  Method  of  Residues,  thus  stated  in  his  Fourth  Canon  :  — 

"  'Subduct  from  any  phenomenon  such  part  as  is  known 
by  previous  inductions  to  be  the  effect  of  certain  antecedents, 
and  the  residue  of  the  phenomenon  is  the  effect  of  the  remain- 
ing antecedents.'  " 

"  If  we  know  that  the  joint  effect  a,  b,  c,  is  due  to  the  causes 


KINDS  OF  ARGUMENTS  129 

A,  B,  and  C,  and  can  prove  that  a  is  due  to  A  and  b  to  B, 
it  follows  that  c  must  be  due  to  C.  There  cannot  be  a  simpler 
case  of  this  than  ascertaining  the  exact  weight  of  any  commod- 
ity in  a  cart  by  weighing  the  cart  and  load,  and  then  sub- 
tracting the  tare  or  weight  of  the  cart  alone,  which  had  been 
previously  ascertained.  We  can  thus  too  ascertain  how  much 
of  the  spring  tides  is  due  to  the  attraction  of  the  sun,  provided 
we  have  previously  determined  the  height  of  the  tide  due  to 
the  moon,  which  will  be  about  the  average  height  of  the  tides 
during  the  whole  lunar  month.  Then  subtracting  the  moon's 
tide  the  remainder  is  the  sun's  tide. 

"Newton  employed  this  method  in  a  beautiful  experiment 
to  determine  the  elasticity  of  substances  by  allowing  balls 
made  of  the  substances  to  swing  against  each  other,  and 
then  observing  how  far  they  rebounded  compared  with  their 
original  fall.  But  the  loss  of  motion  is  due  partly  to  imper- 
fect elasticity  and  partly  to  the  resistance  of  the  air.  He 
determined  the  amount  of  the  latter  effect  in  the  simplest 
manner  by  allowing  the  balls  to  swing  without  striking  each 
other,  and  observing  how  much  each  vibration  was  less  than 
the  last.  In  this  way  he  was  enabled  to  calculate  the  quantity 
that  must  be  subtracted  for  the  resistance  of  the  air.  .  .  . 

e.  Method  of  concomitant  variations.  "Every  science 
and  every  question  in  science,  is  first  a  matter  of  fact  only, 
then  a  matter  of  quantity,  and  by  degrees  becomes  more  and 
more  precisely  quantitative.  Thirty  years  ago  most  of  the 
phenomena  of  electricity  and  electro-magnetism  were  known 
merely  as  facts;  now  they  can  be  for  the  most  part  exactly 
measured  and  calculated. 

"As  soon  as  phenomena  can  thus  be  measured  we  can  ap- 
ply a  further  Method  of  Induction  of  a  very  important  char- 
acter. It  is  the  Method  of  Difference  indeed  applied  under 
far  more  favourable  circumstances,  where  every  degree  and 
quantity  of  a  phenomenon  gives  us  a  new  experiment  and 
proof  of  connection  between  cause  and  effect.  It  may  be 
called  the  Method  of  Concomitant  Variations,  and  is  thus 


130  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

stated  by  Mr.  Mill,  in  what  he  entitled  the  Fiff  h  Can?n  of 
Induction. 

"'Whatever  phenomenon  varies  in  any  manner  whenever 
another  phenomenon  varies  in  some  particular  manner,  is 
either  a  cause  or  an  effect  of  that  phenomenon,  or  is  con- 
nected with  it  through  some  fact  of  causation.  .  .  . ' 

"The  illustrations  of  this  method  are  infinitely  numerous. 
Thus  Mr.  Joule,  of  Manchester,  conclusively  proved  that 
friction  is  a  cause  of  heat  by  expending  exact  quantities  of 
force  in  rubbing  one  substance  against  another,  and  showed 
that  the  heat  produced  was  exactly  greater  or  less  in  propor- 
tion as  the  force  was  greater  or  less.  We  can  apply  the 
method  to  many  cases  which  had  previously  been  treated 
by  the  simple  method  of  difference;  thus  instead  of  striking 
a  bell  in  a  complete  vacuum  we  can  strike  it  with  a  very 
little  air  in  the  receiver  of  the  air-pump,  and  we  then  hear 
a  very  faint  sound,  which  increases  or  decreases  every  time 
we  increase  or  decrease  the  density  of  the  air.  This  experi- 
ment conclusively  satisfies  any  person  that  air  is  the  cause 
of  the  transmission  of  sound.  .  . 

"The  most  extraordinary  case  of  variations,  however, 
consists  in  the  connection  which  has  of  late  years  been  shoT\Ti 
to  exist  between  the  Aurora  Borealis,  magnetic  storms,  and 
the  spots  on  the  sun.  It  has  only  in  the  last  thirty  or  forty 
years  become  known  that  the  magnetic  compass  needle  is 
subject  at  intervals  to  very  slight  but  curious  movements, 
and  that  at  the  same  time  there  are  usually  natural  currents 
of  electricity  produced  in  telegraph  wires  so  as  to  interfere 
with  the  transmission  of  messages.  These  disturbances  are 
known  as  magnetic  storms,  and  are  often  observed  to  occur 
when  a  fine  display  of  the  Northern  or  Southern  Lights  is 
taking  place  in  some  part  of  the  earth.  Observations  during 
many  years  have  shown  that  these  storms  come  to  their 
worst  at  the  end  of  every  eleven  years,  the  maximum  taking 
place  about  the  present  year  1870,  and  then  diminish  in 
intensity  until  the  next  period  of 'eleven  years  has  passed. 


KINDS  OF  ARGUMENTS.  131 

Close  observations  of  the  sun  during  thirty  or  forty  years 
have  shown  that  the  size  and  number  of  the  dark  spots,  which 
are  gigantic  storms  going  on  upon  the  sun's  surface,  increase 
and  decrease  exactly  at  the  same  periods  of  time  as  the  mag- 
netic storms  upon  the  earth's  surface.  No  one  can  doubt, 
then,  that  these  strange  phenomena  are  connected  together, 
though  the  mode  of  the  connection  is  quite  unknown.  It  is 
now  believed  that  the  planets  Jupiter,  Saturn,  Venus,  and 
Mars,  are  the  real  causes  of  the  disturbances;  for  Balfour 
Stewart  and  Warren  de  la  Rue  have  shown  that  an  exact 
correspondence  exists  between  the  motions  of  these  planets 
and  the  periods  of  the  sunspots.  This  is  a  most  remarkable 
and  extensive  case  of  concomitant  variations."  ^ 

C.  The  syUogism.  "The  name  Syllogism  means  the 
joining  together  in  thought  of  two  propositions,  and  is  de- 
rived from  the  Greek  words  ovv,  with,  and  X0709,  thought  or 
reason.  It  is  thus  exactly  the  equivalent  of  the  word  compu- 
tation, which  means  thinking  together  (Latin  con,  together, 
puto,  to  think),  or  reckoning.  In  a  syllogism  we  so  unite  in 
thought  two  premises,  or  propositions  put  forward,  that 
we  are  enabled  to  draw  from  them  or  infer,  by  means  of  the 
middle  term  they  contain,  a  third  proposition  called  the  con- 
clusion. Syllogism  may  thus  be  defined  as  the  act  of  thought 
by  which  from  two  given  propositions  we  proceed  to  a  third 
proposition,  the  truth  of  which  necessarily  follows  from  the 
truth  of  these  given  propositions.  When  the  argument  is 
fully  expressed  in  language  it  is  usual  to  call  it  concretely 
^a  syllogism. 

1.  "The  special  rules  of  the  syllogism  .  .  .  serve  to  in- 
form us  exactly  under  what  circumstances  one  proposition 
can  be  inferred  from  two  other  propositions,  and  are  eight  in 
number,  as  follows: — 

a.  Every  syllogism  has  three  and  only  three  terms. 

These  terms  are  called  the  major  term,  the  minor  term, 
and  the  middle  term. 

^  Jevons,  Lessons  in  Logic,  pp.  239-253. 


132  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

b.  Every  syllogism  contains  three y  and  only  three  propositions. 
These  propositions  are  called  the  major  premise,  the  minor 

premise,  and  the  conclusion. 

c.  The  middle  term  must  be  distributed  once  at  least,  and  must 
not  be  ambiguous. 

d.  No  term  must  be  distributed  in  the  conclusion  which  was 
not  distributed  in  one  of  the  premises. 

e.  From  negative  premises  nothing  can  be  inferred. 

f .  //  one  premise  be  negative,  the  conclusion  must  be  negative; 
and  vice  versa,  to  prove  a  negative  conclusion  one  of  the  premises 
mu^t  be  negative. 

From  the  above  rules  may  be  deduced  two  subordinate 
rules,  which  it  will  nevertheless  be  convenient  to  state  at 
once. 

g.  From  two  particular  premises  no  conclusion  can  be  drawn. 
h.  //  one  premise  be  particular,  the  conclusion  must  be  par- 
ticular. 

"All  these  rules  are  of  such  extreme  importance  that 
it  will  be  desirable  for  .the  student  not  only  to  acquire  a 
perfect  comprehension  of  their  meaning  and  truth,  but  to 
commit  them  to  memory.  ..." 

2.  Definitions.  "The  middle  term  may  always  be 
known  by  the  fact  that  it  does  not  occur  in  the  conclusion. 
The  major  term  is  always  the  predicate  of  the  conclusion, 
and  the  minor  term  the  subject.  .  .  . 

"Again,  the  syllogism  necessarily  consists  of  a  premise 
called  the  major  premise,  in  which  the  major  and  middle 
terms  are  compared  together;  of  a  minor  premise  which 
similarly  compares  the  minor  and  middle  terms;  and  of  a 
conclusion,  which  contains  the  major  and  minor  terms  only. 
In  a  strictly  correct  syllogism  the  major  premise  always 
stands  before  the  minor  premise,  but  in  ordinary  writing  and 
speaking  this  rule  is  seldom  observed;  and  that  premise 
which  contains  the  major  term  still  continues  to  be  the  major 
premise,  whatever  may  be  its  position. 

"The  third  rule  is  a  very  important  one,  because  many 


KINDS  OF  ARGUMENTS  133 

fallacies  arise  from  its  neglect.  By  the  middle  term  being 
distributed  once  at  least,  we  mean  that  the  whole  of  it  must  be 
referred  to  universally  in  one  premise,  if  not  both.  The  two 
propositions — 

All  Frenchmen  are  Europeans, 
All  Russians  are  Europeans, 

do  not  distribute  the  middle  term  at  all,  because  they  are 
both  affirmative  propositions,  which  have  undistributed 
predicates."  ^ 

3.  "  Sorites  or  chain  of  reasoning.  A  Sorites  is  a  chain  of 
reasoning  in  which  the  two  terms  of  the  conclusion  are  united 
through  the  mediation  of  more  than  one  intervening  or  con- 
necting term.  It  may  assume  either  of  the  two  following 
forms: 

I 


AisB; 

All  negroes  are  men; 

BisC; 

All  men  are  vertebrates; 

CisD; 

All  vertebrates  are  animals; 

DisE; 

All  animals  are  mortal; 

.AisE;. 

■ .  All  negroes  are  mortal. 

n 

CisE; 

All  animals  are  mortal; 

C  is  D; 

AH  vertebrates  are  animals; 

BisC; 

All  men  are  vertebrates; 

AisB; 

All  negroes  are  men; 

. ' .  A  is  E; .  ■  .All  negroes  are  mortal. 

"It  is  possible  to  treat  a  Sorites  as  an  abbreviated  form 
of  syllogistic  inference,  because  the  chain  of  reasoning  may  be 
resolved  into  a  series  of  syllogisms,  each  of  which,  except  the 
last,  yields  a  conclusion  that  serves  as  a  premise  in  the  suc- 

*  Jevons,  Lessons  in  Logic,  pp.  127-129. 


134  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

ceeding  syllogism.  From  this  point  of  view,  the  first  of  th« 
above  inferences  is  equivalent  to  three  complete  syllogisms, 
as  follows: 


BisC; 

CisD 

D  is  E; 

AisB; 

AisG 

AisD; 

AisC;. 

•.AisD. 

.AisE; 

4.  "Inferences  in  quantitative  relations.  Certain  infer- 
ences that  deal  with  quantitative  relations  give  valid  conclu- 
sions, in  spite  of  the  fact  that  they  seem  to  violate  the  rules 
of  the  syllogism.    The  following  are  examples : 

I 

A  is  greater  than  B; 

B  is  grea  ter  than  C ; 

'  . ' .  A  is  greater  than  C* 

n 

A  is  north  y  B; 

B  is  north  ot  C; 

. ' .  A  is  north  of  C. 

** In  form  these  arguments  are  exactly  the  same  as: 

A  is  the  landlord  of  B ;  ^ 

B  is  the  landlord  of  1^; 
. '  .A  is  the  landlord  of  C. 

Yet  this  latter  conclusion  does  not  follow  from  the  premises. 
All  of  these  syllogisms,  it  will  be  noticed,  have  four  terms. 
What  requires  explanation,  therefore,  is  the  fact  that,  In  spite 
of  this  apparent  iiregularity,  it  is  possible  to  draw  valid 
conclusions  when  the  subject-matter  concerns  relations  of 
quantity. 

"  The  explanation  of  this  fact  is,  in  brief,  that  the  valid 


KINDS  OF  ARGUMENTS  •     135 

conclusions  are  possible  because  they  rest  upon  a  true  major 
premise  which  does  not  appear  in  the  argument.  If  A  is 
north  of  B,  and  B  is  north  of  C,  we  can  infer  the  relation  of 
A  and  C,  because  we  are  familiar  with  the  nature  of  space 
relations.  To  state  the  law  or  the  generalization  which  under- 
lies the  inference  is  a  matter  of  some  diflSculty.  According 
to  some  writers  the  inference,  in  correct  syllogistic  form, 
would  read  about  like  this : 

Whatever  is  north  of  that  which  is  north  of  another  is 

north  of  that  other; 
A  is  something  that  is  north  of  that  which  is  north  of  C; 

.  * .  A  is  north  of  C. 

"  It  is  true  that  we  never  formulate  the  major  premise  of  this 
inference,  and  that  we  usually  do  not  even  suspect  its  pres- 
ence. But,  as  we  shall  see  a  little  later,  the  suppression  of  one 
of  our  premises  is  a  frequent  occurrence  in  everyday  reason- 
ing. This  major  premise  is  not  formulated,  just  because  the 
relationship  which  it  expresses  is  so  simple  and  obvious. 
This  relationship  is  peculiar  to  the  realm  of  quantity,  and 
so  the  recognition  of  this  relationship  enables  us  to  make 
inferences  in  this  realm  which  have  no  precise  parallel  in 
other  fields."  ^ 

5.  Enthymemes.  "When  one  premise  of  an  argument 
is  lacking,  the  name  of  enthymeme  is  applied  to  it.  When  an 
argument  is  defective  in  this  way,  it  must  be  remembered 
that  the  missing  proposition  is  to  be  regarded  as  in  conscious- 
ness, though  not  expressed.  It  is  of  great  importance  to 
form  the  habit  of  making  clear  to  oneself  the  premises  by 
which  any  conclusion  claims  to  be  supported.  In  this  way 
groundless  assumptions  are  often  brought  to  light,  and  the 
weakness  of  an  argument  exposed."^  "Indeed,  it  is  but 
seldom  in  ordinary  reasoning  that  we  arrange  our  arguments 
in  the  strict  syllogistic  form.  We  hurry  on  from  one  fact  to 
another  in  our  thinking  without  stopping  to  make  all  the 
steps  definite  and  explicit.  We  feel  it  to  be  a  waste  of  time, 
1  Bode,  pp.  78-80.  2  Creighton,  p.  41.      . 


136  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

and-a  trial  to  the  patience,  to  express  what  is  clearly  obvious, 
and  so  we  press  on  to  the  conclusion  which  is,  for  the  time 
being,  the  central  point  of  interest.  But  the  more  rapid  and 
abbreviated  the  reasoning,  the  more  necessary  is  it  to  keep 
a  clear  head,  and  to  understand  what  conclusion  is  aimed  at, 
and  what  premises  are  assumed  in  the  argument.  To  bring 
to  light  the  hidden  assumption  upon  which  an  argument  is 
based,  is  often  the  best  means  of  refuting  it.  Enthymemes 
are  sometimes  said  to  be  of  the  first,  second,  or  third  order, 
according  as  the  major  premise,  the  minor  premise,  or  the 
conclusion  is  wanting.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  an  enthymeme 
of  the  third  order  is  a  rhetorical  device  used  to  call  special 
attention  to  a  conclusion  which  is  perfectly  obvious,  although 
suppressed.  Thus,  for  example,  *all  boasters  are  cowards, 
and  we  have  had  proofs  that  A  is  a  boaster.'  Here  the  con- 
clusion is  at  once  obvious,  and  is  even  more  prominent  than 
if  it  were  actually  expressed."  ^ 

6.  The  nature  of  syllogistic  reasoning.  "The  syllogism, 
as  we  have  already  seen,  presents  a  conclusion  together  with 
the  reasons  by  means  of  which  it  is  supported.  A  single 
proposition  taken  by  itself  is  dogmatic:  it  merely  asserts 
without  stating  the  grounds  upon  which  it  rests.  The  syl- 
logism, on  the  other  hand,  justifies  its  conclusion  by  showing 
the  premises  from  which  it  has  been  derived.  It  thus  appeals 
to  the  reason  of  all  men,  and  compels  their  assent.  To  do  this, 
it  is  of  course  necessary  that  the  truth  of  the  premises  to 
which  appeal  is  made  should  be  granted.  If  the  premises  are 
disputed  or  doubtful,  the  argument  is  pushed  a  step  further 
back,  and  it  is  first  necessary  to  show  the  grounds  upon  which 
these  premises  rest.  The  assumption  of  syllogistic  reason- 
ing— and,  indeed,  of  all  reasoning  whatsoever — is  that  it  is 
possible  to  reach  propositions  which  every  one  will  accept. 
There  are  certain  facts,  we  say,  well  known  and  established, 
and  these  can  always  be  appealed  to  in  support  of  our  con- 
clusions. In  syllogistic  reasoning,  then,  we  exhibit  the  inter- 
1  Creighton,  pp.  126,  127. 


KINDS  OF  ARGUMENTS  137 

dependence  of  propositions;  i.  e.,  we  show  how  the  truth  of 
some  new  proposition,  or  some  proposition  not  regarded  as 
beyond  question,  follows  necessarily  from  other  propositions 
whose  truth  every  one  will  admit. "  ^ 

7.  Weakness  of  the  syllogism  in  general  argumentation. 
But  the  man  who  wishes  to  be  successful  in  general  argumen- 
tation needs  to  be  armed  with  more  than  a  knowledge  of  the 
syllogism.  While  it  is  true  that  putting  an  argument  into 
"syllogistic  form"  for  the  purpose  of  testing  it  is  one  of  the 
easiest  and  most  accurate  ways  of  determining  the  strength 
or  weakness  of  our  argument  (and  of  exactly  locating  any 
weakness),  the  warning  in  the  following  paragraph  against 
depending  upon  the  syllogism  as  a  constructive  device  should 
be  carefully  heeded. 

"For  it  tells  us  only  what  the  soundness  of  inferences 
depends  upon  when  we  assume  that  the  words  in  which  they 
are  expressed  are  free  from  ambiguity.  In  actual  inferences 
this  assumption  is  never  strictly  in  accordance  with  the  facts, 
and  is  least  in  accordance  with  them  when  the  soundness  of 
the  inference  is  most  debatable.  That  is  the  chief  reason  why 
an  appeal  to  Syllogistic  Logic  is  generally  so  unconvincing. 
Now  that  the  direct  inquiry  into  Nature  is  open  to  almost 
every  one,  almost  every  one  has  begun  to  learn  that  sharp-cut 
words  are  traps  for  the  unwary.  A  syllogism  can  always  be 
blocked  by  refusing  to  admit  the  truth  of  a  premise,  and  in 
these  times  no  special  study  of  the  forms  of  Syllogism  is 
needed  to  show  us  in  practice  at  any  rate  that  the  easiest 
and  most  effective  way  to  do  this  is  to  criticise  the  words  in 
which  it  is  expressed.  Where  the  conclusion  is  disputable 
there  is  seldom  any  difficulty  in  finding  some  want  of  def- 
initeness  in  the  premises,  so  that  they  can  only  combine 
to  form  a  conclusion  when  one  of  them  is  interpreted  in  a 
sense  which  makes  it  untrue.  To  raise  this  objection — ^in 
however  untechnical  language — is  to  tell  the  syllogistic 
logician  that  his  simple  process  is  not  yet  available.  The 
1  Creighton,  pp.  105,  106. 


138  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

real  diflSculty  of  the  question  has  first  to  be  settled,  and  then 
those  who  care  to  do  so  may  put  the  reasoning  into  *  syllo- 
gistic form.'"  ^ 

II.  In  rhetoric.  Nearly  all  writers  on  the  subject  of 
rhetoric  have  divided  the  kinds  of  arguments  into  three 
classes,  and  have  given  to  these  classes  the  names,  (A)  an- 
tecedent probabiHty,  (B)  sign,  and  (C)  example.  The  mean- 
ings given  to  these  titles  and  the  divisions  made  under  them 
have  been  somewhat  varied,  so  that  there  is  no  universally 
accepted  classification.  Any  division  which  shall  be  of 
service  in  argumentation  must  have  for  its  purpose  the 
establishment  of  standards  by  which  we  may  determine 
whether  any  particular  arguments  are  good  or  bad,  strong 
or  weak,  as  the  materials  of  proof.  Consequently,  in  order 
to  give  a  practical  insight  into  the  proper  selection  and  use  of 
arguments  in  argumentation,  and  a  practical  power  to  detect 
the  most  serious  fallacies,  the  kinds  of  arguments  should  be 
classified  and  explained  in  such  a  way  as  to  make  clear,  as 
far  as  possible,  on  what  the  strength  of  the  various  kinds  of  ar- 
guments depends.  The  classification  used  here  (the  old  tril- 
ogy, systematized  and  clarified,  we  trust,  in  its  subdivi- 
sions) is  retained  as  much  more  fundamental,  accurate, 
and  serviceable  than  any  of  the  modifications  of  it  attempted 
by  recent  writers. 

The  lines  of  division  between  the  classes  of  arguments 
cannot  always  be  drawn  with  absolute  distinctness.  Many 
arguments  with  slight  changes  in  phrase  pass  from  one  class 
to  another.  But  this  is  not  a  serious  matter.  It  is  the  under- 
standing of  the  structure  and  substance  of  the  arguments  that 
is  essential.  We  have  seen  that  an  argument  is  a  process  by 
which,  from  knowing  the  existence  of  a  fact  or  a  certain  num- 
ber of  facts,  we  infer  the  existence  of  some  other  fact  or  facts. 
In  the  first  place,  then,  it  should  be  stated  that  in  nearly  every 
argument  the  validity  of  the  inference  depends  upon  a  connec- 
tion of  cause  and  effect  between  the  facts  from  which  we  infer  and 
^  Sidgwick,  pp.  75,  76. 


KINDS  OF  ARGUMENTS  139 

the  facts  to  which  we  infer.  This  connection  is  not  always 
actuaRy  understood  by  the  person  making  the  argument, 
and  is  often  not  stated.  But  this  connection  is,  nevertheless, 
in  most  cases,  the  source  of  strength  or  weakness  in  the  reason- 
ing. It  must  be  understood  in  order  to  know  the  real  force 
of  the  argument  and  detect  the  fallacies  of  the  opponents. 
"Whether  the  given  inference  be  right  or  wrong,  whether 
it  be  express  and  deliberate,  or  rapid  and  free,  whether  it 
take  the  form  of  a  cut-and-dried  syllogism,  an  argument  from 
analogy,  or  from  circumstantial  evidence,  in  all  cases  equally 
it  is  our  belief  about  the  way  things  hang  together  in  nature 
that  provides  alike  the  sole  motive  power  of  inference  and  the 
sole  foundation  on  which  we  rest  our  proofs,"  ^  However, 
there  are  many  valid  arguments  in  which  this  causal  connec- 
tion is  not  evident,  and  in  these  cases  it  must  also  be  deter- 
mined what  is  the  element  of  their  strength. 

A.  Antecedent  probability.  The  argument  from  antece- 
dent probability  is  an  argument  from  cause  to  effect. 

It  is  sometimes  said  that  the  argument  from  antecedent 
probability  requires  a  preliminary  assumption;  that  the 
argument  consists  in, assuming  the  existence  of  some  fact  and 
then  producing  evidence  to  show  that  the  assumption  is 
justified.  This  is  not  true.  Very  often  it  is  convenient  in 
presenting  or  explaining  the  argument  to  make  such  an  as- 
sumption. As,  for  instance,  in  a  criminal  trial  a  lawyer, 
when  he  is  arguing  before  the  jury,  may  practically  assume 
for  the  time  that  A  murdered  B,  and  then  go  on  to  show  that 
A  had  a  motiye.  Of  course  he  must  not  assume  that  A  com- 
mitted the  murder  and  then  infer  from  this  that  he  must  have 
had  a  motive.  The  assumption  is  purely  a  preliminary  step. 
The  motive  must  be  established  independently.  This  having 
been  done,  the  lawyer  argues  from  the  known  cause  (the 
motive)  to  the  unknown  effect  (that  A  murdered  B).  This 
is  an  argument  from  antecedent  probability,  and  the  assump- 
tion made  by  the  lawyer  is  not  an  essential  part  of  the  argu- 
*  Sidgwick,  p.  46, 


140  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

ment.  Note  that  the  unknown  effect  is  not  that  B  was  mur- 
dered, or  that  B  was  killed,  or  that  B  is  dead.  The  unknown 
effect  to  which  we  argue  is  the  fact  in  issue  concerning  A. 
For  the  sake  of  clearness  he  may  first  show  that  A's  pistol 
was  found  beside  the  body,  and  present  various  other  kinds 
of  evidence,  to  create  a  presumption  of  guilt  against  A,  be- 
fore he  discusses  his  motives.  Such  a  method  is  obviously 
more  sensible  than  examining  the  possible  motives  of  all  the 
persons  who  might  possibly  have  committed  the  crime,  es- 
pecially since  the  lawyer  is  hired  to  prosecute  this  particular 
man,  A.  Moreover,  the  effect  on  the  jury  is  helped  by  the 
corroboration  of  other  kinds  of  arguments,  the  arguments 
from  sign  in  this  case.  But  this  assumption  is  not  essential. 
The  strength  of  the  argument  itself  depends  entirely  upon  the 
connection  of  cause  and  effect,  between  the  motive  and  the 
deed.  The  argument  is  conclusive  if  it  can  be  shown  that 
these  motives  of  A  were  the  cause  that  would  produce  the 
effect  in  question,  viz.,  the  murder  of  B  by  A,  and  its  validity 
will  vary  with  the  strength  of  this  causal  connection. 

The  argument  from  antecedent  probability,  then,  is  an 
inference  from  a  known  cause  to  an  unknown  effect;  it  consists 
in  showing  that  a  certain  known  fact  or  combination  of  facts 
is  of  such  a  nature  as  to  bring  to  pass  the  existence  of  another 
fact,  whose  existence  is  in  dispute.  An  argument  from  cause 
to  effect  is  often  called  an  a  priori  argument. 

An  example  is  found  in  the  famous  White  murder  trial. 
There  Daniel  Webster  showed  that  the  Knapps  believed  they 
could  get  Captain  White's  fortune  by  murdering  him  and 
stealing  his  last  will,  and  then  argued  that  this  motive  was  the 
cause  that  produced  the  effect  in  question,  viz.,  their  murder 
of  Captain  White.  Again,  if  one  of  the  larger  universities 
of  the  country  is  known  and  acknowledged  to  have  a  very 
strong  foot-ball  team,  it  is  an  argument  from  antecedent 
probability  to  infer  that  this  team  will  defeat  a  team  from 
some  small  college  of  two  or  three  hundred  students.  It 
is  inferred  that  the  known  cause — the  strength  of  the  univer- 


KINDS  OF  ARGUMENTS  141 

sity  team — will  produce  the  effect  of  a  victory  over  a  weaker 
rival.  A  good  illustration  of  this  kind  of  argument  is  found 
in  the  following  selection  from  a  speech  given  at  a  National 
Democratic  Convention  to  account  for  hard  times  under  a 
Democratic  administration: — 

"When  the  Democracy  came  into  power  in  1893  it  inherited  from 
its  Republican  predecessor  a  tax  system  and  currency,  a  system  of 
which  the  McKinley  and  Sherman  laws  were  the  culminating 
atrocities.  It  came  into  power  amidst  a  panic  which  followed  upon 
their  enactment  with  strikes,  lockouts,  riots,  civil  commotions,  while 
scenes  of  peaceful  industry  in  Pennsylvania  had  become  military 
camps.  Besides  its  manifest  features,  the  McKinley  law  had  thrown 
away  fifty  millions  of  revenue  derived  from  sugar  under  a  special 
plea  of  a  free  breakfast  table,  and  substituted  bounties  to  sugar 
planters,  thus  increasing  expenditure,  thus  burning  the  candle  at 
both  ends  and  making  the  people  pay  at  last  for  their  alleged  free 
breakfast. 

"From  the  joint  operation  of  the  McKinley  law  and  the  Sherman 
law,  an  adverse  balance  of  trade  was  forced  against  us  in  1893,  a 
surplus  of  $100,000,000  in  the  treasury  was  converted  into  a  deficit 
of  $70,000,000  in  1894;  and  engraved  bonds  prepared  by  a  Repub- 
lican secretary  to  borrow  money  to  support  the  Government  were 
ill  omens  of  preorganized  ruin  that  awaited  the  coming  Democracy 
and  depleted  treasury." 

The  orator  argues  that  these  acts  of  Republican  malad- 
ministration were  the  causes  that  produced  the  effect  of 
Republican  responsibility  for  hard  times. 

1.  Effect  to  cause  not  part  of  a  priori  argument.  It  may 
be  noticed  that  in  many  such  instances  the  argument  from 
cause  to  effect  is  preceded  by  a  sort  of  preliminary  argument 
from  effect  to  cause.  Before  we  argue  that  the  strength  of 
the  foot-ball  team  will  be  the  cause  of  victory,  we  may  prove 
that  the  team  is  strong  by  showing  that  it  has  won  victories 
over  other  teams  in  the  past.  This  is  an  inference  from 
effect — the  past  victories — to  cause — the  strength  of  the 
team.    But   this   is   not  part  of   the   a  priori  argument. 


142  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

The  strength  of  the  team  is  not  really  in  question;  it  is  in 
this  case  generally  admitted.  If,  however,  the  abilities  of 
the  team  are  questioned  and  must  first  be  proved  by  showing 
past  evidences  of  their  achievements,  the  argument  thus 
becomes  more  truly  an  argument  from  certain  known 
effects  of  a  given  cause  to  other  effects  of  the  same  cause, 
i.  e.,  an  argument  from  sign.  As  has  already  been  re- 
marked, the  lines  of  division  between  the  classes  are  not 
definite. 

2.  Methods  of  attack.  An  argument  from  antecedent 
probability  may  be  attacked  in  several  ways,  but  they  are 
all  the  same  in  that  they  are  all  directed  toward  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  connection  between  cause  and  effect.  In  order  to 
be  effective,  the  argument  must  show  that  the  known  or 
proved  fact  would  probably  act  as  a  cause  to  produce 
the  effect;  and  it  is  here  that  the  argument  is  best  at- 
tacked. 

a.  Is  the  connection  of  cause  and  effect  complete?  Is 
there  a  broken  or  missing  link  in  the  chain? 

The  two  facts,  one  of  which  is  called  the  cause  and  the 
other  the  effect,  are  rarely  in  immediate  connection  with 
each  other.  There  are  almost  always  several  in- 
C  termediate  steps  between  the  two.     "  Intermediate 

o  links  in  a  chain  of  causation  are  so  many  opportu- 

o  '  nities  for  counteraction,  in  the  same  way  as  the 

2  length  of   a  piece  of   railway  provides   opportu- 

nities for  any  accident.  They  are  intermediate 
conditions.  The  pull  on  the  trigger  will  fire  the  shot  if,  and 
only  if,  the  catch,  the  spring,  the  hammer,  the  cap,  and  so  on, 
all  act  in  the  expected  manner.  Therefore  our  forgetfulness 
of  intermediate  links  takes  effect  just  in  the  same  way  as  our 
forgetfulness  of  conditions  generally;  it  may  give  us  a  false 
security."  ^  It  follows,  then,  that  the  closer  the  causal  con- 
nection, the  surer  is  the  argument,  and  that  any  argument 
may  be  destroyed  by  showing  that  some  of  the  necessary 
^  Sidgwick,  p.  153. 


KINDS  OF  ARGUMENTS  143 

intennediate  links  are  lacking.  It  might  be  proved  that  A 
was  inspired  with  a  most  malevolent  hatred  of  B,  that  he 
would  welcome  any  favorable  opportunity  of  attacking  him, 
even  that  he  had  actually  sought  to  do  him  injury;  but  in 
order  to  connect  this  motive  with  the  murder  of  B,  it  must 
be  shown  that  none  of  the  necessary  intermediate  steps  were 
lacking.  It  must  be  proved  that  A  was  present  at  the  time, 
that  he  had  the  necessary  weapon,  that  he  was  physically 
strong  enough  to  do  the  deed.  The  destruction  of  one  of 
these  links  of  the  chain  destroys  the  argument. 

b.  Is  the  cause  adequate  to  produce  the  effect  in  question? 
Could  such  a  little  cause  have  such  a  big  effect? 

It  is  not  difficult  to  imagine  any  number  of  facts  that  might 
possibly  follow  from  the  existence  of  some  other  fact.  But 
such  connections  are  not  always  sufficient  to  make  C— ~^ 
a  valid  argument.  It  is  not  sufficient  that  a  fact 
might  have  a  general  tendency  to  produce  a  certain 
effect.  It  must  be  shown  that  the  cause  in  question 
is  in  itself  adequate  to  account  for  the  existence  of 
the  effect  in  question.  Is  it  reasonable  to  argue  that 
such  a  little  c  could  produce  such  a  big  E.^^ 

Ex-Governor  Black  of  New  York,  in  the  trial  of  Roland  B. 
Molineux  for  the  murder  of  Mrs.  Adams,  used  this  test  when, 
in  speaking  of  the  motives  assigned  by  the  prosecution  as  the 
cause  of  the  murder,  he  said:  "They  have  failed  utterly  to 
supply  a  motive.  It  is  absurd  to  suggest  that  out  of  a  mere 
quarrel  such  as  Cornish  and  Molineux  had,  should  grow  a 
hatred  so  profound  as  to  inspire  a  man  twelve  months  later 
to  commit  murder."  In  1893  the  so-called  "hard  times" 
from  1892  to  1896  were  said  by  some  people  to  have  been 
caused  solely  by  the  unexpected  failure  of  a  prominent  Eng- 
lish banking  house.  The  failure  in  question  might  have  been 
a  startling  incident  of  the  day,  it  might  perhaps  have  precipi- 
tated failures  and  misfortune  elsewhere;  but  it  was  clearly 
no  adequate  cause  for  such  a  widespread  and  prolonged  mis- 
fortune. 


144  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

c.  Did  the  operation  of  other  causes  in  the  case  in  ques^ 
tion  prevent  the  action  of  the  cause  under  discussion? 

The  normal  progress  between  the  cause  and  the  effect  is 
often  stopped  or  turned  from  its  course  by  the  intervention  of 
some  other  cause  which  destroys  or  turns  aside  the  natural 
result  of  the  first  cause.  If  a  man  takes  a  dose  of  deadly 
poison,  the  chances  are  that  it  will  cause  his  death;  but  it 
may  be  shown  that  this  effect  will  not  actually  follow  in  this 
case,  by  showing  that  the  man  took  an  anti- 
dote. The  antidote  prevents  the  occurrence  of 
the  natural  effect.  One  may  argue  that  the, 
Chinese  race  are  very  numerous,  that  as  a 
£  people   they  are  physically  formidable,   that 

they  are  peculiarly  fortunate  in  climate  and  in 
economic  resources,  and,  consequently,  that  there  is  great 
danger  of  a  commercial  "Yellow  Peril."  This  is  a  clear 
inference  from  cause  to  effect.  But  this  reasoning  may  be 
attacked,  by  arguing  that  certain  racial  peculiarities  of  the 
Chinese  prevent  them  from  being  aggressive  competitors, 
and  make  them  thus  incapable  of  the  powers  of  initiative 
and  self-advancement  necessary  for  independent  commercial 
progress  as  a  race.  The  operation  of  this  second  cause  will 
destroy  the  connection  of  cause  and  effect  on  which  the  argu- 
ment depends. 

d.  Is  there  an  entirely  different  argument  from  cause  to 
effect  that  should  be  substituted  for  the  one  advanced? 

Very  often  the  argument  from  antecedent  probability  is 
used  to  account  for  the  existence  of  some  particular  phe- 
nomenon. It  is  human  nature  to  wish  to  know  a  sufficient 
cause  for  any  fact  presented.  If  you  say 
something  is  true,  somebody  immediately 
wants  to  know  why  it  is  natural  that  it  should 
be  true.  To  recur  to  the  example  of  the 
criminal,  if  a  lawyer  tries  to  account  for  a 
robbery,  he  must  show  that  his  explanation  of  it  is  natural 
and    reasonable.     So   he   tries   to  show  that  the  man  he 


KINDS  OF  ARGUMENTS  145 

is  prosecuting  had  a  motive  for  committing  the  crime.  In 
attempting  to  overthrow  such  an  argument,  it  may  not  be 
suflScient  to  show  that  the  connection  of  cause  and  effect  is 
weak.  A  weak  cause  is  better  than  no  cause  at  all.  Con- 
sequently, it  is  necessary  to  substitute  some  other  argument 
from  cause  to  effect  for  the  argument  that  has  been  attacked. 
The  causal  connection  that  seems  the  more  reasonable  will 
be  accepted  to  the  exclusion  of  the  other. 

For  instance,  a  man  is  murdered.  This  is  a  known  fact. 
We  try  to  account  for  it  by  showing  that  A  murdered  him. 
To  prove  this  we  show  A's  motive.  In  answer  A  shows  that 
B  had  a  stronger  motive.  Here  we  substitute  a  complete  new 
argument  that  seems  better  to  account  for  the  big  problem 
we  are  trying  to  explain.  Note  that  we  are  not  substituting 
a  new  c  for  the  same  E.  We  substitute  B's  motive  for  A's 
motive  and  from  this  known  cause  argue  to  a  new  unknown 
effect  that  B  is  the  murderer.  This  being  inconsistent  with 
the  effect  we  inferred  from  A's  motive,  we  make  the  substi- 
tution complete  and  drop  the  first  argument. 

Of  two  such  arguments  of  unequal  force  the  stronger,  of 
course,  ought  to  displace  the  weaker.  If  one  argues  that  A 
committed  a  murder  in  order  to  inherit  $1,000,  this  argument 
is  met  (though  perhaps  not  the  whole  case  against  A)  by  show- 
ing that  B  knew  that  by  the  death  of  the  deceased  he  would 
get  $1,000,000.  Other  things  being  equal  the  million  dollar 
motive  outweighs  the  thousand  dollar  motive.  In  case  two 
equal  a  priori  arguments  are  presented,  each  person  will 
accept  the  one  that  he  prefers  to  believe — the  one  that  fits 
his  likes  and  dislikes  best.  This  method  was  used  in  the 
Molineux  trial.  The  defence  attacked  the  argument  of  the 
prosecution  to  show  that  the  defendant  had  a  motive  that 
caused  him  to  commit  the  murder  in  question,  by  producing 
e\ndence  to  show  that  another  man  concerned  in  the  case  had 
stronger  motives  and  consequently  that  it  was  no  more  ra- 
tional to  accuse  the  defendant  than  it  was  to  accuse  this  man. 

In  refuting  arguments  from  antecedent  probability  the 


146  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

rhetorical  treatment  may  take  various  forms,  but  the  analysis 
of  the  argument  is  always  the  same;  the  attack  is  always 
directed  toward  one  point, — the  connection  between  cause 
and  effect. 

B.  Sign.  The  argument  from  sign  is,  in  general,  what  the 
name  implies.  It  rests  upon  the  assumption  that  the  facts  dealt 
with  will  always  or  usually  accompany  each  other,  and  that 
consequently  the  presence  of  one  will  be  a  sign  of  the  presence 
of  the  other.  As  in  the  argument  from  antecedent  probabil- 
ity, most  arguments  from  sign  depend  for  their  validity  upon 
a  causal  connection;  but  we  shall  also  find  that  there  is  a  class 
of  arguments  from  sign  in  which  this  causal  connection  is  not 
fully  understood  or  expressed,  or,  at  least,  is  hard  to  trace. 
Arguments  of  this  last-mentioned  class  depend  for  their 
strength  upon  the  fact  of  a  more  or  less  invariable  association 
in  the  past  between  the  facts  in  question,  and  are  therefore 
closely  akin  to  generalization.  There  are  three  kinds  of 
arguments  from  sign.     1.     Arguments  from  effect  to  cause. 

2.  Arguments  from  one  effect  to  another  effect  of  the  same  cause. 

3.  Arguments  from  the  association  of  phenomena  in  the  past. 

1.  The  argument  from  effect  to  cause  is  the  reverse  of 
the  argument  from  antecedent  probability.  As  that  was  an 
argument  based  on  facts  antecedent  to  the  fact  in  dispute, 
so  this  is  an  argument  based  on  facts  coming  after  the  fact 
in  dispute.  As  the  former  is  called  an  a  priori  argument,  so 
the  latter  is  called  an  a  posteriori  argument.  From  a  known, 
admitted  fact  we  argue  back  to  an  unknown,  disputed  fact. 
We  say  the  latter  exists  or  existed  because  the  former  is  an 
effect  of  it.  If  it  can  be  shown  that  any  alleged  fact  whose 
existence  we  wish  to  prove  is  or  was  the  cause  of  any  known 
fact,  the  proof  of  this  alleged  fact  is  indisputable.  When  we 
see  ice,  we  safely  conclude  that  the  temperature  has  been 
below  a  certain  point;  and  the  argument  is  beyond  dispute, 
because  it  is  only  a  certain  degree  of  coldness  that  will  freeze 
water. 

William  Seward  argued  from  effect  to  cause  in  the  follow- 


KINDS  OF  ARGUMENTS  147 

ing  part  of  his  defence  of  William  Freeman.  Freeman  was 
on  trial  for  murder,  and  Seward's  defence  was  that  of  insanity 
on  the  part  of  the  prisoner: — 

"There  is  proof,  gentlemen,  stronger  than  all  this.  It  is  silent, 
yet  speaking.  It  is  that  idiotic  smile  which  plays  continually  on 
the  face  of  the  maniac.  It  took  its  seat  there  while  he  was  in  the 
State  prison.  In  his  solitary  cell,  under  the  pressure  of  his  severe 
tasks  and  trials  in  the  workshop,  and  during  the  solemnities  of 
public  worship  in  the  chapel,  it  appealed,  although  in  vain,  to  his 
task-masters  and  his  teachers.  It  is  a  smile,  never  rising  into 
laughter — without  motive  or  cause — the  smile  of  vacuity.  .  .  . 

"That  chaotic  smile  is  the  external  derangement  which  signifies 
that  the  strings  of  the  harp  are  disordered  and  broken,  the  superficial 
mark  which  God  has  set  upon  the  tabernacle  to  signify  that  its 
immortal  tenant  is  disturbed  by  a  divine  and  mysterious  com- 
mandment. If  you  cannot  see  it,  take  heed  that  the  obstruction  of 
your  vision  be  not  produced  by  the  mote  in  your  own  eye,  which 
you  are  commanded  to  remove  before  you  consider  the  beam  in 
your  brother's  eye.  If  you  are  bent  on  rejecting  the  testimony  of 
those  who  know,  by  experience  and  by  science,  the  deep  afflictions 
of  the  prisoner,  beware  how  you  misinterpret  the  handwriting  of 
the  Almighty."  i 

A  number  of  years  ago,  in  Yorkshire,  England,  a  traveller, 
having  in  his  pocket  certain  marked  coins,  was  attacked  in 
the  early  evening,  murdered,  and  robbed.  The  following 
day  coins  of  this  peculiar  stamp  were  found  on  the  person  of  a 
certain  manservant  at  an  inn  in  the  vicinity.  This  servant 
was  unable  to  account  for  his  possession  of  the  money,  and 
on  this  evidence  he  was  tried,  convicted,  and  hanged.  This 
was  a  clear  argument  from  sign — from  effect  to  cause.  It 
was  argued  that  his  possession  of  the  coins  was  the  effect 
of  his  taking  them  from  the  body  of  the  murdered  man  on  the 
evening  before.  But  several  years  after  it  was  found  that  the 
conviction  was  a  mistake.  The  keeper  of  the  inn  confessed 
that  he  himself  committed  the  murder  and,  in  order  to  trans- 
»  Works  of  William  H.  Seward,  Vol.  I,  p.  468. 


148  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

fer  the  guilt,  got  his  servant  intoxicated  and  put  the  coins  into 
his  pocket.  The  argument  from  sign  was  fallacious,  because 
the  effect  in  question  was  the  result  of  another  cause  than 
that  inferred. 

a.  Methods  of  attack.  There  are  two  ways  of  attacking 
the  argument  from  effect  to  cause,  one  from  the  alleged  cause 
as  the  basis  showing  that  it  could  not  have  been  the  cause  of 
the  effect,  the  second  from  some  other  cause  as  a  basis  show- 
ing that  this  other  cause  more  probably  produced  the  effect. 

(I)  May  not  the  known  effect  be  due  to  some  other  cause 
than  the  one  alleged? 

A  mariner  at  night  seeing  lights  ahead  infers 
C     ^^     C        that  a  ship  or  a  lighthouse  is  at  hand.     But 
•"'""'  ^^<  \       his  inference  may  be  sadly  false.    The  lights 
/   "**?    may  be  set  or  manipulated  on  shore  with  the 
'  purpose   to  mislead  him   and    profit  by  the 

^£  wreck  of  his  ship.     Again  it  is  argued  that 

Shakespeare  must  have  written  the  works 
attributed  to  him,  because  he  was  credited  with  their  au- 
thorship all  through  his  life.  It  is  said  that  this  effect  must 
have  been  due  to  the  cause,  that  he  did  actually  write 
the  works.  But  those  who  oppose  this  view  attack  the  ar- 
gument by  showing  that  the  popular  belief  may  be  attributed 
to  other  good  causes,— to  the  comparative  lack  of  interest 
in  the  authorship  at  the  time,  or  the  desire  of  the  real  author 
to  conceal  his  identity, — and  so,  that  the  reputation  is  no 
sure  sign  of  authorship. 

(II)  Is  the  alleged  cause  capable  of  being  the  real  cause 
of  the  effect  in  question? 

We  may  also  attack  the  argument  directly,  in    C ^_p 

much  the  same  way  that  we  would  attack  the 
argument  from  antecedent  probability,  by  showing 
that  the  cause  which  it  is  alleged  produced  the 
known  effect  was  really  not  capable  of  producing  it. 
This  is  commonly  done  by  showing  that  the  cause 
was  not  powerful  enough,  or  that  in  some  way  the  effect  would 


KINDS  OF  ARGUMENTS  149 

not  be  a  reasonable  and  normal  result  of  this  cause.  But  it 
must  be  observed  that  this  alone  is  not  always  suflBcient  to  de- 
stroy the  argument.  Although  this  phenomenon  might  not 
in  itself  have  been  a  sufficient  cause,  other  causes  might  have 
cooperated  with  it  in  producing  the  effect,  and  so  the  known 
effect  may  still  be  a  sign  of  this  alleged  cause.  To  make  the 
refutation  complete  in  such  a  case,  it  must  be  shown  that 
these  other  causes,  whose  cooperation  was  necessary,  did  not 
exist. 

(HI)  Is  the  cause  and  effect  connection  complete?    This, 
the  same  test  already  suggested  for  antecedent  probability,  is, 
of  course,  just  as  effective  here.     When  a  washout 
^  carries  away  a  section  of  a  railroad,  trains  cannot 

B  ^    go  through  in  either  direction.     We  can  neither 

ft  "     go  up  or  down  the  chain  of  causal  connection  if  a 

g  link  is  missing. 

There  are  many  other  devices  that  may  be  in- 
vented and  employed  in  different  cases,  which  are  too  numer- 
ous or  complicated  to  be  explained  here.  The  foregoing  are 
the  most  common  and  effective  tests;  and  of  the  other  tests 
it  may  be  remarked  that  they  are  all  directed  to  destroy  the 
causal  connection,  and  that  they  may  be  readily  invented  if 
the  nature  of  this  inference  from  effect  to  cause  is  understood. 
2.  The  argument  from  effect  to  effect.  The  second 
class  of  the  arguments  from  sign  involves  a  process  of  in- 
ference which  is  a  combination  of  the  argument  from  cause 
to  effect  and  the  argument  from  effect  to  cause.  The  argu- 
ment from  effect  to  effect  is  simply  an  inference  from  a 
known  effect  of  some  cause  to  the  existence  of  an  unknown 
effect  of  the  same  cause.  A  certain  fact  or  combination  of 
facts  is  known  to  exist.  From  the  existence  of  this  known  fact 
the  existence  is  inferred  of  another  fact  which  is  alleged  to 
be  its  cause — the  argument  from  effect  to  cause.  Then  a 
second  step  is  taken;  it  is  inferred  that  this  cause  produces 
another  effect,  this  second  unknown  effect  being  the  fact 
which  it  is  the  aim  of  the  argument  to  prove.    Very  often, 


150  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

of  course,  a  short  cut  is  taken  from  one  effect  to  the  othef 
effect,  paying  little  or  no  attention  to  the  common  cause. 
To  illustrate  by  a  diagram : — 

In  full  detail  the  process  is  as 
follows: 

The  effect  A  is  known,  i  e., 
it  is  admitted  or  it  has  been 
established  by  evidence.  From 
this  known  effect  is  inferred 
FfF  f  ^y  process  number  I  (argument 
from  effect  to  cause)  the  ex- 
istence of  X,  which  is  alleged  to  be  its  cause.  Then  by 
process  number  II  (argument  from  cause  to  effect)  is  inferred 
the  existence  of  Y,  which  is  alleged  to  be  another  effect  of 
the  cause  X.  The  argument  seeks  to  prove  Y  as  an  inference 
from  A,  and  in  doing  so  it  passes  through  the  connecting 
cause  X.  The  short  cut  consists  of  inferring  immediately 
that  where  there  is  A  there  is  Y.  This  is  sound  when  it  is 
true  that  that  which  causes  A  invariably  causes  Y  also. 

In  the  evening  we  observe  a  redness  of  the  sky,  and  we 
argue  that  there  will  be  fair  weather  the  next  day.  It  is 
an  argument  from  effect  to  effect.  The  redness  is  due  to 
certain  atmospheric  conditions,  and  these  conditions  are 
such  that  they  will  produce  fair  weather.  We  argue  that 
a  certain  man  will  succeed  as  the  president  of  a  corpora- 
tion. We  first  point  to  his  success  in  other  enterprises  re- 
quiring executive  skill  and  creative  power;  from  them  we 
infer  their  cause,  his  abilities,  and  then  reason  that  these 
abilities  will  produce  their  effect,  viz.,  success  in  his  new 
undertaking.  We  notice  that  the  thermometer  is  low  and 
at  once  infer  good  skating. 

The  following  illustration  is  taken  from  the  speech  of  David 
Paul  Brown  in  defence  of  Alexander  William  Holmes  (before 
the  Circuit  Court  in  Philadelphia,  in  1832).  A  vessel  was 
wrecked,  and,  in  order  to  save  as  many  as  possible  of  the 
passengers,  orders  were  given  to  throw  overboard  a  part 


KINDS  OF  ARGUMENTS  151 

of  them.  The  defendant  obeyed  the  order  and  threw  certain 
men  over  the  side  of  the  ship  into  the  water.  He  was  tried 
for  murder,  and  Mr.  Brown  is  here  arguing  to  show  that  the 
defendant  acted  in  good  faith  and  with  right  motives.  He 
said: — 

"I  am  strengthened  in  this  position  by  the  indisputable  fact  that 
Holmes,  the  prisoner,  during  the  whole  voyage,  was  upon  the  kindest 
and  most  harmonious  terms  with  all  the  passengers;  that  he  pre- 
served the  same  friendly  relation  to  them  after  the  loss  of  the  ship; 
that  he  had  perilled  his  life  more  than  once  to  preserve  them;  that 
he  had  literally  stripped  himself  of  his  apparel  for  their  comfort;  in 
short,  his  desire  to  save  them  seemed  to  absorb  all  consideration  of  ^ 
mere  personal  or  individual  safety.  In  these  circumstances,  to 
suppose  anything  cruel  or  wanton  upon  his  part  is  to  run  counter 
to  everything  that  is  possible  or  natural.  I  infer,  therefore,  that 
he  supposed  the  peril  to  be  imminent  and  instantaneous,  or  he 
never  would  have  complied  with  the  orders  of  the  mate.  ...  I 
maintain,  therefore,  that  the  most  favorable  construction  is  to  be 
placed  upon  his  motives;  and  it  is  justly  to  be  inferred  that  he 
acted  upon  the  impression  that  the  danger  was  imminent,  and  that 
death  was  inevitable  to  all,  except  by  resorting  to  those  means 
which  he  actually  adopted.  .  .  But  even  taking  all  the  statements 
of  the  witnesses  for  the  prosecution,  highly  colored — I  will  not  say 
discolored — as  they  are,  and  torture  them  as  you  may,  it  is  impos- 
sible for  you  to  arrive  at  any  other  conclusion  than  that  Holmes 
was  actuated  by  the  kindest  and  most  generous  influences;  and 
certainly  I  need  not  say  that  kindness  and  generosity  are  opposed  to 
wantonness  and  barbarity."  ^ 

He  argues  that  the  former  actions  of  Holmes  were  the 
evidences  of  their  cause,  viz.,  his  sincere  interest  for  the  wel- 
fare of  the  passengers,  and  then  argues  that  this  cause  pro- 
duced the  effect  in  question,  his  honesty  of  motive  in  this 
particular  instance. 

In  a  great  part  of  the  arguments  of  this  class  it  is  notice- 
able that  more  than  one  effect  is  usually  adduced  to  prove 

^  Great  Speeches  by  Great  Lawyers,  pp.  143,  144. 


152  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

the  existence  of  the  cause,  each  eflFect  giving  added  evidence 
of  the  single  cause  alleged. 

a.  Methods  of  attack.  The  points  of  weakness  in  this 
kind  of  argument  are  evident.  It  is  a  combination  of  the  two 
foregoing  arguments, — from  sign  and  from  antecedent  prob- 
ability; and  if  either  one  of  these  component  inferences  is  de- 
fective or  can  be  successfully  attacked,  the  whole  argument 
is  destroyed.  Referring  to  the  diagram  given  above,  the 
argument  can  be  attacked  in  either  leg  of  the  triangle.  (I) 
The  tests  are,  therefore,  the  tests  already  given  for  the  arguments 
from  cause  to  effect  and  from  effect  to  cause. 

For  example,  the  argument  of  Mr.  Brown  might  be  at- 
tacked at  two  points.  It  might  be  shown  that  the  effects 
he  mentioned — relations  of  Holmes  with  the  passengers  and 
his  apparent  solicitude  in  their  behalf,  etc. — might  not  really 
be  due  to  the  alleged  cause,  viz.,  his  interest  for  their  welfare, 
but  to  another  cause — perhaps  his  desire  to  win  favor  or 
pecuniary  gain.  Again  it  might  be  attacked  (test  number  3, 
of  arguments  from  antecedent  probability)  by  granting  the 
sincerity  of  his  motives  in  general,  but  showing  that  certain 
circumstances  peculiar  to  his  particular  case  prevented  the 
natural  operation  of  the  cause.  Perhaps  the  defendant  was 
so  fearful  for  his  own  life  that  his  usual  honesty  was  put  aside 
and  he  acted  selfishly  or  maliciously.  Or  in  the  other  example, 
the  thermometer  may  be  out  of  order,  so  the  cold  that  we  in- 
ferred may  not  have  been.  Our  cause  was  wrong.  Or  the 
cause  may  have  been  right,  but  a  high  wind  prevented  the 
formation  of  ice,  so  our  second  effect  is  lacking. 

3.  Association  of  phenomena  in  the  past.  The  third 
class  of  arguments  from  sign  is  composed  of  arguments  based 
upon  the  past  association  of  facts  or  phenomena.  Two  phe- 
nomena have  been  observed  to  happen  together  so  many 
times  in  the  past  as  to  seem  to  justify  the  belief  that  they  will 
accompany  one  another  in  the  future.  So  when  one  of  the 
facts  or  phenomena  is  observed  to  be  present  in  any  particular 
case,  it  is  inferred  that  the  other  also  is  present.     In  such 


KINDS  OF  ARGUMENTS  155 

arguments  the  causal  relation  is  not  readily  understood  or 
explained,  although  it  undoubtedly  exists. 

a.  Association  of  phenomena  and  generalization.  This 
kind  of  argument  is  very  closely  related  to  the  argument  by 
generalization.  In  any  given  case  a  slight  change  in  expres- 
sion may  shift  the  argument  from  one  type  to  the  other. 
In  so  far  as  it  is  possible  to  draw  a  strict  dividing  line  between 
arguments  from  the  association  of  phenomena  in  the  past 
and  arguments  by  generalization,  we  classify  according  to 
whether  the  underlying  causal  connections  are  expressed 
or  not.  When  the  causal  relations  are  not  understood,  or 
are  understood  and  taken  for  granted  but  not  expressed,  no 
general  rule  formulated,  the  argument  is  strictly  speaking 
an  argument  from  the  association  of  phenomena  in  the  past. 
That  is  we  accept  one  thing  as  the  sign  of  something  else 
without  expressing  our  mode  of  reasoning,  without  citing 
a  general  rule  with  instances  to  prove  it  (generalization)  and 
without  comparing  two  individual  cases  as  to  resemblances, 
point  by  point,  as  a  basis  for  inferring  resemblance  on  a  dis- 
puted point  (analogy).  The  argument  from  association 
might  be  called  simply  an  implied  generalization.  Its  strength 
depends  upon  the  validity  of  the  underlying  unexpressed 
generalization. 

We  may  infer  that  any  ruminating  animal  has  cloven 
hoofs;  conversely,  we  may  infer  that  any  animal  with  cloven 
hoofs  is  a  ruminant.  These  inferences  are  reasonably  safe 
because  in  most  cases  the  two  characteristics  have  been 
found  to  exist  together,  although  scientists  do  not  under- 
stand the  exact  nature  of  the  connection.  The  argument 
about  ruminant  animals  depends  on  the  fact  that  the  con- 
currence of  the  two  phenomena  seldom  fails.  In  some  cases 
the  rule  has  been  broken;  the  pig  and  the  tapir,  for  illustra- 
tion, have  cloven  hoofs,  but  are  not  ruminants :  consequently, 
the  convincingness  of  the  argument  is  weakened,  and  any 
considerable  number  of  exceptions  would  make  it  valueless. 

The  conclusion  you  draw  that  A  is  nearby  when  you  see 


154  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

his  dog  or  horse  or  hat  somewhere;  many  every  day  state- 
ments about  the  weather  or  crops,  or  the  habits  of  animals; 
the  immediate  and  almost  universal  import  of  a  half-masted 
flag,  or  crepe  on  a  door;  all  these  are  examples  of  this  type  of 
argument.  What  has  been  said  earlier  about  the  impossi- 
bility of  hard  and  fast  dividing  lines,  should  be  kept  in  mind 
in  connection  with  this  type  of  argument.  It  is  possible  to 
list  here  arguments  that  might  fit  under  either  of  the  other 
types  of  sign,  or  under  generalization,  or  even  antecedent 
probability.  But  it  still  seems  well  worth  while  to  keep  this 
old  label  for  that  large  class  of  "implied  generalizations"  in 
which  no  general  law  is  fonnulated  or  expressed,  and  many 
times  not  understood.  It  should  also  be  observed  that  ex- 
amples of  this  type  of  argument  are  usually  (not  always) 
found  in  fields  where  unchanging  laws  of  nature  are  not  in 
control — or  are  not  understood  to  be  in  control — but  usually 
are  cases  in  which  the  human  will  plays  an  important  part. 
It  is  so  possible  that  the  two  phenomena  are  not  associated 
this  time — that  someone  else  has  A's  horse,  or  dog,  or  hat — 
that  the  flag  has  been  half-masted  by  mistake,  or  the  crepe 
put  up  as  a' joke.  This  argument  is  very  weak  in  itself,  but 
is  often  important  in  corroborating  other  elements  in  a  case, 
b.  Methods  of  attack.  It  is,  then,  clear  where  the  argu- 
ment may  be  open  to  attack.  The  habit  of  hasty,  unreason- 
ing (and  often  unrecognized)  implied  generalization  is  very 
common.  In  many  debates  this  very  error  is  predominant. 
A  speaker  or  writer  cites  a  few  instances  of  the  concurrence 
of  two  facts  in  the  past  and  argues  that  because  they  have 
happened  together  in  the  past,  they  must  happen  together 
in  the  present  instance.  Really,  what  he  has  established  is, 
that  they  may  happen  together;  he  has  proved  nothing,  and 
his  attempt  may  be  rendered  null  by  (I)  pointing  out  that 
the  cases  are  too  few  to  establish  a  law  of  concurrence,  which 
is  really  necessary — i.  e.,  exposing  the  weakness  of  the  im- 
plied generalization  which  fails  to  come  up  to  the  tests  of  a 
real  generalization  which  it  must  meet;  or  better,   (II)  by 


KINDS  OF  ARGUMENTS  155 

producing  contrary  examples,  definite  eases  where  the  one  phe- 
nomenon has  occurred  without  the  other;  or  (III)  destroying 
its  corroborative  function  by  showing  it  to  be  actually  in- 
consistent with  facts  in  the  case  already  known.  Arguments 
of  this  kind  are  from  their  nature  of  doubtful  value.  The  co- 
existence of  the  two  facts  in  past  instances  is  not  shown  to  be 
anything  more  than  mere  accident,  and  chance  is  at  best  a 
weak  foundation  on  which  to  base  an  interference.  The 
argument  gathers  its  force  wholly  from  the  frequency  of  the 
past  concurrence  of  the  phenomena.  In  order  to  approach 
conclusiveness  we  must  have:  (I)  a  very  large  number  of  cases 
of  the  observed  concurrence  of  the  facts  or  phenomena,  and 
(II)  substantial  uniformity  in  the  operation  of  the  rule  that 
when  one  occurs  the  other  accompanies  it,  and  (III)  har- 
mony with  accepted  facts  in  the  case. 

C.  Example.  The  third  and  last  division  of  the  kinds 
of  arguments  is  composed  of  those  which  depend  for  their 
strength  upon  the  resemblance  between  the  case  in  question 
and  some  other  case  or  cases,  which  are  adduced  either  as 
analogous  in  nature  to  this  particular  case,  or  as  establishing 
some  general  law  that  is  applicable  to  it.  There  are,  there- 
fore, two  classes  of  arguments  from  example,  which  may  be 
called,  respectively,  (1)  the  argument  by  generalization,  and 
(2)  the  argument  from  analogy. 

1.  Generalization.  In  arguments  of  this  kind  we  "con- 
sider one  or  more  known  individual  objects  or  instances  of  a 
certain  class  as  fair  specimens,  in  respect  of  some  point  or 
other,  of  that  class;  and  consequently  draw  an  inference 
from  them  respecting  either  the  whole  class  or  other  less 
known  individuals  of  it."  ^  Our  purpose  is  to  establish  a 
general  law  which  will  apply  to  a  particular  case  under  dis- 
cussion. 

The  following  from  Burke*s  Speech  on  Conciliation  is 
an  illustration  of  an  inference  from  individual  instances  to 
a  truth  respecting  the  whole  class  to  which  they  belong: — 
1  Whately,  p.  52. 


156  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

"In  large  bodies,  the  circulation  of  power  must  be  less  vigorous 
at  the  extremities.  Nature  has  said  it.  The  Turk  cannot  govern 
Egypt,  and  Arabia,  and  Curdistan,  as  he  governs  Thrace;  nor  has 
he  the  same  dominion  in  Crimea  and  Algiers,  which  he  has  at  Brusa 
and  Smyrna.  Despotism  itself  is  obliged  to  truck  and  huckster. 
The  Sultan  gets  such  obedience  as  he  can.  He  governs  with  loose 
rein,  that  he  may  govern  at  all;  and  the  whole  of  the  force  and  vigor 
of  his  authority  in  his  centre  is  derived  from  a  prudent  relaxation 
in  all  his  borders.  Spain,  in  her  provinces,  is,  perhaps,  not  so  well 
obeyed  as  you  in  yours.  She  complies  too,  she  submits,  she  watches 
times.  This  is  the  immutable  condition,  the  eternal  law,  of  ex- 
tensive and  detached  empire."  ^ 

Chief  Justice  Marshall,  in  his  opinion  delivered  in  the  case 
of  McCulloch  vs.  Maryland,^  used  the  argument  by  generali- 
zation as  follows: — 

"The  power  of  creating  a  corporation,  though  appertaining  to 
sovereignty,  is  not,  like  the  power  of  making  war  or  levying  taxes 
or  of  regulating  commerce,  a  great  substantive  and  independent 
power,  which  cannot  be  implied  as  incidental  to  other  powers,  or 
used  as  a  means  of  executing  them.  It  is  never  the  end  for  which 
other  powers  are  exercised,  but  a  means  by  which  other  objects 
are  accomplished.  No  contributions  are  made  to  charity  for  the 
sake  of  an  incorporation,  but  a  corporation  is  created  to  administer 
the  charity;  no  seminary  of  learning  is  instituted  in  order  to  be 
incorporated,  but  the  corporate  character  is  conferred  to  subserve 
the  purposes  of  education.  No  city  was  ever  built  with  the  sole 
object  of  being  incorporated,  but  is  incorporated  as  affording  the 
best  means  of  being  well  governed.  The  power  of  creating  a  cor- 
poration is  never  used  for  its  own  sake,  but  for  the  purpose  of 
effecting  something  else." 

In  the  following,  Channing,  arguing  that  the  sufferings  of 
the  slaves  are  evils  and  should  be  done  away  with,  infers 
from  individual  instances  of  a  class  to  "another  less  known 
individual  of  it:*' — 

1  Cook's  Edition,  p.  £6.  24  Wheat.  316. 


KINDS  OF  ARGUMENTS  157 

"Allow  that  the  sufferings  of  the  slave  are  less  than  those  of  the 
free  laborer.  But  the  sufferings  are  Wrongs,  and  this  changes  their 
nature.  Pain  as  pain  is  notliing  compared  with  pain  when  it  is 
wrong.  A  blow,  given  me  by  accident,  may  fell  me  to  the  earth; 
but,  after  all,  it  is  a  trifle.  A  slight  blow,  inflicted  in  scorn  or  with 
injurious  intent,  is  an  evil,  which,  without  aid  from  my  principles, 
I  could  not  bear.  Let  God's  providence  confine  me  to  my  room  by 
disease,  and  I  more  than  submit,  for  in  his  dispensations  I  see 
parental  goodness  seeking  my  purity  and  peace.  But  let  man  im- 
prison me,  without  inflicting  disease,  and  how  intolerable  my  nar- 
row bounds.  So  if  the  elements  take  away  our  property,  we  resign 
it  without  a  murmur;  but  if  a  man  rob  us  of  our  fortune,  poverty 
weighs  on  us  as  a  mountain.  Anything  can  be  borne  but  the  will 
and  the  power  of  the  selfish,  unrighteous  man.  .  .  . 

'*  My  hostility  to  the  system  does  not  rest  primarily  on  the  physical 
agonies  it  inflicts,  but  on  a  deeper  foundation:  on  its  flagrant  injus- 
tice, and  on  the  misery  necessarily  involved  in  a  system  of  wrong."  ^ 

He  adduces  examples  to  prove  the  general  truth  that, 
regardless  of  the  pain  it  inflicts,  injustice  or  wrong  always 
creates  an  evil,  and  then  applies  this  general  truth  to  the 
instance  of  slavery  so  proving  that  slavery  is  an  evil. 

Under  this  head  Hill  ^  offers  some  good  suggestions  and 
provides  some  excellent  examples  which  we  quote. 

a.  Illustrative  and  argumentative  examples.  "In  argu- 
ments of  the  first  class,  it  is  important  to  distinguish  between 
examples  which  are  merely  illustrative  and  those  which  are 
argumentative.  A  supposed  case  under  a  general  principle 
which  is  itself  in  dispute,  though  it  may  make  the  principle 
more  intelligible,  does  not  tend  to  prove  its  truth.  Cicero's 
proposition  that  nothing  is  expedient  which  is  dishonorable 
is  explained,  but  not  established,  by  the  example  he  gives, — 
an  example  drawn  from  Themistocles's  project  of  burning 
the  Spartan  fleet.  This  plan  Cicero,  in  opposition  to  Aris- 
tides,  maintains  to  be  inexpedient  because  dishonorable; 
but  no  one  who  had  not  already  assented  to  the  general 

1  Channing's  Works,  Vol.  V,  pp.  37,  39.  ^  HiU,  pp.  361,  363. 


158  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

principle   would   be   convinced   of    its   soundness   by   this 
example. 

"An  actual  instance  of  the  operation  of  a  principle  has, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  force  of  an  argument.  Such  an  ar- 
gument is  given  in  a  criticism  of  Sir  James  Fitzjames  Steph- 
en's History  of  the  Criminal  Law  of  England.  In  answer 
to  Sir  James's  proposition  'that  unanimity  of  jurors  is  es- 
sential to  trial  by  jury:  that  if  that  is  to  be  given  up,  the 
institution  itself  should  be  abolished,'  his  critic  refers  to  the 
fact  that  in  Scotland,  where  a  majority  of  jurors  decide, 
trial  by  jury  succeeds  as  well  as  in  England.  Another  ex- 
ample is  given  in  the  following  passage : — 

"The  outcry  of  a  suffering  beast  may  be  no  measure  of  its  dis- 
tress. That  outcry,  like  all  else  in  nature,  is  of  a  strictly  utilitarian 
character.  But  it  was  not  developed  in  the  first  place  as  an  appeal 
to  the  sympathy  of  man,  and  therefore  man's  senses  and  intuitive 
judgment  cannot  be  trusted  to  interpret  it  aright.  The  pig  squeals 
aloiid  when  he  is  hurt,  and  advertises  his  woe  over  half  the  parish, 
because,  in  the  wild  state,  his  comrades  were  sworn  to  rescue  him 
from  a  foe  or  die.  Many  a  hunter  who  has  been  treed  by  a  herd  of 
peccaries,  after  wounding  one  of  them,  has  had  convincing  proof 
of  their  magnificent  esprit  de  corps.  The  sheep  is  dumb  before 
her  persecutors  because,  when  wild,  there  was  no  hope  of  salvation 
from  the  scared  flock,  fast  fleeing  to  inaccessible  hills  as  soon  as  the 
wolf  began  his  raid.  The  Virginian  opossum,  when  playing  that 
part  in  the  world's  drama  which  he  has  made  peculiarly  his  own, 
will  allow  his  limp  carcase  to  be  mauled  to  an  incredible  extent 
without  moving  an  eyelid.  He  acts  his  lie  with  Cretan  facility,  and 
sticks  to  it  with  more  than  Spartan  fortitude.  Yet  he  is  silent  for 
exactly  the  same  reason  that  the  pig  is  so  shrilly  vociferous,  viz., 
because  this  has  been  proved  the  best  way  to  preserve  his  precious 
life."  1 

"Still  another  example  is  the  little  essay  by  Charles  Lamb^ 

1  Louis  Robinson,  M.  D.,  E very-day  Cruelty.  The  Fortnightly  Review, 
July,  1894,  p.  107. 

2  Essays  of  Elia.    Popular  Fallacies,  VII. 


KINDS  OF  ARGUMENTS  159 

on  the  popular  proverb  that  '  of  two  disputants  the  warmest 
is  generally  in  the  wrong' : — 

"Our  experience  would  lead  us  to  quite  an  opposite  conclusion. 
Temper,  indeed,  is  no  test  of  truth;  but  warmth  and  earnestness 
are  a  proof  at  least  of  a  man's  own  conviction  of  the  rectitude  of 
that  which  he  maintains.  Coolness  is  as  often  the  result  of  an  un- 
principled indifference  to  truth  or  falsehood,  as  of  a  sober  con- 
fidence in  a  man's  own  side  in  a  dispute.  Nothing  is  more  insulting 
sometimes  than  the  appearance  of  this  philosophic  temper.  There 
is  little  Titubus,  the  stammering  law-stationer  engaged  in  Lincoln's 
Inn — we  have  seldom  known  this  shrewd  little  fellow  engaged  in  an 
argument  where  we  were  not  convinced  he  had  the  best  of  it,  if  his 
tongue  would  but  fairly  have  seconded  him.  When  he  has  been 
spluttering  excellent  broken  sense  for  an  hour  together,  writhing 
and  labouring  to  be  delivered  of  the  point  of  dispute — the  very  gist 
of  the  controversy  knocking  at  his  teeth,  which  like  some  obstinate 
iron-grating  still  obstructed  its  deliverance — his  puny  frame  con- 
vulsed, and  face  reddening  all  over  at  an  unfairness  in  the  logic 
which  he  wanted  articulation  to  expose,  it  has  moved  our  gall  to  see 
a  smooth  portly  fellow  of  an  adversary,  that  cared  not  a  button  for 
the  merits  of  the  question,  by  merely  laying  his  hand  upon  the 
head  of  the  stationer,  and  desiring  him  to  be  calm  (your  tall  dis- 
putants have  always  the  advantage),  with  a  provoking  sneer  carry 
the  argument  clean  from  him  in  the  opinion  of  all  the  by-standers, 
who  have  gone  away  clearly  convinced  that  Titubus  must  have 

been  in  the  wrong,  because  he  was  in  a  passion;  and  the  Mr. , 

meaning  his  opponent,  is  one  of  the  fairest  and  at  the  same  time 
one  of  the  most  dispassionate  arguers  breathing!" 

We  have  already  mentioned  a  priori  (antecedent  probability 
— cause  to  effect)  and  a  posteriori  (sign,  first  type,  effect  to 
cause).  A  third  label,  afortioriy  which  is  often  used  in  con- 
nection with  these  two,  covers  a  certain  use  of  the  argument 
from  example.  It  may  be  used  either  in  generalization,  or 
analogy.  Genung  ^  explains  it  briefly  and  gives  some  very 
good  illustrations. 

1  Genung,  Prac.  Rhet^  pp.  421.  422. 


160  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

"A  favorite  use  of  the  argument  from  example,  especially 
in  oratory,  is  the  argument  technically  called  a  fortiori, 
which  reasons  that  if  a  certain  principle  is  true  in  a  given  case, 
much  more  will  it  be  true  in  a  supposed  case,  wherein  the 
conditions  are  more  favorable. 

*'  Many  of  the  assertions  of  Scripture  are  put  in  the  form  of 
an  argument  a  fortiori;  for  example:  *  Wherefore,  if  God  so 
clothe  the  grass  of  the  field,  which  today  is,  and  tomorrow  is 
cast  into  the  oven,  shall  he  not  much  more  clothe  you,  O  ye 
of  little  faith?' 

"The  following,  from  Burke,  advocates  sympathy  with 
the  Irish  Roman  Catholics,  as  more  natural  and  fitting,  for 
the  English,  than  the  sympathy  which  was  actually  given  to 
the  Americans  in  the  time  of  the  Revolution : — 

"  'I  confess  to  you  freely  that  the  sufferings  and  distress  of  the 
people  of  America  in  this  cruel  war  have  at  times  affected  me  more 
deeply  than  I  can  express.  I  felt  every  gazette  of  triumph  as  a 
blow  upon  my  heart,  which  has  an  hundred  times  sunk  and  fainted 
within  me  at  all  the  mischiefs  brought  upon  those  who  bear  the 
whole  brunt  of  the  war  in  the  heart  of  their  country.  Yet  the 
Americans  are  utter  strangers  to  me;  a  nation  among  whom  I  am 
not  sure  that  I  have  a  single  acquaintance.  Was  I  to  suffer  my 
mind  to  be  so  unaccountably  warped,  was  I  to  keep  such  iniquitous 
weights  and  measures  of  temper  and  of  reason,  as  to  sympathize 
with  those  who  are  in  open  rebellion  against  an  authority  which  I 
respect,  at  war  with  a  country  which  by  every  title  ought  to  be, 
and  is,  most  dear  to  me, — and  yet  to  have  no  feeling  at  all  for  the 
hardships  and  indignities  suffered  by  men  who  by  their  very  vicinity 
are  bound  up  in  a  nearer  relation  to  us,  who  contribute  their  share, 
and  more  than  their  share,  to  the  common  prosperity,  who  perform 
the  common  offices  of  social  life,  and  who  obey  the  laws,  to  the 
full  as  well  as  I  do?'" 

b.  Methods  of  attack.  In  this  argument  as  we  have  said 
we  present  '*one  or  more  individual  objects  or  instances,  of 
a  certain  class,  as  fair  specimens,  in  respect  of  some  point  or 
other,  and  draw  an  inference  from  them,  respecting  the  whole 


KINDS  OF  ARGUMENTS  161 

class  or  other  less  known  objects  of  it."  The  itahcised  parts 
of  this  definition  indicate  the  two  points  for  attack  on  this 
argument.  To  test  an  argument  by  generalization  apply  two 
questions  to  it: 

(I)  "Are  the  specimens  fair  in  respect  of  the  point  in  is- 
sue? "  The  failure  to  meet  this  test  is  very  common  in  dis- 
honest and  partisan  controversy.  The  statement  that  *'  100 
students  were  asked  if  they  wanted  the system  intro- 
duced, and  only  three  said  *  Yes," '  has  no  valid  force  whatever 
if  the  100  students  were  all  unfair  specimens  of  the  general 
student  body  of  5000  in  regard  to  the  particular  point  in  issue. 
Choosing  unfair  specimens  and  making  out  a  plausible,  but 
dishonest  and  worthless  generalization,  is  a  favorite  trick  of 
partisan  investigators  and  advocates  who  have  to  make  out 
a  preconceived  case  regardless  of  the  truth. 

(II)  "  Has  a  large  enough  part  of  the  class  been  observed 
to  justify  an  inference  regarding  the  whole  class  or  unob- 
served parts  of  it?  "  To  apply  this  test,  as  the  first  one,  it  is 
necessary  to  know  the  exact  nature  of  the  question  at  issue. 
In  questions  which  concern  the  working  out  of  natural  laws, 
as  in  chemistry,  physics,  biology,  etc.,  a  very  small  number  of 
specimens  are  needed  to  determine  the  rule.  If  a  certain 
treatment  of  a  dozen  rabits  results  in  each  case  in  the  same 
way,  it  is  reasonably  safe  to  formulate  a  rule  for  all  the  mil- 
lions of  rabbits,  or  for  other  animals  as  well.  In  chemistry  or 
physics  one  very  carefully  performed  experiment  may  well 
settle  some  question  for  all  time.  A  rule  can  be  formulated 
and  followed  with  confidence  in  every  case.  This  is  gen- 
eralization from  a  single  instance.  It  is  allowable  when 
dealing  with  the  working  of  natural  laws  on  inanimate 
materials,  and  sometimes  on  plants  and  animals.  Of  course, 
in  regard  to  many  questions,  as  questions  in  chemistry,  or 
physics,  plants  and  animals,  even  human  beings,  are  to  be 
tested  in  the  same  manner  as  inanimate  materials.  It  is  as 
we  get  further  and  further  from  this  type  of  question,  and 
nearer  to  questions  involving  personal  taste,  ability,  prej- 


162  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

udice,  opinion,  belief,  etc.,  that  we  must  increasingly  enlarge 
the  proportion  of  observed  instances.  The  greater  the  possi- 
ble variations  in  answer  to  our  question,  the  wider  must  be 
the  field  of  observation,  in  order  to  justify  a  generalization. 
And,  of  course,  the  very  nature  of  many  questions  preclude 
the  possibility  of  getting  a  rule  that  will  work  without  ex- 
ceptions. In  practically  all  questions  affecting  human  con- 
duct a  high  degree  of  probability  is  all  we  can  hope  to  get  for 
any  general  rule. 

2.  Analogy.  In  taking  up  a  consideration  of  the  analogy 
it  is  well  to  cite  some  well  known  and  authoritative  writers 
in  regard  to  different  ideas  as  to  what  constitutes  an  analogy. 
There  are  two  quite  different  conceptions  which  we  shall  label 
for  convenience  "figurative  analogy"  and  "literal  analogy." 

a..  Figurative  analogy.     Says  Whately: — ^ 

"The  word  Analogy  again  is  generally  employed  in  the 
case  of  Arguments  in  which  the  instance  adduced  is  somewhat 
more  remote  from  that  to  which  it  is  applied;  e.  g.,  a  physi- 
cian would  be  said  to  know  by  Experience  the  noxious  effects 
of  a  certain  drug  on  the  human  constitution,  if  he  had  fre- 
quently seen  men  poisoned  by  it;  but  if  he  thence  conjectured 
that  it  would  be  noxious  to  some  other  species  of  animal,  he 
would  be  said  to  reason  from  analogy;  the  only  difference 
being  that  the  resemblance  is  less,  between  a  man  and  a 
brute,  than  between  one  man  and  another;  and  accordingly 
it  is  found  that  many  brutes  are  not  acted  upon  by  some 
drugs  which  are  pernicious  to  man. 

"But  more  strictly  speaking.  Analogy  ought  to  be  distin- 
guished from  direct  resemblance,  with  which  it  is  often  con- 
founded, in  the  language,  even  of  eminent  writers  (especially 
on  Chemistry  and  Natural  History)  in  the  present  day. 
Analogy  being  a  *  resemblance  of  ratios,*  that  should  strictly 
be  called  an  Argument  from  Analogy,  in  which  the  two  things 
(viz.  the  one  from  which,  and  the  one  to  which  we  argue) 
are  not,  necessarily,  themselves  alike,  but  stand  in  similar 
*  ElemerUs  of  Rhetoric,  pp.  72,  73. 


KINDS  OF  ARGUMENTS  163 

relations  to  some  other  things;  or  in  other  words,  that  the 
common  genus  which  they  both  fall  under,  consists  in  a 
relation.  Thus  an  egg  and  a  seed  are  not  in  themselves  alike, 
but  bear  a  like  relation,  to  the  parent  bird  and  to  her  future 
nestling,  on  the  one  hand,  and  to  the  old  and  young  plant 
on  the  other,  respectively;  this  relation  being  the  genus  which 
both  fall  under;  and  many  arguments  might  be  drawn  from' 
this  Analogy.  Again,  the  fact  that  from  birth  different  per- 
sons have  different  bodily  constitutions,  in  respect  of  com- 
plexion, stature,  strength,  shape,  liability  to  particular  dis- 
orders, &c.,  which  constitutions,  however,  are  capable  of 
being,  to  a  certain  extent,  modified  by  regimen,  medicine, 
&c.,  affords  an  Analogy  by  which  we  may  form  a  presumption, 
that  the  like  takes  place  in  respect  of  mental  qualities  also; 
though  it  is  plain  that  there  can  be  no  direct  resemblance 
either  between  body  and  mind,  or  their  respective  attributes. 

"In  this  kind  of  Argument,  one  error,  which  is  very  com- 
mon, and  which  is  to  be  sedulously  avoided,  is  that  of  con- 
cluding the  things  in  question  to  be  alike,  because  they  are 
Analogous;  to  resemble  each  other  in  themselves,  because 
there  is  a  resemblance  in  the  relation  they  bear  to  certain 
other  things;  which  is  manifestly  a  groundless  inference. 

"Sometimes  the  mistake  is  made  of  supposing  this  direct 
resemblance  to  exist  when  it  does  not;  sometimes,  of  suppos- 
ing, or  sophistically  representing,  that  such  resemblance  is 
assertedy  when  no  such  thing  was  intended.  One  may  often 
hear  a  person  reproached  with  having  compared  such  and 
such  a  person  or  thing  to  this  or  that,  and  with  having  in 
so  doing  introduced  a  most  unjust,  absurd,  and  indecorous 
comparison;  when,  in  truth,  the  object  in  question  had  not 
been,  properly  speaking,  compared  to  any  of  these  things; 
an  Analogy  only  having  been  asserted.  And  it  is  curious  that 
many  persons  are  guilty  of  misrepresentation,  who  are,  or 
ought  to  be,  familiar  with  the  Scripture-Parables;  in  which 
the  words  "compare"  and  "liken"  are  often  introduced, 
where  it  is  evident  that  there  could  have  been  no  thought  of 


164  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

any  direct  resemblance.  A  child  of  ten  years  old  would 
hardly  be  guilty  of  such  a  blunder  as  to  suppose  that  members 
of  the  church  are  literally  'like'  plants  of  corn, — sheep, — 
fish  caught  in  a  net, — and  fruit  trees. 

''Another  caution  is  applicable  to  the  whole  class  of  argu- 
ments from  Example;  viz.  not  to  consider  the  Resemblance 
or  Analogy  to  extend  further  (i.  e.,  to  more  particulars  than 
it  does) .  The  resemblance  of  a  picture  to  the  object  it  rep- 
resents, is  direct;  but  it  extends  no  further  than  the  one  sense, 
of  Seeing,  is  concerned.  .  .  . 

"Thus,  because  a  just  Analogy  has  been  discerned  between 
the  metropolis  of  a  country,  and  the  heart  of  the  animal  body, 
it  has  been  sometimes  contended  that  its  increased  size  is  a 
disease — that  it  may  impede  some  of  its  most  important 
functions,  or  even  be  the  cause  of  its  dissolution." 

Here  we  have  an  excellent  discussion  of  the  strict  old 
analogy — a  comparison  of  things  which  are  not  alike  in  them- 
selves,— but  are  alike  in  the  relations  they  bear  to  other 
things.  So  we  have  analogies  drawn  between  the  circula- 
tion of  the  blood  and  the  circulation  of  money,  the  life  of  man 
and  the  life  of  a  nation,  the  spread  of  ideas  and  the  spread  of 
disease.  In  all  such  analogies  we  are  dealing  simply  with  a 
resemblance  of  relations. 

b.  Literal  analogy.  Another  kind  of  analogy  is  explained 
by  Minto.^  "In  a  strict  logical  sense,  however,  as  defined 
by  Mill,  sanctioned  by  the  previous  usage  of  Butler  and 
Kant,  analogy  means  more  than  a  resemblance  of  relations. 
It  means  a  preponderating  resemblance  between  two  things 
such  as  to  warrant  us  in  inferring  that  the  resemblance  ex- 
tends further.  This  is  a  species  of  argument  distinct  from  the 
extension  of  an  empirical  law.  In  the  extension  of  an  empiri- 
cal law  (i.  e.,  generalization),  the  ground  of  inference  is  a  coin- 
cidence frequently  repeated  vnthin  our  experience,'^  and  the 
inference  is  that  it  has  occurred  or  will  occur  beyond  that 
experience;  in  the  argument  from  analogy,  the  ground  of  in- 
^  Minto,  book  ii.  ch.  X.  ^  Italics  ours. 


KINDS  OF  ARGUMENTS  16^ 

ference  is  the  resemblance  between  two  individual  objects  or 
kinds  of  objects  in  a  certain  number  of  points,  and  tlie  inference 
is  that  they  resemble  one  another  in  some  other  point, 
known  to  belong  to  the  one,  but  not  known  to  belong  to  the 
other.  "Two  things  go  together  in  many  cases,  therefore  in 
all,  including  this  one,"  is  the  argument  in  extending  a 
generalization:  *Two  things  agree  in  many  respects,  there- 
fore in  this  other,'  is  the  argument  from  analogy. 

"The  example  given  by  Reid  in  his  Intellectual  Powers 
has  become  the  standard  illustration  of  the  peculiar  argu- 
ment from  analogy. 

"*We  may  observe  a  very  great  similitude  between  this  earth 
which  we  inhabit,  and  the  other  planets,  Saturn,  Jupiter,  Mars, 
Venus,  and  Mercury.  They  all  revolve  around  the  sun,  as  the 
earth  does,  although  at  different  distances  and  in  different  periods. 
They  borrow  all  their  light  from  the  sun,  as  the  earth  does.  Several 
of  them  are  known  to  revolve  around  their  visible  axis  like  the 
earth,  and  by  that  means  have  like  succession  of  day  and  night. 
Some  of  them  have  moons,  that  serve  to  give  them  light  in  the  ab- 
sence of  the  sun,  as  our  moon  does  to  us.  They  are  all,  in  their  mo- 
tions, subject  to  the  same  law  of  gravitation  as  the  earth  is.  From 
all  this  similitude  it  is  not  unreasonable  to  think  that  these  planets 
may,  like  our  earth,  be  the  habitations  of  various  orders  of  living 
creatures.  There  is  some  probability  in  this  conclusion  from 
analogy.' " 

The  difference  between  these  types  of  analogy  may  be 
brought  out  by  an  illustration.  Suppose  you  take  an  apple 
and  ascertain:  (a)  its  shape,  (b)  its  color,  (c)  its  size,  (d)  its 
weight,  (e)  scars  and  blemishes  on  it,  (f )  its  softness,  and  then 
(g)  its  taste.  The  next  day  you  find  another  apple  which 
agrees  in  all  the  points  (a)  to  (f )  inclusive,  and  you  infer  that 
this  second  apple  will  be  like  the  first  in  taste  also.  They 
agree  in  so  many  points  that  you  reason  that  they  will  agree 
in  the  point  in  question.  Is  this  an  analogy?  It  seems  evi- 
dent that  Whately  would  say  "No,"  and  Minto  would  say 
"Yes," 


166  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

(I)  Generalization  from  a  single  instance.  According  to 
Whately's  definition  of  the  analogy  this  would  have  to  fall 
into  the  "generalization"  class  of  argument  from  example. 
It  would  then  be  a  generaHzation  from  a  single  instance. 
And  that  is  precisely  what  this  argument  is;  literal  analogy 
is  simply  another  name  for  it.  You  have  in  effect  estab- 
lished a  general  rule  that  apples  which  fit  the  condi- 
tions (a)  to  (f),  inclusive,  taste  so  and  so,  and  you  apply 
this  general  rule  to  the  first  apple  considered.  You  would, 
of  course,  apply  it  similarly  to  a  whole  barrel  of  apples. 
This  is  a  generalization  based  on  a  single  specimen  which 
is  considered  a  fair  specimen,  and  is  made  in  regard  to  things 
that  are  so  uniform  in  nature  that  such  a  generalization  is 
justified.  The  analogy  quoted  by  Minto  from  Reid's  In- 
tellectual Powers  is  the  same.  Substantially  a  general  law  is 
formed  to  the  effect  that  all  planets  which  are  like  the  earth 
in  such  and  such  respects  are  probably  inhabited. 

c.  In  summary,  then,  we  have  in  arguments  from  ex- 
ample two  types:  First,  generalization,  the  establishment  of 
a  general  law,  based  upon  specimens  examined.  This  may 
range  from  instances  dealing  with  phenomena  affected  by 
the  human  will  (generalizations  regarding  people  and  human 
institutions)  to  instances  dealing  with  phenomena  affected 
only  by  unchanging  laws  of  nature  (generalizations  in  chem- 
istry, physics,  biology,  etc.)  At  the  first  end  of  the  scale  we 
must  examine  a  great  number  of  instances  in  order  to  have  a 
sound  generalization.  The  number  diminishes  until  at  the 
last  end  of  the  scale  we  can  generalize  from  a  single  instance. 
Such  generalization  from  a  single  instance,  especially  when 
only  one  case  for  its  application  is  in  mind,  is  often  called 
analogy.  This  use  is  so  widespread  that  we  must  accept  this 
as  permissible  and  recognize  this  as  one  of  the  types  of  analogy 
{literal  analogy) .  Such  an  analogy  is  of  course  often  a  strong 
argument.  It  has  real  logical  force.  Second,  in  addition  to 
the  use  of  this  term  to  cover  a  generalization  from  a  single 
instance,  literal  analogy,  as  discussed  above,  we  have  the  old- 


KINDS  OF  ARGUMENTS  167 

fashioned  analogy  (figurative),  based  purely  on  a  resem- 
blance of  relations — not  a  direct  comparison  of  members  of 
the  same  class  point  for  point.  This  type  of  analogy  is 
usually  only  a  figure  of  speech  and  has  practically  no  logical 
force.  It  is  usually  possible  to  answer  it  by  saying  that  the 
analogy  is  false,  that  the  parallel  is  not  close.  Since  the 
things  compared  are  not  alike  in  themselves — not  members 
of  the  same  class,  it  is  always  easy  to  show  wherein  the 
parallel  breaks  down. 

d.  Methods  of  attack.  So  the  methods  of  attack  of  the 
(I)  first  type  of  analogy  are  really  those  to  be  applied  to  gen- 
eralization: (A)  Is  it  a  fair  specimen  of  the  class?  (B)  Are 
you  taking  a  large  enough  part  of  the  class — i.  e.,  is  this  a 
field  in  which  one  can  generalize  from  a  single  instance? 

(II)  False  analogy.  The  second  type  of  analogy  is  met  by 
pointing  out  that  the  resemblances  are  not  suflSciently  par- 
allel, by  attacking  it  as  a  false  analogy.  Thus  we  often  hear 
it  argued  that  men  and  nations  are  alike  in  certain  particu- 
lars, and  that  consequently  nations  must  have  youth,  man- 
hood, old  age,  and  decay.  The  argument  is  not  valid,  be- 
cause the  resemblance  is  not  a  resemblance  that  has  any 
bearing  on  the  argument.  Men  and  nations  are  alike  in 
their  moral  responsibilities;  for  both,  self-indulgence  or  mis- 
judged action  brings  its  punishment;  for  both,  the  same 
intellectual  qualities  may  bring  success.  But  they  are  not 
alike  in  the  one  essential  point,  viz.,  physical  organization. 
It  is  usually  possible  thus  to  waive  aside  any  analogy  of  this 
type.  It  has  no  probative  force  unless  the  parallel  is  admitted 
to  be  sound — and  then  probative  force  is  not  needed.  But 
while  this  analogy  is  of  little  use  as  an  "argument,"  it  is 
very  effective  as  a  "figure  of  speech"  to  make  meaning  clear. 
To  explain  the  unknown  by  drawing  an  analogy  to  the  known 
is  one  of  the  best  ways  of  getting  clearness — of  showing 
what  you  mean.  It  is  very  useful  indeed  in  exposition.  In 
regard  to  resemblances,  we  must  bear  in  mind  that  in  order 
to  give  grounds  for  any  argument  or  illustration,  it  is  impor- 


168  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

tant  not  that  the  resemblances  are  many,  but  that  they  are 
such  as  bear  directly  upon  the  argument.  Horses  and  generals 
are  not  alike  in  their  relations,  in  many  ways;  but  Lincoln's 
argument  derives  its  force  from  the  fact  that  the  two  are 
similar  in  the  relation  that  is  important  to  the  argument. 
"  Csesar  had  his  Brutus,  Charles  I  his  Cromwell,  and  George 
III  may  profit  by  their  example."  Caesar  was  unlike  Charles 
I  in  most  of  his  personal  qualities;  he  ruled  a  different  coun- 
try, in  a  different  age.  George  III  was  the  very  opposite  of 
the  Roman  in  temper  and  character;  his  people,  his  advisers, 
his  century,  were  not  similar  to  those  of  either  of  the  men 
cited  as  "examples."  But  the  three  cases  were  similar  in  the 
essential  element:  Caisar,  Charles  I,  and  George  III  all  repre- 
sented the  pressure  of  tyranny  upon  a  spirited,  liberty-loving 
people.  In  each  case  oppression  was  the  cause  of  the  effect, 
rebellion;  and  whatever  other  differences  there  may  be  in  the 
circumstances,  the  causes  were  similar  in  nature.  Such  an 
argument  only  emphasizes  the  fact  that  the  causal  connec- 
tion is  essential  in  this  class  of  arguments,  and  that  the  simili- 
tude between  the  instances  is  a  similitude  of  causes  and  effects. 
3.  Cause  and  effect  in  argument  from  example.  In  ar- 
guments from  example  the  connection  of  cause  and  effect, 
as  in  the  other  two  classes  of  arguments,  is,  of  course,  present. 
The  difference  is  that  in  the  other  classes  the  inference  is 
directly  from  cause  to  effect,  or  effect  to  cause,  whereas  in 
this  class  the  inference  depends  upon  a  comparison  of  causes 
and  effects.  In  the  argument  from  antecedent  probability 
we  argue  that  certain  known  facts  are  of  such  kind  that  they 
must  from  their  very  nature  produce  a  certain  effect.  In  the 
argument  from  example  we  argue  that  certain  known  facts 
will  be  the  cause  of  a  certain  effect  because  they  are  similar 
to  the  certain  other  facts  which  have  been  the  cause  of  a  sim- 
ilar effect  in  the  past.  If  the  facts  that  we  produce  as  "ex- 
amples" have  happened  to  follow  one  another  in  the  past 
merely  by  accident,  then  no  amount  of  comparison  can  prove 
anything  more  than  that  similar  facts  may  happen  together  in 


KINDS  OF  ARGUMENTS  169 

the  future  by  accident;  the  comparison  cannot  give  valid 
grounds  for  a  belief  that  they  certainly  mil  follow  one 
another.  The  causal  connection  must  be  present  in  order 
to  make  the  argument  sound.  It  is,  then,  sometimes  possible 
to  attack  arguments  from  example  from  this  point  of  view  by 
showing  weakness  in  the  connection  in  the  "examples,''  as 
well  as  by  showing  that  the  resemblance  between  the  "ex- 
amples" and  the  instance  in  dispute  may  not  be  a  true 
resemblance.  The  test  of  the  causal  connections,  have  been 
given  in  the  treatment  of  the  other  classes  of  arguments. 

EXERCISE.    CHAPTER  7 

KINDS   OF   ARGUMENTS 

1.  Write  out  original  examples  of  inductive  and  deductive 

reasoning. 

2.  Hand  in  three  examples  each  of  perfect  and  imperfect 

induction. 

3.  Give  an  original  example  of  each  of  the  five  methods  of 

induction. 

4.  Hand  in  one  good  example  of  each  of  the  following:  Syl- 

logism; Sorites;  Inference  in  quantitative  relation;  En- 
thymeme. 

5.  Give  one  sound  argument  from  antecedent  probability 

and  one  unsound  argument  from  antecedent  probability, 
indicating  which  method  of  attack  exposes  the  weakness 
of  the  latter. 

6.  Give  one  sound  original  example  of  each  of  the  three  kinds 

of  argument  from  mgp.;  and  one  unsound  argument  of 
each  kind,  indicating  the  weakness  of  each  of  the  latter 
and  the  proper  methods  of  attack  to  use  against  each. 

7.  Give  two  sound  and  two  unsound  examples  of  argument 

by  generalization,  explaining  the  strength  and  weakness 
of  each. 

8.  Give  two  examples  each  of  figurative  and  literal  analogy, 

explaining  the  strength  and  weakness  of  each  for  argu- 
mentative purposes. 


CHAPTER  8 

FALLACIES 

OUTLINE 

I.  Definition  and  classification. 
II.  Rhetorical  fallacies  (Errors  in  interpretation)o 

A.  Incorrect  obversion. 

B.  Incorrect  conversion. 

C.  Amphibology. 

D.  Accent. 

III.  Logical  fallacies  (Errors  in  reasoning). 

A.  Formal  (Violations  of  rules  of  syllogism). 

1.  In  categorical  arguments. 

a.  Four  terms. 

b.  Undistributed  Middle  (Illicit  Middle). 

c.  Illicit  Major. 

d.  Illicit  Minor. 

e.  Negative  premise. 

f.  Particular  premise. 

2.  In  hypothetical  arguments. 

a.  Denying  the  antecedent. 

b.  Affirming  the  consequent. 

3.  In  disjunctive  arguments. 

a.  Imperfect  disjunction. 

B.  Material  (not  in  the  form  but  in  the  matter). 

1.  Equivocation  (Ambiguity). 

a.  In  quantity. 

(I)  Composition. 

(II)  Division, 
s    b.  In  quality. 

(I)  Ambiguous  Middle  (Specific  accident). 

(II)  Simple  accident. 

(III)  Converse  accident. 

2.  Presumption. 

a.  Begging  the  question  (Petitio  Principii). 
170 


FALLACIES  171 

(I)  Assumption  of  unproved  premise    (As- 
sumptio  non  probata). 

(II)  Arguing  in  a  circle  (Circulus  in  pro- 
bando). 

b.  Irrelevant  conclusion  (Ignoring  the  question) 

(Ignorantio  Elenchi). 

(I)  Argumentum  ad  hominem. 

(II)  Argumentum  ad  populum. 

(III)  Argumenlflta  ud  ignorantiam. 

(IV)  Argumentum  ad  verecundiam. 

(V)  Argumentum  ad  judicium. 

c.  Complex  question. 

d.  Non  sequitur  (False  consequent). 

(I)  Simple. 

(II)  False   Cause   (Post  hoc  ergo  propter 
hoc). 

I.  Definition  and  classification.  A  fallacy  is  an  error  in 
reasoning.  In  a  strictly  logical  sense  the  term  fallacy  can  be 
applied  to  no  other  kind  of  error.  It  is  usual,  however,  in 
discussing  fallacies,  to  consider  certain  definite  errors  in  in- 
terpretation as  well  as  errors  in  reasoning.  Indeed  logicians 
usually  preface  their  comments  on  these  errors  with  the  state- 
ment that  the  proper  place  to  deal  with  them  is  in  a  book  on 
rhetoric.  They  are  variously  classified  as  "errors  in  inter- 
pretation," "hermeneutic  fallacies,"  etc.  We  shall  classify 
them  as  rhetorical  fallacies,  to  distinguish  them  from  the 
errors  in  reasoning,  which  we  shall  call  logical  fallacies.  Con- 
siderable search  has  failed  to  discover  any  two  writers  who 
use  classifications  of  fallacies  which  are  the  same  in  all  re- 
spects. Nor  does  the  classification  given  here  follow  in  detail 
any  given  elsewhere.  It  is,  however,  in  the  main  identical 
with  those  given  by  Hyslop^  and  Creighton.^  The  amount 
of  time  that  can  be  profitably  spent  in  studying  a  rather 
complete  list  of  fallacies,  will  vary  with  different  classes. 
But  the  avoidance  of  fallacies  in  our  own  reasoning,  and  the 
1  Page  227.  2  Page  154. 


172  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

detection  of  them  in  the  reasoning  of  o.thers  are  of  such  vital 
importance  that  it  seems  well  to  give  the  student  of  argu- 
mentation at  least  an  opportunity  to  learn  the  nature  of 
the  most  common  dangers.  The  twelve  fallacies  printed 
in  italics  in  the  above  table  should  be  carefully  studied. 
This  classification  is  not  put  forward  as  all-inclusive,  nor  are 
its  divisions  deemed  to  be  mutually  exclusive.  A  given 
fallacy  may  be  classified  under  different  heads,  according 
to  the  standpoint  from  which  it  is  viewed.  It  is  thought, 
however,  that  this  classification  is  better  than  others  hitherto 
published  with  respect  to  completeness,  terminology,  and 
logical  division. 

II.  Rhetorical  fallacies,  or  errors  of  interpretation,  are 
faults  of  understanding,  not  of  reasoning.  They  are  mistakes 
in  interpreting  propositions.  They  are  not  errors  in  "any 
process  or  act  of  the  mind  by  which,  from  knowing  one  thing, 
it  advances  on  to  know  another.''  ^  There  is  no  advance  to- 
ward a  new  thing.  The  inference  (if  inference  at  all)  involved 
here  is  immediate  inference.  No  new  truth  is  developed.  No 
steps  in  reasoning  are  taken.  For  instance,  in  getting  the 
proposition  "Some  quadrupeds  are  horses"  from  the  proposi- 
tion "All  horses  are  quadrupeds,"  we  are  doing  no  reasoning, 
inferring  no  new  truth.  The  first  statement  is  the  result 
of  the  interpretation  of  the  second,  not  of  reasoning  from  the 
second  as  a  basis. 

A.  Incorrect  obversion.  Obversion  of  a  proposition 
means  changing  it  from  aflSrmative  to  negative  or  from 
negative  to  affirmative  without  changing  its  meaning.  For 
instance,  "All  of  the  campers  were  asleep" — "Not  one  of  the 
campers  was  awake."  "Not  one  of  the  specimens  was 
perfect" — "All  of  the  specimens  were  imperfect."  The 
fallacy  of  illogical  obversion  arises  when  we  fail  to  understand 
the  exact  meaning  of  the  first  proposition  or  some  of  its 
terms,  and  consequently  get  an  obverse  that  does  not  mean 
the  same  thing  as  the  original.  "All  University  men  are 
^  Newman  (italics  not  in  original). 


FALLACIES  173 

eligible"  does  not  mean  necessarily  "No  non-University  men 
are  eligible,"  but  **No  University  men  are  ineligible."  To 
avoid  the  fallacy  of  illogical  obversion,  we  must  change  the 
predicate  only.  The  use  of  the  negative  of  the  original  sub- 
ject gives  illogical  obversion.  To  state  the  rule  technically: 
instead  of  affirming  a  predicate  as  true  of  a  given  subject, 
we  may  deny  its  negative  in  regard  to  the  same  subject;  in- 
stead of  denying  a  predicate  of  a  given  subject  we  may  affirm 
^he  negative  of  this  predicate  in  regard  to  the  same  subject. 
I'* All  citizens  will  be  admitted,''  logically  ob verted  gives  us 
"No  citizens  will  be  refused  admission'';  illogically  ob  verted 
it  results  in  "No  aliens  vnll  be  admitted." 

B.  Incorrect  conversion.  Conversion  of  a  proposition 
means  transposing  its  subject  and  predicate  without  changing 
its  meaning.  "No  seniors  are  members  of  the  club" — "No 
members,  of  the  club  are  seniors."  The  fallacy  of  illogical 
conversion  arises  when  we  fail  to  grasp  clearly  the  limitations 
on  the  terms  of  the  first  proposition  and  give  some  term  a 
wider  application  in  the  second  proposition  than  it  had  in 
the  first.  Technically  it  is  an  error  in  distribution  of  terms. 
If  the  second  proposition  distributes  a  term  which  was  not 
distributed  in  the  first,  the  fallacy  of  illogical  conversion  is 
committed.  The  statement  that  "All  brave  men  are  gener- 
ous" does  not  mean  that  ".^  generous  men  are  brave." 
From  "All  horses  are  animals"  it  does  not  follow  that  "All 
animals  are  horses"  but  that  "Some  animals  are  horses." 
"In  the  heat  of  debate,  or  when  using  propositions  without 
proper  attention,  there  is  a  natural  tendency  to  assume  that 
a  proposition  which  makes  a  universal  statement  regarding 
the  subject,  does  the  same  with  regard  to  the  predicate.  And, 
although  such  errors  are  very  obvious  when  pointed  out, — ^as, 
indeed,  in  the  case  with  nearly  all  logical  fallacies, — they 
may  very  easily  impose  on  us  when  our  minds  are  not  fully 
awake,  that  is,  when  attention  is  not  active  and  consciously 
on  guard."  ^ 

1  Creighton,  pp.  155,  156. 


174  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

C.  "  The  fallacy  of  amphibology  consists  in  an  ambiguous 
grammatical  structure  of  a  sentence,  which  produces  miscon- 
ception. A  celebrated  instance  occurs  in  the  prophecy  of  the 
Spirit  in  Shakespeare's  Henry  VI.:  *The  Duke  yet  lives  that 
Henry  shall  depose,'  which  leaves  it  wholly  doubtful  whether 
the  Duke  shall  depose  Henry,  or  Henry  the  Duke.  This 
prophecy  is  doubtless  an  imitation  of  those  which  the  ancient 
oracle  of  Delphi  is  reported  to  have  uttered;  and  it  seems  that 
this  fallacy  was  a  great  resource  to  the  oracles  who  were  not 
confident  in  their  own  powers  of  foresight.  The  Latin  lan- 
guage gives  great  scope  to  misconstructions,  because  it  does 
not  require  any  fixed  order  for  the  words  of  a  sentence,  and 
when  there  are  two  accusative  cases  with  an  infinitive  verb, 
it  may  be  difficult  to  tell,  except  from  the  context,  which 
comes  in  regard  to  sense  before  the  verb.  The  double  mean- 
ing which  may  be  given  to  *  twice  two  and  three'  arises  from 
amphibology;  it  may  be  7  or  10,  according  as  we  add  the  3 
after  or  before  multiplying.  In  the  careless  construction  of 
sentences  it  is  often  impossible  to  tell  to  what  part  any 
adverb  or  qualifying  clause  refers.  Thus,  if  a  person  says, 
*I  accomplished  my  business  and  returned  the  day  after,' 
it  may  be  that  the  business  was  accomplished  on  the  day 
after  as  well  as  the  return;  but  it  may  equally  have  been 
finished  on  the  previous  day.  Any  ambiguity  of  this  kind 
may  generally  be  avoided  by  a  simple  change  in  the  order 
of  the  words;  as,  for  instance,  *I  accomplished  my  business, 
and  on  the  day  after  returned.'  Amphibology  may  some- 
times arise  from  confusing  the  subjects  and  predicates  in  a 
compound  sentence,  as  if  in  the  sentence,  *  Platinum  and  iron 
are  very  rare  and  useful  metals,'  I  w^ere  to  apply  the  predicate 
useful  to  platinum  and  rare  to  iron,  which  is  not  intended. 
The  word  *  respectively'  is  often  used  to  show  that  the  reader 
is  not  at  liberty  to  apply  each  predicate  to  each  subject."  ^ 

D.  "  The  fallacy  of  accent  consists  in  any  ambiguity 
arising  from  a  misplaced  accent  or  emphasis  thrown  upon 

1  Jevons,  pp.  172,  173o 


FALLACIES  175 

some  word  of  a  sentence.  A  ludicrous  instance  is  liable  to 
occur  in  reading  Chapter  XIII.  of  the  First  Book  of  Kings, 
verse  27,  where  it  is  said  of  the  prophet,  *And  he  spoke  to 
his  sons,  saying.  Saddle  me  the  ass,  and  they  saddled  him.* 
The  Italics  indicate  that  the  word  him  was  supplied  by  the 
translators  of  the  authorized  version,  but  it  may  suggest 
a  very  different  meaning.  The  Commandment,  *Thou  shalt 
not  bear  false  witness  against  thy  neighbor,*  may  be  made  by 
a  slight  emphasis  of  the  voice  on  the  last  word  to  imply  that 
we  are  at  liberty  to  bear  false  witness  against  other  persons. 
Mr.  De  Morgan,  who  remarks  this,  also  points  out  that  the 
erroneous  quoting  of  an  author,  by  unfairly  separating  a 
word  from  its  context,  or  italicising  words  which  were 
not  intended  to  be  italicised,  gives  rise  to  cases  of  this 
fallacy. 

"It  is  curious  to  observe  how  many  and  various  may 
be  the  meanings  attributable  to  the  same  sentence  according 
as  emphasis  is  thrown  upon  one  word  or  another.  Thus  the 
sentence,  *The  study  of  Logic  is  not  supposed  to  communicate 
a  knowledge  of  m^ny  useful  facts,'  may  be  made  to  imply 
that  the  study  of  Logic  does  communicate  such  a  knowledge 
although  it  is  not  supposed  to  do  so;  or  that  it  communi- 
cates a  knowledge  of  a  few  useful  facts;  or  that  it  communi- 
cates a  knowledge  of  many  useless  facts.  This  ambiguity 
may  be  explained  by  considering  that  if  you  deny  a  thing  to 
have  the  group  of  qualities  A,  B,  C,  D,  the  truth  of  your 
statement  will  be  satisfied  by  any  .one  quality  being  absent, 
and  an  accented  pronunciation  will  often  be  used  to  indicate 
that  which  the  speaker  believes  to  be  absent.  If  you  deny 
that  a  particular  fruit  is  ripe  and  sweet  and  well-flavored, 
it  may  be  unripe  and  sweet  and  well-flavored;  or  ripe  and 
sour  and  well-flavored;  or  ripe  and  sweet  and  ill-flavored; 
or  any  two  or  even  all  three  qualities  may  be  absent.  But 
if  you  deny  it  to  be  ripe  and  sweet  and  well-flavored,  the  denial 
would  be  understood  to  refer  to  the  last  quality.  Jeremy 
Bentham  was  so  much  afraid  of  being  misled  by  this  fallacy 


176  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

of  accent  that  he  employed  a  person  to  read  to  him,  as  I 
have  heard,  who  had  a  peculiarly  monotonous  manner  of 
reading."  ^ 

in.  Logical  fallacies  are  errors  in  reasoning  or  inference, 
as  distinct  from  errors  in  interpretation.  There  are  two 
classes  of  logical  fallacies — formal  and  material. 

A.  Formal  fallacies  arise  from  a  violation  of  the  rules 
of  the  syllogism.  To  detect  them  it  is  necessary  only  to  be 
familiar  with  the  formal  laws  of  reasoning.  Knowledge 
of  the  subject-matter  dealt  with  in  the  argument  is  not 
essential.  Formal  fallacies  consist  in  violations  of  the 
rules  of  the  syllogism  which  have  been  given  in  an  earlier 
chapter.  In  enumerating  and  illustrating  here  the  fallacies 
that  are  associated  with  these  rules,  it  is  probably  well  to 
follow  the  subdivisions  indicated  in  our  classification:  cate- 
gorical, hypothetical,  and  disjunctive  syllogisms.^ 

1.  In  categorical  syllogisms.  A  categorical  syllogism  is 
one  in  which  all  the  propositions  are  categorical  propositions. 
A  categorical  proposition  is  an  absolute,  declarative,  positive 
statement  admitting  no  conditions  or  exceptions.  "All  men 
are  mortal.  John  is  a  man.  John  is  mortal."  These  are 
categorical  statements.  Six  fallacies  arise  in  categorical 
syllogisms. 

a.  Four  terms.  ''Every  syllogism  has  three  and  only 
three  terms.''  A  fallacy  arises  when  a  fourth  term  is  used. 
It  is  so  obvious  when  all  four  terms  are  quite  distinct  that 
there  is  little  danger  of  any  one's  being  deceived  by  it. 
As  in: 

Frenchmen  are  Europeans. 

Germans  are  Caucasians. 

Therefore  Frenchmen  are  Caucasians. 
But  we  commit  the  fallacy  just  the  same  when  we  have  verb- 
ally only  three  terms,  if  in  reality  we  have  four,  by  using  one 
term  in  two  different  senses.     "The  terms  must  be  three, 

^  Jevons,  pp.  174,  175. 

2  See  aisQ  "dilemma"  in  Chapter  on  Refutation. 


FALLACIES  177 

not  only  with  regard  to  the  letters  and  the  words,  but  even 
with  regard  to  the  meaning.     For  example: — 

"Mouse  is  a  monosyllable; 

"A  mouse  eats  cheese; 

"Therefore  a  monosyllable  eats  cheese. 
Here  we  have  apparently  only  three  terms,  viz.,  *  Mouse,' 
*  monosyllable,'  and  a  'creature  that  eats  cheese';  but  in 
reality  we  have  four  terms,  for  the  word  *  mouse'  means  two 
different  things.  In  one  case  it  means  an  animal,  in  the  other 
case  it  means  a  word.  It  is  not  true  to  say  that  the  animal 
'mouse'  is  a  monosyllable,  nor  that  the  word  'mouse'  eats 
cheese."  ^  The  overlapping  of  the  divisions  in  our  classifica- 
tion of  fallacies  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  this  fallacy  may  also 
be  classed  as  the  material  fallacy  of  equivocation  called  am- 
biguous middle. 

b.  Undistributed  middle.  "  The  middle  term  must  be 
distributed  once  at  least.**  The  fallacy  arising  from  failure 
to  observe  this  rule  is  sometimes  called  illicit  middle  or  illicit 
process  of  the  middle  term.  A  term  is  distributed  when  the 
whole  of  it  is  referred  to  universally. 

Frenchmen  are  (some)  Europeans; 

(Some)  Europeans  are  Teutonic; 

Therefore  Frenchmen  are  Teutonic. 
The  middle  term,   Europeans,  is  undistributed  here.     The 
conclusion  is  therefore  erroneous,  in  spite  of  the  truth  of  the 
premises. 

Frenchmen  are  Europeans; 

(All)  Europeans  are  Occidentals. 

Therefore  Frenchmen  are  Occidentals. 
Here  the  middle  term  is  distributed  in  the  major  premise. 
The  conclusion  is  correct. 

c.  Illicit  major.  *'No  term  must  be  distributed  in  the 
conclusion  which  was  not  distributed  in  one  of  the  premises.** 
Violations  of  this  rule  are  called  the  fallacies  of  illicit  major 
when  the  major  term  is  so  treated. 

1  Bodkin,  p.  39. 


178  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

Horses  are  animals; 

Cows  are  not  horses; 

Therefore  cows  are  not  animals. 
The  major  term,  animals,  is  here  used  in  the  premise  to  de- 
note some  animals.    Horses  are  a  part  of  the  animals  of  the 
world.  In  the  conclusion  the  term  animals  is  used  universally, 
or  covering  all  of  the  animals  of  the  world. 

d.  Illicit  minor.  The  fallacy  of  illicit  minor  consists 
in  distributing  the  minor  term — giving  it  a  wider  apphcation 
— in  the  conclusion  when  it  was  not  distributed  in  the  minor 
premise — as  in, 

All  Senators  are  at  least  thirty  years  old; 

All  Senators  are  voters; 

Therefore  all  voters  are  at  least  thirty  years  old. 

e.  Negative  premises.  ''From  negative  premises  noth- 
ing can  be  inferred.''  This  "rule  is  evidently  founded  on  the 
principle  that  inference  can  proceed  only  where  there  is 
agreement,  and  that  two  differences  or  disagreements  allow 
of  no  reasoning."  ^  A  is  not  B,  and  C  is  not  B,  may  both  be 
true  statements  and  A  and  C  may  or  may  not  agree  with 
each  other.  "Democratic  Senators  did  not  vote  for  this  bill; 
Senator  A  did  not  vote  for  this  bill;  therefore  Senator  A  is  a 
Democratic  Senator."  The  fallacy  is  here  very  evident. 
The  major  premise  simply  tells  us  that  Democratic  Senators 
and  those  who  voted  for  the  bill  are  in  separate  classes.  The 
minor  premise  tells  us  that  Senator  A  is  not  in  the  latter 
class.  But  he  may  or  may  not  be  in  the  former  class.  Je- 
vons  ^  gives  a  warning  that  must  never  be  lost  sight  of  in 
dealing  with  negative  premises.  "It  must  not  be  supposed 
that  the  mere  occurrence  of  a  negative  particle  (not  or  no) 
in  a  proposition  renders  it  negative  in  the  manner  contem- 
plated by  this  rule.    Thus  the  argument: 

'What  is  not  a  compound  is  an  element; 
*Gold  is  not  a  compound; 
'Therefore  gold  is  an  element,' 
1  Jevoas,  p.  133.  2  p.  134. 


FALLACIES  179 

contains  negatives  in  both  premises,  but  is  nevertheless  valid, 
because  the  negative  in  both  cases  affects  the  middle  term 
which  is  really  the  negative  term  not-compound.'* 

f.  Particular  premises.  ^*From  two  particular  premises 
no  conclusions  can  be  drawn."  "If  one  premise  is  particular, 
the  conclusion  must  be  particular."  Particular  propositions  are 
those  in  which  the  predicate  is  affirmed  of  a  part  only  of  the 
subject,  those  in  which  the  subject  is  qualified  by  "some" 
'*a  few,"  "the  majority  of,"  "most  all  of,"  etc.  "The  re- 
maining rules  of  the  syllogism,  the  7th  and  the  8th,  are  by  no 
means  of  a  self-evident  character,  and  are,  in  fact,  corrol- 
laries  of  the  first  six  rules;  that  is,  consequences,  which  follow 
from  them.  .  .  .  We  may  call  a  breach  of  the  7th  rule  a 
fallacy  of  particular  premises,  and  that  of  the  8th  rule  the 
fallacy  of  a  universal  conclusion  from  a.  particular  premise, 
but  these  fallacies  may  really  be  resolved  into  those  of  Illicit 
Process,  or  Undistributed  Middle."  ^  Since  these  fallacies, 
when  tested,  always  turn  out  to  be  due  to  illicit  distribution 
of  terms,  we  shall  not  take  space  to  treat  them  further  under 
this  head. 

2.  In  hypothetical  syllogisms.  A  hypothetical  syllogism 
IS  one  in  which  the  major  premise  is  a  hypothetical  proposi- 
tion, and  the  minor  premise  a  categorical  proposition.  A 
hypothetical  proposition  asserts  something  not  directly  and 
positively,  but  subject  to  some  condition  or  limitation.  Ex- 
ample: 

If  A  paid  the  hotel  bill,  B  owes  A  $1^00. 

A  paid  the  hotel  bill. 

Therefore  B  owes  A  $10.00. 
The  part  of  the  major  premise  expressing  the  condition  or 
supposition  is  the  antecedent;  the  part  stating  the  result  is  the 
consequent.  Sound  reasoning  is  obtained  in  this  form  of 
argument  only  when  the  minor  premise  either  affirms  the  ante- 
cedent or  denies  the  consequent.  Two  fallacies  are  therefore  to 
be  specially  guarded  against  here. 

1  Jevons,  p.  135. 


180  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

SL.  Denying  the  antecedent.  Whenever  the  minor  prem- 
ise of  a  hypothetical  syllogism  denies  the  antecedent  the 
reasoning  is  fallacious.    For  example: 

If  he  has  sold  out,  he  will  pay. 

He  has  sold  out.  He  has  not  sold  out. 

Therefore  he  will  pay.  Therefore  he  will  not  pay. 

Notice  that  when  we  affirm  the  antecedent  ("he  has  sold 
out")  it  follows  necessarily  that  "he  will  pay."  But  when  we 
deny  the  antecedent,  "he  has  not  sold  out,"  it  does  not 
follow  necessarily  that  "he  will  not  pay."  The  major  premise 
does  not  say  that  he  will  not  pay  unless  he  sells  out.  He  may 
pay  any  way.    So  in  the  following: 

If  he  passed  the  examination,  he  is  eligible. 

He  passed  the  examination.       He    did    not    pass    the 

examination. 

.'.  He  is  eligible.  /.  He  is  not  eligible. 

He  may  have  had  other  ways  of  becoming  eligible — daily  aver- 
age, outside  reading,  etc.  Whenever  the  antecedent  is  denied 
the  conclusion  does  not  necessarily  follow — the  reasoning  is 
fallacious.    The  conclusion  may  or  may  not  be  a  true  statement. 

b.  Aflirming  the  consequent.  Whenever  the  minor 
premise  of  a  hypothetical  syllogism  affirms  the  consequent 
the  reasoning  is  fallacious. 

If  he  were  well,  he  would  write. 

He  has  not  written.  He  has  written. 

.' .  He  is  not  well.  .* .  He  is  well. 

Notice  that  when  we  deny  the  consequent,  "he  has  not 
written,"  it  follows  necessarily  that  "he  is  not  well,"  but 
when  we  affirm  the  consequent  it  does  not  follow  that  "he  is 
well."  The  major  premise  did  not  say  that  he  would  not 
write  unless  he  were  well.  He  might  write  anyway.  So  in 
the  following: 

If  the  winter  has  been  severe,  the  birds  will  be  dead. 

The  birds  are  not  dead.  The  birds  are  dead. 

,*.  The  winter  has  not  been  severe.    .*.  The  winter  has  been 

severe. 


FALLACIES  181 

If  the  major  premise  is  true,  finding  the  birds  alive  proves  the 
winter  has  not  been  severe;  but  finding  them  dead  proves 
nothing  about  the  severity  of  the  winter.  They  may  have 
died  from  other  causes.  But  notice  that  you  cannot  say 
"  they  might  have  been  kept  alive  by  special  causes,"  for  this 
is  denying  the  truth  of  your  major  premise. 

3.  In  disjunctive  syllogisms.  A  disjunctive  syllogism 
has  a  disjunctive  proposition  for  a  major  prepaise,  and  a 
categorical  proposition  for  a  minor  premise.  A  disjunctive 
proposition  is  one  in  which  the  predicate  is  made  up  of  a 
series  of  two  or  more  words,  phrases,  or  clauses  expressing 
opposition  or  separation,  as  in:  A  is  either  B  or  C  or  D. 
"A  disjunctive  proposition  is  one  which  implies  or«sserts 
an  alternative  in  the  relation  between  the  subject  and  predi- 
cate; as,  *A  is  either  B  or  C,'  or  *  Metals  are  either  hard  or 
soft.'  The  symbols  of  the  disjunctive  proposition  are  either 
and  or.''  ^ 

a.  Imperfect  disjunction.  In  disjunctive  arguments 
the  fallacy  of  imperfect  disjunction  arises  whenever  the  dis- 
junction expressed  is  not  both  exhaustive  and  mutually 
exclusive. 

Since  "the  affirmation  of  one  of  the  alternatives,  as  the 
disjunctive  syllogism  informs  us,  involves  the  denial  of  the  rest; 
and  conversely,  the  denial  of  all  the  other  alternatives  is 
equivalent  to  the  affirmation  of  the  one  that  remains,"  ^ 
we  commit  the  fallacy  whenever  we  fail  to  mention  possible 
alternatives,  or  when  those  mentioned  overlap. 

He  is  either  slow-witted  or  lazy. 

He  is  lazy. 

.'.  He  is  not  slow  witted. 
This  is  fallacious — ^the  alternatives  are  not  mutually  ex- 
clusive— a  person  may  be  both  slow-witted  and  lazy. 

All  voters  are  either  democrats  or  republicans. 

He  is  not  a  democrat. 

.*.  He  is  a  republican. 
1  Hyslop,  p.  119.  2  Bode,  p.  91.   Italics  ours. 


182  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

Here  the  fallacy  arises  from  the  fact  that  the  disjunction 
does  not  exhaust  the  possibilities.  He  may  be  a  socialist,  a 
prohibitionist,  or  a  member  of  some  other  party,  or  of  none. 

The  fallacy  of  imperfect  disjunction,  while  usually  listed 
as  a  formal  fallacy,  might  well  be  considered  a  material 
fallacy  of  presumption.  The  fault  lies  in  the  matter — the 
false  assumption  in  the  major  premise.  Grant  the  truth  of 
these  premises  and  the  conclusions  follow. 

B.  Material  fallacies  arise  outside  of  the  form  of  the 
argument,  and  are  involved  in  the  matter  dealt  with.  "The 
formal  laws  may  be  confoi'med  to,  but  owing  to  some  am- 
biguity of  meaning  or  assumption  of  facts  which  are  not 
true  the  conclusion  may  be  materially  vitiated  in  spite  of 
the  correctness  of  the  formal  reasoning.  The  material  Tal- 
lacy  can  be  detected  only  by  those  who  are  familiar  with  the 
subject-matter  of  the  discourse  or  argument."  ^  Material 
fallacies  are  divided  into  two  groups — fallacies  of  equivoca- 
tion and  fallacies  of  presumption. 

1.  Fallacies  of  equivocation  are  caused  by  the  equivocal 
or  ambiguous  use  of  terms.  "I  have  divided  them  into  two 
classes,  those  of  quality,  or  accident,  and  those  of  quantity. 
Those  of  quality  or  accident  are  so  called  because  the  fallacy 
arises  from  some  confusion  due  to  differences  of  meaning  in 
regard  to  the  attributes  denoted  by  a  term  in  a  proposition. 
Thus,  if  I  say  "Iron  is  a  metal,'*  I  aflSrm  "metal"  of  it  in 
its  proper  form,  as  an  aggregate  of  certain  qualities  or  at- 
tributes. Now,  if  I  also  say  "Rust  is  iron,"  I  use  the  term 
"iron"  in  a  slightly  different  sense,  affirming  that  the  sub- 
stance, or  generic,  not  the  specific,  qualities  of  it  are  identical 
with  "rust";  that  is  to  say  "rust"  is  "iron"  only  in  its  sub- 
stance, not  in  its  form.  This  fact  prevents  me  from  drawing 
the  conclusion  that  "Rust  is  a  metal."  The  fallacies  of 
quantity  are  so  called  because  they  are  due  to  the  different 
senses  in  which  a  merely  numerical  aggregate  of  individuals 
can  be  taken.  Thus,  "All  the  trees"  may  be  taken  coUec- 
1  Hyslop,  223. 


FALLACIES  183 

lively  or  distributively,  and  so  give  rise,  as  we  shall  see,  to 
an  equivocation.  We  consider  this  form  of  fallacy  first  in 
order,  and  it  is  perhaps  the  easier  to  detect.  It  is  that  of  Com- 
position and  Division."  ^ 

a.  In  quantity.  (I)"  The  fallacy  of  composition  arises 
when  we  affirm  something  to  be  true  of  a  whole,  which  holds 
true  only  of  one  or  more  of  its  parts  when  taken  separately 
or  distributively."  ^  The  difficulty  comes  from  using  the 
middle  term  distributively  in  the  major  premise  and  col- 
lectively in  the  minor  premise.  The  following  illustrate  this 
fallacy : 

All  the  angles  of  a  triangle  are  less  than  two  right  angles. 

A,  B,  and  C  are  all  the  angles  of  a  triangle. 

. '  .  A,  B,  and  C  are  less  than  two  right  angles. 
In  the  major  premise  we  mean  that  each  angle  is  less  than  two 
right  angles  (the  middle  term  is  used  distributively),  in  the 
minor  premise  we  mean  all  the  angles  taken  together  (the 
middle  term  is  used  collectively).  This  fallacy  is  committed 
when  we  argue  that  what  is  true  of  the  various  states  in  the 
union  is  true  of  the  United  States  as  a  nation,  or  that  what  is 
true  of  members  of  a  class  or  college,  taken  as  individuals, 
is  true  of  the  class  as  a  class  or  of  the  college  as  an  institution. 

(n)  Division  is  the  opposite  of  composition.  *'  It  consists 
in  assuming  that  what  is  true  of  the  whole  is  also  true  of 
the  parts  taken  separately."  ^    For  instance: 

All  the  angles  of  a  triangle  are  equal  to  two  right  angles. 

A  is  an  angle  of  a  triangle. 

. '  .  A  is  equal  to  two  right  angles. 
The  difficulty  comes  from  using  the  middle  term  collectively 
in  the  major  premise,  and  distributively  in  the  minor  premise. 

Congress  voted  for  X. 

A  is  in  Congress.  i 

.  *  .  A  voted  for  X. 

b.  In  quality,  or  accident.  "It  is  important  to  keep 
these  distinct  from  the  fallacies  of  Composition  and  Division. 

1  Hyslop,  p.  228.  2  Creighton,  p.  160.  ^  Creighton,  162. 


184  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

The  latter  have  to  do  with  numerical  or  mathematical  ag« 
gregates  and  individuals,  the  former  with  logical  or  meta- 
physical  wholes  which  represent  totals  of  attributes.  Unless 
we  keep  this  in  view  we  are  liable  to  confuse  them.  But  if 
we  remember  that  Composition  and  Division  turn  upon  the 
collective  and  distributive  use  of  terms,  and  the  fallacies  of 
Accident  upon  the  confusion  of  essentia  and  accidentia,  or 
genus  and  species  (conferentia  and  differentia),  or  of  the  ab- 
stract and  concrete,  we  shall  have  no  difficulty  in  the  judg- 
ment of  particular  cases.  We  divide  the  fallacies  of  Accident 
or  Quality  into  three  kinds."  ^ 

(I)  Ambiguous  middle  (specific  accident).  In  this  fallacy 
we  use  the  middle  term  ambiguously — that  is,  give  it  a  differ- 
ent meaning  in  major  premise  and  minor  premise.  Says 
Jevons,^  "Equivocation  consists  in  the  same  term  being 
used  in  two  distinct  senses;  any  of  the  three  terms  of  the 
syllogism  may  be  subject  to  this  fallacy,  but  it  is  usually  the 
middle  term  which  is  used  in  one  sense  in  one  premise  and 
in  another  sense  in  the  other.  In  this  case  it  is  often  called 
the  fallacy  of  ambiguous  middle,  and  when  we  distinguish  the 
two  meanings  by  using  other  suitable  modes  of  expression 
it  becomes  apparent  that  the  supposed  syllogism  contains 
four  terms.  The  fallacy  of  equivocation  may  accordingly 
be  considered  a  disguised  fallacy  of  four  terms.  Thus  if  a 
person  were  to  argue  that  *all  criminal  actions  ought  to  be 
punished  by  law;  prosecutions  for  theft  are  criminal  actions; 
therefore  prosecutions  for  theft  ought  to  be  punished  by 
law,'  it  is  quite  apparent  that  the  term  *  criminal  action' 
means  totally  different  things  in  the  two  premises,  and  that 
there  is  no  true  middle  term  at  all.  Often,  however,  the  am- 
biguity is  of  a  subtle  and  difficult  character,  so  that  dif- 
ferent opinions  may  be  held  concerning  it.  Thus  we  might 
argue : 

"He  who  harms  another  should  be  punished.  He  who 
communicates  an  infectious  disease  to  another  person  harms 
1  Hyslop,  p.  231.  2  Pages  171,  172. 


FALLACIES  •  185 

him.  Therefore  he  who  communicates  an  infectious  disease 
to  another  person  should  be  punished. 

"This  may  or  may  not  be  held  to  be  a  correct  argument 
according  to  the  kinds  of  actions  we  should  consider  to  come 
under  the  term  harrriy  according  as  we  regard  negligence  or 
malice  requisite  to  constitute  harm.  Many  diflficult  legal 
questions  are  of  this  nature,  as  for  instance: 

"Nuisances  are  punishable  by  law: 

'*To  keep  a  noisy  dog  is  a  nuisance; 

"To  keep  a  noisy  dog  is  punishable  by  law. 

"The  question  here  would  turn  upon  the  degree  of  nuisance 
w^hich  the  law  would  interfere  to  prevent.    Or  again: 

"Interference  with  another  man's  business  is  illegal; 

"Underselling  interferes  with  another  man's  business; 

"Therefore  underselling  is  illegal. 

"Here  the  question  turns  upon  the  kind  of  interference ,  and 
it  is  obvious  that  underselling  is  not  the  kind  of  interference 
referred  to  in  the  major  premise." 

Such  fallacies  may  rise  in  many  ways.  (A)  We  may  confuse 
the  etymological  meaning  and  the  common  meaning  of  a 
word :  as,  for  instance,  the  sophistical  argument  often  founded 
on  the  word  "representative." 

"Perhaps  no  example  of  this  can  be  found  that  is  more 
extensively  and  mischievously  employed  than  in  the  case 
of  the  word  *  representative.'  Assuming  that  its  right  mean- 
ing must  correspond  exactly  with  the  strict  and  original  sense 
of  the  verb  *  represent,'  the  sophist  persuades  the  multitude 
that  a  member  of  the  House  of  Commons  is  bound  to  be 
guided  in  all  points  by  the  opinion  of  his  constituents;  and, 
in  short,  to  be  merely  spokesman:  whereas  law  and  custom, 
which  in  this  case  may  be  considered  as  fixing  the  meaning 
of  the  term,  require  no  such  thing,  but  enjoin  the  representa- 
tive to  act  according  to  the  best  of  his  ovm  responsibility."  ^ 

(B)  We  may  confuse  two  or  more  common  meanings  of  the 
same  word,  where  the  word  has  different  meanings  in  different 
^  Mill,  System  of  Logic,  p.  503. 


186  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

circumstances.  The  word  "democratic"  in  one  connection 
is  the  name  of  a  poHtical  party;  in  another  it  designates  a 
body  of  political  and  social  ideas  and  principles.  So  we 
argue  falsely:  all  Americans  should  be  democratic;  conse- 
quently vote  the  Democratic  ticket.  The  word  "church" 
may  mean  the  whole  body  of  believers,  or  it  may  mean  the 
officers  of  this  body,  viz.,  the  clergy;  and  many  false  argu- 
ments may  result  from  confusing  these  meanings. 

There  are  many  other  sources  of  confusion  from  ambiguity 
in  terms.  Their  variety  and  frequency  only  emphasize  the 
necessity  of  careful  definition.  Definition  is  the  weapon 
before  which  all  ambiguity  must  fall. 

"Nothing  is  more  important  than  the  subject  of  Definition, 
and  too  much  stress  cannot  be  laid  on  it.  It  is  the  keystone 
of  all  correct  reasoning,  and  is  most  diflScult.  .  .  .  This 
fault  of  not  knowing  the  precise  meanings  of  words  is  the  most 
fruitful  source  of  Fallacies.  Nearly  all  the  flaws  in  argument 
that  are  diflScult  of  detection  take  their  rise  from  this.  Too 
much  attention  cannot  be  given  to  the  matter  of  Definition. 
It  is  the  true  panacea  for  all  false  reasoning."  ^ 

,(II)  Simple  accident  consists  in  arguing  from  genus  to 
species,  from  essence  to  accidenU  from  abstract  to  concrete. 
To  argue  from  genus  to  genus,  from  essence  to  essence  is, 
of  course,  always  sound.  "One  of  the  oldest  examples  of 
Simple  Accident  is  the  following: 

"  What  you  bought  yesterday  you  eat  to-day. 

"  You  bought  raw  meat  yesterday. 

"Therefore  you  eat  raw  meat  to-day. 
De  Morgan  humorously  remarks  of  this  ancient  illustration: 
*This  piece  of  meat  has  remained  uncooked,  as  fresh  as  ever,  a 
prodigious  time.  It  was  raw  when  Reisch  mentioned  it  in 
the  Margarita  Philosophica  in  1496;  and  Dr.  Whately  found 
it  in  just  the  same  state  in  1826.*  It  is  not  so  accurate  an 
illustration  as  is  desirable  according  to  the  definition,  because 
the  subject  of  the  major  premise  is  so  indefinite,  and  is  hardly 
1  Bodkin,  p.  145. 


FALLACIES  187 

a  genus.  But  in  the  conclusion  the  predicate  is  asserted  of 
the  subject,  with  the  accidental  quality  of  rawness  added, 
while  in  the  major  premise  that  predicate  is  asserted  only 
of  the  substance  or  essence  of  what  was  bought,  and  hence 
we  mistakenly  argue  from  meat  in  general,  and  without 
qualification  to  meat  in  a  particular  form.  Another  and 
perhaps  better  illustration  is  the  following: 

"  Pine  wood  is  good  for  lumber. 

*'  Matches  are  pine  wood. 

"  Therefore  matches  are  good  for  lumber. 
Here  the  predicate  of  the  major  premise  is  asserted  of  the 
substance  or  essence  of  *pine  wood,'  not  of  all  forms  of  it, 
while  matches  are  pine  wood  not  only  in  essence,  but  in  a 
particular  form  or  accident.  ...  So  also  we  cannot  argue 
from  the  fact  that  oxygen  and  hydrogen  will  burn,  that 
water  will  burn  because  it  is  oxygen  and  hydrogen.  *It 
w^ould  be  a  case  of  the  simple  fallacy  cf  Accident  to  argue 
that  a  magistrate  is  justified  in  using  his  power  to  forward 
his  own  religious  views,  because  every  man  has  a  right  to 
inculcate  his  own  opinions.  Evidently  a  magistrate  as  a  man 
has  the  rights  of  other  men,  but  in  his  capacity  of  a  magis- 
trate he  is  distinguished  from  other  men,  and  he  must  not 
infer  of  his  special  powers  in  this  respect  what  is  true  only 
of  his  rights  as  a  man.'  All  fallacies  which  attempt  the  sub- 
stitution of  a  particular  thing  for  the  generic  form  belong 
to  this  head."  ^ 

(III)  Converse  accident  arises  when  we  argue  from  species 
to  genus,  from  accident  to  essence,  from  concrete  to  abstract. 
"An  illustration  of  the  fallacy  of  Converse  Accident  is  the 
following: 

"  Intoxicating  liquors  act  as  a  poison. 

"  Wine  is  an  intoxicating  liquor. 

"  Therefore  wine  acts  as  a  poison. 
In  this  case  we  are  arguing  from  the  excessive  use  to  all 
uses  of  wine,  an  inference  that  is  fallacious.     The  major 
^  Hyslop,  232-234. 


188  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

premise  is  true  only  of  a  particular  mode  of  using  liquors, 
or  of  the  excessive  use  of  them,  while  the  conclusion,  unless 
interpreted  with  a  similar  qualification,  asserts  the  same 
thing  of  a/Z  forms  of  using  them.  *It  is  undoubtedly  true 
that  to  give  to  beggars  promotes  mendicancy  and  causes 
evil;  but  if  we  interpret  this  to  mean  that  assistance  is  never 
to  be  given  to  those  who  solicit  it,  we  fall  into  the  converse 
fallacy  of  Accident,  inferring  of  all  who  solicit  alms  what  is 
true  only  of  those  who  solicit  alms  as  a  profession.'  Another 
formulated  instance  appears  in  the  following  illustration: 

"  Loyalty  to  the  government  is  the  duty  of  all  citizens. 

"Loyalty  to  Charles  I.  was  loyalty  to  the  government. 

"Therefore  loyalty  to  Charles  I.  was  the  duty  of  all  citizens. 
We  may  look  at  this  instance  in  more  than  one  way.  In  the 
first  place,  the  major  premise  means  that  loyalty  is  a  duty  to 
legitimate  governments  or  to  such  as  execute  the  law,  while 
the  minor  premise  asserts  the  fact  that  loyalty  to  Charles  I. 
was  loyalty  to  the  government  whatever  its  nature  was,  and 
hence  the  conclusion  asserts  loyalty  to  Charles  I.  to  be  a  duty 
without  qualification,  and  without  distinguishing  between 
him  as  a  magistrate  and  as  a  man.  In  the  second  place,  loy- 
alty to  Charles  I.  may  have  been  loyalty  to  him  as  a  private 
person,  say  by  his  servants,  while  all  citizens  could  not  be 
loyal  to  him  in  this  capacity,  and  so  it  is  an  error  to  argue 
from  this  particular  kind  of  loyalty  to  every  form  of  it  in- 
cluding civil  allegiance."  ^  ^ 

2.  Presumption.  Fallacies  of  presumption  arise  from 
assuming  or  presuming  something  which  needs  to  be  proved, 
taking  for  granted  something  we  have  no  right  to  take  for 
granted.  Examples  follow  of  its  main  divisions  and  sub- 
divisions. 

a.  Begging   the   question    (petitio   principii).     This   fal- 
lacy consists  in  assuming  the  truth  of  some  proposition  which 
is  the  same  as,  or  equivalent  to,  the  conclusion  to  be  proved, 
and  thence  inferring  the  truth  of  the  conclusion.     It  may 
^  Hyslop,  234. 


FALLACIES  189 

take  any  one  of  several  forms.  The  most  common  are: 
(I)  assuming  the  truth  of  an  unproved  premise;  (II)  arguing 
in  a  circle, 

(I)  Assumption  of  an  unproved  premise  (assumptio  non- 
probata).  It  seems  at  first  sight  that  no  man  would  be  so 
foolish  or  so  bold  as  to  assume  the  truth  of  his  conclusion  as 
one  of  the  means  of  proving  it.  But  names  and  phrases  often 
cloak  the  error,  and  in  the  course  of  the  intervening  discussion 
the  assumption  may  be  forgotten  before  the  conclusion  is 
reached;  so  it  is  not  always  an  easy  fallacy  to  run  to  earth. 
Assuming  the  truth  of  some  general  proposition  from  which 
the  particular .  conclusion  in  question  must  follow,  is  but 
another  form  of  the  same  mistake.  To  take  an  example 
cited  by  John  Ward:  ^ 

**So  when  the  Clodian  party  contended  that  Mile  ought  to  suffer 
death  for  this  reason,  because  he  had  confessed  that  he  had  killed 
Clodius,  that  argument  reduced  to  a  syllogism  would  stand  thus: 

*'He  who  confesses  he  has  killed  another  ought  not  to  be  allowed  to 
see  the  light. 

"  But  Milo  confesses  this. 

*'  Therefore  he  ought  not  to  live. 

"Now  the  force  of  this  argument  lies  in  the  major  or  first  prop- 
osition, which  Cicero  refutes  by  proving  that  the  Roman  people 
had  already  determined  contrary  to  what  is  there  asserted:  'In 
what  Citpy^  says  he,  'do  these  men  dispute  after  this  weak  manner? 
In  that  wherein  the  first  capital  trial  was  in  the  case  of  the  brave  Hora- 
tiuSy  who,  before  the  city  enjoyed  perfect  freedom,  was  saved  by  the 
suffrages  of  the  Roman  people,  tho'  he  confessed  that  he  killed  his 
sister  toith  his  own  hand.' " 

In  this  case  the  advocate  who  was  prosecuting  Milo  as- 
sumed the  truth  of  a  general  proposition,  which  included  the 
particular  proposition  he  sought  to  establish.  He  assumed 
that  every  man  who  has  killed  another  ought  to  die,  when 
it  was  admitted  that  Milo  had  killed  Clodius.  Cicero  re- 
1  Volume  I,  p.  159. 


190  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

futed  the  argument  by  pointing  out  the  fallacy  and  showing 
that  the  general  assumption  was  false,  because  the  Roman  peo- 
ple had  in  tlie  past  pardoned  a  man  who  had  killed  another. 

(II)  Arguing  in  a  circle  (circulus  in  probando).  More 
common  than  the  foregoing  is  the  fallacy  called  "arguing 
in  a  circle."  It  is  one  of  the  frequent  errors  of  careless  ar- 
guers  and  a  common  trick  for  confusing  a  sluggish  thinker. 
The  fallacy  consists  in  taking  two  propositions  and  using 
them  each  in  turn  to  prove  the  other — as  in  trying  to  prove 
that  a  train  is  on  time  because  it  agrees  with  your  watch,  and 
then  proving  that  your  watch  is  correct  because  it  agrees 
with  the  train. 

The  counsel  for  the  plaintiff  in  the  case  of  Ogden  vs.  Saund- 
ers argued  in  a  circle,  and  was  exposed  by  Mr.  Webster: 

"The  plaintiff  in  error  argues  in  a  complete  circle.  He  supposes 
the  parties  (in  the  making  of  a  contract)  to  have  had  reference  to  it 
(the  statute  law)  because  it  was  a  binding  law,  and  yet  he  proves  it 
to  be  a  binding  law  only  upon  the  ground  that  such  reference  was 
made  to  it." 

Sir  James  Fitzjames  Stephen,  in  his  Introduction  to  the 
Indian  Evidence  Act,  Ch.  II,  gives  the  following  illustration: 

"A  ship  is  cast  away  under  such  circumstances  that  her  loss 
may  be  accounted  for  either  by  fraud  or  by  accident.  The  captain 
is  tried  for  making  away  with  her.  A  variety  of  circumstances 
exist  which  would  indicate  preparation  and  expectation  on  his  part 
if  the  ship  really  was  made  away  with,  but  which  would  justify  no 
suspicion  at  all  if  she  was  not.  It  is  manifestly  illogical,  first,  to 
regard  the  antecedent  circumstances  as  suspicious,  because  the 
loss  of  the  ship  is  assumed  to  be  fraudulent,  and,  next,  to  infer 
that  the  ship  was  fraudulently  destroyed  from  the  suspicious  char- 
acter of  the  antecedent  circumstances." 

b.  Irrelevant  conclusion,  ignoring  the  question  (ignor- 
antio  elenchi).  This  fallacy  consists  in  mistaking  the  con- 
clusion to  be  proved,  or  endeavoring  to  prove  something 
which  has  no  important  bearing  on  the  point  at  issue.    One 


FALLACIES  191 

IS  liable  to  fall  into  this  fallacy  either  in  positive  proof  in 
proving  the  wrong  point  or  in  refutation  in  proving  something 
which  is  not  the  contradictory  of  the  thing  asserted  by  one's 
opponent.  In  one's  own  proof  one  may  waste  effort  in  the 
attempt  to  establish  what  is  not  worth  establishing,  or  one 
may  attempt  to  deceive  by  proving  something  so  near  like 
the  real  conclusion  that  it  seems  the  same.  In  refutation,  this 
error  lies  in  mistaking  the  point  to  be  answered,  or  in  delib- 
erately misrepresenting  an  opponent's  position  in  order  to 
make  reply  easier. 

Mill  cities  the  example  of  the  refutation  made  against 
Malthus's  theory  of  population: 

"The  attempts,  for  instance,  to  disprove  the  population  doctrines 
of  Mai  thus  have  been  mostly  cases  of  ignoratio  elenchi — ignoring 
the  point.  Malthus  has  been  supposed  to  be  refuted  if  it  could  be 
shown  that  in  some  countries  or  ages  population  has  been  nearly 
stationary;  as  if  he  had  asserted  that  population  always  increases 
in  a  given  ratio,  or  had  not  expressly  declared  that  it  increases 
only  in  so  far  as  it  is  not  restrained  by  prudence,  or  kept  down  by 
poverty  and  disease.  Or,  perhaps,  a  great  collection  of  facts  is 
produced  to  prove  that  in  some  one  country  the  people  are  better 
off  with  a  dense  population  than  they  are  in  another  country  with  a 
thin  one;  or  that  the  people  have  become  more  numerous  and  better 
off  at  the  same  time.  As  if  the  assertion  were  that  a  dense  popula- 
tion could  not  possibly  be  well  off:  as  if  it  were  not  part  of  the  very 
doctrine,  and  essential  to  it,  that  where  there  is  a  more  abundant 
capital  there  may  be  a  greater  population  without  any  increase  of 
poverty,  or  even  with  a  diminution  of  it."  ^ 

Webster,  arguing  for  the  prosecution  in  the  White  murder 
trial,  exposed  in  an  opponent  the  fallacy  of  ignoring  the  point, 
as  follows: 

"The  prisoner's  counsel  catch  at  supposed  flaws  of  evidence,  or 
bad  character  of  witnesses  without  meeting  the  case.  Do  they 
mean  to  deny  conspiracy?     Do  they  mean  to  deny  that  the  two 

1  MUl,  p.  517. 


192  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

Crowninshields  and  the  two  Knapps  were  conspirators?  Why  do 
they  rail  against  Palmer,  while  they  do  not  disprove,  and  hardly 
dispute,  the  truth  of  any  fact  sworn  to  by  him?  Instead  of  this, 
it  is  made  a  mere  matter  of  sentimentality  that  Palmer  had  been 
prevailed  upon  to  betray  his  bosom  companions  and  to  violate  the 
sanctity  of  friendship.  Again  I  ask.  Why  do  they  not  meet  the 
case?  If  the  fact  is  out,  why  not  meet  it?  Do  they  mean  to  deny 
that  Captain  White  is  dead?  One  would  almost  have  supposed 
even  that,  from  some  remarks  that  have  been  made.  Do  they 
mean  to  deny  the  conspiracy?  Or,  admitting  a  conspiracy,  do  they 
mean  to  deny  only  that  Frank  Knapp,  the  prisoner  at  the  bar,  was 
abetting  in  the  murder,  being  present,  and  so  deny  that  he  was  a 
principal?  If  a  conspiracy  is  proved,  it  bears  closely  upon  every 
subsequent  subject  of  inquiry.  Why  do  they  not  come  to  the  fact? 
Here  the  defence  is  wholly  indistinct.  The  counsel  neither  take 
the  ground  nor  abandon  it.  They  neither  fly  nor  light.  They 
hover.  But  they  must  come  to  a  closer  mode  of  contest.  They 
must  meet  the  facts  and  either  denj'^  or  admit  them."  ^ 

There  are  five  common  subdivisions  of  the  fallacy  of 
irrelevant  conclusion.  The  mistake  in  each  is  the  same — 
ignoring  the  real  point  in  issue  to  argue  about  some  other 
point.    These  five  types  follow. 

(I)  Argumentum  ad  hominem  is  an  appeal  or  attack 
directed  at  the  character,  principles,  beliefs,  or  statements 
of  some  person,  rather  than  at  the  subject-matter  in  con- 
troversy. It  is  talking  about  a  man  when  his  character  has 
nothing  to  do  with  the  case,  attacking  the  past  record  of  a 
lawyer  rather  than  the  merits  of  his  clients  claim.  Of  course, 
when  a  man*s  character  is  a  legitimate  part  of  the  case  it 
should  be  discussed.  An  attempt  to  show  personal  unfitness 
of  a  candidate  for  the  oflSce  he  is  seeking  is  not  an  example  of 
this  fallacy — or  of  any  other. 

(II)  Argumentum  ad  populum  is  an  appeal  to  the  passion 
or  prejudice  of  a  people  and  so  obscuring  and  avoiding  the 
i*eal  question — as  when  national  prejudice  is  aroused  rather 

1  The  Works  of  Daniel  Webster,  Vol.  VI,  p.  59. 


FALLACIES  193 

than  facts  discussed  in  regard  to  national  defence  or  inter- 
national relations  of  any  kind. 

(III)  Argumentum  ad  ignorantiam  is  practically  a  falla- 
cious attempt  to  shift  the  burden  of  proof.  It  is  saying, 
"  What  I  say  is  true,  because  you  cannot  prove  that  it  is  not 
true."  It  is  essentially  a  confusion  of  positive  proof  and 
refutation.  To  show  that  an  opponent's  case  cannot  be 
estabhshed  is  a  proper  kind  of  attack  in  argumentation;  but 
it  is  only  negative  and  destructive  in  nature.  It  proves 
nothing  positive,  and  the  fallacy  consists  in  maintaining  that 
the  lack  of  proof  thsit  a  proposition  is  not  true,  establishes  that 
it  is  true.  "Thus,"  says  Creighton,  ^  "we  cannot  prove 
affirmatively  that  spirits  do  not  revisit  the  earth  or  send 
messages  to  former  friends  through  mediums."  But  this 
does  not  prove  that  spirits  do  walk  the  earth. 

(IV)  **  Argumentum  ad  verecundiam  is  an  appeal  to  the 
reverence  which  most  people  feel  for  a  great  name.  This 
method  of  reasoning  attempts  to  settle  a  question  by  referring 
to  the  opinion  of  some  alleged  authority,  without  any 
consideration  of  the  arguments  which  are  advanced  for  or 
against  the  position.  It  is,  of  course,  right  to  attach  much 
importance  to  the  views  of  great  men,  but  we  must  not 
suppose  that  their  opinion  amounts  to  proof,  or  forbids  us 
to  consider  the  matter  for  ourselves. 

"There  is,  however,  a  more  common,  though  still  less  jus- 
tifiable, form  of  the  argument  from  authority.^  A  man  who 
is  distinguished  for  his  knowledge  and  attainments  in  some 
particular  field,  is  often  quoted  as  an  authority  upon  ques- 
tions with  which  he  has  no  special  acquaintance.  The  pres- 
tige of  a  great  name  is  thus  attached  to  it.  Thus,  for  example, 
a  successful  general  is  supposed  to  speak  with  authority  upon 
problems  of  state-craft,  and  the  opinions  of  prominent  clergy- 
men are  quoted  regarding  the  latest  scientific  theories."  ^ 

(V)  Argumentum  ad  judi6ium.  This  fallacy  is  com- 
mitted when  the  real  question  is  ignored  and  an  attempt 

1  P.  169.  8  See  pp.  99-100.  «  Creighton,  p.  170, 


194  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

made  to  prove  that  men  generally  believe  so  and  so.  It  is 
answering  the  proposition  that  the  earth  is  round  by  proving 
that  all  men  believe  the  earth  is  flat.  If  you  put  forward  a 
proposition  that  admittedly  is  contrary  to  the  general  belief, 
it  is  no  answ^er  to  you  to  prove  what  the  general  belief  is. 
The  fallacy  consists  in  assuming  that  general  belief  cannot 
be  wrong.  Prevailing  opinion  creates  a  strong  presumption 
in  its  favor,  and  places  a  heavy  burden  of  proof  on  him  who 
opposes  it,  but  it  does  not  settle  all  questions. 

c.  Complex  question.  This  is  a  question  founded  on 
an  assumption.  It  cannot  be  answered  by  "yes"  or  *'no'* 
without  granting  the  truth  of  the  assumption.  "Are  you 
again  on  speaking  terms  with  your  wife.'^"  "Have  you  quit 
drinking  to  excess  .f^" 

d.  Non  sequitur  (false  consequent).  This  consists  sim- 
ply in  asserting  a  conclusion  that  does  not  follow  from  the 
premises,  because  the  conclusion  has  in  it  new  matter  that  is 
not  covered  by  the  premises. 

(I)  Simple  non  sequitur  arises  when  the  conclusion  covers 
new  matter  with  no  attempt  made  to  show  a  cause  and  effect 
connection.  "Jones  is  a  good  husband  and  father,  so  he 
ought  to  be  elected  mayor."  "All  men  are  rational.  Socrates 
is  a  man.    Therefore  Socrates  is  noble." 

(II)  False  cause  (post  hoc,  ergo  propter  hoc).  This  is 
probably  the  most  common  and  the  most  insidious  form  of 
non  sequitur.  The  fallacy  consists  in  assuming  that  because 
one  occurrence  precedes  another  in  timey  the  one  is  the  cause 
of  the  other.  Here  time  order  is  mistaken  for  cause  and  effect 
connection.  Many  of  the  common  superstitions  of  ancient 
and  of  modern  times  illustrate  this  fallacy.  For  instance, 
thirteen  people  sit  at  table  together,  and  within  a  few  months 
one  of  the  number  is  accidentally  drowned;  immediately 
some  one  argues  that  the  death  is  the  effect  of  the  thirteen 
sitting  at  meat  together. 

Again,  it  has  recently  been  argued  that,  because  the  num- 
ber of  crimes  perpetrated  by  negroes  in  the  Southern  states 


FALLACIES  195 

has  increased  since  educational  opportunities  were  first  offered 
to  the  negro,  therefore  the  growth  of  crime  is  directly  due  to 
the  growth  of  education.  It  certainly  is  not  sufficient  for  the 
arguer  to  base  his  contention  simply  on  the  fact  that  the  one 
thing  has  followed  the  other y  and  few  thoughtful  men  will  be 
inclined  to  accept  the  conclusion  thus  drawn.  Until  some- 
thing more  is  done  to  show  a  definite  causal  connection,  we 
may  safely  call  this  a  post  hoc  fallacy. 

The  most  common  form  of  this  fallacy,  perhaps,  is  that 
used  by  the  political  arguer.  It  runs  something  like  this: 
"Such  and  such  a  political  party  came  into  power  at  such  a 
time,  and  for  a  number  of  years  thereafter  the  country  suffered 
from  financial  depression;  therefore  the  policies  and  admin- 
istration of  this  political  party  are  the  cause  of  the  unfortu- 
nate state  of  affairs.**  Now,  the  statement  may  or  may  not 
be  true,  but  the  argument  in  the  above  form  certainly  con- 
tains a  fallacy.  To  show  that  this  fallacy  does  exist,  and 
that  the  conclusion  is  not  worthy  of  acceptance,  it  is  neces- 
sary only  to  point  out  the  fact  that  any  one  of  a  half  dozen 
other  causes  might,  at  least  as  readily,  have  produced  the 
same  result. 

An  illustration  will  make  clear  the  commonness  of  this 
kind  of  fallacy,  and  will  also  suggest  the  care  that  is  neces- 
sary to  guard  against  it.  In  Harper's  Weekly  for  March  5, 
1904,  the  editors  noted  the  fact  that  various  college  presi- 
dents had  estimated  that  "the  college  graduate  has  one 
chance  m  iorty  of  *  succeeding  in  life,*  whereas  the  man  who 
hasn't  been  to  college  has  only  one  chance  in  ten  thousand.** 
The  inference  naturally  drawn  from  this  statement  is  that 
the  mere  fact  that  a  man  secures  a  college  education  multi- 
plies many  times  his  chances  for  success.  To  this  inference 
and  to  the  possible  fallacy  that  may  lurk  therein  the  editorial 
in  question  addresses  itself  as  follows: 

"Not  many  persons  doubt  any  longer  that  an  American  college 
education  is  an  advantage  to  most  youths  who  can  get  it,  but  in 


196  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

these  attempts  to  estimate  statistically  what  college  education  does 
for  men  there  is  a  good  deal  of  confusing  of  post  hoc  and  propter  hoc. 
Define  success  as  you  will,  a  much  larger  proportion  of  American 
college  men  win  it  than  of  men  who  don't  go  to  college,  but  how 
much  college  training  does  for  those  successful  men  is  still  debatable. 
Remember  they  are  a  picked  lot,  the  likeliest  children  of  parents 
whose  ability  or  desire  to  send  their  children  to  college  is  evidence 
of  better  fortune,  or  at  least  of  higher  aspirations  than  the  average. 
And  because  their  parents  are,  as  a  rule,  more  or  less  prosperous 
and  well  educated,  they  get  and  would  get,  whether  they  went  to 
college  or  not,  a  better  than  average  start  in  life.  In  order  to  make 
an  estimate  that  would  be  really  fair  of  what  college  does  for  boys, 
it  would  be  necessary  to  compare  the  fortunes  of  two  groups  of 
boys  from  something  like  the  same  rank  of  life  and  of  something 
like  equal  ability,  one  a  college- taught  group  and  the  other  not. 
But  that  cannot  well  be  done.  The  colleges  get  the  likeliest  boys. 
If  one  boy  out  of  a  family  of  four  goes  to  college  it  is  the  clever 
one.  The  boys  who  might  go  to  college  and  don't  are  commonly 
the  lazy  ones  who  won't  study.  The  colleges  get  nowadays  a  large 
proportion  of  the  best  boys  of  the  strongest  families.  The  best 
boys  of  the  strongest  families  would  win  far  more  than  their  pro- 
portionate share  of  success  even  if  there  were  no  colleges." 


EXERCISE.    CHAPTER  8 

FALLACIES 

1.  Hand  in  two  specimens  of  copied  matter  from  current 

newspapers,  lectures,  text-books,  etc.,  each  containing  a 
fallacy,  naming  the  fallacy,  and  writing  an  answer  to 
the  reasoning  given. 

2.  Hand  in  one  original  example  each  of  undistributed  mid- 

dle, illicit  major,  and  illicit  minor. 

3.  Hand  in  two  examples  each  of  the  fallacies  denying  the 

antecedent  and  affirming  the  consequent. 

4.  Hand  in  one  example  each  of  ambiguous  middle,  begging 

the  question,  irrelevant  conclusion,  and  false  cause. 


\ 


SECTION  C.    ARRANGEMENT 
CHAPTER  9 

GENERAL  PRINCIPLES   OF  ARRANGEMENT 

OUTLINE 

A.  Function  of  arrangement. 

B.  Three  great  rhetorical  principles. 

1.  Unity. 

a.  Introduction. 

b.  Conclusion. 

c.  Discussion. 

2.  Coherence. 

a.  Order. 

(I)  Subordination  secondary  materials. 

(II)  Elevation  primary  materials. 

b.  Conilection. 

c.  Summary. 

3.  Emphasis. 

a.  Emphasis  and  coherence. 

b.  Methods^of  emphasis. 

(I)  Emphatic  places. 

C.  Special  importance  of  these  principles  in  argumentation. 

A.  Function  of  arrangement.  Through  the  study  of 
propositions,  issues,  and  burden  of  proof,  we  have  learned 
what  must  he  done.  Guided  by  an  understanding  of  evidence, 
forms  of  arguments,  and  fallacies,  we  have  chosen  the  materials 
with  which  to  accomplish  our  task.  We  now  come  to  the 
problem  of  organizing  these  materials  into  the  most  effective 
arrangement  for  the  performance  of  this  particular  task. 
We  have  chosen  our  recruits  and  gathered  them  together; 
but  that  is  all.  Our  army  is  only  half  made;  it  is  but  a  con- 
fused and  straggling  mob.    To  tempt  the  fortunes  of  battle 

197 


198  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

with  such  an  array  would  mean  defeat.  The  forces  must  be 
organized  into  companies,  regiments,  divisions;  they  must  be 
officered  with  captains,  colonels,  and  generals,  and  at  their 
head  must  be  placed  a  commander,  the  master  spirit  of  all; 
they  must  be  drilled  and  disciplined  and  taught  to  know  their 
rights  and  their  duties.  Organization  is  no  more  necessary 
in  an  army  than  is  arrangement  in  an  argument:  every  master 
of  the  art  of  war  knows  how  to  organize  his  forces;  every 
master  of  the  art  of  debate  knows  how  to  arrange  his  proofs. 
The  results  from  lack  of  organization  are  the  same  in  both, — 
confusion,  wasted  strength,  and  weakness.  It  is  only  by 
careful  arrangement  that  ideas  and  evidence  can  be  kept 
from  self-contradiction  and  confusion,  that  their  strength 
can  be  saved  and  directed  to  accomplish  anything. 

B.  Three  great  rhetorical  principles.  To  secure  an 
effective  arrangement  of  materials  in  argumentation,  the  old 
rhetorical  principles  of  unity,  coherence,  and  emphasis  must 
be  scrupulously  observed.  We  shall  consider  first  their  special 
importance  in  argumentation,  and  then  discuss  (ch.  10)  the 
rules  of  brief  drawing  and  outlining  the  following  of  which 
will  insure  the  observances  of  these  principles. 

1.  Unity.  It  is  essential  to  the  success  of  any  piece  of 
argumentation  that  the  ultimate  effect  produced  by  it  upon 
the  audience  shall  be  a  single  impression,  viz.,  the  truth  or 
falsity,  the  wisdom  or  unwisdom  of  the  proposition  under 
discussion.  To  achieve  such  a  result  our  materials  must  be  so 
arranged  as  to  be  a  single  unit  of  force.  Little  facts  and  great 
ideas  must  work  together,  each  enforcing  the  other.  Each 
fact  must  corroborate  its  fellows,  and  inconsistency  must 
never  appear.  Everything  must  work  for  the  single  ulti- 
mate purpose  of  proving,  not  this  idea  or  that,  but  the  propo- 
sition. Proving  a  number  of  "main  points"  more  or  less 
connected  with  the  question  in  hand  will  not  do.  It  is  the 
proposition  that  the  affirmative  must  establish  by  proving 
(or  gaining  admission  of)  all  the  issues  contained  in  it.  It  is 
the  proposition  that  the  negative  must  overthrow  by  prevent- 


GENERAL  PRINCIPLES  OF  ARRANGEMENT      199 

ing  the  establishment  of  one  or  more  of  the  issues  on  which 
it  rests.  This  is  what  is  meant  by  unity  in  the  whole  compo- 
sition. 

a.  Introduction.  In  any  piece  of  argumentation  the 
most  vital  force  is  obviously  the  proof  itself, — the  evidence 
and  the  arguments.  It  would,  however,  be  a  very  defective 
effort  which  contained  nothing  else  besides  the  giving  of 
testimony  and  the  manufacture  of  it  into  proof.  These 
materials  must  be  introduced  in  such  a  manner  as  will  clear 
the  way  before  them  and  place  them  in  the  field  advantage- 
ously for  action.  This  is  the  work  of  the  divisions  of  the 
speech  called  the  introduction.  The  purpose  of  introduction 
is  to  make  clear  the  real  nature  of  the  question  in  contro- 
versy, why  it  is  in  dispute,  how  it  is  related  to  other  prob- 
lems, what  the  really  significant  facts  are.  Such  an  explana- 
tion presents  the  question  to  the  audience  as  a  single  complete 
probleniy  distinguished  from  other  problems;  it  fixes  the  proofs 
that  are  to  follow  in  their  true  relations  to  the  proposition 
and  to  each  other  by  explaining  what  facts  are  vital  in  the 
case,  how  these  facts  may  be  proved,  and  how  the  disputant 
intends  to  create  the  proof.  The  word  introduction  as  used 
here  embraces  all  of  the  old  division  of  the  first  part  of  a 
speech  into  introduction  (or  exordium),  narration,  and  par- 
tition. By  whatever  name  we  call  it,  some  preparation  is 
needed  before  the  work  of  the  discussion  can  be  well  done. 
The  audience  must  know  what  the  dispute  is  about,  what  are 
the  issues  to  he  decided,  and  what  are  the  points  of  fact  that  de- 
cide them, 

b.  Conclusion.  In  argumentation  our  work  is  seldom 
complete  until  we  have  gathered  together  the  evidence  and 
argument  at  the  end  of  the  discussion,  to  show  how  we  have 
made  good  the  promises  and  claims  of  the  beginning;  no  long 
or  elaborate  work  of  argumentation  is  finished  without  a 
conclusion,  or  peroration.  From  the  viewpoint  of  unity  the 
conclusion  is  as  indispensable  as  the  introduction.  It  is 
practically  impossible  to  bind  together  evidence,  arguments, 


200  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

and  ideas  of  all  kinds  and  degrees  of  importance,  and  make 
them  work  in  harmony,  simply  by  means  of  logical  internal 
arrangement.  There  must  be  some  other  external  force  to 
weld  them  together  and  establish  them  in  their  true  relations 
to  one  another  and  to  the  whole.  The  purpose  of  the  con- 
clusion is  to  do  this  final  binding  together  of  the  many  and 
varied  elements  of  the  proof.  However  perfect  the  intro- 
ductory precautions,  as  evidence  and  arguments  are  mar- 
shalled in  rapid  succession,  and  as  each  fact  and  each  idea 
is  emphasized  in  its  importance,  the  reader  or  hearer  may 
lose  his  grasp  on  the  case  as  a  whole.  He  may  believe  this 
testimony  or  accept  that  idea  and  still  his  beliefs  may  be 
vague  or  hesitating  about  the  conclusiveness  of  the  proof  as 
a  whole.  He  is  not  yet  brought  to  that  place  where  he  can 
be  trusted  to  render  a  decision  or  to  carry  out  his  decision 
into  action.  It  still  remains  to  show  that  the  proof  of  this 
point  and  that,  though  insufficient  in  themselves,  when  added 
together  prove  the  proposition.  The  cumulative  force  of  the 
whole  proof  must  be  displayed;  evidence  and  arguments 
must  be  gathered  together  and  finally  delivered  as  one  blow. 
This  is  the  work  of  the  conclusion,  and  if  it  is  well  done,  the 
end  is  but  a  restatement — though  in  very  different  manner — 
of  the  beginning.  The  conclusion  should  usually  be  so  re- 
lated to  the  introduction  that  the  proof  seems  in  a  way  to 
lead  around  in  a  circle,  so  that  in  the  end  we  arrive  again  at 
the  point  from  which  we  started,  the  proposition. 

c.  Discussion.  In  addition  to  the  work  of  the  intro- 
duction and  the  conclusion,  in  giving  unity  to  the  composi- 
tion, care  must  be  taken  in  the  choice  of  the  material  for  the 
body  of  the  discussion  itself.  But  here  the  problem  is  very 
simple.  If  all  the  material  bears  on  the  proposition  unity 
will  be  observed.  The  problem  of  making  this  bearing  clear 
is  largely  one  of  coherence.  Unity  and  coherence  are  closely 
related,  and  unity  in  the  discussion  might  be  said  to  be  a 
by-product  of  coherence.  The  proposition  is  the  heart  of  the 
whole  composition;  by  relation  to  it  all  must  be  bound  to- 


GENERAL  PRINCIPLES  OF  ARRANGEMENT      201 

gether  in  one.  Consequently  the  materials  should  be  so 
chosen  and  so  arranged  that  every  element  is  connected 
either  directly  or  indirectly  with  the  proposition,  and  the 
connection  so  clearly  established  that  it  will  be  understood 
without  effort.  If  a  fact  or  an  idea  is  set  up  as  if  for  its  own 
sake  or  is  left  ambiguous  in  its  bearing  on  the  facts  in  issue, 
it  turns  attention  in  the  wrong  direction,  gives  a  mistaken 
impression  of  the  whole  position  taken  by  the  arguer,  and 
destroys  the  cooperation  between  the  parts,  which  is  neces- 
sary to  unity.  This  whole  problem  of  harmony  within  the 
proof  itself  is,  however,  largely  a  matter  of  proper  subordina- 
tion of  the  parts,  and  may  better  be  treated  under  the  head- 
ing of  coherence. 

2.  Coherence.  Closely  akin  to  unity  is  the  quality  of 
coherence.  The  purpose  of  all  argumentation  is  to  convey 
ideas  to  others  and  make  them  believe  or  act  as  we  want 
them  to;  and,  however  well  settled  our  own  conceptions 
may  be,  if  we  beget  confusion  in  presenting  them  to  others, 
our  efforts  are  in  vain.  However  truly  the  principle  of  unity 
is  observed — however  truly  our  facts  and  our  inferences 
have  a  bearing  on  the  proposition  we  uphold,  this  bearing 
must  be  clear  to  those  we  seek  to  influence  or  our  argumenta- 
tion is  a  failure.  The  principle  of  coherence,  then,  demands 
that  all  the  materials  of  the  proof  be  so  (a)  ordered  and  so  (6) 
connected  as  to  make  clear  their  relation  to  each  other  and  to  the 
proposition. 

SL,  Order.  To  have  coherence  we  must  first  have  order 
among  the  elements  used.  First  things  must  come  first, 
last  things  last.  Big  points  must  follow  each  other  in  proper 
succession,  each  with  its  subordinate  little  points  properly 
grouped  under  it.  The  first  thing  to  do  to  obtain  order  is  to 
attend  to  what  may  be  called  "subordination." 

(I)  Subordination  of  secondary  elements.  We  have  seen, 
in  the  treatment  of  the  finding  of  the  issues,  that  in  any 
argumentative  composition,  the  proof  is  made  up  of  materials 
of  widely  different  values.    There  are  some  facts  that  are  so 


202  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

vital  that,  if  we  can  make  sure  of  them,  they  will  establish 
our  whole  case;  and  there  are  others  that,  while  truly  valu- 
able in  the  proper  connection,  have  no  meaning  or  impor- 
tance in  themselves.  These  secondary  facts  find  the  excuse 
for  their  introduction  in  that  they  serve  to  prove  the  exist- 
ence of  some  other  more  important  fact.  It  follows  that  to 
put  them  into  the  proof  without  making  clear  just  what  is 
their  bearing  on  these  other  larger  facts,  and  just  what  is 
the  part  they  are  intended  to  perform,  is  to  lose  their  only 
value. 

(II)  Elevation  of  primary  elements.  In  contrast  with 
these  materials  of  a  secondary  nature  are  those  facts  and 
ideas  in  the  proof  that  are  themselves  of  primarj'^  importance. 
The  nature  of  the  human  mind  is  such  that,  in  reasoning, 
there  are  always  a  few  points  that  stand  out  boldly,  while  all 
else  sinks  into  a  background  of  support.  Few  readers  or 
hearers  can  carry  in  mind  and  thoroughly  assimilate  more 
than  a  half  dozen  important  ideas  on  any  question  in  a  single 
debate;  so  that  the  greatest  care  must  be  taken  to  enforce 
upon  the  attention  and  fix  in  the  memory  of  auditors  the 
facts  in  the  case  that  are  really  decisive.  They  may  be  per- 
mitted to  forget  the  details  of  evidence,  but  the  existence  of 
these  decisive  facts  they  must  be  compelled  to  remember.  If 
a  reader  or  hearer  is  really  to  comprehend  the  meaning  of 
any  proofs,  he  must  be  made  to  understand  what  is  large  and 
what  is  small,  what  is  important  and  what  trivial.  There- 
fore, in  arranging  our  materials:  (1)  We  must  first  find  out 
what  are  the  critical  points  to  be  established.  (2)  Then  these 
points  must  be  elevated — made  to  stand  out  above  all  the 
rest  of  the  proofs.  (3)  Finally,  all  the  secondary  materials 
must  be  subordinated  and  grouped  about  these  centers  of 
proof. 

b.  Connection.  Order  alone  will  not  give  coherence. 
The  materials  used  must  be  properly  connected  or  confusion 
is  likely  to  result.  This  principle  of  connection  is  observed 
when  the   different   elements   are  woven  together  properly. 


GENERAL  PRINCIPLES  OF  ARRANGEMENT      203 

Transitions  must  be  arranged.  Connections  must  be  made. 
Not  only  must  the  horse  be  before  the  cart,  but  he  must  be 
hitched  to  the  cart  if  the  whole  outfit  is  to  be  serviceable. 
Rarely  is  any  one  fact  suflScient  to  establish  another  larger 
fact;  more  rarely  is  any  one  single  fact  or  idea  sufficient  to 
establish  the  proposition.  Usually  the  process  is:  many 
lesser  bits  of  evidence  are  set  forth  to  prove  each  larger  fact; 
then  a  number  of  these  larger  facts  combine  and  cooperate 
to  prove  the  whole.  Where  the  proofs  are  of  such  a  nature, 
the  effectiveness  of  the  coequal  facts  depends,  in  large  de- 
gree, upon  the  way  in  which  they  were  made  to  work  together. 
Transitional  phrases,  sentences,  and  paragraphs  must  be 
employed  to  ensure  this  cooperation.  Much  evidence,  not 
intelligible  in  itself,  becomes  full  of  meaning  and  force  when 
viewed  in  the  light  of  other  correlative  evidence.  In  any  part 
,of  the  proof,  then,  it  is  important  that  such  facts  be  not  set 
forth  till  after  those  from  which  they  get  their  importance, 
and  that  the  vital  connection  between  such  facts  be  clearly 
evident.  For  a  fact  misunderstood  or  neglected  when  it  is 
first  given,  "falls  back  dead"  and  is  rarely  called  to  mind 
again;  it  must  in  rnost  cases  be  appreciated  when  it  is  given, 
or  it  is  lost.  Especially  is  this  true  of  the  treatment  of  the 
larger  ideas  in  a  composition.  Often  an  audience  listens 
inattentively  for  many  minutes  to  a  speaker  who  is  giving 
his  best  energy  to  the  establishment  of  some  idea  of  the  first 
importance,  because  they  are  not  possessed  of  those  other 
facts  that  they  must  know  to  realize  the  meaning  of  his  proof. 
c.  Summary.  For  full  coherence  then  it  is  necessary 
to  arrange  all  the  ideas,  primary  and  secondary,  in  the  proper 
order  and  to  weave  them  all  together  with  easy,  natural 
transitions.  A  reader  or  hearer  should  not  feel  that  he  is 
being  arbitrarily  picked  up,  carried  around,  and  dropped, 
at  the  whim  of  the  speaker  or  writer;  he  should  rather  haVe 
the  sensation  of  being  led  easily,  yet  firmly,  along  in  the  most 
natural  paths  of  reasoning.  Readers  or  listeners  are  easily 
confused  by  sudden  breaks  in  the  chain  of  reasoning,  and 


204  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

readily  become  lost  if  their  mental  scenes  are  shifted  too 
suddenly.  Listeners  should  know  "where  they  are"  in  the 
case  at  all  times.  As  the  speaker  proceeds,  an  audience  should 
see  the  way  opening  gradually  before  them,  and  feel  that 
each  step  is  natural;  so  that  when  they  have  come  to  the  end 
they  will  believe  they  have  reached  a  proper  destination.  In 
arranging  for  the  proper  observance  of  this  principle,  then, 
we  need  to  consider  two  requisites:  (1)  Proofs  must  be  pre- 
sented in  such  a  logical  order  that  every  fact  is  clear  in  its 
full  import  at  the  time  when  it  is  presented.  (2)  Each  idea 
must  be  verbally  connected  with  the  one  preceding  by  such 
a  natural  transition  that  a  single  chain  of  reasoning  runs  all 
through  the  proof. 

3.  Emphasis.  Well-directed  emphasis  is  one  of  the 
prime  qualities  of  all  successful  composition,  and  nowhere 
does  it  do  a  greater  service  than  in  argumentation.  In  the 
first  place,  as  we  have  already  seen,  there  are  some  things 
in  our  proof  that  are  important  and  some  that  are  trivia!; 
emphasis  distinguishes  between  them,  magnifying  the  ad- 
vantages of  the  former  and  minimizing  the  disadvantages 
of  the  latter.  A  disputant  always  has  some  points  in  his  case 
that  are  strong  and  can  be  relied  on,  while  he  has  others  that 
are  weak  and  vulnerable;  emphasis  gives  prominence  to  his 
strong  points  and  covers  up  his  weak  points. 

a.  Emphasis  and  coherence.  Many  qualities  of  arrange- 
ment that  make  for  coherence  are  as  truly  matters  of  em- 
phasis. In  fact  all  three  principles  we  are  considering  are 
very  closely  related.  There  are  no  sharp  dividing  lines  be- 
tween their  provinces.  Particularly  do  emphasis  and  co- 
herence cooperate  in  bringing  out  the  strength  and  in  con- 
cealing the  weakness  of  any  case.  The  grouping  of  lesser 
facts  around  the  greater,  which  is  so  essential  to  coherence, 
is  equally  important  in  emphasizing  the  important  points 
in  the  proof.  But,  in  addition  to  this  discrimination  between 
the  lesser  and  the  greater  facts,  it  is  also  necessary  to  dis- 
criminate between  the  various  more  important  points  of 


GENERAL  PRINCIPLES  OF  ARRANGEMENT      205 

the  proof.  Some  are  more  warmly  contested  than  others,  and 
the  proof  on  these  critical  points  must  be  made  to  stand  out 
over  everything  else.  Again,  on  some  issues,  one  contestant 
or  another  has  the  weaker  side  for  facts;  available  evidence 
may  be  against  him,  and  he  must  conceal  his  defects.  So  it 
becomes  necessary  to  know  what  are  the  ways  of  displaying 
strength,  and  of  hiding  weakness. 

b.  Methods  of  emphasis.  The  common  methods  of  em- 
phasis, as  far  as  the  several  principles  of  arrangement  are 
concerned,  might  be  called  the  methods  of  place  and  space. 
The  former  means  placing  more  important  points  in  certain 
more  emphatic  positions.  The  latter  means  simply  that  we 
give  more  space  in  a  manuscript,  more  time  in  a  speech,  to 
the  important  things  and  less  space  to  the  unimportant 
things.  A  combination  of  both  place  and  space  methods  is 
of  course  better  than  either  alone. 

(I)  Emphatic  places.  The  emphatic  parts  of  the  proof 
are  the  beginning  and  the  end.  At  the  beginning  the  audience 
is  expectant  and  critical,  and  the  first  impression  is  usually 
enduring.  The  importance  of  the  beginning  depends  some- 
what on  the  circumstances;  but  it  is  rarely  safe  to  make  a 
feeble  beginning.  The  first  impression  must  not  be  weak,  for 
it  too  often  creates  a  prejudice  that  is  an  obstacle  to  later 
progress.  Sometimes  the  beginning  is  made  exceptionally 
important  by  the  necessity  for  an  immediate  answer  to  some 
argument  advanced  by  an  opponent.  His  arguments  may 
have  been  so  strong  and  may  have  made  such  an  efl'ect  that 
the  answer  to  them  becomes  a  turning-point  of  the  proof; 
the  refutation  of  them  must  be  made  emphatic.  This  ref- 
utation may,  if  the  answer  is  very  strong,  and  if  it  concerns 
the  most  vital  point  of  the  whole  question,  be  reserved  till 
the  end.  But  sometimes  the  arguments  need  to  be  answered 
at  once,  in  order  to  remove  hostility  on  the  part  of  the  au- 
dience, and  in  order  to  influence  them  favorably  for  the  recep- 
tion of  the  other  proofs  that  are  to  come.  In  such  cases 
both  emphasis  and  tact  require  that  the  refutation  be  placed 


206  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

/  .     . 

^t  the  beginning.    The  most  important  point  should  usually 

|e  placed  at  the  end,  for  that  is  the  position  of  maximum 
iphasis.  At  the  end  comes  "the  last  word,"  the  part 
lich  gives  the  final  impulse  to  conviction  and  persuasion, 
le  parts  between  are  most  easily  forgotten;  so  it  is  the  mid- 
dle of  the  proof  that  receives  what  is  to  be  neglected  or  con- 
cealed. 

C.  Special  importance  of  these  principles  in  argumenta- 
tion. It  may  readily  be  seen  from  the  preceding  discussion 
of  the  general  principles  of  arrangement  that  unity,  coherence, 
and  emphasis  in  argumentation  imply  more  than  in  most 
kinds  of  composition.  The  fusing  of  a  multitude  of  thoughts 
into  one  thought,  the  careful  leading  of  a  man's  reason  from 
one  point  to  another,  the  indispensable  discrimination  be- 
tween great  and  small,  the  painstaking  establishment  of  un- 
mistakable relations  between  each  small  fact  and  the  whole 
question,  the  impressing  of  the  few  vital  points  on  the  atten- 
tion and  the  memory, — all  these  tasks  are  exaggerated  and 
made  more  critical  than  in  any  other  kind  of  writing  or  speak- 
ing. It  follows  that  much  more  care  must  be  taken  here 
than  in  other  kinds  of  composition,  in  the  arrangement  of  our 
materials,  before  we  finally  put  them  in  rhetorical  form  for 
presentation.  In  description  or  narration,  all  the  work  of  pre- 
liminary arrangement  that  may  be  desirable  may  be  embodied 
in  a  short  outline  of  a  few  headings.  All  that  is  needed  may 
be  a  few  rough  jottings  to  state  the  main  ideas  and  suggest 
the  general  lines  of  their  development;  facts,  rhetorical  figures, 
mental  pictures  may  properly  be  left  to  the  suggestion  of  the 
moment.  In  argumentation  the  requisities  are  very  different. 
So  much  depends  upon  the  exact  relations  of  fact  to  fact  and 
point  to  point,  in  order  to  make  our  appeals  to  the  reasoning 
faculties  clear  and  effective,  that  we  must  give  much  more 
time  and  consideration  to  the  arrangement  of  our  materials. 
We  must  not  only  arrange  our  main  ideas  and  indicate  the 
general  trend  of  the  development  of  these  ideas,  but  also  the 
details  of  fact  and  of  explanation  must  be  accurately  estab- 


GENERAL  PRINCIPLES  OF  ARRANGEMENT     207 

lished  in  their  proper  relations  with  each  other.  To  meet 
this  special  demand  for  attention  to  these  principles  in  ar- 
gumentation, we  have  special  devices,  the  brief  and  the  out- 
line based  on  the  brief.  These  are  accurate,  definite  schemes 
which  if  followed  will  make  evident  the  proper  arrangement 
for  practically  perfect  unity,  coherence,  and  emphasis  in  each 
particular  case. 


CHAPTER  10 

BRIEF   DRAWING   AND   OUTLINING 

OUTLINE 

A.  What  a  brief  is. 

B.  Purposes  of  a  brief. 

C.  Brief  is  impersonal. 

D.  Legal  brief  drawing. 

E.  Brief  and  outline. 

F.  Rules  for  brief  drawing. 

G.  Parallel  column  brief. 
H.  Complete  sample  brief. 

A.  What  a  brief  is.  A  brief  is  a  full  and  finished  arrange- 
ment in  logical  order  of  the  evidence  and  argument  on  a  given 
side  of  a  given  case.  It  is  not  a  preliminary  outline  on  which 
to  build  a  speech  or  essay.  Every  detail  of  evidence  in  the 
case  is  put  into  a  properly  drawn  brief.  The  brief  is  a  finished 
article.  It  contains  a  full  and  complete  statement  of  the 
intellectual  side  of  the  case.  Nothing  need  be  added  to  it  if 
we  want  a  decision  simply  on  the  weight  of  evidence  and  the 
force  of  inference — and  have  a  tribunal  ready  to  give  a  de- 
cision on  these  things  alone.  So  we  might  present  briefs  on  a 
disputed  question  to  a  board  of  judges  for  decision  without 
presenting  any  other  manuscripts  or  making  any  speeches. 
All  the  materials  of  proof  appear  in  a  good  brief.  It  is  complete 
in  the  elements  of  conviction,  and  almost  wholly  lacking  in 
the  elements  of  persuasion  as  such.  Except  as  some  of  the 
evidence  may  have  a  persuasive  force,  there  is  no  persuasion 
in  a  brief. 

B.  Purposes  of  a  brief.     A  brief  may  serve  many  pur- 
poses.    Its  most  important  use  is  that  of  presenting  it  to 

208 


BRIEF  DRAWING  AND  OUTLINING  209 

judges  as  the  whole  statement  of  the  case  without  additional 
comment  of  any  kind.  It  may  also  be  presented  as  the  whole 
statement  of  the  intellectual  side  of  a  case  preliminary  to 
arguing  the  question  in  full;  or  it  may  be  presented  as  the 
complete  statement  of  fact  in  a  case  preliminary  to  arguing 
general  principles  or  points  of  law  which  should  apply  to  such 
a  case.  For  all  these  purposes  in  which  the  brief  passes  from 
the  hands  of  the  one  who  prepares  it  to  a  judge  who  is  to  de- 
cide the  case,  the  brief  should  be  complete  and  perfectly 
drawn.  But  this  statement  holds  good  also  even  when  the 
case  is  to  be  presented  by  a  speech  or  an  argumentative 
article,  pamphlet,  or  book.  Putting  the  whole  intellectual 
side  of  the  case  into  the  form  of  a  perfect  brief  gives  one  the 
best  opportunity  really  to  know  his  case,  all  the  details  of  it, 
its  strength  and  weakness.  A  perfect  brief  exhibits  the 
relation  of  every  bit  of  evidence  to  the  proposition  and  to 
every  other  bit  of  evidence  in  the  whole  case.  It  also  shows 
the  value  and  importance  of  each  piece  of  evidence.  It 
brings  out  the  strong  points,  the  points  that  are  covered  by 
more  evidence  than  is  necessary,  and  the  weak  points,  the 
points  that  must  be  bolstered  up  with  more  evidence  or 
very  carefully  handled  in  the  presentation.  So  the  prepara- 
tion of  a  perfect  brief  is  a  most  important  part  of  the  prepara- 
tion of  any  case  even  if  the  case  is  to  be  presented  orally. 

C.  The  brief  is  impersonal.  It  belongs  to  and  is  deter- 
mined by  "the  case."  It  is  a  true  and  unemotional  arrange- 
ment of  all  the  facts  and  arguments  in  the  case.  It  is  not  and 
cannot  be  designed  to  fit  a  particular  audience,  without 
losing  its  chief  characteristics  which  distinguish  it  from  an 
outline.  In  fact  we  might  say  that  a  brief  by  its  very  nature 
is  not  adapted  to  any  audience.  While  perfect  brief  form  is 
probably  the  best  method  ever  devised  for  presenting  certain 
types  of  cases  on  paper,  it  is  usually  a  very  poor  method  of 
presenting  any  case  orally.  Getting  ideas  and  impressions 
through  the  eyes  from  a  printed  page  is  very  different  from 
getting  ideas  and  impressions  through  the  ears  from  a  living 


210  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

voice.  But  granting  all  this,  it  still  remains  true  that  the 
preparation  of  a  perfect  brief  should  be  part  of  the  prepara- 
tion of  any  important  work  in  argumentation  however  it  is 
to  be  finally  presented. 

D.  Legal  brief  drawing.  Legal  briefs  are  drawn  to  be 
submitted  to  courts  either  to  serve  as  the  basis  for  oral  ar- 
gument or  to  be  the  complete  presentation  of  the  case, 
when  decision  is  rendered  without  argument,  merely  on  the 
briefs  presented.  "A  brief  is  a  document,  prepared  by  coun- 
sel for  the  use  of  the  court  as  a  basis  for  oral  argument  of  a 
cause;  it  contains  a  statement  of  the  manner  in  which  the 
questions  in  controversy  arose,  of  the  facts  of  the  case  so  far 
as  they  relate  to  the  questions;  it  is  an  outline  of  the  argu- 
ment, consisting  of  the  propositions  of  law  or  fact  to  be  main- 
tained, the  reasons  upon  which  they  are  based,  and  citations  of 
authorities  in  their  support."  ^  The  rules  of  legal  brief  draw- 
ing are  for  the  most  part  like  the  rules  given  in  this  chapter. 
One  important  exception,  however,  is  that  solid  paragraphs 
containing  many  statements  are  usually  used  in  legal  briefs. 
So  our  rule  No.  4  is  not  a  rule  of  legal  briefing.  Many  details 
of  legal  briefing  are  prescribed  by  law  in  various  states,  and 
while  conventions  as  to  form,  etc.,  differ  slightly  in  different 
states,  it  is  true  that  the  main  principles  of  brief  drawing  in 
general  argumentation  are  identical  with  the  main  principles 
of  legal  brief  drawing  as  practiced  by  the  best  lawyers, 
through  the  country. 

"In  the  typical  legal  *  brief  on  appeal'  one  looks  for  the 
following  well-defined  stages,  or  subdivisions: — 

1.  The  Title. 

2.  The  Preliminary  Statement. 

3.  The  Statement  of  the  Case  (sometimes  termed  *The 

Facts'). 

4.  The  Specification  of  Errors. 

5.  The  Brief  of  the  Argument. 

*  Professor  Henry  S.  Redfield  in  The  Brief  on  Appeal.  Quoted  from  Brief 
Making  (The  West  Publishing  Co.,  p.  219)  by  Maxcy,  The  Brief,  p.  3. 


BRIEF  DRAWING  AND  OUTLINING  211 

The  general  form  of  the  argumentative  brief,  as  it  has  been 
developed  in  practice,  follows  closely  after  the  legal  model. 
It  contains — 

1.  The  Title. 

2.  The  PreHminary  Introduction. 

3.  The  Main  Introduction. 

4.  The  Statement  of  Issues. 

5.  The  Brief  of  the  Argument. 

6.  The  Conclusion."  ^ 

Notice  that  the  first  four  of  these  parts  are  covered  by  an 
introduction  y  and  that  the  fifth  and  sixth  correspond  to  our 
discussion  and  conclusion  respectively.  Some  legal  briefs 
have  "conclusions"  in  separate  parts  and  some  do  not. 

Dean  Ballantine's  twenty-one  rules  for  legal  briefing  ^ 
show  clearly  how  closely  the  rules  for  briefing  in  general  ar- 
gumentation follow  those  for  the  legal  brief.  Of  course,  the 
argumentative  brief  is  an  offspring  of  the  legal  brief.  Here 
as  in  many  other  phases  of  argumentation  we  have  general- 
ized what  the  legal  profession  has  worked  out  for  its  specific 
needs. 

E.  Brief  and  outline.  After  the  impersonal  brief  is 
finished  an  outline  should  be  drawn  up  for  any  speech  that  is 
to  be  presented.  In  drawing  up  the  outline  the  speaker 
should  always  keep  his  particular  audience  in  mind,  and  adapt 
his  speech  carefully  to  the  audience  which  he  must  meet. 
In  preparing  an  argumentative  speech  one  may  differ  from 
the  order  of  the  brief  as  much  as  is  desirable.  It  is  a  mistake 
to  suppose  that  a  brief  is  always  a  good  outline  for  a  speech. 
As  a  matter  of  fact  it  is  rarely  if  ever  so.  An  outline  of  al- 
most any  great  argument  will  not  coincide  with  a  brief  of 
the  material  in  the  argument.  This  is  as  it  should  be.  The 
speech  must  fit  the  audience.  It  must  be  planned  with  great 
attention  to  considerations  of  persuasion.  Men  differ  in 
their  ways  of  presenting  cases  to  audiences,  and  the  same 
case  must  be  presented  to  different  audiences  differently. 
1  Maxcy,  pp.  6,  7.  *  Appendix  E. 


212  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

In  a  speech  we  may  wish  to  catch  the  attention  and  arouse 
interest  in  the  very  beginning  by  presenting  the  most  strik- 
ing piece  of  evidence  we  have.  In  a  brief  we  are  not  con- 
fronted with  the  problem  of  getting  the  attention  of  the 
judge.  In  a  speech  we  may  wish  to  reserve  certain  explana- 
tory matter  until  we  are  ready  to  present  certain  arguments, 
in  a  brief  confusion  would  result  if  this  were  left  out  of  the 
introduction  and  put  into  the  discussion.  So  the  outline  of 
a  speech  should  be  made  from  a  brief  of  the  case,  to  meet  the 
requirements  of  a  certain  situation.  Time,  place,  audience, 
etc.,  should  be  carefully  considered  in  the  preparation  of  any 
speech — and  should  not  be  considered  at  all  in  the  prepara- 
tion of  a  brief.  And  the  speech  may  differ  from  the  brief  as 
much  as  seems  desirable  in  any  given  case.  Of  course  in 
some  cases  the  brief  may  be  followed  rather  closely,  and  in 
many  cases  the  main  lines  of  the  brief  are  followed.  We 
should  never  so  desert  the  brief  that  we  fail  to  meet  the  re- 
quirements of  unity,  coherence,  and  emphasis  in  argumenta- 
tion. In  all  cases  the  task  of  outlining  the  desired  speech  is 
relatively  simple  after  a  good  brief  of  the  case  is  completed, 
especially  if  the  circumstances  under  which  the  speech  is  to 
be  given  are  fully  understood.  We  should  first  go  over  the 
brief  and  select  those  parts  of  the  case  which  we  wish  to 
present  to  the  particular  audience  which  we  have  to  meet. 
We  may  select  almost  wholly  different  portions  for  use  in 
presenting  the  same  case  to  different  audiences.  (A  case  on 
the  honor  system,  for  instance,  to  be  presented  first  to  stu- 
dents and  later  to  faculty.  One  audience  might  grant  with- 
out any  argument  the  very  points  that  would  have  to  be 
argued  at  great  length  before  the  other  audience.)  Second , 
we  should  arrange  these  selected  parts  in  whatever  order 
seems  most  persuasive  for  the  particular  audience  we  have 
in  mind,  practically  regardless  of  the  arrangement  of  these 
parts  in  the  brief.  A  knowledge  of  persuasion  and  of  the 
principles  of  speech  composition  are  of  course  of  great  value 
here.    But  as  far  as  brief  drawing  is  concerned  the  principle 


BRIEF  DRAWING  AND  OUTLINING  213 

to  remember  is  this :  The  brief  is  determined  by  the  nature  oj 
the  impersonal  case  which  it  is  possible  to  build  up  on  our  side 
of  the  proposition;  the  speech  outline  (or  the  speech)  is  determined 
by  the  kind  of  presentation  (both  in  substance  and  order)  which  it 
is  most  desirable  to  make  to  a  particular  audience  or  set  of  judges. 
F.  Rules  for  brief  drawing.  The  following  seventeen 
rules  cover  the  work  of  brief  drawing.  Each  rule  here  should 
be  strictly  observed.  Students  should  memorize  these  rules  as 
stated  and  should  be  able  to  explain  the  reasons  for  each  rule. 

GENERAL   RULES 

1.  The  brief  should  be  divided  into  three  parts,  marked 
respectively,  introduction,  discussion,  and  conclusion. 

2.  The  ideas  in  the  brief  should  be  arranged  in  the  form  of 
headings  and  subheadings. 

3.  Each  heading  and  subheading  should  be  in  the  form  of 
a  complete  statement. 

4.  Each  heading  and  subheading  should  contain  but  a  single 
statement.  (Rare  exceptions  may  be  made  to  this  in  the  case 
of  literal  quotations  covering  more  than  a  single  statement.) 

5.  Every  coordinate  series  of  statements  should  be  ar- 
ranged in  order  of  climax^  unless  this  violates  time  order 
in  expository  matter  or  logical  order  in  argumentativ^e  matter. 

6.  The  relation  between  the  headings  and  subheadings 
should  be  indicated  by  means  of  margins,  and  letters,  num- 
bers, or  other  symbols. 

7.  No  heading  or  subheading  should  be  marked  with  more 
than  one  symbol. 

8.  All  references  and  sources  of  information  should  be  ac- 
curately stated  in  the  brief,  on  the  same  page  on  which  the 
information  is  given. 

RULES   FOR   INTRODUCTION 

9.  The  first  part  of  the  introduction  should  contain  all 
the  information  necessary  for  an  understanding  of  the  dis- 
cussion— history,  definition,  explanations,  admissions,  etc. 


214  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

10.  The  last  part  of  the  introduction  should  contain  a 
statement  of  the  issues  and  of  the  partition. 

11.  The    introduction    should    contain    only    statements 
the  truth  of  which  is  admitted  by  both  sides. 


RULES   FOR  DISCUSSION 

12.  The  discussion  should  contain  all  evidence  and  argu- 
ment to  be  used  on  the  given  side  of  the  given  proposition. 

13.  In  the  discussion,  each  main  heading  should  read  as  a 
reason  for  the  truth  or  falsity  of  the  proposition. 

14.  Each  subheading,  or  series  of  coordinate  subheadings, 
should  read  as  a  reason  for  the  truth  of  the  heading  above  it. 

15.  Objections  to  be  refuted  should  be  dealt  with  as  they 
arise. 

16.  In  phrasing  refutation  the  heading  should  state  clearly 
the  argument  to  be  answered,  and  the  character  of  the  an- 
swer to  be  made. 

RULE   FOR   CONCLUSION 

17.  The  conclusion  should  contain  a  summary  of  the 
essential  points  of  the  proof. 

Let  us  consider  each  of  these  rules  in  connection  with  work- 
ing out  a  brief  on  the  negative  side  of  the  proposition:  Re- 
solved that  the  contract  system  of  employing  convict  labor 
should  be  abolished. 

Rule  1.  The  brief  should  he  divided  into  three  parts, 
marked  respectively^  introduction,  discussion,  and  conclusion. 
In  the  last  chapter  we  saw  that  in  any  piece  of  argumenta- 
tion the  important  part  is  the  proof  itself,  and  that  in  order 
to  secure  unity  it  is  necessary  to  subordinate  the  introduc- 
tion and  conclusion,  making  them  simply  a  means  to  the  more 
effective  presentation  of  the  points  in  the  proof.  In  outline 
(A)  it  is  evident  that  a  part  is  introductory  in  nature,  a  part 
is  a  discussion  of  the  proof,  and  part  is  merely  a  word  of  con- 


BRIEF  DRAWING  AND  OUTLINING  215 

elusion.    The  first  step,  then,  is  to  separate  the  parts  and  show 
their  relationship. 

Negative  (A) 

The  convict  labor  problem. 

Necessity  of  employment.    Experiments  with  different  systems. 
Effect  of  contract  system  on  reformation. 

Control  by  prison  officers,  habits  of  industry  (regulations  of  the 
contract),  and  learning  trades. 

Competition  with  free  labor  under  the  different  systems. 

Competition  under  piece-price  system. 

Competition  under  contract  system. 

Public-account  system. 

Methods  of  removing  evils  of  competition  under  contract  system. 

Contract  system  is  the  most  profitable. 

Examples. 
On  the  whole  the  contract  system  is  preferable  to  any  other. 

Taking  this  outline  and  separating  the  parts  according 
to  Rule  1  we  have: 

(B) 
Introduction 

The  convict  labor  problem. 

Necessity  of  employment.    Experiments  with  different  systems. 

Discussion 

Effect  of  contract  system  on  reformation. 

Control  by  prison  officers,  habits  of  industry  (regulations  of  the 

contract),  and  learning  trades. 
Competition  with  free  labor  under  the  different  systems. 
Competition  under  piece-price  system. 
Competition  under  contract  system. 

Methods  of  removing  evils  of  competition  under  contract  system. 
Contract  system  is  the  most  profitable. 
,  Examples. 

Conclusion 
On  the  whole  the  contract  system  is  preferable  to  any  other. 


216  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

Rule  2.  The  ideas  in  the  brief  should  be  arranged  in  the 
form  of  headings  and  subheadings.  To  secure  unity  and  co- 
herence in  a  brief  we  found  not  only  that  it  was  necessary  to 
consider  the  introduction  and  conclusion  ancillary  to  the 
discussion  itself,  but  also  that  it  was  necessary  to  arrange 
the  material  so  that  it  will  make  clear  what  is  important  and 
what  is  subordinate.  The  most  natural  methods  of  securing 
this  result  is  to  arrange  the  material  of  the  brief  in  headings 
and  subheadings. 

Take,  for  instance,  this  from  (A): 

Competition  with  free  labor  under  the  different  systems. 

Competition  under  piece-price  system. 

Competition  under  contract  system. 

Public-account  system. 

Although  these  points  are  made  here  as  of  equal  value, 
it  is  obvious  after  a  moment's  observation  that  they  are  of 
unequal  value.  Take  the  first  two  headings:  the  second  is 
certainly  subordinate  to  the  first,  and  should  be  so  arranged. 
Evidently  there  is  some  central  idea  in  this  group  of  headings, 
and  we  must  find  this  idea  and  state  it  in  such  a  way  that  the 
minor  points  can  all  be  grouped  under  it.  What,  then,  is  the 
central  idea.f*  It  involves  a  comparison  of  the  contract  system 
and  the  other  systems  as  regards  its  competition  with  free 
labor,  and  it  may  be  stated  as  follows: 

(C) 

Competition  with  free  labor  is  less  harmful  under  the  contract 
system  than  under  the  other  systems. 
Effects  of  competition  under  the  piece-price  system. 
Effects  of  competition  under  the  public-account  system. 
Ways  of  removing  any  evil  effects  under  the  contract  system. 

Rule  3.  Each  heading  and  subheading  should  be  in  the  form 
of  a  complete  statement.  In  (B)  the  most  obvious  fault  is  the 
lack  of  clearness.    For  the  purpose  of  conveying  the  ideas 


BRIEF  DRAWING  AND  OUTLINING  217 

to  any  other  person  than  the  mi?>ker  of  the  brief,  the  outline 
is  useless.  Take,  for  illustration,  the  introduction  to  this 
outline : 

The  convict  labor  problem. 

Necessity  of  employment.    Experiments  with  different  systems. 

Here  no  one  of  the  statements  carries  a  clear  idea  of  what 
was  in  the  mind  of  the  writer.  "Necessity  of  employment." 
What  about  it?  Does  the  writer  mean  there  is  no  necessity 
of  employment,  or  that  there  is  a  general  necessity.'^  Em- 
ployment for  what  purpose?  Under  what  conditions?  These 
questions  and  others  may  justly  be  asked,  and  the  brief  can- 
not be  said  to  be  even  tolerable,  until  the  ideas  are  so  stated 
that  they  cannot  be  misunderstood.  Evidently,  the  principal 
difficulty  lies  in  the  fact  that  the  writer  has  failed  to  make  his 
statements  complete.  A  word,  or  even  a  number  of  words, 
taken  out  of  their  connection  may  often  have  a  number  of 
different  meanings,  and  the  way  to  guard  against  vagueness 
and  ambiguity  is  to  make  complete  sentences.  Let  us  then 
expand  these  phrases  into  complete  statements. 

(D) 

The  problem  of  employment  of  the  convict  is  one  of  the  serious 
problems  of  criminology. 
It  is  admitted  that  the  convict  must  be  employed  in  some  kind 
of  work.  Several  different  systems  of  employment  have  been 
tried  in  this  country;  the  most  important  of  which  are:  the 
piece-price  system,  the  public-account  system,  and  the  contract 
system. 

Rule  4.  Each  heading  and  subheading  should  contain 
but  a  single  statement^  except  in  occasional  cases  of  literal 
quotations. 

Another  common  fault  of  brief  drawing,  and  one  closely 
akin  to  the  one  just  considered,  is  that  of  crowding  too  much 


218  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

into  one  heading.  It  is  as  important  to  have  each  heading 
a  single  statement  as  it  is  to  have  each  heading  a  complete 
statement.  Occasionally  it  may  be  allowable  to  quote 
directly  more  than  a  single  statement  and  have  this  stand  as 
one  heading  or  subheading.  But  this  must  not  be  taken  as 
permission  to  insert  whole  blocks  of  undigested  quotations. 
Material  taken  from  others  should  be  boiled  down  to  single 
statements  or  to  properly  related  series  of  single  statements. 
Clearness  is  greatly  increased  by  living  up  to  this  rule  very 
carefully.  Take,  for  instance,  the  first  point  from  the  dis- 
cussion (B): 

Effect  of  the  contract  system  on  reformation. 

.  Control  by  prison  oflficers,  habits  of  industry  (regulations  of  the 
contract),  and  the  learning  of  trades. 

Expanding  this  into  complete  statements  in  accordance 
with  Rule  3  we  have: 

The  contract  system  is  eflFective  in  the  work  of  reforming  the  crim- 
inal. Under  this  system  criminals  are  under  the  direct  and 
responsible  control  of  the  prison  officers,  and  are  taught  habits 
of  industry,  for  the  regulations  of  the  contracts  prescribe  these 
things.  The  criminals  have  an  opportunity  to  learn  practical 
trades. 

The  subordinate  heading  here  is  an  incoherent  jumble, 
or,  as  it  may  be  called,  a  crowded  heading.  The  results  of  a 
crowded  heading  are:  a  lack  of  evident  connection  between 
the  different  subordinate  headings,  and  a  similar  lack  of  con- 
nection between  the  subordinate  headings  and  the  main 
heading.  For  instance,  the  statement  "for  the  regulations  of 
the  contracts  prescribe  these  things"  evidently  has  no  direct 
connection  with  the  main  heading,  "The  contract  system  is 
effective  in  the  work  of  reforming  the  criminal,"  and  to  show 
justification  for  its  presence  in  the  brief  some  change  must 
be  made.    This  change  must  be  made  by  a  separation  of  the 


BRIEF  DRAWING  AND  OUTLINING  219 

different  ideas  of  this  heading  into  headings  each  containing  a 
single  statement.    It  would  then  read  as  follows: 

(E) 

The  contract  system  is  effective  in  the  work  of  reforming  the 

criminal. 
Convicts  are  under  the  direct  and  responsible  control  of  the  prison 

officers. 
The  contract  provides  that  the  contractor  shall  have  no  control 

over  the  discipline  of  the  prison. 
The  convicts  are  taught  habits  of  industry. 
The  contract  provides  that  they  shall  be  continually  employed. 
Convicts  have  an  opportunity  to  learn  a  practical  trade. 

Rule  5.  Every  coordinate  series  of  statements  should  be 
arranged  in  order  of  climax,  unless  this  violates  time  order  in 
expository  matter  or  logical  order  in  argumentative  matter. 
Suppose  we  have  six  coordinate  statements,  say  of  the  third 
degree,  1,  2,  3,  4,  5,  6,  under  B.  If  this  situation  occurs  in 
the  introduction,  when  we  are  explaining  the  history  of  the 
question,  and  deals  with  incidents  having  a  time  order,  we 
should  follow  the  time  order  regardless  of  the  climax  or  other 
considerations.  If  in  the  discussion  our  six  coordinate  points 
have  to  do  with  matter  linked  in  a  logical  sequence, — have 
a  cause  and  effect  connection  with  each  other — we  must 
follow  the  logical  order.  In  all  other  cases  we  should  arrange 
them  in  climactic  sequence,  beginning  with  the  weakest  and 
ending  with  the  strongest. 

Rule  6.  The  relation  between  the  headings  and  subheadings 
should  be  indicated  by  means  of  margins,  and  letters,  numbers, 
or  other  symbols.  Thus  far  we  have  seen  the  importance  of 
so  stating  our  headings  that  the  main  and  the  subordinate 
parts  shall  stand  clearly  in  their  proper  relations.  It  is  nec- 
essary to  show  the  varying  importance  of  the  different 
parts  by  the  indentation  of  the  margins  and  by  the  use  of 
symbols.     In  doing  this  some  definite  system  ought  to  be 


220  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

followed.     In  this  book  the  system  of  marking  will  be  as 
follows : 
I. 
A. 
1. 
a. 

(I). 
(A). 

(1). 
II. 

A.  etc. 

Great  care  must  be  taken  to  see  that  marginal  indentations 
are  always  the  same  for  symbols  of  equal  order.  So  all  roman 
numerals  on  a  page  should  be  in  line,  and  the  same  for 
capital  letters,  arabic  numerals,  etc.  The  statements  should 
never  run  back  to  the  left  under  the  symbols.  All  margins 
should  be  clear — the  lower  the  order  of  importance  of  the 
statements,  the  shorter  the  lines  used,  so  that  the  eye  can 
quickly  grasp  the  relation  of  all  the  statements  on  a  page. 

Outline  (E),  then,  when  these  directions  are  carried  out 
will  read: 

(F) 

I.  The  contract  system  is  effective  in  the  work  of  reforming  the 
criminal. 

A.  Convicts  are  under  the  direct  and  responsible  control  of  the 

prison  officers. 
1,  The  contract  provides  that  the  contractor  shall  have  no 
control  over  the  discipline  of  the  prison. 

B.  The  convicts  are  taught  habits  of  industry. 

1.  The  contracts  provides  that  they  shall  be  continually 
employed. 

C.  Convicts  have  an  opportunity  to  learn  a  practical  trade. 

Rule  7.  No  heading  or  subheading  should  be  marked 
with  more  than  one  symbol.  In  applying  any  system  of  letter- 
ing there  is  a  common  fault  which  leads  to  confusion,  namely. 


BRIEF  DRAWING  AND  OUTLINING  221 

using  more  than  one  symbol  for  marking  a  single  heading. 
For  instance,  in  outline  (F),  the  marking  is  done  correctly; 
but  a  beginner  in  argumentation  might  easily  fall  into  the 
mistake  of  marking  it  something  as  follows: 

(6) 

A.  1.  Convicts  are  under  the  direct  and  responsible  control  of  the 
prison  officers. 

2.  The  convicts  are  taught  habits  of  industry. 

3.  Convicts  have  an  opportunity  to  learn  a  practical  trade. 

In  the  first  heading  of  (G)  the  reason  in  the  mind  of  the 
writer  for  marking  it  A.  1  probably  is  the  more  or  less  vague 
idea  that  the  three  headings,  numbered  1,  2,  3,  are  to  be 
grouped  together.  He  feels  that  these  headings  are  more  or 
less  connected  in  meaning,  so  he  puts  in  the  letter  A  to  indi- 
cate the  connection.  He  allows  A  to  stand  for  a  grouping 
or  summarizing  statement  which  he  has  carelessly  neglected 
to  put  into  words.  This  can  be  his  only  excuse  for  putting 
in  the  extra  letter,  for  otherwise  it  has  no  meaning  whatever. 

However,  the  use  of  the  extra  letter  does  not  serve  the 
purpose  he  has  in  mind.  It  does  not  make  clear  just  how 
the  subheads  1,  2,  and  3  are  connected,  but  confuses  the 
reader  by  making  him  stop  and  guess  what  is  the  connection 
between  them.  If  any  such  headings  are  really  associated, 
the  association  can  be  made  clear  only  by  definitely  stating 
the  connecting  idea,  in  a  separate  heading.  By  reference  to 
outline  (F)  we  see  how  the  relation  of  the  ideas  is  rightly  ex- 
pressed. The  subheadings  are  clearly  established  in  their 
proper  relations  to  one  another  by  stating  in  main  heading  I 
the  larger  idea  of  which  they  are  subordinate  parts.  So  we 
have  the  inviolable  rule  that  no  symbol  should  be  put  into 
the  brief  unless  it  marks  a  separate  and  distinct  heading  of  its 
own. 

Rule  8.  All  references  and  sources  of  information  should 
be  accurately  stated  in  the  brief  on  the  same  page  on  which  the 


222  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

information  is  given.  Exact  references  (volume,  number, 
page,  etc.)  to  all  authorities  and  particular  sources  of  informa- 
tion should  always  be  given  on  the  page  of  the  brief  which  has 
the  statement  which  they  support. 

The  method  of  inserting  references  to  authorities  is  a 
matter  of  individual  discretion  rather  than  of  rule  or  precept. 
The  method  may  be  adopted  which  is  used  in  the  text  of  the 
present  volume,  of  putting  numbers  in  the  body  of  the  text 
(or  brief)  with  the  title  and  exact  citation  of  the  authority 
appended  at  the  foot  of  the  page.  Or,  it  is  simpler,  and  just 
as  clear,  merely  to  insert  the  reference  in  the  margin  of  the 
brief,  opposite  the  heading  in  connection  with  which  it  is 
quoted.  Probably  the  best  method,  on  the  whole,  and  the 
one  to  be  recommended,  is  to  add  the  reference  at  the  end 
of  the  quotation  or  statement  which  it  supports. 

Whatever  the  method,  the  exact  citation  for  every  author- 
ity and  particular  source  of  information  used  should  always 
be  given. 

We  have  now  a  fairly  distinct  idea  of  the  general  rules  for 
arranging  our  ideas  in  the  form  of  a  brief.  But  there  are 
certain  particular  requisites  that  are  peculiar  to  the  three 
divisions  of  the  brief — the  introduction,  the  discussion,  and 
the  conclusion.  These  three  parts  differ  from  one  another 
in  many  ways,  and  must  have  certain  rules  of  their  own,  in 
accordance  with  which  they  can  best  perform  their  respective 
functions. 

Introduction 

Rule  9.  •  The  first  part  of  the  introduction  should  contain 
all  the  information  necessary  for  an  understanding  of  the  dis- 
cussion— history y  definition,  explanations,  admissions,  etc.  The 
force  of  this  rule  is  obvious  from  the  very  nature  of  the  intro- 
duction. The  introduction  exists  solely  for  the  purpose  of 
preparing  the  way  for  the  effective  operation  of  the 
actual  proof;  and  it  has  obviously  failed  in  its  purpose 
if,  when   the   evidence   and    arguments    are  presented   to 


BRIEF  DRAWING  AND  OUTLINING  223 

the  reader  or  hearer,  by  reason  of  his  lack  of  information 
about  the  question,  he  is  incapable  of  understanding  the 
proof. 

For  an  example  take  outline  (B) .  We  find,  in  the  discussion 
proper,  references  to  "the  contract  system,"  "the  public- 
account  system,"  "the  piece-price  system,"  terms  which 
are  meaningless  to  any  man  who  has  not  given  particular 
study  to  the  question.  Again,  we  find  the  most  important 
points  of  the  proof  to  be  concerned  with  "reformation," 
"competition  with  free  labor,"  and  "profitableness";  these 
words  have  meaning  in  themselves,  but  we  cannot  see  the 
force  of  the  arguments  brought  forward  concerning  them, 
because  we  do  not  understand  why  these  points  are  impor- 
tant or  how  they  tend  to  prove  anything  about  the  proposi- 
tion. The  introduction  in  this  case,  in  the  first  place,  should 
have  explained  the  import  of  these  words  whose  meaning  is 
not  clear  in  the  discussion,  i.  e.,  it  should  have  explained  the 
piece-price  system,  the  public-account  system,  and  the 
contract  system. 

This  is  the  work  that  is  necessary  to  the  introduction,  viz. : 
(1)  a  definition  and  explanation  of  the  meaning  of  the  words 
of  the  proposition,  and  of  all  the  important  terms  in  the 
question  that  need  explanation  in  order  to  be  perfectly  clear 
in  the  discussion;  (2)  a  narration  of  the  history  of  the  problem 
in  dispute,  if  such  a  statement  is  necessary  to  make  clear  the 
real  nature  of  the  question. 

The  explanation  of  the  terms  of  the  question  we  are  using 
might  take  form  somewhat  as  follows : 

(H) 

Introduction 

I.  The  problem  of  the  employment  of  the  convict  is  one  of  the 
serious  questions  of  criminology. 
A.  It  is  admitted  that  convicts  must  be  employed  in  some 
kind  of  work. 


224  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

B.  Several   different   systems   have  been   tried   in   this 
country. 
1.  The  principal  systems  are  the  piece-price  system, 
the  public  account-system,  and  the  contract  sys- 
tem. 
II.  The  three  systems  may  be  described  as  follows: 

A.  The  characteristics  of  the  piece-price  system  are  three: 

1.  Contracts  are  made  with  persons,  firms,  or  corpora- 

tions, under  which  the  prison  is  furnished  with 
raw  material. 

2.  These   raw   materials   are   manufactured  by  the 

convicts  at- agreed  prices  per  piece. 

3.  The  work  is  done  wholly  under  the  supervision  of 

prison  officials. 

B.  The  public-account  system  is  as  follows: 

1.  The  prison  buys  its  own  raw  materials. 

2.  The  prison  manufactures  like  a  private  firm,  and 

sells  in  the  best  available  market. 

C.  The  contract  system  involves  the  following  charac- 

teristics : 

1.  Contracts  are  made  with  persons,  firms,  or  corpora- 

tions, under  which  convicts  are  employed  at 
certain  agreed  prices  for  their  labor  for  fixed 
periods  of  time. 

2.  The  contractors  are  usually  furnished  by  the  prison 

with  power  and  machinery. 

3.  The  convicts  work  under  the  immediate  direction 

of  the  contractor,  but  subject  to  the  super- 
vision of  the  prison  officials. 
Rule  10.  The  last  part  of  the  introduction  should  con- 
tain a  statement  of  the  issues  and  of  the  partition.  The  work 
of  explaining  the  nature  of  the  question,  and  stating  the 
points  to  be  proved,  is  essentially  the  work  that  has  been 
treated  in  Chapter  4  on  the  Issues.  By  analyzing  the  ques- 
tion, studying  the  history  of  its  discussion,  and  picking  out 
the  points  that  are  vital  to  the  establishment  of  the  proposi- 


BRIEF  DRAWING  AND  OUTLINING  225 

tion  we  may  find  that  the  settlement  of  the  question  depends 
on  the  decision  of  one  vital  issue,  viz.:  Is  the  continuance 
of  the  contract  system  detrimental  to  the  general  welfare  of 
the  State?  And  further  that  this  question  must  be  decided 
by  comparing  the  system  with  other  possible  systems  (since 
it  is  admitted  that  some  system  must  be  employed)  on  three 
points,  viz.:  What  system  gives  the  best  financial  returns.'* 
What  system  is  most  effective  in  reforming  the  criminal.^ 
What  system  has  the  most  beneficial  effect  on  the  free  labor 
of  the  State? 

If  the  contract  system  can  be  shown  on  the  whole  to  have 
the  preponderance  of  virtue  in  these  respects,  it  is  the  most 
desirable  and  should  not  be  abolished.  If,  judged  by  these 
standards,  it  is  inferior  on  the  whole  to  some  one  of  the  other 
systems,  it  should  be  abolished.  The  explanation  of  the 
nature  of  the  question  and  the  statement  of  the  issue  might, 
then,  take  form  as  follows  : 

(I) 

III.   The  issue  is :  Is  the  continuance  of  the  contract  sys- 
tem   detrimental    to    the    general    welfare    of    the 
State  ? 
A.  This  question  must  be  decided  by  comparing  the  sys- 
tem with  other  possible  systems   (since  it   is  ad- 
mitted that  some  systems  must  be  employed)  on 
three  points,  viz.: 

1.  Are  the  financial  returns  unsatisfactory? 

2.  Is  the  contract  system  unsatisfactory  in  regard  to 

the  reformation  of  the  criminal? 

3.  Does  the  contract  system  entail  unnecessary  in- 

jurious effects  to  the  free  labor  of  the  State? 
The  amount  of  explanation  required  in  a  brief  depends 
entirely  upon  the  nature  of  the  particular  question.  In  out- 
line (H)  given  above,  the  explanation  of  the  nature  of  the  ques- 
tion is  short  and  takes  the  form  of  exposition.  In  treating 
any  new  or  uncommon  question,  full  and  detailed  explana- 


226  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

tions  would  be  required,  in  order  to  give  the  reader  the  in- 
formation necessary  to  an  understanding  of  the  issue  and 
of  the  question  as  a  whole.  In  such  a  generally  known  ques- 
tion as  that  of  the  contract-labor  system,  little  explanation 
was  necessary,  and  that  simply  of  an  expository  nature. 
But  very  often  the  explanation  of  the  question  takes  the 
form  of  a  narration  of  facts  or  a  history  of  the  question.  In 
the  court  room  it  commonly  consists  of  a  narration  of  the 
leading  facts  of  the  case  to  be  presented.  In  a  discussion  of 
the  question,  *^  Resolved,  that  United  States  senators  should 
be  elected  by  a  direct  vote  of  the  people,"  the  explanation 
would  take  a  similar  form.  It  would  require  a  history  of  the 
origin  of  the  Senate  and  of  the  existing  form  of  election,  and  a 
narration  of  the  events  leading  up  to  the  agitation  for  popular 
election. 

Finally,  it  is  desirable  to  state  the  points  which  the  dis- 
putant proposes  to  prove  in  order  to  establish  his  case.  This 
is  the  part  of  the  introduction  called  the  partition.  Though 
the  points  in  the  partition  may  well  correspond  quite  closely 
with  the  statement  of  the  issues,  thej^  are  not  always  identical. 
With  the  addition  of  this  statement  of  the  points  of  the  proof, 
the  completed  introduction  might  read  as  follows: 

(J) 

I.  The  problem  of  the  employment  of  the  convict  is  one  of  the 

serious  questions  for  criminology. 

A.  It  is  admitted  that  convicts  must  be  employed  in  some 

kind  of  work. 

B.  Several  different  systems  have  been  tried  in  this  coun- 

try. 
1.  The  principal  systems  are  the  piece-price  system, 
the    public-account    system,    and    the    contract 
system. 

II.  The  three  systems  may  be  described  as  follows: 

A.  The  characteristics  of  the  piece-price  system  are  three: 


BRIEF  DRAWING  AND  OUTLINING  227 

1.  Contracts  are  made  with  persons,  firms,  or  cor- 

porations, under  which  the  prison  is  furnished 
with  raw  material. 

2.  These   raw   materials   are   manufactured   by   the 

convicts  at  agreed  prices  per  piece. 

3.  The  work  is  done  wholly  under  the  supervision  of 

prison  officials. 

B.  The  public-account  system  is  as  follows: 

1.  The  prison  buys  its  own  raw  materials. 

2.  The  prison  manufactures  like  a  private  firm  and 

sells  in  the  best  available  market. 

C.  The  contract  system   involves   the  following  char- 

acteristics : 

1.  Contracts  are  made  with  persons,  firms,  or  cor- 

porations, under  which  convicts  are  employed 
at  certain  agreed  prices  for  their  labor,  for  fixed 
periods  of  time. 

2.  The  contractors  are  usually  furnished  by  the  prison 

with  power  and  machinery. 

3.  The  convicts  work  under  the  immediate  direction 

of  the  contractor,  but  subject  to  the  supervision 
of  the  prison  officials. 

III.  The  real  question  is,  whether  the  continuance  of  the 

contract  system  is  detrimental  to  the  general  welfare 
of  the  State. 
A.  The  value  of  the  system  must  be  judged  by  three  tests: 

1.  Are  the  financial  returns  unsatisfactory .^^ 

2.  Is  the  contract  system  unsatisfactory  in  regard  to 

the  reformation  of  the  criminal  .f* 

3.  Does  the  contract  system  entail  unnecessary  in- 

jurious effects  to  the  free  labor  of  the  State  .^^ 

IV.  The  negative  intends  to  prove  its  case  by  establishing 

four  facts : 

A.  The  contract  system  brings  the  best  financial  returns. 

B.  The  contract  system  is  effective  in  the  work  of  re- 

forming the  criminal. 


228  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

C.  Any  defects  of  the  system  can  be  remedied  without 

destroying  the  system. 

D.  The  contract  system  is  the  most  desirable  for  its 

efiFect  on  the  free  labor  of  the  State. 

This  introduction,  of  course,  is  susceptible  to  many  changes 
and  improvements  leading  up  to  the  issues,  perhaps  if  desired 
a  fuller  statement  of  the  analysis,  but  it  fulfils  with  reasonable 
accuracy  the  functions  of  a  good  introduction  for  this  particu- 
lar question.  In  addition  to  Rule  9,  which  is  explanatory  of 
the  general  nature  of  this  part  of  the  brief,  it  should  be  borne 
in  mind  that  there  are  generally  three  things  necessary  in 
the  introduction,  in  order  to  make  it  conform  to  this  general 
rule:  (1)  a  definition  and  explanation  of  all  the  terms  of  the 
proposition  and  of  any  other  important  terms  in  the  discus- 
sion that  need  explanation;  (2)  an  explanation  of  the  nature 
and  real  meaning  of  the  question  as  found  by  analyzing  its 
essential  parts,  in  such  a  way  as  to  lead  up  to  (3)  (Rule  10) 
a  statement  of  the  issues  and  of  the  points  to  be  proved  by 
the  disputant  in  establishing  his  case.  These  three  elements 
of  the  introduction  are,  however,  variable  in  importance,  and 
their  necessity  is  not  in  all  cases  so  imperative  as  to  make 
them  all  properly  part  of  our  Rules  for  Brief-drawing.  But 
the  statement  of  the  issues  and  of  the  points  to  be  proved  in 
the  discussion  is  so  important  as  to  justify  the  incorporation 
of  it  among  the  principles  of  good  brief  drawing.  We  have 
seen  how  indispensable  it  is  for  the  disputant  himself  to  find 
and  understand  the  issue;  it  is  also  generally  desirable  that 
the  reader  or  hearer  understand  them.  For  him,  as  for  the 
writer  himself,  it  is  knowlege  of  the  issue  that  helps  him  to 
get  a  clear  view  of  the  real  question  in  its  entirety;  it  is  the 
issue  that  enables  him  to  follow  readily  the  subsequent  de- 
velopment of  the  proof;  it  is  by  an  understanding  of  the  is- 
sues that  he  may  be  made  to  feel  the  force  of  the  evidence 
and  the  arguments,  and  their  full  effect  upon  the  proposition. 

The  work  of  explaining  the  issues  is  like  the  work  of  the 
mill-race.     The  waters  of  the  river  go  rushing  by  with  im- 


BRIEF  DRAWING  AND  OUTLINING  229 

pressive  sound  and  force;  but  they  do  not  make  paper  or  spin 
cotton  till  the  raceway  gathers  in  their  power  and  directs  it 
straight  at  the  turbine  wheel.  So  evidence,  arguments,  and 
proof  of  all  kinds  may  impress  an  audience  with  their  volume 
and  loud  sound,  but  they  do  not  actually  convince  anybody 
until  they  are  controlled  and  effectively  directed  straight  at 
the  proposition.  This  is  the  true  work  of  the  issues.  They 
are  the  agency  by  which  the  proofs  given  in  the  discussion 
are  brought  into  connection  with  the  proposition,  in  such  a 
way  that  every  blow  in  the  proof  strikes  the  question  fairly 
and  helps  the  disputant  to  win  his  cause.  In  a  speech  it  is 
sometimes  desirable,  as  a  matter  of  tact,  to  conceal  the  points 
to  be  proved  in  the  discussion;  but  such  cases  are  exceptional, 
and  are  under  all  circumstances  provided  for  in  the  out- 
lining of  the  presentation  rather  than  in  the  drawing  of  the 
brief. 

"  Clash  of  opinion  "  in  the  brief.  If  the  proposition  is  ac- 
curately analyzed,  each  side  will  arrive  at  the  "potential 
issues,"  the  claims  the  affirmative  must  advance  unless  they 
are  admitted  by  the  negative.  Wherever  it  is  possible  to  get 
the  admissions  of  the  negative  these  should  be  stated  by  the 
affirmative  to  show  the  narrowing  down  to  the  actual  fight- 
ing issues.  The  negative  brief,  of  course,  should  recite  the 
admissions  after  giving  the  potential  issues,  thus  showing 
clearly  the  issues  on  which  the  argument  is  to  turn.  But  a 
perfunctory  statement  of  "the  clash  of  opinion"  for  all  briefs 
(in  most  of  which  probably  one  side  gives  not  only  its  opinions 
but  also  those  it  supposes  the  opposition  will  hold)  is  super- 
ficial and  worthless.  Stating  what  you  are  ready  to  prove  and 
what  you  expect  the  other  side  to  admit,  or  what  your  oppo- 
nent must  prove  and  what  you  actually  do  admit,  is  quite  a 
different  thing.  This  is  what  should  be  given  to  show  the  ac- 
tual issues  rather  than  a  carefully  balanced  "clash  of  opinion" 
which  is  in  part  mere  guess-work. 

Rule  11.  The  introduction  should  contain  only  statements 
the  truth  of  which  is  admitted  by  both  sides.    To  recur  again 


230  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

to  the  general  principles  of  arrangement,  the  introduction 
never  exists  for  its  own  sake,  and  does  not  properly  contain 
the  proof  of  the  proposition.  Particularly  in  brief  drawing 
is  it  the  servant  of  the  discussion  and  merely  preparatory  in 
nature.  If  we  put  into  it  prejudiced  statements,  that  an 
opponent  must  deny  and  that  we  must  consequently  support 
by  proof,  it  is  no  longer  an  introduction,  but  merely  one 
part  of  the  discussion.  We  have  destroyed  our  real  intro- 
duction. This  is  a  serious  mistake,  for  with  very  few  excep- 
tions it  is  indispensable  to  success  that  the  minds  of  judges 
or  readers  of  the  brief  be  prepared  for  the  reception  of  the 
proofs  before  they  are  thrust  upon  them,  and  this  work  can- 
not be  well  done  if  the  writer  is  actually  arguing,  and  fighting 
an  opponent  all  the  way.  There  is  nothing  in  the  work  of  the 
introduction  to  a  brief  to  require  any  prejudice  or  controver- 
sial attitude  to  make  it  effective.  It  is  merely  an  explanation 
of  the  matters  that  are  to  be  reasoned  about  in  the  discussion, 
and  of  the  facts  that  must  be  known  in  order  that  the  discus- 
sion may  be  understood.  The  writings  and  speeches  of  the 
masters  of  argumentative  art  all  show  their  appreciation  of 
the  true  functions  of  the  introduction  and  of  the  desirability 
of  keeping  it  free  from  signs  of  prejudice  even  in  oral  pres- 
entation. Although  it  may  sometimes  be  helpful  to  put 
argument  and  evidence  in  at  the  beginning  of  a  speech,  it 
usually  turns  out  in  the  end  that  it  is  just  as  well  for  us  to 
withhold  our  proof  till  the  discussion  proper  is  reached, 
and  use  the  introduction  for  its  primary  purpose  only.  In  a 
brief  this  should  always  be  done.  It  is  no  less  important  in 
the  case  of  briefs  prepared  not  for  the  use  of  others  in  decid- 
ing the  case,  but  for  the  purpose  of  arranging,  testing,  and 
relating  all  the  evidence  and  argument  that  might  be  used, 
as  a  step  in  preparation  for  oral  or  written  presentation  of 
the  whole  case  to  one  or  several  different  audiences.  Here 
it  is  important  that  the  writer  keep  his  case  clear  by  arrang- 
ing an  unprejudiced  introduction. 


BRIEF  DRAWING  AND  OUTLINING  231 

The  Discussion 

Rule  12.  The  discussion  should  contain  all  evidence 
and  argument  to  be  used  on  the  given  side  of  the  given  proposi- 
tion. This  rule  is  rather  obvious  when  we  understand  the 
proper  functions  of  a  brief,  and  that  arguing  should  not  be 
done  in  the  introduction  of  a  brief.  Of  course,  space  does  not 
permit  us  to  illustrate  this  rule.  It  should  be  remarked  here 
that  the  specimen  brief  given  here  is  to  illustrate  correct 
form — not  full  and  accurate  substance.  It  is  undesirable  to 
insert  into  a  text-book  a  full  and  complete  brief  on  a  big 
question. 

Rule  13.  In  the  discussion,  each  main  heading  should 
read  as  a  reason  for  the  truth  or  falsity  of  the  proposition.  The 
main  headings  of  the  discussion  are  the  points  of  the  parti- 
tion and  should  be  taken  up  in  the  order  given  in  the  intro- 
duction. They  should  be  carefully  phrased,  so  they  may  be 
connected  directly  with  the  proposition  by  the  word  "be- 
cause.'* For  instance,  we  may  say  (the  negative  statement 
of  the  proposition  here,  because  we  are  working  on  a  negative 
brief):  "The  contract  system  of  employing  convict  labor 
should  not  be  abolished,  because 

I.  It  brings  the  best  financial  returns. 
II.  It  is  effective  in  the  work  of  reforming  the  criminal. 
III.  Any  defects  in  it  can  be  remedied  without  destroying 

the  system. 
IV.  It  is  most  desirable  for  its  effect  on  the  free  labor  of  the 
State. 

If  there  were  an  additional  point  of  pure  refutation  it  might 
read  as  follows: 

V.  The  contention  of  the  affirmative  that  (such  and  such 
a  condition  exists)  is  untenable. 

Rule  14.  Each  subheading,  or  series  of  coordinate  sub-' 
headings,  should  read  as  a  reason  for  the  truth  of  the  heading 
above  it.  By  a  series  of  coordinate  sub-headings  is  meant  a 
coordinate  series  which  taken  together  constitute  a  reason  for 


232  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

the  heading  above,  as  B  is  true  because  1  and  2  are  true. 

1  alone  is  not  a  reason  for  B.  Neither  is  2.  But  1  and  2 
taken  together  make  a  reason.    The  relation  between  1  and 

2  may  not  be  best  expressed  by  "and.'*  This  situation  ob- 
tains whenever  we  have  subheadings  that  must  be  taken 
together.  "  When  coordinated  statements  in  a  brief  stand  in 
contrast  to  one  another,  or  in  any  suspended  relation,  the 
several  related  propositions  constitute,  in  reality,  a  single 
compound  argument,  rather  than  a  succession  of  equivalent 
contentions."  ^ 

Such  a  series  must  read  as  a  reason,  rather  than  each  part 
of  it  so  read,  in  order  to  comply  with  this  rule.  The  symbols 
used  to  represent  such  a  series  should  be  not  1  and  2,  but  1^ 
and  1^  or  A^  A^  A^,  etc.    As, 


A^ — and 

A^ 


because 


The  discussion  contains  the  real  proofs  of  the  composition. 
These  proofs  are  always  of  the  nature  of  flights  of  stairs  as- 
cending from  different  directions  toward  the  proposition. 
There  are  the  smallest  details  of  evidence,  which  serve  to 
establish  certain  facts;  these  facts  go  to  prove  some  larger 
facts;  and  so  on,  till  all  meet  and  are  made  one  in  the  propo- 
sition itself. 

Now  there  are  two  ways  in  which  these  proofs  may  be 
arranged  to  make  clear  this  relation  to  one  another.  By 
one  method  we  proceed  from  lesser  to  greater;  the  smallest 
details  are  stated  first,  then  follow  the  facts  these  details 
are  meant  to  prove,  and  finally  the  result  of  it  all  is  stated 
in  the  proposition.  C  is  true,  hence  B  is  true;  B  is  true, 
hence  A  is  true,  and  so  on. 

The  other  method  is  just  the  inverse  of  this.  The  fact 
that  is  directly  connected  with  the  proposition  is  put  first; 

1  Maxcy,  p.  29. 


BRIEF  DRAWING  AND  OUTLINING  233 

jiiext  come  the  facts  that  are  the  reasons  for  the  truth  of  the 
facts  that  were  first  alleged;  then,  following  in  series,  are  the 
lesser  and  still  lesser  ideas,  each  statement  reading  as  a  reason 
for  the  truth  of  the  statement  next  above  it.  A  is  true  be- 
cause B  is  true;  B  is  true  because  C  is  true,  etc. 

The  first  methods  may  be  illustrated  briefly  as  follows : 

a.  The  convicts  are  generally  employed  within  the  walls 

of  the  prison,  and 

b.  The  instructors  employed  by  the  contractors  are  under 

the  control  of  the  prison  ofiicers,  and 

c.  The  conditions  of  the  employment  of  the  convict  are 

specified  in  the  contract  or  by  legislation :  hence: 
1.  The  system  gives  opportunity  for  proper  control  of 
the  convicts,  hence: 

A.  Deficiencies  in  reformatory  methods  and  prison 
discipline  can  be  remedied  by  careful  adminis- 
tration, therefore: 
III.  Any  defects  in  the  contract  system  can  be  remedied 
without  destroying  the  system. 
The  second  method  would  make  this  part  of  the  brief  read 
as  follows: 

III.  Any  defects  in  the  contract  system  can  be  remedied 
without  destroying  the  system  because, 
A.  Deficiencies  in  reformatory  methods  and  prison  dis- 
cipline can  be  remedied  by  careful  adminis- 
tration,  for, 
1.  The    system    gives    opportunity   for   proper 
control  of  the  convicts,  for, 

a.  The    convicts    are    generally    employed 

within  the  walls  of  the  prison. 

b.  The  instructors  employed  by  the  con- 

tractors are  under  the  control  of  the 
prison  officers. 

c.  The  conditions  of  the  employment  of  the 

convict  are  specified  in  the  contract  or 
by  legislation. 


234  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

For  the  purposes  of  drawing  a  briefs  the  second  method, 
using  the  connectiv^es  ''for'  or  ''because,''  is  clearly  far 
better  than  the  first,  and  should  always  be  followed.  In  some 
cases  ^  it  is  wise  in  presenting  proof  to  conceal  till  the  end  the 
point  that  is  being  proved,  but  these  cases  are  exceptional; 
and  even  where  such  concealment  is  desirable,  it  should  be 
carried  out  in  the  final  presentation,  not  in  the  making  of  the 
brief.  The  defects  of  the  first  method,  which  may  perhaps 
be  called  the  *' hence  and  therefore"  method,  are  obvious. 
When  a  brief  or  an  argument  founded  upon  such  a  brief  is 
presented,  the  reader  or  hearer  does  not  understand  what 
the  disputant  is  "driving  at,"  till  after  long  wanderings  he 
reaches  the  point  to  be  proved;  then  the  reader  is  forced  to  go 
back  over  all  the  ground  again,  in  order  to  estimate  the  real 
force  of  what  he  has  been  reading,  and  an  audience,  who 
cannot  be  given  the  privilege  of  hearing  it  explained 
again,  have  irretrievably  lost  many  of  the  good  points  of  the 
proof. 

Again,  the  "hence  and  therefore"  arrangement  has  the 
disadvantage  of  presenting  a  deceptive  appearance  to  the 
eye.  It  puts  the  least  important  proof  in  the  most  prominent 
places  and  makes  it  hard  to  appreciate,"  at  a  glance,  the  real 
co-ordination  of  the  points.  Finally,  it  makes  the  work  of 
lettering  and  numbering  difficult. 

Rule  15.  Objections  to  be  refuted  should  be  dealt  with  as  they 
arise.  This  means  that  in  the  brief  we  should  weave  in  with 
our  constructive  work  specific  refutation  of  statements  of  our 
opponents  whenever  we  know  of  them  and  are  able  to  do  so. 
In  any  part  of  the  brief  it  is  possible  to  introduce  a  point 
in  refutation,  by  making  one  of  the  regular  reasons  read  as 
an  answer  to  a  specific  charge  of  the  other  side.  For  in- 
stance: 

1  Sec  a,  p.  308. 


BRIEF  DRAWING  AND  OUTLINING  235 

I  because 

A  

B   because 

1   

2   because 

a   

b   

c  The  charge  that  ( ) 

is  false,  because 

(I) 

(11) _ •••  . 

Such  a  piece  of  refutation  as  c  in  this  diagram  can  obvi- 
ously be  inserted  anywhere,  in  any  series  of  reasons,  in  any 
order  of  reasons,  in  any  order  of  subordination.  Of  course, 
if  the  refutation  is  of  the  first  order,  it  will  stand  as  a  main 
point  in  the  discussion  and  so  will  be  announced  in  the  par- 
tition as  a  regular  main  point. 

Rule  16.  In  phrasing  refutation  the  heading  should  state 
clearly  the  argument  to  be  ansivered,  and  the  character  of  the 
answer  to  be  made.  This  precept  is  of  great  importance, 
because  it  guards  against  a  serious  error.  Refutation  is  the 
name  that  is  given  to  any  attack  directed  against  the  proof 
of  an  opponent.  With  the  importance  of  refutation  and  the 
methods  of  handling  it,  we  are  not  now  concerned;  ^  but  there 
must  always  be  more  or  less  of  it  in  any  brief,  and  its  effective- 
ness depends  very  largely  upon  the  way  it  is  introduced. 
The  writer  of  a  brief,  knowing  in  his  own  mind  what  is  the 
position  of  his  opponent  which  he  desires  to  assail,  very 
naturally  falls  into  the  mistake  of  unconsciously  attributing 
a  like  knowledge  to  others,  and  so  goes  on  to  array  his  an- 
swers, \^^thout  making  clear  to  his  audience  or  readers  just 
what  it  is  he  is  answering,  and  how  he  is  answering  it.  This 
carelessness  often  proves  troublesome;  for  in  order  to  make 
refutation  achieve  its  purposes,  it  is  necessary  that  the  at- 
tention of  an  audience  be  first  directed  toward  the  exact  point 
1  See  chapter  15. 


236  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

in  controversy,  in  order  that  they  may  see  the  comparison  of 
the  two  sides  and  so  feel  the  destructive  force  of  the  answer. 

For  example,  it  is  urged  by  opponents  of  the  contract 
system,  that  the  system  enables  the  prison  authorities  and 
the  contractors  to  become  rich  at  the  expense  of  the  prisoners. 
In  refuting  this  point,  the  student  w^ould  be  guilty  of  am- 
biguity if  he  should  say,  "The  contract  system  does  not 
allow  the  prison  authorities  and  the  contractors  to  become 
rich  at  the  expense  of  the  prisoners."  It  might  very  naturally 
be  supposed  from  the  statement  that  this  is  a  point  of  posi- 
tive proof  rather  than  a  point  in  refutation,  that  the  writer 
is  upholding  this  as  one  of  the  virtues  of  the  system.  This 
makes  his  proof  weak,  for  he  is  "damning  the  system  with 
faint  praise."  Again,  this  statement  of  the  point  might  be 
interpreted  to  mean,  that  the  writer  was  comparing  the  con- 
tract system  with  other  systems,  and  declaring  it  to  be  pref- 
erable in  this  respect.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  what  he  means 
is,  that  the  arguments  made  by  his  opponent  to  prove  this 
objection  to  the  contract  system  are  false.  To  make  his 
position  clear  and  to  bring  his  own  arguments  into  proper 
contrast  with  those  of  his  opponent,  he  should  have  stated 
his  refutation  somewhat  as  follows:  "The  objection  that 
this  system  allows  the  prison  authorities  and  the  contractors 
to  become  rich  at  the  expense  of  the  prisoners  is  groundless, 
for,  etc." 

This  is,  in  general,  the  desirable  way  to  introduce  refuta- 
tion: (1)  state  briefly  and  clearly  the  argument  to  be  answered; 
and  (2)  tell  the  nature  of  the  answer.  Then  give  the  answer. 
As  for  instance,  "The  contention  that  free  silver  causes  pros- 
perity is  founded  upon  a  false  assumption,  for,"  etc.  "The 
evidence  of  Madden  that  Swift  was  married  to  Stella  John- 
son is  unreliable,  for,"  etc.  "The  argument  that  the  incor- 
poration of  labor  unions  will  prevent  strikes  is  weak,  for," 
etc.  Whatever  the  form  of  the  statement,  it  should  so  pro- 
claim the  argument  to  be  answered  that  the  attention  of  a 
reader  or  hearer  cannot  be  misdirected. 


BRIEF  DRAWING  AND  OUTLINING  237 

The  Conclusion 

Rule  17.  The  conclusion  should  contain  a  summary  oj 
the  essential  paints  of  the  proof.  The  function  of  the  conclu- 
sion in  the  brief  is  obvious  from  the  work  itself.  Its  duty  is 
merely  to  sum  up  the  essential  points  that  have  been  estab- 
hshed  by  the  proof,  and  to  make  clear  their  bearing  as  a 
whole  on  the  proposition.  This  work  is  best  done  by  a 
summary  in  brief  form,  lettered  and  numbered. 

The  summary  should  generally  contain  a  statement  of 
all  the  main  headings  of  the  discussion,  and  of  as  many  of  the 
subheadings  as  are  necessary  finally  to  present  the  proof  as 
a  whole.  An  illustration  of  the  form  of  such  summary  is 
given  in  the  conclusion  of  the  brief  printed  at  the  end  of  this 
chapter. 

G.  Parallel  column  brief.  Before  closing  this  chapter 
attention  should  be  caUed  to  a  new  style  of  brief  drawing 
which  arranges  the  discussion  in  three  parallel  columns  of 
inferences,  facts,  and  sources.  While  this  device  seems  to  us 
not  well  adapted  for  use  as  a  final  form  for  the  finished  brief, 
it  is  an  excellent  scheme  for  enforcing  and  testing  thorough- 
going analysis.  It  brings  out  with  great  clearness  the  three 
elements  (arguments,  evidence,  and  sources  of  information) 
that  must  be  found  in  any  well-drawn  brief,  and  might  well 
be  used  in  preliminary  exercises  for  training  in  accurate 
analysis.  As  a  means  of  demonstrating  the  difference  between 
bare  assertions  and  substantial  proof,  it  can  be  used  to  great 
advantage.  The  following  illustration  and  brief  comment  is 
quoted  from  Professor  F.  B.  Robinson's  Elective  Public 
Speaking}  The  words  "arguments"  and  "evidence"  have 
been  substituted  for  "inferences"  and  "facts"  as  the  head- 
ings for  the  first  two  columns.  In  the  first  paragraph 
quoted  (p.  239)  for  "issues"  the  student  should  read 
"points  in  partition." 

1  Pages  280-284. 


238 


ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 


Arguments 

Evidence 

Sources 

B.  The  permanent  retention 

of  the  Philippines  is  de- 

sirable for  economic  rea- 

sons, for 

1.  A  valuable  territory 

(a)  The  area  is  more  than 

U.  S.  Survey. 

is  acquired. 

115,000  square  miles. 

(b)  Soil  is  very  productive. 

Miller:  Eco- 

(c) Can  support  a  popula- 

nomic Condi- 

tion of  42,000,000— 

tions  in  the 

• 

equal     to    that    of 
Japan. 

Philippines. 

2.  Our  foreign  trade  will 

Increase  since  possession: 

increase,  for 

In  1899,  the  Philippine 

(a)  Retention  insures 

Islands   imported   from 

larger  trade  with 

us  one  out  of  thirteen 

the  Philippines, 

millions  and  sold  us  one 

out  of  fifteen  millions;  in 

Miller,  p.  368. 

1912,     they     imported 

from  us  twenty-one  out 

of  fifty-five  millions,  and 

sent  us  twenty-two  out 

of  fifty  millions. 

(b)  Retention  will  in- 

Philippines are  located  in 

Worcester, 

sure  access  to  the 

trade  routes. 

p.  888. 

larger    trade    of 

Philippine      harbors      are 

Chamberlin, 

the  East,  and 

good. 

Philippine 

They  are  the  best  in  the 

Problem, 

Pacific. 

Ch.  7. 

(c)  The  Eastern  trade 

is  desirable. 

I.  There  is  a  great 

We  alone  exported  to  Asia 

Worcester, 

trade        with 

and  Oceania   two   hun- 

pp. 870-872. 

Asia    and    es- 

dred     million      dollars' 

pecially  China. 

worth  in  1913. 

BRIEF  DRAWING  AND  OUTLINING 


239 


Arguments 

Evidence 

Sources 

3.  Home     business     and 

Exports    to    China     from 

World  Almanac, 

capitat    will  be    bene- 

United  States  in    1914, 

p.  219. 

fited,  for 

thirty-five  millions. 

(a)    Foreign       exports 

support  additional 

home     production 

and 

I.  Employ      more 

American  labor. 

II.  Employ      more 

American     cap- 

ital. 

(b)  American     capital 

See  figures  for  investment 

Statesman's 

will  invest  in  the 

of    English     capital    in 

Year  Book. 

Philippines,       for 

English  colonies ; 

I.  Capital        will 

German  capital  in  German 

go    where    the 

colonies,  etc. 

home    country 

guarantees 

protection. 

"  The  backbone  of  the  inference  column  is  made  up  of  the 
issues.^  Each  one  of  them  is  an  inference  and  all  of  the  sub- 
ordinate statements  which  are  offered  as  supports  are  also 
inferences.  These  issues  ^  should  be  examined  systemat- 
ically. ...  (a)  Is  each  issue  ^  distinct  from  every  other  one  ? 
(b)  Are  they  all,  taken  together,  adequate  to  lead  you  to 
infer  the  main  resolution  from  them  ?  (c)  Are  they  properly 
supported?  .  .  . 

"  The  facts  in  the  second  column  should  be  abundant. 
Furthermore,  the  source  column  must  contain  the  names  of 
witnesses  and  sources  so  that  the  acceptability,  credibility, 
and  conditions  of  observations  may  be  passed  upon.  The 
place  where  the  evidence  is  to  be  found  should  be  noted  in 


^  For  issues  read  points  in  partition. 


240  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

sufficient  detail  to  enable  others  to  get  it  readily  ahd  read 
it  in  context. 

"For  faults  in  reasoning,  carefully  read  the  inference 
column;  to  discover  lack  of  facts,  read  the  fact  column; 
and  to  check  up  authorities  and  sources,  consult  the  last 
column.  This  form  of  brief  provides  not  only  an  or- 
derly form-arrangement  of  material  but  also  a  basis  of 
criticism." 

H.  Complete  sample  brief.  The  following  brief  while 
not  complete  as  to  details  of  evidence  is  correct  in  form,  and 
ought  to  be  a  satisfactory  model.  It  is  not  presented  as 
complete  or  perfect  or  as  approaching  perfection,  but  it  il- 
lustrates the  principles  that  govern  the  making  of  a  brief, 
effectively  embodying  the  general  laws  of  the  arrangement 
of  materials. 

Introduction  ^ 

I.  The  problem  of  the  employment  of  the  convict  is  one  of 
the  serious  questions  of  criminology. 

A.  It  is  admitted   that  convicts  must  be  employed  in 

some  kind  of  work. 

B.  Several  different    systems   have  been  tried  in  this 

country. 
1 .  The  principal  systems  are  the  piece-price  system,  the 
public-account  system,  and  the  contract  system. 
II.  These  three  systems  may  be  described  as  follows : 

A.  The  characteristics  of  the  piece-price  systems  are  three: 

1.  Contracts  are  made  with  persons,  firms,  or  corpo- 

rations   under   which   the   prison   is    furnished 
with  raw  materials. 

2.  These  raw  materials  are  manufactured  by  the  con- 

victs at  agreed  prices  per  piece. 

3.  The  work  is  done  wholly  under  the  supervision  of 

prison  officials. 

^  The  proposition  is :  "  Resolved :  that  the  contract  system  of  employ- 
ing convict  labor  should  be  abolished." 


BRIEF  DRAWING  AND  OUTLINING  241 

B.  The  public-account  system  is  as  follows: 

1.  The  prison  buys  its  own  raw  materials. 

2.  The  prison  manufactures  like  a  private  firm,  and 

sells  in  the  best  available  market. 

C.  The  contract  system  involves  the  following  charac- 

teristics : 

1.  Contracts  are  made  with  persons,  firms,  or  corpo- 

rations, under  which  convicts  are  employed  at 
certain  agreed  prices  for  their  labor,  for  fixed 
periods  of  time. 

2.  The  contractors  are  usually  furnished  by  the  prison 

with  power  and  machinery. 

3.  The  convicts  work  under  the  immediate  direction 

of  the  contractor,  but  subject  tc  the  supervision 
of  the  prison  oflficials. 
III.   The   issue   is :     Is    the    continuance    of   the   contract 
system  detrimental  to  the    general  welfare  of  the 
State.? 
A.  This  question  must  be  decided  by  comparing  the  sys- 
tem with  other  possible  systems   (since  it  is  ad- 
mitted that  some  system  must  be  employed)   on 
three  points,  viz.: 

1.  Are  the  financial  returns  unsatisfactory? 

2.  Does  it  fail  to  promote  satisfactorily  the  reforma- 

tion of  the  criminal.'^ 

3.  Does   it   entail   unnecessary^   injurious   effects   on 

the  free  labor  of  the  State  .'^ 
IV.  The  negative  intends  to  prove  its  case  by  establishing 
four  facts: 

A.  The  contract  system  brings  the  best  financial  returns. 

B.  The  contract  system  is  effective  in  the  work  of  re- 

forming the  criminal. 

C.  Any  defects  of  the  system  can  be  remedied  without 

destroying  it. 

D.  The  contract  system  is  the  most  desirable  for  its 

effect  on  the  free  labor  of  the  State. 


242  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

Discussion 

I.  The  contract  system  brings  the  best  financial  returns, 
because, 

A.  The  system  avoids  expenses  necessary  in  the  other 

systems,  for, 

1.  It  avoids  the  expense  of  machinery. 

2.  It  avoids  the  necessity  of  supplying  working  cap- 

ital. 

3.  It  avoids  the  employment  of  high-priced  officials 

and  salesmen. 

4.  It  avoids  the  risks  and  losses  of  trade. 

5.  It  diminishes  opportunities  for  peculation,  because, 

a.  Extravagance  and  peculation  are  common 
under  the  other  systems,  for, 
(I)  The  Commissioner  of  Labor  of  New 
York  declares,  "The  large  outlay 
of  funds  under  the  public-account 
system  gave  opportunity  for  whole- 
sale extravagance  and  peculation." 

B.  The  public-account  system  is  seriously  defective  from 

a  financial  standpoint,  for, 

1.  In  Illinois  in  four  years  and  five  months  the  loss 

to  the  State  was  $314,212. 

2.  In  New  York  it  was  found  that  the  expenses  of 

the  sales  department  were  such  as  to  make  the 
system  financially  impracticable. 

C.  According  to  the  report  of  the  United  States  Com- 

mission of  Labor,  the  income  of  this  system  is  sixty- 
five  per  cent  of  the  running  expenses  of  the  prison. 

D.  The  Commission,  comparing  this  system  with  others, 

declares  these  returns  to  be  more  satisfactory  than 

those  from  any  other  system,  for, 
1.  This  Commission  says,  "In  a  financial  sense  the 
contract  system  is  the  most  profitable  of  any  to 
the  State,  except  the  so-called  lease  system." 


BRIEF  DRAWING  AND  OUTLINING  243 

II.  The  contract  system  is  effective  in  the  work  of  reforming 

the  criminal,  because, 

A.  The  convicts  are  under  the  direct  and  responsible 

control  of  the  State,  for, 

1.  In  every  contract  there  is  a  clause  providing  that 

the  contractor  shall  have  no  control  over,  and 
shall  in  no  way  interfere  with,  prison  discipline. 

2.  Punishment  cannot  be  inflicted  on  the  complaint 

of  instructors  without  full  investigation  by  the 
wardens. 

3.  The  penalty  for  any  violation  of  the  rules  by  a 

contractor  or  instructor  is  immediate  dismissal. 

B.  The  system  teaches  the  prisoner  a  practical  trade  by 

which  he  can  earn  an  honest  living  after  release, 
because, 

1.  The  Labor  Commissioners  of  New  York  say  that 

the  convicts  learn  exactly  the  same  trades  and 
specialize  in  the  same  way  as  in  factories  and 
other  places  of  work  outside. 

2.  It  proved  effective  in  Pennsylvania  in  teaching 

trades  for  practice  after  leaving  the  prison. 

C.  It  teaches  habits  of  industry,  because, 

1.  Under  it  the  convict  must  be  constantly  employed, 
for, 
a.  The  contractor  engages  to  keep  a  certain  num- 
ber of  men  continually  employed. 

D.  The  contract  system  promotes  the  health  of  the  con- 

victs, because, 
1.  Mr.  Pillsbury  of  New  York  says  that  the  system 
is  very  beneficial  to  the  health  of  the  convicts, 
and  that  they  leave  the  prison  in  better  physi- 
cal condition  than  when  they  came. 

III.  Any  defects  in  the  contract  system  can  be  remedied 

without  destroying  the  system,  because 
A.  Deficiencies  in  reformatory  methods  and  prison  disci- 
pline can  be  remedied  by  careful  administration,  for, 


244  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

1.  The  system  gives  opportunity  for  proper  control 

of  the  convicts,  for, 

a.  The  convicts  are  generally  employed  within  the 

walls  of  the  prison. 

b.  The  instructors  employed  by  the  contractors 

are  under  the  control  of  the  prison  officers. 

c.  The  conditions  of  the  employment  of  the  con- 

vict are  specified  in  the  contract  or  by  legis- 
lation. 

2.  The  work   of  reform   depends   largely  upon  the 

character  of  the  officers  in  charge. 

3.  The  character  of  the  officials  can  be  improved  by 

legislation,  for, 

a.  Making  the  offices  non-partisan  would  remove 

inefficiency  due  to  politics. 

b.  Efficiency  of  the  officers  would  be  improved  by 

making  the  term  of  office  permanent  during 
good  behavior. 
B.  Any  possible  evils  of  competition  can  be  remedied  by 
legislation,  because, 

1.  Competition  can  be  prevented   by   limiting   the 

production  of  any  article  by  convicts  to  one- 
tenth  of  the  total  product  in  that  State. 

2.  Competition  could  be  lessened  by  providing  for  a 

greater  diversity  of  products  by  the  convicts,  for, 
a.  The  Labor  Commissioner  of  Massachusetts  rec- 
ommends this  as  a  remedy. 

3.  Competition  could  be  lessened  by  a  law  requiring 

the  public  advertisement  for  proposals  for  con- 
tracts, because, 
a.  This  would  tend  to  prevent   injuriously  low 
prices  in  competition,  for, 
(I)  The  advertisement  of  the  proposals  would 
raise  the  cost  of  production  to  the  con- 
tractor  by   stimulating  competition  in 
bids  for  the  labor. 


BRIEF  DRAWING  AND  OUTLINING  245 

IV.  The  contract  system  is  the  most  desirable  for  its  effect  on 
the  free  labor  of  the  State,  because, 
A.  The  argument  that  the  competition  of  convict  labor 
with  free  labor  under  the  contract  system  is  det- 
rimental to  the  welfare  of  the  State  is  weak,  for, 

1.  The  competition  must  exist  under  any  system  of 

employment,  because, 
a.  The  products  of  the  convict  must  be  sold  in  the 
market. 

2.  The  competition  is  more  serious  under  the  public- 

account  system,  for, 

a.  Goods  can  be  sold  below  the  market  price  in 

competition,  because, 

(I)  The   State   cannot  be  forced  into  bank- 

ruptcy. 

(II)  The  whole  cost  of  production  is  the  cost 

of  the  material. 

b.  The  tendency  is  to  centralize  manufactures  on 

a  few  lines  of  production,  for, 
(I)  It  is  impossible  to  manage  many  different 
lines  of  manufacturing. 

c.  The  United  States  Industrial  Commission  says, 

"It  has  been  shown  by  numerous  investiga- 
tions that  under  the  public-account  system 
there  is  greater  competition  with  the  prod- 
ucts of  free  labor  than  under  any  other." 

3.  The  competition  is  at  least  no  less  harmful  under 

the  piece-price  system,  because, 

a.  The  Industrial  Commission  in  their  report  of 

1900  say  that  the  piece-price  system  does 
not  affect  the  competition  with  free  labor. 

b.  The  first  biennial  report  of  the  Bureau  of  Labor 

of  California  declares  that  under  the  piece- 
price  system  the  effects  of  competition  were 
no  different  from  the  effects  under  the  con- 
tract system. 


246  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

c.  The  Prison  Labor  Reform  Commission  of  New 

York  stated  that,  in  practical  operation,  the 
piece-price  system  was  shown  to  be  more 
oppressive  to  competitive  free  labor  than  the 
contract  system. 

d.  In  New  Jersey  this  system  was  found  to  be 

worse  in  its  competitive  effects  than  the  con- 
tract system. 
B.  It  is  conductive  to  the  effective  administration  of  the 
prison,  for, 

1.  The  officers  of  the  prison  are  chosen  solely  for 

their  efficiency  as  prison  keepers,  for, 
a.  They  are  not  required  to  act  as  business  man- 
agers, because 
(I)  The  manufacturing  is  done  under  the  di- 
rection of  outside  contractors. 

2.  The  contract  system  restricts  prisons  to  the  use 

for  which  they  are  intended,  for, 
a.  It  relieves  the  management  of  the  prison  from 
the  necessity  of  managing  large  manufactur- 
ing establishments,  as  under  the  other  sys- 
tems. 

Conclusion 

I.  The  negative  has  proved  the  following: 

A.  The  contract  system  brings  the  best  financial  returns, 

because, 

1.  It  avoids  expenses  necessary  in  the  other  systems. 

2.  The  public-account  system  is  seriously  defective 

financially. 

3.  The  income  from  the  contract  system  is  sixty-five 

per  cent  of  the  running  expenses. 

4.  Students  of  the  subject  declare  that  the  returns  are 

largest  from  the  contract  system. 

B.  The  contract  system  is  effective  in  the  work  of  reform- 

ing the  criminal,  for 


BRIEF  DRAWING  AND  OUTLINING  247 

1.  The  convicts  are  under  the  direct  control  of  the 

State. 

2.  The  system  furnishes  a  trade  to  the  convict,  and 

thus  furnishes  a  means  of  honest  Hvehhood  on  his 
release. 

3.  The  convict  is  taught  habits  of  industry. 

4.  The  contract  system  promotes  the  health  of  the 

convicts. 

C.  Any  defects  in  the  contract  system  can  be  remedied 

without  destroying  the  system,  for, 

1.  Disciplinary  and  reformatory  deficiencies  can  be 

remedied  by  careful  administration. 

2.  Any  possible  evils  of  competition  can  be  remedied 

by  legislation. 

D.  The  contract  system  is  the  most  desirable  for  its  effect 

on  the  general  welfare  of  the  State,  for, 

1.  The  argument  that  it  introduces  undesirable  com- 

petition with  free  labor  is  weak. 

2.  It  gives  effective  prison  administration. 

II.  We  therefore  maintain  that  the  contract  system  of  em- 
ploying convict  labor  should  not  be  abolished. 


EXERCISE.     CHAPTER  10 

BRIEF   DRAWING   AND   OUTLINING 

1.  Write   the   introduction  to   a  brief  on   some   "campus 

topic.'* 

2.  Write  the  discussion  of  the  brief  mentioned  in  1. 

3.  Hand  in  a  complete  brief  of  the  material  contained  in 

Appendix  E,  1. 

4.  Write  a  complete  brief  of  material  contained  in  Appendix 

E,  2. 

5.  Hand  in,  in  the  form  of  a  parallel  column  brief,  all  of  your 

material  on  one  main  point  in  the  discussion  of  the  brief 
of  your  original  forensic. 


248  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

6.  Hand  in  a  complete  brief  of  the  subject  chosen  for  your 

original   forensic. 

7.  Hand  in  three  different  outlines,  showing  the  adaptation 

of  the  material  in  the  brief  on  the  campus  topic  to  three 
different  audiences — as  for  instance,  the  Freshman  Class, 
the  Faculty,  the  Board  of  Regents,  or  Trustees. 

8.  Hand   in  a  complete  outline  of  your  original  forensic, 

adapting  the  outline  carefully  to  a  particular  audience 
and  occasion,  the  characteristics  of  each  of  which  shall 
be  definitely  set  forth. 


SECTION  D.    PRESENTATION 
CHAPTER  11 

PERSUASION 

OUTLINE 

I.  Conviction  and  Persuasion  in  Presentation 

A.  The  brief  and  presentation. 

B.  Conviction  and  persuasion. 

C.  Selecting  parts  of  case  for  particular  audience. 

II.  The  Nature  of  Persuasion 

A.  Persuasion  defined. 

B.  Persuasion  in  almost  all  argumentation. 

C.  Prejudice  against  an  "emotional  appeal." 

D.  Emotion  in  argumentation. 

1.  Emotion  the  basis  in  practical  issues  affecting  human 

conduct. 

2.  Strong  tendency  of  men  to  believe  what  they  wish  to  be- 

lieve. 

3.  Emotions   not  belonging   to   the  argument   itself   affect 

decisions. 

E.  Kinds  of  emotional  appeals. 

F.  Classifications  of  emotions. 

m.  Practical  Suggestions  for  Persuasion 

A.  The  speaker. 

1.  Know  human  nature. 

2.  Personality. 

3.  Sincerity  or  earnestness. 

4.  Modesty. 

5.  Self-control  and  reserve  force. 

6.  Fairness. 

249 


250  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

B.  The  subject. 

1 .  Fit  audience  and  speaker„ 

2.  Handling  subject-matter. 

a.  Brevity. 

b.  Simplicity. 

c.  Vividness. 

(I)  Reference  to  experience. 

(A)  Vivid  experiences. 

(1)  Originally  intense. 

(2)  Frequent  occurrence. 

(3)  Frequently  recollected. 

(4)  Recent. 

(II)  Concrete  and  specific. 

d.  Variety. 

(I)  Comparison  and  climax. 

C.  The  audience. 

1.  Adaptation  to  particular  audience. 

2.  Tact. 

3.  Indirect  appeal. 

4.  Responsibility;  facing  the  truth. 

5.  The  friendly  audience. 

6.  The  hostile  audience. 

7.  Eight  suggestions  for  persuasion  illustrated. 

I.    Conviction  and  Persuasion  in  Presentation 

A.  The  brief  and  presentation.  Under  invention,  se- 
lection, and  arrangement,  we  have  considered  the  methods 
of  finding  materials,  of  estimating  their  value,  and  of  arrang- 
ing them  so  as  best  to  utilize  their  strength.  The  product  of 
our  work  has  been  embodied  in  a  brief.  It  sometimes  happens 
that  our  preparation  ends  here;  the  brief  itself  may  be  the 
presentation  of  our  argument.  But  as  a  rule  other  prepara- 
tion is  required.  The  brief  may  be  but  the  foundation- 
st^nes.^ilithfi-feemns  which  sustain  anrj  shape  the  buildhig, 
but  which  in  the  end  ar/^  hidden  from  view  by  nut^ward  forms 
thafare  more  sightJ^^and^Jnore  useful;  or  it  miijr  behut  an 
orderTystorehouse  of  material  from  which  Id  .draaLwJiatever 


PERSUASION  251 

is  neededf  or  specific  occasions.  To  achieve  our  purposes, 
we  generally  neemo  put  the  materials  in  more  pleasing 
and  effective  rhetorical  form.  The  brief  as  we  have  consid- 
ered it  so  far  is  an  impersonal  thing.  Iti^a  full  statement 
of  "the  case'*  as  a  case-  adapted  to  no  audience  in  particular. 
It  has  no  persuasion  in  it — except  what  may  be  there  inci- 
dentally on  account  of  the  persuasive  nature  of  some  of  the 
evidence.  Even  when  a  brief  is  to  be  the  final  presentation 
of  the  case,  it  is  still  usually  lacking  in  persuasion,  is  largely 
impersonal  and  simply  introduces  the  argument  without 

bias,  prf>gpntg  pviHptipp  \x\  r^ff^r\  fr>rmj  and  draws  jngjcal  in- 
fprenres  without  fervor  or  ernntinn  nf  any  kind.^  For  the 
presentation  of  this  kind  of  case  we  are  now  prepared.  A 
neat  manuscript  which  follows  the  suggestions  and  rules  of 
the  last  chapter  is  all  that  is  necessary. 

B.  Conviction  and  persuasion.  When  we  have  to  argue 
a  case  in  public  (either  orally  or  in  print)  the  situation  is 
different.  Then  there  is  more  to  be  done  than  we  have  yet 
considered.  Up  to  this  point  the  work  is  the  same  for  all 
kinds  of  presentation.  In  the  preparation  of  any  important 
argument  the  first  thing  to  be  done  is  the  drawing  of  a  com- 
plete brief — a  full  statement  of  the  intellectual  basis  of  the 
case.  In  this  we  consider  the  inherent  weight  of  evidence  and 
force  of  inference  as  such,  as  far  as  possible  without  regard 
to  any  particular  audience.  Now  a  new  element  enters  in. 
We  now  have  to  consider  persuasion. 

In  our  earlier  consideration  of  the  general  nature  of  the 
art,  we  have  seen  that  there  are  two  aspects  or  methods  of 
approach  in  all  argumentation:  (1)  conviction,  or  the  appeal 
to  the  reason,  which  is  the  act  of  inducing  another  to  accept 
the  truth  of  an  idea  or  proposition;  and  (2)  persuasion,  or 
the  appeal  to  the  emotions,  which  is  the  act  of  influencing 
another  by  affecting  his  feelings.  We  have  further  seen  that 
both  are  usually  essential  to  effectiveness.  Certain  elements 
of  persuasion  must  be  considered  in  preparing  to  present  any 
case  either  oral  or  written  to  any  general  audience.    There  is 


252  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

no  such  thing  as  an  audience  of  human  beings  to  whom  it  is 
safe  to  present  any  case  without  giving  thought  to  the  Hkes 
and  dishkes,  prejudices,  experiences,  and  habits  of  the  people 
to  be  addressed.  How  much  conviction  and  how  much  per- 
suasion to  use  must  be  determined  by  circumstances.  In 
an  intercollegiate  debate,  the  element  of  persuasion  is  slight. 
It  is  usually  no  more  than  tact  and  vigor  in  the  work  of  con- 
viction. The  lawyer  before  the  jury  needs  a  judicious  mix- 
ture of  both.  Dan  ton  before  the  French  convention  made 
his  appeal  almost  wholly  to  the  turbulent  passions  of  a  pas- 
sionate mob.  But  though  the  relative  amounts  of  the  two 
elements  may  vary,  both  are  almost  always  necessary  for 
success. 

C.  Selecting  parts  of  case  for  each  particular  audience: 
conviction.  If  we  have  a  complete  brief  of  the  case  pre- 
pared with  no  particular  audience  in  mind  there  is  one  other 
step  to  take  before  we  prepare  a  persuasive  presentation  for  a 
given  audience.  That  is:  sort  out  those  parts  of  the  brief, 
those  phases  of  the  case,  which  you  wish  to  present  to  this 
particular  audience.  Not  only  will  you  perhaps  want  to 
present  the  same  material  differently  to  different  audiences 
but  you  will  want  to  present  different  material  to  different 
audiences.  Do  not  waste  time  and  tire  an  audience  by  prov- 
ing elaborately  a  point  which  to  this  particular  audience  needs 
no  proof.  Do  not  give  a  long  detailed  introduction  (suitable 
to  an  uninformed  audience)  to  an  audience  already  familiar 
with  the  facts.  In  other  words,  do  not  make  a  brief  and  then 
present  it  as  drawn  to  all  audiences.  Take  the  appropriate 
parts  for  each  audience.  For  instance,  suppose  you  wish  to 
have  a  new  policy  adopted  in  your  university.  After  careful 
investigation  and  gathering  of  evidence  you  prepare  a  com- 
plete brief  in  support  of  the  proposed  policy.  If  the  decision 
rests  with  a  single  officer  or  small  committee  this  brief  may 
be  submitted  in  full  either  with  or  without  comment.  But 
suppose  you  must  gain  the  support  of  a  number  of  different 
bodies  by  presenting  the  merits  of  your  plan  orally  to  them. 


PERSUASION  253 

Suppose  a  group  of  audiences  taken  from  this  list:  senior 
class,  athletic  council,  whole  student  body,  faculty,  board  of 
trustees,  state  legislature.  One  of  these  groups  may  admit 
points  which  will  have  to  be  substantiated  (with  varying 
degrees  of  thoroughness)  before  other  bodies.  Introductory 
material  needed  in  a  student  meeting  might  be  superfluous 
before  faculty  or  legislature — or  vice  versa.  In  this  way 
"the  case"  as  briefed  must  be  changed  and  adapted  to  fit 
each  separate  audience  approached.  An  audience  before 
which  a  complete  and  properly  drawn  brief  may  profitably 
be  used  as  the  outline  of  an  oral  argument  is  rarely  if  ever 
found. 

The  most  important  work  of  conviction  is  about  done 
when  the  brief  is  completed.  When  the  materials  have  been 
gathered  and  arranged,  it  only  remains  to  put  the  proof  in 
words  that  will  impress  it  clearly  and  forcibly  on  the  under- 
standing of  those  we  would  convince.  To  be  able  to  do  this, 
obviously  the  first  requisite  is  a  knowledge  of  rhetoric.  The 
effect  of  well-arranged  and  well-chosen  proofs  is  often  neu- 
tralized by  confused  and  halting  English.  The  man  who 
cannot  express  himself  is  always  a  weakling  in  argumentation. 

Then,  in  addition  to  the  general  principles  of  rhetoric, 
there  are  certain  adaptations  of  these  rhetorical  principles 
to  the  peculiar  work  of  argumentation. 

A  general  treatment  of  rhetorical  forms  lies  beyond  the 
necessary  limits  of  this  book.  The  principles  that  are  pecu- 
liar to  argumentative  composition  will  be  treated  in  the  fol- 
lowing chapters  on  the  introduction,  the  discussion,  and  the 
conclusion. 

II.  The  Nature  of  Persuasion 

A.  Persuasion  defined.  Persuasion  has  been  defined 
as  the  art  of  influencing  another  by  affecting  his  feelings  or 
emotions.  In  the  past  text-books  on  rhetoric  and  argumenta- 
tion have  for  the  most  part  made  this  statement,  and  left 
the  student  with  little  further  help.    While  it  is  impossible 


254  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

in  this  book  to  give  a  thorough  treatment  of  this  subject, 
it  is  possible,  we  believe,  to  give  considerable  assistance  by 
presenting  a  new  definition.  Winans  ^  ventures  such  a  new 
definition,  as  follows:  "Persuasion  is  the  process  of  inducing 
others  to  give  fair,  favorable,  or  undivided  attention  to  propo- 
sitions." In  discussing  this  definition  Professor  Winans  ^ 
quotes  in  substantiation  and  approval  many  of  the  leading 
psychologists.    We  quote  one  such: 

*'  We  now  need  a  principle  by  means  of  which  we  can  sys- 
tematize the  suggestions  for  persuasion  drawn  from  common 
experience.  Why  do  we  will  to  do  or  not  to  do?  We  turn 
to  Professor  James :  ^ 

"'What  holds  attention  determines  action.  ...  It  seems 
as  if  we  ought  to  look  for  the  secret  of  an  idea's  impulsive- 
ness ...  in  the  urgency  with  which  it  is  able  to  compel  atten- 
tion and  dominate  in  consciousness.  Let  it  once  so  dominate, 
let  no  other  ideas  succeed  in  displacing  it,  and  whatever  motor 
effects  belong  to  it  by  nature  will  inevitably  occur.  .  .  . 
In  short,  one  does  not  see  any  case  in  which  the  steadfast 
occupancy  of  consciousness  does  not  appear  to  be  the  prime 
condition  of  impulsive  power.  It  is  still  more  obviously 
the  prime  condition  of  inhibitive  power.  What  checks  our 
impulses  is  the  mere  thinking  of  reasons  to  the  contrary — 
it  is  their  bare  presence  in  the  mind  which  gives  the  veto, 
and  makes  acts,  otherwise  seductive,  impossible  to  perform. 
If  we  could  only  forget  our  scruples,  our  doubts,  our  fears, 
what  exultant  energy  we  should  for  a  while  display! ' "  ^ 

B.  Persuasion  in  almost  all  argumentation.  The  ulti- 
mate aim  of  most  argumentation  is  to  make  others  act  as  we 
desire,  to  influence  the  conduct  of  others,  to  make  others 

^  Public  Speaking,  p.  256.  The  quotations  from  this  book  found  in  this 
chapter  are  used  with  the  kind  permission  of  Professor  Winans  and  the 
Century  Company.  Every  teacher  of  argumentation  should  read  in  full 
Winans'  chapters  on  "Influencing  Conduct"  and  "Persuasion  and  Belief." 

2  Ibid.,  pp.  253-257.  3  Briefer  Course,  pp.  448-452. 

*  Winans,  pp.  253-4. 


PERSUASION  255 

forget  their  scruples,  doubts,  fears,  etc.,  in  so  far  as  these 
keep  them  from  giving  fair,  favorable,  and  undivided  atten- 
tion to  our  proposition.  We  have  seen  already  that  persua- 
sion in  some  degree  is  practically  always  necessary  in  influenc- 
ing the  actions  of  others.  He  who  goes  before  any  audience 
of  human  beings  and  attempts  to  get  favorable  action  on  a 
proposition  ignoring  all  considerations  of  persuasion  is  fore- 
doomed to  defeat.  The  only  situation  that  offers  an  opportu- 
nity for  exceptions  to  this  statement  is  that  in  which  the 
majority  of  the  people  present  are  at  the  start  favorable  to 
the  action  sought — a  situation  in  which  no  discussion  is  re- 
quired at  all.  In  fact  even  in  such  a  case  if  a  speech  is  made 
and  no  attention  paid  to  the  persuasive  elements  in  the  situa- 
tion, the  case  may  well  be  lost.  Men  are  often  turned  away 
from  their  original  intention  by  a  speaker  who  talks  tact- 
lessly (i.  e.,  not  persuasively)  in  favor  of  "their  side."  There 
is  much  erroneous  talk  nowadays  about  educated  people, 
trained  intellects,  intelligent  citizens,  etc.,  being  superior 
to  persuasion,  and  basing  their  opinions,  votes,  decisions, 
on  "facts"  and  logic  and  pure  reason.  There  is  no  such  thing 
as  an  audience  that  will  come  to  decisions  on  "propositions  of 
policy"  on  purely  logical  grounds.  A  simple  question  of  fact 
unassociated  with  human  conduct  may  be  decided  that  way. 
If  anyone  wishes  to  test  this  statement  let  him  go  before  an 
educated  group,  an  audience  of  trained  intellects,  with  a  case 
based  on  sound  evidence  and  reasoning  and  present  his  case 
in  a  way  calculated  to  be  displeasing  to  his  audience.  Go 
before  a  college  or  university  faculty,  for  instance,  and  "  rub 
them  the  wrong  way,"  stand  with  thumbs  in  the  arm-holes 
of  your  vest,  chew  gum,  use  slang,  make  ill-bred  personal 
references  to  members  present  or  absent — and  see  how  many 
votes  you  will  get — even  though  these  things  have  nothing 
whatever  to  do  with  the  real  strength  of  your  case.  None 
of  these  things  could  possibly  be  said  to  have  any  "proba- 
tive value."  The  case  is  lost  because  its  persuasive  side  was 
neglected. 


256  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

C.  Prejudice  against  an  "  emotional  appeal.*'  The  case 
of  the  ''intellectual"  who  resolutely  refuses  to  be  moved  by 
any  emotional  appeal  is  interesting.  Have  you  ever  heard 
such  a  one  declare  that  he  will  never  vote  (in  faculty  meeting 
for  instance)  for  any  measure  that  is  presented  with  an  ap- 
peal to  emotions?  Consider  what  this  means.  If  he  is  to  be 
taken  at  his  word,  it  means  that  in  such  a  case  his  decision 
will  always  be  an  emotional  one — based  on  his  prejudice 
against  what  he  thinks  is  an  "appeal  to  the  emotions" — 
when  he  recognizes  it.  He  has  decided  in  advance  to  exclude 
from  consideration  the  intellectual  value  of  the  case  and 
render  a  purely  emotional  decision!  But  of  course  he  is  not 
to  be  taken  seriously,  because  if  the  persuasion  (emotional 
appeal)  is  well  handled,  he  will  be  pleased.  The  presenta- 
tion will  fit  his  prejudices,  his  tastes  will  be  comphed  with, 
agreeable  ideas  will  be  held  up,  and  he  will  vote  joyfully 
(emotionally)  and  on  the  way  home  will  pronounce  vigor- 
ously (emotionally)  that  that  is  the  way  he  likes  (emotion 
again)  to  see  a  matter  presented!  Such  a  man  is  one  of  the 
many  people  who  have  a  wrong  idea  of  the  meaning  of  per- 
suasion, persuasive  case,  emotional  appeal,  etc.  It  is  thought 
that  there  is  something  unworthy  and  cheap  about  persua- 
sion and  emotion — that  a  persuasive  case  is  always  an  appeal 
to  base  emotions  and  passions.  Of  course  this  is  quite  con- 
trary to  fact.  Says  Winans  on  this  point :^  "Let  us  get 
clearly  in  mind  that  we  are  not  dealing  with  an  artificial 
or  unusual  problem.  When  you  induce  a  man  to  join  your 
party,  or  buy  an  automobile,  or  improve  his  habits,  or  go 
fishing  with  you,  or  pay  his  bills,  or  open  his  mind  to  the 
possibility  that  the  Germans,  or  the  English,  are  well-mean- 
ing men,  you  are  persuading  him.  Persuasion  is  as  familiar 
as  living,  and  you  will  recognize  at  once  its  means,  such  as 
arguments,  motives,  suggestions,  personal  influence,  tact." 
"Persuasion  is  sometimes  spoken  of  as  altogether  a  matter 
of  *  appealing  to  emotion.'  The  phrase  proves  misleading, 
1  Public  Speaking,  pp.  251-252. 


PERSUASION  257 

It  is  taken  by  some  to  refer  to  pathos  only,  or  to  an  arousal 
of  the  more  violent  feelings;  or  at  best  as  an  appeal  to  some 
large  emotion,  such  as  patriotism.  Again,  the  word  appeal 
is  misunderstood  as  meaning  direct,  fervid  exhortation  only. 
It  is  true  that  persuasion  is  quite  largely  concerned  with 
emotion.  In  persuasion  we  wish  to  allay  such  emotions  as 
will  keep  hostility  to  the  proposed  action  in  mind,  such  as 
dislike  for  the  means  or  the  end,  or  desire  for  other  ends; 
and  we  wish  to  awaken  such  emotions  as  will  win  for  the  pro- 
posed action  favorable  attention.*'  ^ 

D.  Emotion  in  argumentation.  The  place  of  emotion  in 
argumentation  has  been  best  stated  by  Professor  Winans  in 
the  following  paragraphs.^ 

1.  "Let  us  notice,  ^7-5/,  that  in  dealing  vnth  those  practical 
issues  that  directly  ajfect  human  conduct,  the  very  basis  of  argu- 
ment is  emotion;  or  as  we  noted  in  the  preceding  chapter,  the 
major  premise  of  such  an  argument  is  the  expression  of  an 
emotion.  If  we  argue  that  the  square  of  the  hypotenuse  of  a 
right  triangle  is  equal  to  the  sum  of  the  squares  of  the  other 
two  sides,  we  have  pure  reasoning,  free  from  emotion;  but 
when  we  take  up  the  proposition  that  Congress  should  pass 
the  immigration  bill,  involving  an  illiteracy  test,  over  the 
President's  veto,  we  are  constantly  dealing  with  emotions. 
We  must  assume  first  the  emotion  of  patriotism,  or  that  all  de- 
sire the  good  of  the  country.  As  we  proceed  we  find  ourselves 
meeting  with  emotions  involved  in  the  interests  of  labor  and 
of  corporations,  with  self-interest  and  the  love  of  justice, 
with  race  prejudices  and  loyalties,  with  the  sentiment  that 
America  should  remain  the  home  of  the  oppressed,  with  pity 
for  those  who  have  had  no  opportunity  for  education,  and 
with  a  reluctance  on  the  part  of  many  to  pass  a  measure  over 
President  Wilson's  veto.  If  we  looked  beneath  the  surface 
of  newspaper  discussion,  we  might  find  certain  religious 
feelings  playing  an  active  part  in  the  settlement  of  this  issue. 
The  fact  that  some  of  these  feelings  ought  not  to  influence 
1  Public  Speaking,  p.  257.  2  jbij.^  pp.  304-310. 


258  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

our  judgment  of  the  question,  and  the  fact  that  none  of  them 
should  be  permitted  to  put  us  in  such  a  state  that  we  cannot 
reason  justly,  do  not  change  the  facts  that  an  argument  on 
the  issue  impinges  upon  emotion  at  every  point,  that  some  of 
these  emotions  are  necessary  to  a  proper  solution,  and  that 
any  one  or  several  of  them,  good  and  bad,  may  be  domi- 
nating the  minds  of  your  hearers  as  you  address  them.  The 
question  selected  is  far  from  an  extreme  instance,  as  you  will 
see  if  you  think  for  a  moment  of  such  questions  as  intercol- 
legiate athletics,  modern  dancing,  woman's  suffrage,  and 
blame  for  the  European  war. 

2.  *'  In  the  second  place,  we  notice  with  regard  to  the  in- 
fluence of  emotion  on  argument,  the  strong  tendency  of  men  to 
believe  what  they  wish  to  believe}  *  Will  and  belief  are  undoubt- 
edly common  products  of  the  same  deeper  lying  forces. 
Whatever  appeals  to  us  strongly  enough  to  tempt  us  to  de- 
sire to  believe,  by  the  very  same  appeal  compels  belief.* 
Experience  declares,  *A  man  convinced  against  his  will  is 
of  the  same  opinion  still.*  Almost  as  famous  is  the  saying 
attributed  to  a  Scotchman,  *I  am  quite  open  to  convic- 
tion, Sandy,  but  I  should  like  to  see  the  man  who  can  con- 
vince me.*  This  tendency  to  believe  what  we  wish  to  believe 
is  encouraged  by  the  fact  that,  with  reference  to  questions 
at  all  debatable,  there  are  reasons,  usually  good  reasons, 
in  support  of  either  alternative.  One  can  arrive  at  a  decision 
only  by  weighing  the  opposing  arguments.  Now,  if  he  wishes 
to  arrive  at  a  certain  conclusion,  the  arguments  for  it  seem 
weighty  and  those  in  opposition  very  light.  He  is  likely  to 
refuse  credence  to  witnesses  and  authorities  against  the  de- 
sired conclusion.  He  may  even  refuse  to  listen  to  opposing 
arguments;  or  he  may  listen  in  an  attempt  to  be  fair,  but 
with  a  subconscious  determination  to  discredit  what  he  hears, 
saying  all  the  while.  That  is  not  true;  That  is  not  important, 
or  That  is  insufficient.  In  other  words,  he  refuses  fair  at- 
tention. .  .  . 

1  Pillsbury,  Psychology  of  Reasoning,  p.  54. 


PERSUASION  259 

"But  frequently  I  am  told  by  my  students,  *Men  ought 
not  to  be  influenced  in  their  thinking  by  their  emotions  and 
prejudices.'  No  one  is  stricter  with  other  people's  thinking 
than  your  sophomore.  He  himself  is  open-minded  in  regard 
to  those  subjects  in  which  he  has  a  purely  intellectual  inter- 
est; but  hear  him  argue  on  *  activities,'  women's  suffrage, 
or  religion!  At  any  rate,  the  question  is  not  how  men  should 
think,  but  how  they  do  think.  These  are  the  words  of  a 
practical  idealist,  Woodrow  Wilson:^ 

"As  I  look  back  upon  the  past  of  the  South,  it  seems  to  me  to 
contain  that  best  of  dynamic  forces,  the  force  of  emotion.  We  talk 
a  great  deal  about  being  governed  by  mind,  by  intellect,  by  intelli- 
gence, in  this  boastful  day  of  ours;  but  as  a  matter  of  fact,  I  don't 
believe  that  one  man  out  of  a  thousand  is  governed  by  his  mind. 

'"Men,  no  matter  what  their  training,  are  governed  by  their 
passions,  and  the  most  we  can  hope  to  accomplish  is  to  keep  the 
handsome  passions  in  the  majority.' 

"  After  all,  are  we  not  much  too  scornful  of  emotions?  It  is 
true  that  men  are  often  governed  by  unjustified  emotions; 
but  it  is  also  true  that  they  are  often  led  astray  by  false  logic. 
There  are  more  men  who  feel  truly  than  there  are  who  reason 
justly.  Even  Huxley,  who  held  up  the  ideal  of  a  mind  which 
is  a  *cold  logic  engine,'  wished  men  to  have  strong  emotions, 
though  well  controlled.  So  eminent  a  scientist  as  Baldwin 
has  written:  ^ 

'"Neither  will  logic  satisfy  our  moral  or  aesthetic  demands,  for 
the  logically  true  is  often  immoral  and  hideous.  It  is  well,  therefore, 
to  write  large  the  truth  that  logical  consistency  is  not  the  whole  of 
reality,  and  that  the  revolt  of  the  heart  against  fact  is  often  as 
legitimate  a  measure  of  the  true  in  this  shifting  universe  as  is  the 
cold  denial  given  by  rational  conviction  to  the  vagaries  of  casual 
feeling.'" 

^  From  a  speech  to  the  New  York  Southern  Society  in  1910,  found  in 
Wood's  After-Dinner  Speeches,  p.  46. 
2  Elements  of  Psychology,  p.  262. 


260  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

3.  "In  the  third  place,  we  may  notice  that  emotions  not 
belonging  to  the  argument  itself,  affect  decisions.  These  may 
arise  from  the  occasion.  The  audience  may  be  enthusiastic 
or  bored,  good-natured  or  angry.  Again,  emotions  may  arise 
from  the  relation  of  speaker  and  audience.  They  may  feel  great 
respect  for  him,  or  be  pleased  by  his  manner,  his  friendliness 
and  good  humor;  or  they  may  dishke  him  and  feel  resentment 
or  suspicion.  We  must  consider  what  manner  of  men  we  ad- 
dress, what  feelings  move  them,  and  how  opposition  may  be 
abated  and  a  mood  of  friendliness  and  candor  established." 

Perhaps  the  terms  negative  persuasion  and  positive  per- 
suasion will  be  helpful,  the  former  indicating  consideration 
of  the  things  one  must  refrain  from  doing  in  order  not  to  de- 
tract from  the  value  of  his  intellectual  or  logical  case,  and 
the  latter  indicating  consideration  of  the  things  one  must  do 
affirmatively  in  order  to  overcome  prejudices,  to  get  a  fair 
hearing  for  his  case,  or  to  enforce  his  logic  and  add  to  the 
influence  of  his  intellectual  case.  From  this  point  of  view 
negative  persuasion  is  always  necessary,  positive  persuasion 
very  often  necessary  and,  if  well  done,  always  helpful.^ 

E.  Kinds  of  emotional  appeal.  All  those  who  wish  to 
practice  argumentation  successfully  before  any  class  of 
audience  must  practice  persuasion  of  some  kind  to  a  greater 
or  less  extent.  The  question  then  naturally  arises.  If  we  must 
practice  persuasion  and  "appeal  to  emotion,"  what  are  our 
opportunities  .f* 

What  emotion  or  emotions  shall  we  appeal  to?  What 
emotion  shall  we  arouse  "in  regard  to  our  action"  in  order 
"to  win  attention  to  it"  ?  Many  writers  have  offered  more 
or  less  complete  classifications  of  emotions  from  which  the 
student  is  presumablj^  supposed  to  select  the  emotion  which 
fits  his  case.  A  few  such  lists  are  offered  here  as  suggestive 
and  perhaps  even  serviceable  in  a  practical  way  in  some  situa- 
tions.   Aristotle^  mentions:  anger  and  mildness;  friendship 

1  See  ante,  B.,  p.  254  and  C,  p.  256 

2  The  Rhetoric  of  Artistotle,  Jebb  translation,  p.  xxv. 


PERSUASION  261 

and  enmity;  fear  and  boldness;  shame  and  shamelessness; 
gratitude  (or  favor)  and  ingratitude;  pity  and  indignation; 
envy  and  emulation.  Whately  ^  discusses  the  different  kinds 
of  appeals  as  follows : 

"For  in  order  that  the  Will  may  be  influenced,  two  things 
are  requisite;  viz.:  1,  that  the  proposed  Object  should  appear 
desirable;  and  2,  that  the  Means  suggested  should  be  proved 
to  be  conducive  to  the  attainment  of  that  object;  and  this 
last,  evidently  must  depend  on  a  process  of  Reasoning.  .  .  . 

"Persuasion,  therefore,  depends  on,  first.  Argument  (to 
prove  the  expediency  of  the  Means  proposed),  and  secondly, 
what  is  usually  called  Exhortation,  i.  e.,  the  excitement  of 
men  to  adopt  those  Means,  by  representing  the  end  as  suffi- 
ciently desirable.  It  will  happen,  indeed,  not  infrequently, 
that  the  one  or  the  other  of  these  objects  will  have  been  al- 
ready, either  wholly  or  in  part,  accomplished;  so  that  the 
other  shall  be  the  only  one  that  it  is  requisite  to  insist  on; 
viz.:  sometimes  the  hearers  will  be  sufficiently  intent  on  the 
pursuit  of  the  End,  and  will  be  in  doubt  only  as  to  the  means 
of  attaining  it;  and  sometimes,  again,  they  will  have  no  doubt 
on  that  point,  but  will  be  indifferent,  or  not  sufficiently 
ardent,  with  respect  to  the  proposed  End,  and  will  need  to 
be  stimulated  by  Exhortations.  Not  sufficiently  ardent,  I 
have  said,  because  it  will  not  so  often  happen  that  the  object 
in  question  will  be  one  to  which  they  are  totally  indifferent, 
as  that  they  will  practically  at  least,  not  reckon  it,  or  not 
feel  it,  to  be  worth  the  requisite  pains.  .  .  . 

"Aristotle,  and  many  other  writers,  have  spoken  of  ap- 
peals to  the  passions  as  an  unfair  mode  of  influencing  the 
hearers.  .  .  .  But  Aristotle  by  no  means  overlooked  the 
necessity  with  a  view  to  Persuasion,  properly  sQj:;grmed,  of 
calling  into  action  some  motive  that  may  influence  the  Will; 
it  is  plain  that  whenever  he  speaks  with  reprobation  of  an 
appeal  to  the  Passions,  his  meaning  is,  the  excitement  of  such 
feelings  as  ought  not  to  influence  the  decision  of  the  question 
1  Pages  128-131. 


262  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

in  hand.  A  desire  to  do  justice,  may  be  called,  in  Dr.  Camp- 
bell's wide  acceptation  of  the  term,  a  *  Passion*  or  *  Affec- 
tion'; this  is  what  ought  to  influence  a  Judge;  and  no  one 
would  ever  censure  a  Pleader  for  striving  to  excite  and 
heighten  this  desire;  but  if  the  decision  be  influenced  by  an 
appeal  to  Anger,  Pity,  etc.,  the  feelings  thus  excited  being 
such  as  ought  not  to  have  operated,  the  Judge  must  be 
allowed  to  have  been  unduly  biassed.  And  that  this  is 
Aristotle's  meaning  is  evident  from  his  characterizing  the 
introduction  of  such  topics  as  *  foreign  to  the  matter  in  hand.' 
It  is  evident,  also,  that  as  the  motives  which  ought  to  operate 
will  be  different  in  different  cases,  the  same  may  be  objection- 
able and  not  fairly  admissible,  in  one  case,  which  in  another 
would  be  perfectly  allowable. 

"  An  instance  occurs  in  Thucydides,  in  which  this  is  very 
judiciously  and  neatly  pointed  out;  in  the  debate  respecting 
the  Mityleneans,  who  had  been  subdued  after  a  revolt,  Cleon 
is  introduced  contending  for  the  justice  of  inflicting  on  them 
capital  punishment;  to  which  Diodorus  is  made  to  reply,  that 
the  Athenians  are  not  sitting  in  judgment  on  the  offenders, 
but  in  deliberation  as  to  their  own  interest;  and  ought  there- 
fore to  consider,  not  the  right  they  may  have  to  put  the  re- 
volters  to  death,  but  the  expediency  or  inexpediency  of  such 
a  procedure. 

'*  In  judicial  cases,  on  the  contrary,  any  appeal  to  the  per- 
sonal interests  of  the  Judge,  or  even  to  public  expediency, 
would  be  irrelevant.  In  framing  laws  indeed,  and  (which 
comes  to  the  same  thing)  giving  those  decisions  which  are  to 
operate  as  Precedents,  the  public  good  is  the  object  to  be 
pursued;  but  in  the  mere  administering  of  the  estabUshed 
laws,  it  is  inadmissible. 

"  There  are  many  feelings,  again,  which  it  is  evident  should 
in  no  case  be  allowed  to  operate;  as  Envy,  thirst  for  Revenge, 
etc.,  the  excitement  of  which  by  the  orator  is  to  be  reprobated 
as  an  unfair  artifice;  but  it  is  not  the  less  necessary  to  be  well 
acquainted  with  their  nature,  in  order  to  allay  them  when 


PERSUASION  263 

previously  existing  in  the  hearers,  or  to  counteract  the  efforts 
of  an  adversary  in  producing  or  directing  them.  It  is  evident, 
indeed,  that  all  the  weaknesses,  as  well  as  the  powers,  of  the 
human  mind,  and  all  the  arts  by  which  the  Sophist  takes 
advantage  of  these  weaknesses,  must  be  familiarly  known  by  a 
perfect  Orator;  who,  though  he  may  be  of  such  a  character  as 
to  disdain  employing  such  arts,  must  not  want  the  ability 
to  do  so,  or  he  would  not  be  prepared  to  counteract  them. 
An  acquaintance  with  the  nature  of  poisons  is  necessary  to 
him  who  would  administer  antidotes." 

F.  Classification  of  the  emotions.  Professor  W.  C.  Robin- 
son ^  has  given  a  classification  of  the  emotions  that  it  is  some- 
times helpful  to  have  in  mind.  "That  fundamental  principle 
out  of  which  all  noble  impulses  arise  is  the  tendency  of  hu- 
man nature  toward  perfection.  .  .  .  Perfection  is  predicable 
of  human  nature  as  to  its  action,  as  to  its  character,  and  as 
to  its  attainment.  A  man  is  perfect  as  to  action  when  he 
fulfils  his  duty;  as  to  character,  when  his  predominant  ideas 
and  impulses  are  pure  and  virtuous;  as  to  attainment,  when 
he  possesses  the  highest  happiness  which  human  nature  is 
able  to  enjoy.  And  thus  in  actual  life  the  fundamental  tend- 
ency toward  perfection  manifests  itself  in  three  subordinate 
tendencies;  the  tendency  toward  duty,  the  tendency  toward 
virtue,  and  the  tendency  toward  happiness.  .  .  .^ 

"These  natural  dispositions  render  the  heart  susceptible 
to  certain  impulses,  each  of  which  corresponds  to  some  one 
of  the  many  forms  in  which  the  ideas  of  duty,  virtue,  and 
happiness  are  presented  to  the  mind.  The  idea  of  duty  yet 
to  be  fulfilled  awakens  zeal;  of  duty  heretofore  performed, 
complacency;  of  duty  which  another  had  omitted,  anger;  of 
duty  as  discharged  by  another,  approbation.  The  idea  of 
virtue  as  an  attribute  of  character  engenders  admiration; 
as  exemplified  in  individuals,  good  will,  esteem,  friendship, 
or  even  love  for  them  and  emulation  of  their  excellence;  as 
contrasted  with  vice,  abhorrence  of  the  vice  itself  and  aver- 
^  Forensic  Oratory,  pp.  14,  15.  *  italics  ours. 


/ 


\ 


264  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

sion  or  contempt  toward  those  in  whose  character  depravity 
is  manifested.  The  idea  of  happiness  as  possible,  begets 
courage,  desire,  and  hope;  as  unattainable,  despair;  as  al- 
ready possessed,  joy;  as  derived  from  others,  gratitude;  as 
endangered,  fear;  as  denied  to  others,  pity;  as  prevented  or 
destroyed  by  others,  indignation.  These  are  the  universal 
impulses  to  which  all  men  are  subject.  These  are  the  weapons 
of  the  orator  to  which  no  human  heart  can  ever  be  invul- 
nerable." 

Winans^  mentions  particularly  fairness,  the  appeal  for  fair 
play;  desire  for  approval  and  admiration;  rivalry,  the  desire 
to  emulate,  to  equal,  or  to  surpass  others;  and  fear,  dread  of 
unpleasant  consequences,  public  disapproval,  dangers  of  the 
wrong  course. 

III.    Practical  Suggestions  for  Persuasion 

The  purpose  of  this  chapter  so  far  has  been  to  present, 
as  well  as  space  would  allow,  what  may  be  called  the 
theory  of  persuasion — to  get  the  student  to  understand 
broadly  the  nature  and  function  of  persuasion,  and  to 
eradicate,  if  possible,  erroneous  beliefs  in  regard  to  this 
subject.  The  remainder  of  the  chapter  purposes  to  present 
some  brief  practical  suggestions.  These  will  be  arranged 
under  three  heads:  those  primarily  applicable  to  the  speaker 
himself,  those  that  have  to  do  with  the  audience^  and 
those  that  apply  to  the  subject.  While  of  course  all  of  the 
suggestions  are  for  the  use  of  the  speaker,  it  is  convenient 
to  group  them  according  as  they  have  to  do  with  him  per- 
sonally, his  relation  to  the  audience  (which  usually  includes 
his  relation  to  the  occasion)^  and  his  relation  to  the  subject. 
This  division  is  not  strictly  new.  Baker  and  Huntington  ^ 
use  one  much  like  it.  "Broadly  speaking,  the  means  by 
which  a  speaker  aims  to  produce  action  is  by  winning  sym- 
pathy for  himself  or  his  subject — usually  both.  Need  to 
»  Pages  261-263.  «  (Revised  Edition),  p.  294. 


PERSUASION  265 

establish  and  maintain  such  a  sympathetic  relationship 
between  speaker  and  audience  may  come  from  any  one  or  all 
of  three  sources:  the  nature  of  the  subject:  the  relation  of  the  au- 
dience to  it;  and  the  relation  of  the  speaker  to  subject  or  audi- 
ence.'* Foster  ^  gives  the  sources  of  persuasion  as  the  man, 
the  subject,  and  the  occasion,  and  refers  to  Daniel  Webster's 
famous  discussion  of  eloquence. 

"True  eloquence,  indeed,  does  not  consist  in  speech.  It  cannot 
be  brought  from  far.  Labor  and  learning  may  toil  for  it;  but  they 
will  toil  in  vain.  Words  and  phrases  may  be  marshalled  in  every 
way;  but  they  cannot  compass  it.  It  must  exist  in  the  mariy  in  the 
subject,  and  in  the  occasion.  Affected  passion,  intense  expression, 
the  pomp  of  declamation,  all  may  aspire  after  it — they  cannot 
reach  it.  It  comes,  if  it  come  at  all,  like  the  outbreaking  of  a  foun- 
tain from  the  earth,  or  the  bursting  forth  of  volcanic  fires,  with 
spontaneous,  original,  native  force."  ^ 

While  it  is  true  that  there  can  be  no  true  eloquence  with- 
out persuasion,  there  can,  of  course,  be  persuasion  without 
real  eloquence,  and  all  speakers  who  wish  to  achieve  results 
must  pay  attention  to  problems  in  persuasion  even  though 
they  disclaim  any  desire  for  eloquence. 

A.  The  speaker.  1.  Know  human  nature.  The  first 
requisite  for  a  speaker  who  would  persuade  men  is  a  knowl- 
edge of  human  nature.  One  of  the  prime  qualities  of  effec- 
tiveness is  adaptation  to  the  audience.  To  get  such  adapta- 
tion a  speaker  or  writer  must  know  the  peculiarities  of  the 
men  he  addresses.  However,  such  knowledge  alone  will  not 
enable  him  to  persuade.  If  he  does  not  understand  human 
nature  in  general,  he  is  powerless  to  reach  the  emotions  which 
he  knows  are  before  him.  He  must  know  how  men  in  general 
think  and  act;  when  a  man  is  best  persuaded  by  silence  and 
when  he  needs  to  be  reassured;  when  to  wait  and  when  to 

1  Page  265ff . 

2  Webster's  speech  on  John  Adams,  delivered  at  Boston,  August  2,  1826. 
Quoted,  Clark  and  Blanchard,  p.  10. 


/ 


\ 


266  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

strike.  Such  knowledge  is  not  gained  from  books;  it  comes 
only  from  contact  with  men  and  close  study  of  their  habits 
of  mind.    The  master  of  persuasion  is  never  a  recluse. 

2.  Personality»r?  Closely  akin  to  the  persuasive  powers 
arising  from  the  knowledge  of  human  nature,  are  the  influences 
that  come  from  the  personality  of  the  speaker  or  writer.  The 
influence  of  personality  is  felt  most  strongly  in  oratory;  but 
personal  character  shows  itself  in  print  as  well,  and  wherever 
it  goes  it  persuades,  favorably  or  unfavorably.  Every  qual- 
ity of  mind  or  heart  that  may  make  enemies  or  make  friends 
is  a  proper  part  of  persuasive  power.  Says  Foster  ^  on  this 
topic:  "The  power  of  a  speaker  to  draw  a  whole  audience 
into  the  circle  of  his  influence,  and  to  hold  them  as  if  en- 
tranced until  his  last  word,  is  more  easily  felt  than  defined. 
This  power  may  be  called  personal  m'agnetism.  It  is  the 
sum  total  of  all  the  speaker's  attributes, — his  physical,  men- 
tal, and  moral  characteristics,  raised  to  their  highest  power, 
and  working  together  for  a  definite  object.  In  this  respect, 
more  than  in  any  other,  an  orator  is  born,  not  made.  Yet  all 
that  a  man  does  to  keep  his  body  well  formed  and  strong  and 
healthy,  all  that  he  does  to  make  his  thought  keen  and  deep 
and  sound,  and  all  that  he  does  to  make  his  conduct  right  as 
God  gives  him  to  see  the  right,  contribute  to  personal  mag- 
netism. A  great  and  good  speaker  must  first  be  a  great 
and  good  man." 

3.  Sincerity  or  earnestness.  Among  the  definite  qualities 
that  may  be  mentioned  as  particularly  desirable  in  argumen- 
tative persuasion,  the  first  is  sincerity  or  earnestness.  No 
man  will  be  persuaded  by  any  one  who  he  thinks  is  trying  to 
deceive  him  or  play  with  his  convictions  for  personal  ends. 
A  suspicious  audience  is  the  hardest  kind  to  handle,  and 
undoubtedly  an  audience  does  not  require  much  to  make  it 
suspicious.  Sometimes  the  hearers  have  occasion  to  suspect 
that  a  speaker  is  positively  dishonest  and  designing;  but 
more  often  they  believe  simply  that  the  speaker  is  arguing 

1  Foster,  pp.  273,  274. 


PERSUASION  267 

for  argument's  sake  or  **to  be  worthy  of  his  hire,"  and  that 
he  really  has  no  interest  or  confidence  in  his  cause.  Such 
suspicion  is  seriously  damaging  to  persuasive  power.  Lyman 
Abbott  gives  some  excellent  advice  in  an  open  letter  ^  as  fol- 
lows: "When  he  rises  to  speak  he  must  forget  himself,  pray 
to  be  delivered  from  the  ambition  to  be  eloquent  by  an  am- 
bition to  win  a  result;  be  careless  of  admiration  and  covetous 
of  practical  fruits  in  his  auditors'  lives.  Without  this  moral 
preparation  he  will  be  a  mere  declaimer:  with  it  he  rnay  be 
an  effective  speaker.  And  whether  he  is  what  men  call  an 
orator  or  not  is  a  matter  of  no  consequence."  Enthusiasm 
in  an  audience  can  be  roused  only  by  enthusiasm  in  the 
speaker,  and  earnest  conviction  is  begotten  only  by  a  belief 
in  the  earnestness  of  him  who  persuades.  "One  has  only  to 
examine  the  great  speeches  from  Demosthenes  to  Webster 
to  see  how  earnestly  the  orators  have  in  all  parts  of  their 
work  impressed  their  sincerity  on  their  audiences:  one  has 
but  to  study  the  wrecked  careers  among  orators  to  realize 
that  sincerity  is  the  chief  essential  in  persuasion.  Without 
it  all  else,  in  the  long  run,  goes  for  naught."  ^  Consequently 
no  great  orator,  no  effective  writer,  neglects  to  be  sure  at 
every  step  that  those  in  his  audience  have  confidence  in 
the  honesty  and  earnestness  of  his  endeavors.  Hence  it  is, 
that  the  following  exordium  is  an  example  of  one  of  the  most 
common  methods  of  introduction.  It  is  taken  from  the 
speech  of  Sir  James  Mcintosh  in  behalf  of  Jean  Peltier  before 
the  Court  of  the  King's  Bench,  February,  1803,  and  shows 
how  necessary  a  man,  of  even  so  great  eloquence,  thought  it 
to  be  that  his  audience  believe  in  his  sincerity. 

"I  must  begin  with  observing  that,  though  I  know  myself  too 
well  to  ascribe  to  anything  but  to  the  kindness  and  good  nature  of 
my  learned  friend,  the  attorney-general,  the  unmerited  praises 
which  he  has  been  pleased  to  bestow  on  me,  yet,  I  will  venture  to 

^  Quoted  in  Brander  Matthews'  Notes  on  Speech  Making,  p.  91. 
2  Baker  and  Huntington,  p.  302. 


268  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

say,  he  has  done  me  no  more  than  justice  in  supposing  that  in  this 
place  and  on  this  occasion,  where  I  exercise  the  functions  of  an 
inferior  minister  of  justice,  an  inferior  minister,  indeed,  but  a 
minister  of  justice  still,  I  am  incapable  of  lending  myself  to  the  pas- 
sions of  any  client,  and  that  I  will  not  make  the  proceedings  of  this 
court  subservient  to  any  political  purpose."  ^ 

4.  Modesty.  Another  element  of  persuasion  is  a  quality 
in  the  speaker  or  writer  that  may  be  termed  modesty.  Mod- 
esty, in  this  connection,  does  not  mean  an  attitude  of  subser- 
vience or  self-suspicion.  Indeed,  a  speaker  should  feel  and 
(with  modesty)  exhibit  the  feeling  that  he  is  competent, 
prepared,  knows  what  he  is  talking  about.  Self-respect, 
self-confidence,  authority,  and  leadership  are  perfectly  con- 
sistent with  true  modesty.  Proper  modesty  does  not  require 
that  a  speaker  apologize  for  his  poor  abilities,  his  "inadequacy 
to  the  task  before  him,"  etc.  A  good  rule  to  follow  in  public 
speaking  of  any  kind  is  "never  apologize,  never  offer  ex- 
cuses." If  it  is  true  that  you  are  "totally  unprepared,"  know 
nothing  about  the  subject,  do  not  attempt  to  make  a  speech — 
if  it  is  not  true,  do  not  lie  about  it.  "Excuses  and  apologies 
are  sometimes  prompted  by  conceit,  often  they  are  dishonest, 
usually  of  no  interest  to  the  audience,  and  altogether  bad. 
There  is  but  one  speech  in  a  hundred  which  may  well  begin 
with  excuses;  and  there  are  few  that  begin  in  any  other  way."^ 

There  is  such  a  thing — even  in  public  discussion — as  false 
modesty,  and  it  is  a  detriment  to  him  who  plays  with 
it.  Self-confidence  and  manly  courage  are  perfectly  con- 
sistent with  every  attribute  of  real  modesty.  True  modesty 
requires  simplyy  that  the  man  should  he  made  secondary  to 
the  subject.  If  it  be  an  arguer's  purpose  to  display  his  own 
abilities  and  dazzle  his  audience,  conceit  is  no  hindrance; 
but  if  it  be  his  aim  to  win  his  case,  it  is  different.  If  he  makes 
it  evident  that  he  thinks  he  is  himself  more  important  than 
what  he  has  to  say,  the  men  whom  he  is  addressing  will  read- 

1  Howell's  Stale  Trials,  Vol.  28,  p.  566.  ^  Foster,  p.  268. 


PERSUASION  269 

ily  share  his  disrespect  for  the  cause  he  represents,  and,  how- 
ever much  they  may  envy  his  brilHancy,  they  will  be  likely 
to  give  their  allegiance  elsewhere.  Furthermore,  an  audience 
has  a  natural  tendency  to  doubt  the  modesty  of  a  speaker. 
For  the  moment  he  is  on  a  plane  a  little  above  his  auditors; 
he  stands  as  their  leader  in  thought  and  action.  Now  men 
in  an  audience  are  willing  to  be  led,  but  they  object  to  being 
driven.  They  will  accept  leadership,  but  they  will  rebel 
against  dictation,  and  they  are  quick  to  notice  any  assump- 
tion of  superiority  or  command.  The  line  between  leader- 
ship and  dictation,  between  equality  and  assumed  superi- 
ority, is  the  dead-line  of  friendship  with  the  audience,  and  a 
speaker  who  crosses  the  line  has  lost  much  of  the  power  of 
persuasion.  This  is  the  essence  of  the  art  of  persuasion; 
the  relation  of  the  speaker  to  his  audience  and  of  the  writer  to 
his  reader  must  always  be  an  attitude  of  leadership. 

5.  Self-control  and  reserve  force.  Closely  akin  to  mod- 
esty is  self-control  and  reserve.  The  speaker  who  loses  self- 
control  before  an  audience  is  sure  to  distract  attention  from  his 
case  to  himself  and  so  lose  the  very  heart  of  persuasion — 
and  he  is  likely  to  offend  in  a  positive  way  as  well.  "A  lack 
of  self-control  is  the  besetting  sin  of  very  vigorous  and  en- 
thusiastic speakers.  These  men  often  work  themselves  up 
to  a  state  of  such  excitement  that  they  (a)  exaggerate,  (b) 
say  things  they  had  not  planned  or  wanted  to  say,  (c)  for- 
get to  say  what  they  wanted  to  say,  and  (d)  display  feelings 
which  they  should  have  restrained.  Any  newspaper  reporter 
will  tell  you  how  general  is  the  fault  of  poor  self-control. 
Public  men,  because  of  it,  make  speeches  for  which  they  are 
sorry  and  sometimes,  we  regret  to  state,  they  brand  a  true 
report  of  such  an  address  as  a  lie.  Newspapers  are  blamed 
for  *  misstatements'  which  in  reality  are  the  true  records  of 
utterances  made  without  self-control."  ^  This  must  be  not 
taken  to  mean  that  vigor  and  enthusiasm  are  in  essence 
undesirable.  Enough  of  these  to  give  the  impression  that 
^  Robinson,  F.  B.,  p.  144. 


270  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

the  speaker  really  and  vitally  means  what  he  says,  is  decidedly 
worth  while.  But  enthusiasm  must  not  be  allowed  to  "run 
away"  with  the  speaker;  it  must  be  controlled.  We  instinct- 
ively like  the  man  who  can  control  himself  and  seems  always 
to  have  much  power  held  in  reserve.  When  a  speaker  gives 
the  impression  that  he  has  expended  his  last  thought  and 
ultimate  emotion  he  has  lost  his  power  to  lead — to  persuade. 
The  audience  feel  they  have  all  he  has  and  are  as  competent 
to  lead  as  he.  A  sense  that  there  is  much  more  that  might 
be  said;  deeper  emotions  that  are  controlled  in  order  that 
calm  thought  may  prevail,  has  a  very  persuasive  effect. 
"Reserved  force,  which  tells  for  much  in  all  kinds  of  com- 
position, cannot  be  overestimated  as  an  instrument  of  per- 
suasion. Webster's  words,  *It  is,  sir,  as  I  have  said,  a 
small  college,  and  yet  there  are  those  who  love  it,'  together 
with  his  manifest  effort  to  repress  his  emotion,  did  more  for 
Dartmouth  College  than  could  have  been  effected  by  hours 
of  direct  appeal."  ^  This  truth  which  seems  to  be  ignored 
by  so  many  poor  and  mediocre  speakers,  who  always  try 
deliberately  to  work  themselves  and  their  hearers  into  a  pas- 
sion, is  emphasized  by  all  recognized  writers  on  persuasion. 
Says  Foster,^  "Behind  his  most  impassioned  speech  he  must 
have  reserve  force.  He  must  have  such  command  of  self  that 
his  hearers  will  believe  his  convictions  to  be  the  result  of 
calm,  vigorous  thinking,  and  his  strongest  emotions  to  be 
under  the  control  of  his  intellect.  A  speaker  who  is  overcome 
by  his  feelings  may  stimulate  his  audience  to  a  brief  response, 
but  the  more  enduring  persuasion  results  from  a  masterful 
expression  of  firm  conviction,  which  is  felt  to  be  deliberate 
and  just  in  spite  of  a  speaker's  strong  feelings."  There  is  no 
worse  fault  in  public  speaking  than  that  of  talking  always  in 
a  ringing,  emotion  laden  voice.  The  speaker  who  falls  into 
this  habit  has  little  chance  of  being  listened  to  and  no  chance 
of  influencing  intelligent  people.  When  you  underline  every 
word  on  a  page  you  emphasize  none  of  them.  A  comment 
1  Hill,  p.  395.  2  Foster,  p.  271. 


PERSUASION  271 

which  explains  very  well  this  danger  of  lack  of  reserve  force 
is  that  of  Baker  and  Huntington.  "Because  exhibition 
of  emotion  is  often  an  easy  way  of  moving  other  people  to 
act  as  we  wish,  it  has  been  abused  as  a  means  of  persuasion. 
Expression  of  strong  emotion  is  really  dangerous  unless  one's 
hearers  are  in  full  sympathy  with  it;  they  will  feel  in  it,  es- 
pecially if  highly  refined,  something  a  little  repellent  because 
too  uncontrolled.  Moreover,  frequent  dependence  on  this 
method  of  persuasion  weakens  its  effect.  An  audience, 
seeing  that  the  speaker  seems  to  feel  readily  any  emotion, 
begins  to  doubt  the  genuineness  of  this  feeling,  wondering 
whether  it  is  at  best  more  than  perhaps  unconscious  acting 
of  a  high  order.  If  it  decides  that  the  display  of  emotion  is 
really  but  acting,  it  may  admire  the  man  as  an  actor;  it  will 
not  long  do  his  bidding.  .  .  . 

**  For  a  speaker  to  say  to  himself  during  the  preparation  of 
his  address :  *  This  idea  gives  me  a  chance  for  a  stirring  burst 
of  emotion,  therefore  here  I  will  let  my  audience  see  ho\\ 
moved  I  am'  has  the  theatric  about  it,  and  may  lead  to  fail- 
ure. It  is  safer  in  planning  persuasion  to  trust  to  relating 
one's  ideas  to  motives  operant  in  the  audience  and  to  de- 
picting conditions  which  should  arouse  emotion.  If  it  kindles 
in  the  very  words  of  a  speaker,  if  in  spite  of  his  efforts  to  the 
contrary  it  overmasters  him,  he  will  be  very  persuasive,  but 
if  it  does  not  arise  in  these  ways,  a  note  of  insincerity  will 
probably  spoil  its  effect.  A  student  should  remark  here  the 
difference  between  the  art  of  the  orator  and  the  art  of  the 
actor.  The  success  of  the  actor  is  complete  if  his  audience 
feels:  *This  is  the  perfect  simulation  of  anger,  grief,  mirth, 
misery.'  For  the  orator  that  judgment  is  the  doom  of  his 
persuasive  work.  His  audience  must  be  swept  out  of  its 
critical  self-control  into  participation  in  the  anger,  grief, 
mirth,  or  misery,  so  complete  as  to  take  action  in  consequence 
of  it.  The  orator  has  a  special  act  in  mind  as  the  end  of  his 
persuasion;  the  actor  has  not."  ^ 

^  Baker  and  Huntington,  pp.  333-335. 


272  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

6.  Fairness  is  happily  a  quality  that  most  audiences  delight 
to  find  in  a  speaker.  Do  not  try  to  take  unsportsmanlike 
advantages  of  your  opponent.  Be  fair  and  honest  with  him 
as  well  as  with  your  audience.  Quote  him  correctly,  answer 
what  he  really  said.  Be  honest  and  fair  in  all  representations 
of  his  case  or  his  statements  in  detail.  "Fairness  is  itself 
persuasive.  Do  not  attempt  to  conceal  important  facts 
which  make  against  your  position.  Give  your  opponent  all 
possible  credit;  concede  all  that  you  can  honestly  concede. 
Grant  him  everything  but  the  one  point  which  you  must 
establish.  Present  his  case  with  manifest  fairness.  Present 
it  better  than  he  can  present  it;  and,  if  you  can  honestly  do  so, 
make  it  even  more  forcible  against  your  own  contentions. 
If  you  cannot  state  your  opponent's  case,  you  do  not  know  it; 
if  you  do  not  know  it,  you  cannot  hope  to  refute  it;  and  if  you 
dare  not  state  it,  you  acknowledge  that  you  deserve  defeat  at 
the  start.  Give  your  opponent  credit  for  good  faith,  and  thus 
escape  personalities.  Save  your  time  and  your  energy  for  re- 
futing his  arguments  rather  than  himself."  ^ 

B.  The  subject.  1.  Must  fit  speaker  and  audience.  Not 
much  detailed  discussion  of  persuasion  is  required  under 
this  head.  The  subjects  for  most  serious  arguments  are  pre- 
scribed, and  naturally  fit  the  occasion  and  the  speaker.  Thus 
the  greatest  consideration  is  taken  care  of.  To  make  persua- 
sion easy  the  subject  should  fit  the  audience  and  the  speaker. 
Because  in  actual  life  we  usually  argue  on  a  given  subject 
with  those  who  are  interested  and  responsible,  and  because 
we  usually  argue* about  something  that  interests  us  or  con- 
cerning which  we  are  responsible,  this  special  point  is  taken 
care  of.  Of  course  you  have  an  almost  impossible  situation 
from  the  standpoint  of  persuasion  when  you  are  talking  about 
a  subject  that  does  not  fit  either  yourself  or  your  audience. 
Do  not  attempt  to  argue  any  subject  that  will  seem  to  your 
audience  ill  suited  to  your  age,  experience,  station  in  life, 
etc.  And  do  not  argue  with  any  audience  on  a  subject  con- 
1  Foster,  pp.  269-270. 


PERSUASION  273 

cerning  which  you  cannot  find  (or  readily  create)  in  them  a 
vital  feeling  of  interest  or  responsibility. 

2.  Handling  subject-matter.  Assuming  now  that  you  have 
a  subject  that  is  persuasively  appropriate  to  yourself  and  your 
audience,  what  practical  suggestions  can  be  made  for  your 
guidance  in  handling  the  subject-matter?  Four  qualities 
to  be  aimed  at  in  order  to  get  maximum  persuasion  out  of 
the  handling  of  the  subject-matter  are:  brevity,  simplicity, 
vividness,  and  variety. 

a.  Brevity.  Appropriate  brevity  is  attained,  not  by 
leaving  out  material  that  should  be  used,  but  by  omitting 
all  unnecessary  remarks.  It  is  a  relative  rather  than  an  abso- 
lute quality.  The  proper  length  for  any  given  speech  will 
depend  upon  many  circumstances.  Brevity  is  violated  when 
one  talks  simply  to  fill  up  time,  or  because  he  does  not  know 
how  to  quit,  or  because  he  cannot  drop  one  point  when  he  has 
said  enough  on  it.  The  use  of  unnecessary  words  or  sentences 
constitutes  a  breach  of  the  law  of  brevity.  The  shortest 
explanation  that  will  explain,  the  shortest  allusion  that 
will  awaken  the  desired  memories  or  associations,  is  the  most 
persuasive.  Wasting  time  with  unnecessary  talking  irritates 
an  audience  and  greatly  hinders  persuasion.  Hill  ^  gives  a 
pointed  warning  when  he  says,  "It  is  in  exordiums  and  pero- 
rations that  a  young  writer  often  fails :  he  does  not  know  how 
to  get  at  his  subject  or  how  to  get  away  from  it.  He  should 
beware  of  putting  in  a  word  of  introduction  that  is  not  nec- 
essary to  prepare  the  way  for  his  argument,  and  of  adding  a 
word  at  the  end  that  is  not  necessary  to  enforce  his  conclu- 
sion. *Is  he  never  going  to  begin?*  *Will  he  never  have 
done?'  are  questions  equally  fatal."  We  have  shown  al- 
ready how  closely  related  are  persuasion  and  attention.  In- 
deed Winans  says,^  "Persuasion  is  the  process  of  inducing 
others  to  give  fair,  favorable,  or  undivided  attention  to  prop- 
ositions."   Herbert  Spencer  ^  after  commenting  on  numerous 

1  HiU,  A.  S.,  p.  388.  2  page  256. 

'  Philosophy  of  Style,  pp.  6-8. 


274  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

maxims  of  rhetoric  goes  on  as  follows  (italics  not  in  the  orig- 
inal): "On  seeking  for  some  clue  to  the  law  underlying  these 
current  maxims,  we  may  see  shadowed  forth  in  many  of 
them,  the  importance  of  economizing  the  reader's  or  hearer's 
attention.  To  so  present  ideas  that  they  may  be  apprehended 
vnth  the  least  possible  mental  effort^  is  the  desideratum  towards 
which  most  of  the  rules  above  quoted  point.  When  we 
condemn  writing  that  is  wordy,  or  confused,  or  intricate — 
when  we  praise  this  style  as  easy,  and  blame  that  as  fatiguing, 
we  consciously  or  unconsciously  assume  this  desideratum 
as  our  standard  of  judgment.  Regarding  language  as  an 
apparatus  of  symbols  for  the  conveyance  of  thought,  we  may 
say  that,  as  in  a  mechanical  apparatus,  the  more  simple  and 
the  better  arranged  in  its  parts,  the  greater  will  be  the  effect 
produced.  In  either  case,  whatever  force  is  absorbed  by 
the  machine  is  deducted  from  the  result.  A  reader  or  listener 
has  at  each  moment  but  a  limited  amount  of  mental  power 
available.  To  recognize  and  interpret  the  symbols  presented 
to  him,  requires  part  of  this  power;  to  arrange  and  combine 
the  images  suggested,  requires  a  further  part;  and  only  that 
part  which  remains  can  be  used  for  realizing  the  thought  con- 
veyed. Hence,  the  more  time  and  attention  it  takes  to  re- 
ceive and  understand  each  sentence,  the  less  time  and  at- 
tention can  be  given  to  the  contained  idea,  and  the  less  vividly 
will  that  idea  be  conceived. 

"How  truly  language  must  be  regarded  as  a  hindrance  to 
thought,  though  the  necessary  instrument  of  it,  we  shall 
clearly  perceive  on  remembering  the  comparative  force  with 
which  simple  ideas  are  communicated  by  signs.  To  say 
*  Leave  the  room'  is  less  expressive  than  to  point  to  the  door. 
Placing  a  finger  on  the  lips  is  more  forcible  than  whispering 
*Do  not  speak,'  A  beck  of  the  hand  is  better  than  *Come 
here.'  No  phrase  can  convey  the  idea  of  surprise  so  vividly 
as  opening  the  eyes  and  raising  the  eyebrows.  A  shrug  of  the 
shoulders  would  lose  much  by  translation  into  words.  Again, 
it  may  be  remarked  that  when  oral  language  is  employed, 


PERSUASION  275 

the  strongest  effects  are  produced  by  interjections,  which  con- 
dense entire  sentences  into  syllables.  And  in  other  cases,  where 
custom  allows  us  to  express  thoughts  by  single  words,  as  in 
Beware,  Heigho,  Fudge,  much  force  would  be  lost  by  expand- 
ing them  into  specific  propositions.  Hence,  carrying  out  the 
metaphor  that  language  is  the  vehicle  of  thought,  there  seems 
reason  to  think  that  in  all  cases  the  friction  and  inertia  of 
the  vehicle  deduct  from  its  efficiencj^;  and  that  in  compo- 
sition, the  chief,  if  not  the  sole  thing  to  be  done,  is  to  re- 
duce this  friction  and  inartia  to  the  smallest  possible  amount. 
Let  us  then  inquire  whether  economy  of  the  recipient's  at- 
tention is  not  the  secret  of  effect,  alike  in  the  right  choice  and 
collocation  of  words,  in  the  best  arrangement  of  clauses  in  a 
sentence,  in  the  proper  order  of  its  principal  and  subordinate 
propositions,  in  the  judicious  use  of  simile,  metaphor  and 
other  figures  of  speech  and  even  in  the  rhythmical  sequence 
of  syllables." 

b.  Simplicity.  The  first  five  definitions  of  simplicity 
given  in  Webster's  dictionary  show  how  in  practically  every 
shade  of  meaning  of  the  word,  simplicity  as  a  rhetorical 
quality  must  aid  persuasion  by  economizing  attention.  The 
definitions  are:  "  1.  The  quality  or  state  of  being  simple,  un- 
mixed, or  uncompounded.  2.  The  quality  or  state  of  being 
not  complex  or  of  consisting  of  few  parts.  3.  Artlessness 
of  mind;  freedom  from  cunning  or  duplicity.  4.  Freedom 
from  artificial  ornament,  pretentious  style  or  luxury;  plain- 
ness. 5.  Freedom  from  subtlety  or  abstruseness;  clearness." 
Simplicity  in  rhetoric  means  all  these  things:  unmixed,  not 
complex,  free  from  cunning,  duplicity,  artificial  ornament, 
pretentiousness,  subtlety,  and  abstruseness.  The  absence 
of  such  simplicity  both  in  composition  and  delivery  lies  at 
the  bottom  of  the  greatest  fault  known  in  public  speaking, 
that  is  artificial,  ornate,  bombastic  style  which  results  in  a 
speech  which  is  an  exhibition  and  not  a  communication.  This 
indirectness  which  is  a  sort  of  parading  of  voice  and  vocabu- 
lary— ringing,   long  drawn,   emotionally  false  cadences  in 


276  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

voice,  and  high  flowing,  ponderous  periods  in  language, 
is  absolutely  inconsistent  with  thought.  A  mentality  that  is 
alive  and  active  at  the  moment  of  utterance  cannot  use  this 
sort  of  medium.  So  this  fault  is  most  common  in  declama- 
tion or  in  the  speaking  of  those  who  have  learned  to  speak 
largely  by  declamatory  practice.  The  common  custom  of 
choosing  only  the  perorations  of  great  speeches  (the  parts  in 
which  emotion  was  at  its  height  with  the  audience  prepared 
for  it — a  tense  emotional  setting  ready)  for  declamatory 
practice,  in  a  flat,  uninteresting,  absolutely  non-emotional 
atmosphere,  by  a  boy  who  often  cannot  grasp  the  mighty 
thoughts  of  the  orator,  is  a  fruitful  source  of  this  kind  of 
hollow,  declamatory,  meaningless  speaking.  The  result 
is  a  show  rather  than  a  conversation.  Such  speakers  display 
their  powerful  voices  and  teeming  vocabularies  before  an 
audience.  They  do  not  present  live  thoughts  to  an  audience. 
They  do  not  reason  with  an  audience.  There  is  no  contact. 
It  is  all  detached,  impersonal,  indirect;  literally  "sound  and 
fury  signifying  nothing."  After  such  an  experience  the  lis- 
teners may  say  (if  their  taste  is  low)  *' What  a  fine  speech!" 
They  will  not  say  *'Let  us  march  against  Phillip!" 

Simplicity  is  akin  to  sincerity.  The  speaker  or  writer  who 
is  really  sincere  usually  treats  his  subject  with  simplicity. 
In  fact,  having  any  one  good  quality  aids  us  in  getting  the 
others.  False  ornament,  the  ringing  alliterative  adjectives, 
and  trite  figures  of  speech,  which  always  hinder  communi- 
cation of  thought,  are  usually  the  concrete  offenses  against 
simplicity.  Such  hollow  rhetoric  should  be  eliminated  what- 
ever the  cost.  There  can  be  no  speech  or  manuscript  that 
will  not  be  improved  by  such  cutting — regardless  of  the 
nature  of  what  is  left.  Hardress  O'Grady,  of  the  University 
of  London,  in  a  little  volume  ^  whose  keynote  is  sincerity 
gives  much  good  advice  and  suggestion  on  this  topic.  To 
quote:  "Although  the  form  and  style  be  excellent,  there  can 
be  no  good  writing  if  the  subject-matter  is  unreal  to  the 
^  Matter,  Form,  arid  Style. 


PERSUASION  277 

writer.  No  man  can  write  honestly  about  subjects  of  which 
he  has  no  experience.  His  comments  will  strike  the  reader\ 
as  unreal,  affected,  or  priggish,  or  they  will  be  mere  imita- 
tions of  some  author  read  shortly  before  the  work  was 
done.  .  .  .  Form  and  style  are  essential  for  the  proper  pres- 
entation of  the  subject,  to  interest  the  reader,  to  please  him, 
and  to  keep  his  attention  to  the  end.  But  form  and  style  are 
of  no  avail  if  there  is  no  reality  in  the  subject-matter.  There- 
fore the  subject  must  be  alive  to  the  writer,  it  must  be  im- 
portant to  him,  for  otherwise  it  will  not  live  and  become  im- 
portant to  the  reader."  ^  "Is  it  alive?  is  it  interesting.^  is 
it  plain  and  honest  truth  .^^  has  it  a  root  in  you.'^  Do  not  be 
afraid  to  give  yourself  away.  People  will  respect  you  all  the 
more  for  writing  plainly  and  very  sincerely.  If  the  subject 
interests  you,  with  careful  handling  and  sincere  writing  it 
will  interest  others.  An  engineer,  a  motorist,  an  architect, 
a  schoolmaster,  a  scientist,  will  interest  his  audience  very 
much  in  a  highly  technical  description  if  he  is  enthusiastic 
about  it,  and  uses  plain,  clear,  *full-of -blood'  language. 
Great  politicians  have  often  held — or  shall  I  say  gripped  .f* — 
audiences  that  were  really  hostile  to  their  opinions  because 
their  speeches  came  from  their  very  hearts.  They  had  a  root 
in  themselves."^  "Since  I  feel  that  style  is  sincerity,  all 
this  book  has  been  about  style.  .  .  .  Go  through  your 
writing  with  a  blue  pencil,  and  see  what  you  can  cross  out  as 
unnecessary.  .  .  .  Beware  of  set  phrases  which  have  been 
used  so  often  that  they  have  become  stale  or  commonplace, 
and  have  lost  their  original  meaning.  Beware  of  catchwords. 
Beware  of  the  sentence  which  sounds  pretty  or  clever.  Is 
it  true?  Finally,  ask  yourself  of  every  part  and  of  the  whole. 
Is  this  honest  thinking .f*  honest  description.'^  am  I  sincere? 
is  it  true?  Is  it  true?"  ^  "Precision,"  says  Phelps  in  discuss- 
ing this  topic,'*  "is  the  most  effective  test  of  affected  style 

1  Matter,  Form,  and  Style,   p.  11.  2  jbid.,  p.  27. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  121. 

*  English  Style  in  Public  Discourse,  pages  115, 116. 


278  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

as  distinct  from  genuine  style.  In  affected  style,  expression 
is  estranged  from  thought.  Apply  the  test  of  precision,  and 
the  mask  drops.  .  .  .  Apply  to  any  form  of  affectation  in 
style  the  query,  *What  precisely  does  the  writer  mean.'''  and 
the  glamour  of  affected  excellence  disappears." 

c.  Vividness.  "Deductions,"  says  Cardinal  Newman,^ 
"have  no  power  of  persuasion.  The  heart  is  commonly 
reached,  not  through  reason,  but  through  the  imagination, 
by  means  of  direct  impressions,  by  the  testimony  of  facts 
and  events,  by  history,  by  description."  If  we  would  per- 
suade by  means  of  direct  impressions,  facts,  events,  descrip- 
tions, we  must  present  such  material  vividly.  Vividness  is 
an  essential  quality  of  all  good  persuasive  work,  either  oral 
or  written.  Vivid  means  strong,  bright,  animated,  lifelike. 
To  get  vividness  we  must  have  material  capable  of  vivid 
presentation;  so  we  must  keep  this  quality  in  mind  when 
choosing  facts,  evidence,  anecdotes,  etc.  "  The  chief  source  of 
brevity  and  \dvidness  dramatically  is  selection.  That  is,  a 
dramatist  does  not  give  all  the  details  of  the  lives  of  his  char- 
acters or  of  their  conversations,  but  selects  those  parts  which 
are  most  significant  for  his  purpose.  Similarly  a  speaker, 
in  making  any  direct  appeal  to  the  emotions,  should  give  only 
the  essential  or  striking  features  of  that  which  moves  him  or 
is  intended  to  move  his  hearers."  ^  Of  course  only  that  can 
be  vivid  which  is  understood.  A  reference  to  anything  with 
which  your  audience  is  unfamiliar,  instead  of  enforcing  your 
case  by  calling  up  a  vivid  image  only  hinders  your  case  by 
distracting  the  hearer's  attention.  While  the  man  in  the  au- 
dience is  wondering  whom  you  meant,  or  trying  to  recall  the 
historical  fact  to  which  you  refer,  he  is  paying  no  attention 
to  what  you  are  saying.  The  reference  must  be  instantly 
intelligible  or  nothing  is  gained  and  much  may  be  lost  by 
distracting  attention. 

(I)  Reference  to  experience.    Phillips,  in  his  excellent 

^  Dismissions  and  Arguments,  quoted  by  A.  S.  Hill,  p.  394. 
2  Baker  and  Huntington,  p.  338. 


PERSUASION  279 

chapter  on  The  Principle  of  Reference  to  Experience  ^  sums 
this  all  up  as  follows:  "If,  then,  the  coming  into  the  life  of 
the  listener  is  a  means  to  successful  speaking,  it  logically  fol- 
lows that  the  more  closely  the  reference  touches  the  life,  the 
greater  the  effectiveness,  or,  to  state  it  formally  as  a  working 
principle: 

'*  The  more  the  speaker  brings  his  idea  within  the  vivid  experi- 
ence of  the  listener y  the  more  likely  will  he  attain  his  end,  and, 
obversely: 

"  The  less  the  speaker  brings  his  idea  within  the  vivid  experi- 
ence of  the  listener,  the  less  likely  will  he  attain  his  end.** 

(A)  Vivid  experiences.  "This  being  so,  the  problem 
of  the  speaker  is  the  determination  of  the  relative  value  of  ex- 
periences— their  comparative  vividness,  and  the  principles 
that  govern  this  may  now  be  stated: 

"  (1)  An  experience  will  be  vivid  to  the  listener  in  the  degree 
that  it  is  originally  intense,  that  is,  in  the  degree  the  initial 
experience  engraved  itself  upon  his  memory.  .  .  . 

"  (2)  An  experience  will  be  vivid  in  the  degree  that  it  is 
experienced  frequently.  You  could  describe  the  house  that 
you  had  lived  in  daily,  for  years,  better  than  the  house  of  an 
acquaintance  that  you  had  visited  but  once.  .  .  . 

"  (3)  An  experience  will  be  vivid  in  the  degree  that  it  is 
frequently  recollected.  A  war  veteran  served  through  the  cam- 
paign but  once.  Yet  his  battles,  sieges,  fortunes,  have  all 
their  original  intensity,  through  the  frequency  of  recollec- 
tion. Week  after  week,  year  after  year,  he  retells  them,  and 
thereby  keeps  his  mental  pictures  fresh.  .  .  . 

"  (4)  An  experience  will  be  vivid  in  the  degree  that  it  is 
recent.  Other  things  equal,  an  experience  has  power  accord- 
ing to  its  nearness  in  time.  We  can  recall  this  morning's 
breakfast  with  greater  distinctness  than  that  of  a  year  ago. 
The  raging  headache  of  yesterday  arouses  deeper  feeling  than 
that  of  last  month. 

"  Including  the  foregoing  in  one  statement,  we  have:  An  ex 
1  Effective  Speaking,  p.  33ff. 


280  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

perience  will  he  vivid  in  the  degree  that  it  is  originally  intense^ 
recent,  frequent  in  recurrence,  and  frequently  recollected,'* 

(II)  The  concrete  and  specific  is  always  more  vivid  than 
the  abstract  and  general.  Note  the  increasing  vividness  in 
the  following  series :  vegetation,  vegetable,  radish,  white  rad- 
ish, long  white  radish,  big  long  white  radish,  a  white  radish 
four  inches  long,  a  withered  white  radish  four  inches  long; 
flower,  rose,  yellow  rose.  Consumption  is  more  specific  than 
disease;  disease  than  indisposition,  drunkenness  than  dissipa- 
tion. Says  Lamont,  ^  .  .  .  "the  right  word  is  that  which  pre- 
sents the  idea  most  precisely.  The  sentence,  *The  horse  is 
coming  down  the  street,*  is  not  so  precise,  not  so  vivid  as 
*The  horse  is  galloping  down  the  street.'      The  reason  is  that 

*  coming'  is  a  general  word,  covering  all  kinds  of  locomotion; 
the  horse  may  be  walking,  trotting,  or  pacing — all  included 
under  *  coming,'  which  conveys   the   notion   rather  hazily. 

*  Galloping,'  however,  describes  but  one  gait  and  thus  forms 
in  the  mind  a  more  sharply  defined  picture.  *  Galloping' 
we  call  a  specific  word  because  it  specifies  the  idea  exactly. 
From  this  example  it  is  evident  that  one  secret  of  a  vivid  and 
interesting,  as  opposed  to  a  colorless  and  dull,  style,  is  to 
employ,  whenever  possible,  a  specific  rather  than  a  general 
word.  The  difference  in  effect  is  shown  in  the  following  pas- 
sages : 

General.  All  at  once  I  saw  two  figures;  one  a  man  who  was  com- 
ing east,  and  the  other  a  girl  who  was  coming  down  a  cross  street. 
Well,  sir,  the  two  came  together  naturally  enough  at  the  corner; 
and  then  came  the  unpleasant  part  of  the  thing,  for  the  man 
walked  over  the  child  and  left  her  making  a  noise  on  the  ground. 
It  does  not  sound  very  bad,  but  it  was  disagreeable  to  see. 

Specific.  All  at  once  I  saw  two  figures :  one  a  little  man  who  was 
stumping  along  eastward  at  a  good  walk,  and  the  other  a  girl  of 
maybe  eight  or  ten  who  was  running  as  hard  as  she  was  able  down 
a  cross  street.     Well,  sir,  the  two  ran  into  one  another  naturally 

*  Lamont,  English  Composition,  pp.  340-  341. 


PERSUASION  281 

enough  at  the  corner;  and  then  came  the  horrible  part  of  the  thing; 
for  the  man  trampled  calmly  over  the  child's  body  and  left  her 
screaming  on  the  ground.  It  sounds  nothing  to  hear,  but  it  was 
hellish  to  see." 

"Do  not  write  'quite  a  distance*  when  you  can  just  as  well 
write  *  twelve  miles,'  nor  *rude  habitations'  when  you  mean 
*  adobe  huts,'  nor  *  intoxicating  liquor'  when  you  mean 
'Kentucky  bourbon.'  Let  your  trees  be  maples  or  syca- 
mores or  live-oaks,  and  your  birds  towhees  or  blue- jays  or 
vireos.  Give  your  characters  a  name,  your  incidents  a  date, 
and  even  your  sunsets  a  geographical  location.  Macaulay 
understood  well  the  value  of  this  device.  The  Spectator  is 
'served  up  every  morning  with  the  bohea  and  rolls.'  When 
young  men  of  rank  went  into  the  navy,  '  Mulgrave,  Dorset, 
Rochester,  and  many  others,  left  the  playhouses  and  the  Mall 
for  hammocks  and  salt  pork.'  Another  man  might  have 
written :  *  Whenever  the  Mahrattas  threatened  an  incursion, 
the  inhabitants  fled  for  their  lives.'  But  Macaulay  v/rites: 
'Wherever  their  kettledrums  were  heard,  the  peasant  threw 
his  bag  of  rice  on  his  shoulder,  hid  his  small  savings  in  his 
girdle,  and  fled  with  his  wife  and  children  to  the  mountains 
or  the  jungles — to  the  milder  neighborhood  of  the  hyena 
and  the  tiger.'"  ^ 

d.  Variety  is  the  life  of  speech.  "Deadly  monotony" 
is  a  familiar  term  that  is  full  of  meaning.  Monotony  always 
tends  to  put  an  audience  to  sleep;  it  dulls  interest  and  kills 
attention.  Monotony  of  voice,  of  rhythm,  of  sentence  struc- 
ture, of  paragraph  organization,  in  words,  in  the  use  of  evi- 
dence and  illustration — in  fact  monotony  of  any  kind  tires 
and  alienates  the  audience  and  makes  persuasion  diflficult  or 
impossible.  Avoid  monotony  by  securing,  first,  variety  of 
material;  second,  variety  of  phrase,  sentence,  paragraph,  etc. 
Such  material  spoken  with  the  mind  alert,  with  a  "lively 
sense  of  communication"  will  necessarily  insure  a  varied  de- 

*  Newcomer,  Elements  of  Rhetoric,  p.  238. 


282  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

livery.  "Seek  ye  first  a  variety  of  thought,  and  variety  of 
delivery  will  be  added  unto  you."  The  different  qualities 
of  persuasion,  as  has  been  said,  are  of  course  intermingled. 
Having  some  of  them  helps  one  to  get  the  others.  It  is  a 
universal  law.  "To  him  that  hath  shall  be  given."  He 
who  has  simplicity  and  vividness  will  usually  have  variety 
also  without  taking  special  thought  to  obtain  it. 

(I)  Comparison  and  climax.  Two  closely  associated  rhe- 
torical methods  that  aid  in  securing  the  quality  of  variety  (as 
well  as  the  quality  of  vividness)  are  comparison  and  climax. 
The  student  is  doubtless  familiar  with  these  as  explained  in 
all  modern  books  on  rhetoric  and  composition.  The  thor- 
oughness of  Whately's  paragraphs  written  in  1846  may  give 
a  deeper  understanding.  "Comparison  is  one  powerful 
means  of  exciting  or  heightening  any  emotion:  viz.:  by  pre- 
senting a  parallel  between  the  case  in  hand  and  some  other 
that  is  calculated  to  call  forth  such  emotions;  taking  care  of 
course  to  represent  the  present  case  as  stronger  than  the  one 
it  is  compared  with,  and  such  as  ought  to  affect  us  more 
powerfully. 

"When  several  successive  steps  of  this  kind  are  employed 
to  raise  the  feelings  gradually  to  the  highest  pitch  (which  is 
the  principal  employment  of  what  Rhetoricians  call  the  Cli- 
max), a  far  stronger  effect  is  produced  than  by  the  mere 
presentation  of  the  most  striking  object  at  once.  It  is  ob- 
served by  all  travellers  who  have  visited  the  Alps,  or  other 
stupendous  mountains,  that  they  form  a  very  inadequate 
notion  of  the  vastness  of  the  greater  ones,  till  they  ascend 
some  of  the  less  elevated  (which  yet  are  huge  mountains), 
and  thence  view  the  others  still  towering  above  them.  And 
the  mind,  no  less  than  the  eye,  cannot  so  well  take  in  and  do 
justice  to  any  vast  object  at  a  single  glance,  as  by  several 
successive  approaches  and  repeated  comparisons.  Thus  in 
the  well-known  Climax  of  Cicero  in  the  Oration  against 
Verres,  shocked  as  the  Romans  were  likely  to  be  at  the  bare 
mention  of  the  crucifixion  of  one  of  their  citizens,  the  sue- 


PERSUASION  283 

cessive  steps  by  which  he  brings  them  to  the  contemplation 
of  such  an  event,  were  calculated  to  work  up  their  feelings  to 
a  much  higher  pitch:  'It  is  an  outrage  to  bind  a  Roman 
citizen;  to  scourge  him  is  an  atrocious  crime;  to  put  him  to 
death  is  almost  parricide;  but  to  crucify  him — what  shall  I 
call  it?* 

"It  is  observed,  accordingly,  by  Aristotle,  in  speaking  of 
Panegyric,  that  the  person  whom  we  would  hold  up  to  ad- 
miration, should  always  be  compared,  and  advantageously 
compared,  if  possible,  with  those  that  are  already  illustrious, 
but  if  not,  at  least  with  some  person  whom  he  excels :  to  excel, 
being  in  itself,  he  says,  a  ground  of  admiration.  The  same 
rule  will  apply,  as  has  been  said,  to  all  other  feelings  as  well 
as  to  Admiration :  Anger,  or  Pity,  for  instance,  are  more  effec- 
tually excited  if  we  produce  cases  such  as  would  call  forth 
those  passions,  and  which,  though  similar  to  those  before  us, 
are  not  so  strong;  and  so  with  respect  to  the  rest."  ^ 

C.  The  audience.  1.  Adaptation  to  a  particular  audi- 
ence. Know  your  audience  and  adapt  your  speech  to  your 
audience.  This,  in  summary,  is  the  whole  theory  of  handling 
an  audience,  but  it  may  be  well  to  be  somewhat  more  detailed 
and  specific.  By  knowing  your  audience  is  meant  that  you 
should  know  as  accurately  as  possible  the  interests  and  prej- 
udices of  each  audience  in  regard  to  the  subject  you  are  to 
present  to  them,  and  to  the  occasion  on  which  you  speak. 
Do  not  deliver  the  same  speech  to  six  different  types  of  au- 
diences to  whom  you  have  to  present  the  same  subject.  Dis- 
cover how  these  audiences  differ  one  from  the  other  and  adapt 
your  speech  to  each  particular  audience.  In  order  to  do  this, 
consider  carefully  what  ideas  in  your  speech  toill  most  forcibly 
offed  the  emotions  of  your  particular  hearers  or  readers.  There 
are  in  every  question  certain  phases  of  it  that  have  a  particu- 
lar interest  for  any  particular  audience.  The  workingmen  of 
Liverpool  in  1863  were  most  interested  in  the  industrial  side 
of  the  slavery  question,  and  Beecher  showed  his  consummate 
1  Whately,  R.,  p.  142. 


284  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

tact  in  choosing  this  as  the  one  phase  to  be  treated  above  all 
others  at  the  mass-meeting  in  Philharmonic  Hall.  It  would 
have  been  folly  to  have  discussed  the  question  from  the 
standpoint  of  American  patriotism.  On  the  other  hand, 
before  a  council  of  clergymen  in  the  United  States,  it  would 
have  been  the  immorality  of  "man  owning  man"  that  would 
have  been  the  theme  of  persuasion.  It  often  happens  that 
speakers  and  writers  treat  their  subjects  from  too  many  points 
of  view.  They  turn  the  question  over  and  examine  it  on 
every  side,  when  the  men  whom  they  address  are  moved  in 
mind  or  heart  by  only  one  aspect  of  it  all.  Intellect  may  be 
the  same  in  Gwery  audience,  varying  only  in  the  degree  of  its 
keenness;  but  the  emotional  interests  of  audiences  differ 
widely  in  their  very  nature.  In  any  subject  there  are  only 
certain  phases  that  can  touch  these  varying  emotions,  and  it  is 
a  fundamental  duty  of  one  who  would  persuade,  to  consider 
well  what  these  interesting  phases  are.  Then  his  appeals 
will  be  well  directed  toward  the  vulnerable  points,  and  his 
blows  will  be  of  some  effect  on  the  will  of  his  audience. 

2.  Tact.  The  quality  that  lies  at  the  basis  of  adaptation 
is  tact.  The  tactful  person  easily  adapts  his  remarks  to  his 
audience.  Do  not  misunderstand  what  is  meant  by  tact.  It 
does  not  mean  hypocrisy,  flattery,  servility,  obsequiousness. 
There  is  nothing  underhanded  or  deceitful  about  it.  It  is 
nearer  to  politeness,  consideration  for  the  feelings  of  others, 
good  manners.  Your  despiser  of  tact  uses  a  sledge  hammer 
for  all  purposes  whether  the  task  at  hand  properly  requires 
a  tack  hammer  or  a  pile  driver.  He  is  usually  as  incapable  of 
great  force  as  he  is  of  delicate  touch.  He  is  an  unskilled 
workman — ^a  bungler  who  tries  to  make  up  for  his  lack  of 
inteUigence  and  politeness  by  ill-bred  boasting  of  his  honesty 
and  good  intentions.  Of  course  tact  is  no  proper  substitute  for 
careful  preparation  and  honest  convictions,  but  it  is  the  most 
powerful  ally  of  preparation  and  purpose.  To  decry  tact 
because  some  clever  people  rely  on  it  to  the  exclusion  of  other 
means  is  silly.    It  is  like  decrying  education  because  educated 


PERSUASION  285 

criminals  are  more  dangerous  than  others.  Intelligence  is, 
of  course,  a  more  dangerous  adversary  than  stupidity — it  is 
also  a  more  effective  champion. 

Early  in  this  book  we  said  that  persuasion  might  be  likened 
to  the  engine  of  an  automobile,  conviction  to  the  steering 
gear.  In  the  following  extract,  talent  means  practically  that 
which  is  covered  in  argumentation  by  the  word  conviction — 
evidence,  logic,  fact, — the  general  worth  and  truth  of  your 
case;  tact  means  persuasion,  the  power  of  making  your  case 
effective,  of  finding  a  way  to  get  your  truth  accepted  by 
those  to  whom  you  present  it.  "Talent  is  something,  but 
tact  is  everything.  Talent  is  serious,  sober,  grave,  and 
respectable;  tact  is  all  that,  and  more  too.  It  is  not  a  sixth 
sense,  but  it  is  the  life  of  all  the  five.  It  is  the  open  eye,  the 
quick  ear,  the  judging  taste,  the  keen  smell,  and  the  lively 
touch;  it  is  the  interpreter  of  all  riddles,  the  surmounter  of 
all  difficulties,  the  remover  of  all  obstacles.  It  is  useful  in 
all  places,  and  at  all  times;  it  is  useful  in  solitude,  for  it  shows 
a  man  his  way  into  the  world;  it  is  useful  in  society,  for  it 
shows  him  his  way  through  the  world. 

"Talent  is  power,  tact  is  skill;  talent  is  weight,  tact  is 
momentum;  talent  knows  what  to  do,  tact  knows  how  to  do  it: 
talent  makes  a  man  respectable,  tact  will  make  him  respected; 
talent  is  wealth,  tact  is  ready  money.  .  .  . 

"Take  them  to  the  bar,  and  let  them  shake  their  learned 
curls  at  each  other  in  legal  rivalry.  Talent  sees  its  way 
clearly,  but  tact  is  first  at  its  journey's  end.  Talent  has  many 
a  compliment  from  the  bench,  but  tact  touches  fees  from 
attorneys  and  clients.  Talent  speaks  learnedly  and  logically, 
tact  triumphantly.  Talent  makes  the  world  wonder  that  it 
gets  on  no  faster,  tact  excites  astonishment  that  it  gets  on  so 
fast.  And  the  secret  is,  that  tact  has  no  weight  to  carry;  it 
makes  no  false  steps;  it  hits  the  right  nail  on  the  head;  it  loses 
no  time;  it  takes  all  hints;  and,  by  keeping  its  eye  on  the 
weathercock,  is  ready  to  take  advantage  of  every  wind  that 
blows. 


286  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

"  Take  them  into  the  church.  Talent  has  always  something 
worth  hearing,  tact  is  sure  of  abundance  of  hearers;  .  .  . 
talent  convinces^  tact  converts.  .  .  . 

"  Talent  has  the  ear  of  the  house,  but  tact  wins  its  heart  and 
has  its  votes:  talent  is  fit  for  employment,  but  tact  is  fitted 
for  it.  .  .  .  It  has  served  an  invisible  and  extemporary 
apprenticeship:  it  wants  no  drilling;  it  never  ranks  in  the 
awkward  squad;  it  has  no  left  hand,  no  deaf  ear,  no  blind 
side.  It  puts  on  no  looks  of  wondrous  wisdom,  it  has  no  air 
of  profundity,  but  plays  with  the  details  of  place  as  dexter- 
ously as  a  well-taught  hand  flourishes  over  the  keys  of  the 
pianoforte.  It  has  all  the  air  of  commonplace,  and  all  the 
force  and  power  of  genius."  ^ 

3.  Indirect  appeal.  The  value  of  what  is  called  the  "in- 
direct appeal"  has  often  been  discussed.  It  is  probably  one 
of  the  best  and  safest  "thumb  rules"  ever  applied  to  the 
problem  of  persuasion.  Stated  succinctly,  it  is :  Never  avow 
in  so  many  words  your  purpose  to  arouse  any  particular 
emotion.  The  reasons  for  this  rule  have  been  set  forth  by 
many  writers,  but  none  have  surpassed  the  discussion  of 
Whately,  which  follows  in  full: 

"The  first  and  most  important  point  to  be  observed  in 
every  address  to  any  Passion,  Sentiment,  Feeling,  etc.,  is 
(as  has  been  already  hinted),  that  it  should  not  be  introduced 
as  such,  and  plainly  avowed;  otherwise  the  effect  will  be,  in 
great  measure,  if  not  entirely,  lost.  This  circumstance  forms 
a  remarkable  distinction  between  the  head  now  under  con- 
sideration, and  that  of  Argumentation  (conviction).  When 
engaged  in  Reasoning,  properly  so  called,  our  purpose  not 
only  need  not  be  concealed,  but  may  (as  I  have  said),  without 
prejudice  to  the  effect,  be  distinctly  declared:  on  the  other 
hand,  even  when  the  Feelings  we  wish  to  excite  are  such  as 
ought  to  operate,  so  that  there  is  no  reason  to  be  ashamed  of 
the  endeavours  thus  to  influence  the  hearer,  still  our  purpose 

1  "Tact  and  Talent,"  The  London  Adas.  Quoted  by  Clark  and  Blanchard, 
pp.  110,  111. 


PERSUASION  287 

and  drift  should  be,  if  not  absolutely  concealed,  yet  not 
openly  declared,  and  made  prominent.  Whether  the  motives 
which  the  orator  is  endeavouring  to  call  into  action  be  suit- 
able or  unsuitable  to  the  occasion, — such  as  it  is  right,  or 
wrong,  for  the  bearer  to  act  upon, — the  same  rule  will  hold 
good.  In  the  latter  case  it  is  plain,  that  the  speaker  who  is 
seeking  to  bias  unfairly  the  minds  of  the  audience,  will  be 
the  more  likely  to  succeed  by  going  to  work  clandestinely, 
in  order  that  his  hearers  may  not  be  on  their  guard  and  pre- 
pare and  fortify  their  minds  against  the  impression  he  wishes 
to  produce.  In  the  other  case, — where  the  motives  dwelt  on 
are  such  as  ought  to  be  present,  and  strongly  to  operate, — 
men  are  not  likely  to  be  pleased  with  the  idea  that  they  need 
to  have  these  motives  urged  upon  them,  and  that  they  are 
not  already  sufficiently  under  the  influence  of  such  sentiments 
as  the  occasion  calls  for.  A  man  may  indeed  be  convinced 
that  he  is  in  such  a  predicament;  and  may  ultimately  feel 
obliged  to  the  Orator  for  exciting  or  strengthening  such 
sentiments;  but  while  he  confesses  this,  he  cannot  but  feel 
a  degree  of  mortification  in  making  the  confession,  and  a 
kind  of  jealousy  of  the  apparent  assumption  of  superiority, 
in  a  speaker,  who  seems  to  say,  *Now  I  will  exhort  you  to  feel 
as  you  ought  on  this  occasion;'  *I  will  endeavour  to  inspire 
you  with  such  noble,  and  generous,  and  amiable  sentiments 
as  you  ought  to  entertain;'  which  is,  in  effect,  the  tone  of 
him  who  avows  the  purpose  of  Exhortation.  The  mind  is 
sure  to  revolt  from  the  humiliation  of  being  thus  moulded 
and  fashioned  in  respect  to  its  feelings,  at  the  pleasure  of 
another;  and  is  apt,  perversely,  to  resist  the  influence  of  such 
a  discipline. 

"On  the  other  hand,  there  is  no  such  implied  superiority 
in  avowing  the  intention  of  convincing  the  understanding. 
Men  know,  and  (what  is  more  to  the  purpose)  feel,  that  he 
who  presents  to  their  minds  a  new  and  cogent  train  of  Ar- 
gument, does  not  necessarily  possess  or  assume  any  offensive 
superiority;  but  may,  by  merely  having  devoted  a  particular 


288  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

attention  to  the  point  in  question,  succeed  in  setting  before 
them  Arguments  and  Explanations  which  have  not  occurred 
to  themselves.  And  even  if  the  arguments  adduced,  and  the 
conclusions  drawn,  should  be  opposite  to  those  with  which 
they  had  formerly  been  satisfied,  still  there  is  nothing  in  this 
so  humiliating,  as  in  that  which  seems  to  amount  to  the 
imputation  of  a  moral  deficiency. 

"It  is  true  that  Sermons  not  unfrequently  prove  popular, 
which  consist  avowedly  and  almost  exclusively  of  Exhorta- 
tion, strictly  so  called, — in  which  the  design  of  influencing 
the  sentiments  and  feelings  is  not  only  apparent,  but  prom- 
inent throughout;  but  it  is  to  be  feared,  that  those  who  are 
the  most  pleased  with  such  discourses,  are  more  apt  to  apply 
these  Exhortations  to  their  neighbours  than  to  themselves; 
and  that  each  bestows  his  commendation  rather  from  the 
consideration  that  such  admonitions  are  much  needed,  and 
must  be  generally  useful,  than  from  finding  them  thus  useful 
to  himself. 

"When  indeed  the  speaker  has  made  some  progress  in 
exciting  the  feelings  required,  and  has  in  great  measure 
gained  possession  of  his  audience,  a  direct  and  distinct 
Exhortation  to  adopt  the  conduct  recommended  will  often 
prove  very  effectual;  but  never  can  it  be  needful  or  advisable 
to  tell  them  (as  some  do)  that  you  are  going  to  exhort  them. 

"It  will,  indeed,  sometimes  happen  that  the  excitement  of 
a  certain  feeling  will  depend,  in  some  measure,  on  a  process  of 
Reasoning;  e.  g.,  it  may  be  requisite  to  prove,  where  there  is  a 
doubt  on  the  subject,  that  the  person  so  recommended  to  the 
Pity,  Gratitude,  etc.,  of  the  hearers,  is  really  an  object  de- 
serving of  these  sentiments;  but  even  then,  it  will  almost 
always  be  the  case,  that  the  chief  point  to  be  accomplished 
shall  be  to  raise  those  feelings  to  the  requisite  height,  after 
the  understanding  is  convinced  that  the  occasion  calls  for 
them.  And  this  is  to  be  effected  not  by  Argument,  properly 
so  called,  but  by  presenting  the  circumstances  in  such  a  point 
of  view,  and  so  fixing  and  detaining  the  attention  upon  them, 


PERSUASION  289 

that  corresponding  sentiments  and  emotions  shall  gradually, 
and  as  it  were  spontaneously,  arise. 

"Sermons  would  probably  have  more  effect,  if,  instead  of 
being,  as  they  frequently  are,  directly  hortatory^  they  were 
more  in  a  didactic  form;  occupied  chiefly  in  explaining  some 
transaction  related,  or  doctrine  laid  down,  in  Scripture. 
The  generality  of  hearers  are  too  much  familiarized  to  direct 
exhortation  to  feel  it  adequately :  if  they  are  led  to  the  same 
point  obliquely,  as  it  were,  and  induced  to  dwell  with  interest 
for  a  considerable  time  on  some  point,  closely,  though  in- 
cidentally, connected  with  the  most  awful  and  important 
truths,  a  very  slight  application  to  themselves  might  make 
a  greater  impression  than  the  most  vehement  appeal  in  the 
outset.  Often  indeed  they  would  themselves  make  this 
application  unconsciously;  and  if  on  any  this  procedure  made 
no  impression,  it  can  hardly  be  expected  that  anything  else 
would.  To  use  a  homely  illustration,  a  moderate  charge  of 
powder  will  have  more  effect  in  splitting  a  rock,  if  we  begin 
by  deep  boring,  and  introducing  the  charge  into  the  very  heart 
of  it,  than  ten  times  the  quantity,  exploded  on  the  surface."  ^ 

4.  Responsibility:  Facing  the  truth.  The  thing  that  can 
and  should  be  done,  directly,  openly,  bluntly,  is  to  tell  the  audi- 
ence of  their  own  responsibility.  There  is  no  need  here  for  indi- 
rectness. You  are  not  talking  about  what  feeling  should  stir 
them.  You  do  not  say  '*  I  propose  to  arouse  a  feeling  of  guilt, 
or  sympathy,  or  love  or  hate,"  but  "you  are  responsible  for 
this  situation  and  I  propose  to  prove  it  to  you."  "This  is 
the  truth  and  you  must  face  it."  "There  are  the  facts. 
It's  up  to  you.  What  are  you  going  to  do?"  Says  Winans  ^ 
on  this  point:  "It  is  often  very  diflScult  to  bring  home  to  an 
audience  the  feeling  that  they  are  personally  responsible  for 
the  matter  in  hand.  The  preacher  who  levels  a  sermon  at 
the  head  of  an  erring  deacon  is  congratulated  by  that  very 
deacon,  who  chuckles  *to  think  how  Brother  Smith  got 
scored  this  morning.'  The  preacher  is  continually  finding 
1  Whately,  pp.  136-138.  2  Winans,  pp.  265-268. 


290  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

it  necessary  to  say,  *  If  the  coat  fits  you,  put  it  on.'  The  citi- 
zen who  attacks  a  municipal  abuse  finds  dozens  to  *  sympa- 
thize' and  say,  *  Yes,  yes,  why  doesn't  somebody  attend  to 
that? '  for  one  to  step  forward  and  say,'  I  have  come  to  help.' 
Very  likely  the  priest  and  the  Levite  who  passed  the  injured 
man  by,  said,  *Too  bad!  Somebody  should  care  for  him, 
and  clean  out  those  bandits  too;  but  my  business  in  Jericho 
won't  wait.'  We  can  readily  see  that  the  speaker's  task  is 
to  get  people  to  face  their  obligation  squarely,  to  give  it  at- 
tention when  other  matters  of  business  and  pleasure  are 
taking  their  minds.  He  must  make  them  see  that  the  public 
nuisance,  the  grafting  city  administration,  the  violation  of 
tenement-house  laws,  the  endangered  honor  of  the  university, 
are  the  personal  responsibility,  not  only  of  all  of  his  hearers, 
but  of  each  of  them;  not  something  that  *they'  should  at- 
tend to,  but  something  that  unofficial  John  Smith  should 
attend  to. 

"The  most  obvious  thing  to  do  is  to  declare  bluntly  the 
individual  responsibility  of  each  one  present.  But  audiences 
are  rather  hardened  to  this;  we  are  all  told  of  innumerable 
imperative  duties  as  men  and  citizens,  as  members  of  this 
body  and  that.  At  least  a  new  and  interesting  way  of  bring- 
ing home  the  responsibility  is  needed,  especially  when  one's 
hearers  are  not  yet  aroused  over  the  situation.  .  .  . 

"An  important  way  of  awakening  the  sense  of  responsibility, 
which  also  enlists  pride,  is  to  give  one's  hearers  something 
definite  to  do,  whether  that  something  be  really  important 
work  in  a  position  of  trust,  or  merely  signing  a  petition,  or 
standing  up  to  be  counted.  Get  them  at  least  to  commit 
themselves  publicly  to  your  cause  so  that  the  public  will 
expect  action  from  them.  Get  as  many  as  feasible  serving 
on  committees  to  do  specific  tasks  and  report  upon  them. 
Men  of  real  efficiency  may  be  interested  in  a  cause  just  by  the 
chance  to  do  work  well;  they  like  to  make  things  go.  Other 
men  may  be  enlisted  by  being  made  to  feel  that  they  are 
needed.  .  .  . 


PERSUASION  29) 

"It  is  important  to  prevent  people  from  deceiving  them- 
selves with  excuses.  Professor  James,  in  discussing  attention 
and  will,  puts  stress  upon  the  difficulty  we  often  have  in  keep- 
ing attention  upon  the  right  action,  seeing  clearly  that  a 
duty  is  a  duty  and  that  an  evil  action  is  an  evil  action.  .  .  . 
It  is  sometimes  the  speaker's  business  to  compel  his  audience 
to  face  unpleasant  facts  as  real,  and  in  particular  to  prevent 
their  putting  them  away  by  calling  them  by  other  names.  .  . 

"  The  part  of  the  persuader  in  helping  or  compelling  others 
to  accept  and  stick  to  the  right  conception,  labeled  with  the 
right  name,  is  plain  enough.  He  should  not  permit  his 
hearers  to  call  rudeness  or  destructiveness  fun,  penuriousness 
caring  for  one's  own  household,  indolence  weariness  or  illness, 
snobbishness  refinement,  lies  excuses,  bigotry  religion,  or  to 
suffer  from  the  two  delusions  from  which  an  Oxford  don  says 
his  little  world  suffers, — having  no  opinions  and  calling  it 
balanced  mind,  and  expressing  no  opinions  and  calling  it 
moderation. 

"Dr.  Wiley  tells  a  story  of  a  member  of  a  certain  Middle 
West  legislature  who  sought  an  appropriation  of  $100,000 
for  the  protection  of  public  health;  but  could  secure  only 
$5,000.  One  morning  he  put  upon  the  desk  of  each  legislator 
before  the  opening  of  the  session,  a  fable  which  ran  something 
like  this:  *A  sick  mother  with  a  baby  is  told  by  a  physician 
that  she  has  tuberculosis  and  that  she  should  seek  a  higher 
altitude.  Lack  of  means  prevents  her  going.  She  appHes 
to  the  state  government  and  is  told  that  not  a  dollar  is  avail- 
able to  save  the  mother  and  her  child  from  death.  At  the 
same  time  a  farmer  observes  that  one  of  his  hogs  has  cholera 
symptoms.  He  sends  a  telegram,  collect,  to  the  government. 
The  inspector  comes  next  day,  treats  the  hog  with  serum 
and  cures  it.  Moral :  Be  a  hog ! '  The  $  1 00,000  appropriation 
was  promptly  granted.  The  legislators  saw  from  this  vivid 
presentation  of  the  case  that  what  they  had  variously  called 
economy,  common-sense,  business  is  business,  etc.,  was  really 
putting  the  hog  above  the  child." 


292  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

5.  The  friendly  audience.  Audiences  may  be,  of  course, 
friendly,  neutral,  or  hostile  to  the  speaker  or  his  cause.  The 
problem  of  persuasion  is  obviously  comparatively  easy  with 
friendly  hearers,  fairly  diflBcult  with  the  neutral  group,  and 
hardest  with  the  hostile  audience.  Read  the  following  and 
note  the  contrast  due  to  the  different  circumstances  under 
which  these  two  speeches  were  delivered.  This  is  the  elo- 
quent conclusion  of  one  of  Henry  Ward  Beecher's  sermons 
in  the  pulpit  of  the  Plymouth  Church,  Brooklyn: — 

"We  are  children  of  God  in  proportion  as  we  are  in  sympathy 
with  those  who  are  around  about  us,  and  in  proportion  as  we  bear 
with  each  other.  How  sacred  is  man,  for  whom  Christ  died!  And 
how  ruthlessly  do  we  treat  him!  Oh,  my  brother,  oh,  my  sister,  oh, 
father  and  mother,  you  are  of  me,  and  I  am  of  you !  We  have  the 
same  temptations.  We  are  walking  to  the  same  sounds.  We  are 
upon  the  same  journey,  out  of  darkness  toward  light;  out  of  bondage 
toward  liberty;  out  of  sin  toward  holiness;  out  of  earth  toward 
heaven;  out  of  self  toward  God.  Let  us  clasp  hands.  Let  us  cover 
each  other's  faults.  Let  us  pray  more  and  criticise  less.  Let  us 
love  more  and  hate  less.  Let  us  bear  more  and  smite  less.  And 
by  and  by,  when  we  stand  in  the  unthralled  land,  in  pure  hght, 
made  as  the  angels  of  God,  we  will  pity  ourselves  for  every  stone 
that  we  threw,  but  we  shall  not  be  sorry  for  any  tear  that  we  shed, 
or  any  hour  of  patient  endurance  that  we  experienced  for  another. 
Not  the  songs  that  you  sang,  not  the  verses  that  you  wrote,  not 
the  monuments  that  you  built,  not  the  money  that  you  amassed, 
but  what  you  did  for  one  of  Christ's  little  ones,  in  that  hour  will  be 
your  joy  and  your  glory  above  everything  else. 

"  'Brethren,  this  is  a  sermon  that  ought  to  have  an  application 
to-day,  on  your  way  home,  in  your  houses,  and  in  your  business  to- 
morrow. From  this  time  forth,  see  that  you  are  better  men  your- 
selves, and  see  that  your  betterment  is  turned  to  the  account  of 
somebody  else.  And  consider  yourselves  as  growing  in  grace  in 
proportion  as  you  grow  in  patience  and  helpfulness.  Consider 
yourselves  as  growing  in  piety  and  as  growing  toward  God  in  pro- 
portion as  you  grow  in  sympathy  for  men.'"  ^ 

1  Plymouth  Pulpit,  Eighth  Series,  March-September,  1872,  p.  245. 


PERSUASION  293 

6.  The  hostile  audience.  With  this,  contrast  the  follow- 
ing appeal  by  the  same  speaker  to  a  hostile  public  meeting 
in  Liverpool,  England.  Mr.  Beecher  had  already  made  sev- 
eral speeches  in  the  cities  in  England  in  behalf  of  the  North- 
ern interests  in  the  Civil  War,  and  this  was  his  greatest  effort. 
Liverpool  was  the  recognized  headquarters  of  the  Southern 
sympathizers  in  England;  so  that  the  audience  that  confronted 
him  was  largely  hostile,  and  he  was  compelled  to  fight  for  a 
hearing  in  the  face  of  hisses,  catcalls,  and  every  form  of  in- 
decent interruption.    Mr.  Beecher  began: — 

"For  more  than  twenty-five  years  I  have  been  made  perfectly 
familiar  with  popular  assemblies  in  all  parts  of  my  country  except 
the  extreme  South.  There  has  not  for  the  whole  of  that  time  been 
a  single  day  of  my  life  when  it  would  have  been  safe  for  me  to  go 
south  of  Mason  and  Dixon's  line  in  my  own  country,  and  all  for 
one  reason:  my  solemn,  earnest,  persistent  testimony  against  that 
which  I  consider  to  be  the  most  atrocious  thing  under  the  sun — the 
system  of  American  slavery  in  a  great  free  republic.  (Cheers.)  I 
have  passed  through  that  early  period  when  right  of  free  speech  was 
denied  to  me.  Again  and  again  I  have  attempted  to  address  au- 
diences that,  for  no  other  crime  than  that  of  free  speech,  visited 
me  with  all  manner  of  contumelious  epithets;  and  now  since  I  have 
been  in  England,  although  I  have  met  with  greater  kindness  and 
courtesy  on  the  part  of  most  than  I  deserved,  yet,  on  the  other 
hand,  I  perceive  that  the  Southern  influence  prevails  to  some 
extent  in  England.  (Applause  and  uproar.)  It  is  my  old  acquaint- 
ance; I  understand  it  perfectly — (laughter) — and  I  have  always 
held  it  to  be  an  unfailing  truth  that  where  a  man  had  a  cause  that 
would  bear  examination  he  was  perfectly  willing  to  have  it  spoken 
about.  (Applause.)  And  when  in  Manchester  I  saw  those  huge 
placards,  'Who  is  Henry  Ward  Beecher.?'  (laughter,  cries  of  'Quite 
right,'  and  applause),  and  when  in  Liverpool  I  was  told  that  there 
were  those  blood-red  placards,  purporting  to  say  what  Henry  Ward 
Beecher  has  said,  and  calling  upon  Englishmen  to  suppress  free 
speech,  I  tell  you  what  I  thought.  I  thought  simply  this,  'I  am 
glad  of  it.'  (Laughter.)  Why?  Because  if  they  had  felt  perfectly 
secure,  that  you  are  the  minions  of  the  South  and  the  slaves  of 


294  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

slavery,  they  would  have  been  perfectly  still.  (Applause  and  up- 
roar.) And,  therefore,  when  I  saw  so  much  nervous  apprehension 
that,  if  I  were  permitted  to  speak — (hisses  and  applause) — when 
I  found  they  were  afraid  to  have  me  speak — (hisses,  laughter,  and 
"No,  no!") — when  I  found  that  they  considered  my  speaking  dam- 
aging to  their  cause — (applause) — when  I  found  that  they  appealed 
from  facts  and  reasonings  to  mob  law — (applause  and  uproar) — I 
said,  no  man  need  tell  me  what  the  heart  and  secret  counsel  of  these 
men  are.  They  tremble  and  are  afraid.  (Applause,  laughter,  hisses, 
"No,  no!"  and  a  voice,  "New  York  mob.")  Now,  personally,  it  is 
a  matter  of  very  little  consequence  to  me  whether  I  speak  here  to- 
night or  not.  (Laughter  and  cheers.)  But  one  thing  is  very  cer- 
tain, if  you  do  permit  me  to  speak  here  to-night,  you  will  hear  very 
plain  talking.  (Applause  and  hisses.)  You  will  not  find  a  man 
that  dared  to  speak  about  Great  Britain  three  thousand  miles  oflF, 
and  then  is  afraid  to  speak  to  Great  Britain  when  he  stands  on  her 
shores.  (Immense  applause  and  hisses.)  And  if  I  do  not  mistake  the 
tone  and  temper  of  Englishmen,  they  had  rather  have  a  man  who 
opposes  them  in  a  manly  way — (applause  from  all  parts  of  the 
hall) — than  a  sneak  that  agrees  with  them  in  an  unmanly  way. 
(Applause  and  "Bravo!")  Now,  if  I  can  carry  you  with  me  by 
sound  convictions,  I  shall  be  immensely  glad  (applause);  but  if 
I  cannot  carry  you  with  me  by  facts  and  sound  arguments,  I  do 
not  wish  you  to  go  with  me  at  all;  and  all  that  I  ask  is  simply 
FAIR  PLAY.    (Applause,  and  a  voice.  "You  shall  have  it,  too.") 

"Those  of  you  who  are  kind  enough  to  wish  to  favor  my  speak- 
ing,— and  you  will  observe  that  my  voice  is  slightly  husky  from 
having  spoken  almost  every  night  in  succession  for  some  time 
past, — those  who  wish  to  hear  me  will  do  me  the  kindness  simply 
to  sit  still;  and  I  and  my  friends  the  Secessionists  will  make  all  the 
noise.       (Laughter.)"  ^ 

It  is  striking  indeed  that  these  two  speeches  were  from  the 
same  lips.  They  are  both  strong  emotional  appeals,  and  the 
power  of  each  depends,  in  no  small  degree,  upon  the  fitness 
for  the  time  and  place.  In  the  case  of  the  sermon,  Mr. 
Beecher  spoke  to  an  audience  gathered  on  a  quiet  Sabbath 

^  Patriotic  Addresses,  Beecher,  p.  516. 


PERSUASION  295 

day,  in  a  consecrated  edifice,  in  whose  "dim  religious  light" 
were  felt  all  the  sacred  influences  of  architecture  and  of.  music. 
The  minds  of  his  hearers  were  open  to  high  thoughts  and 
ready  to  meet  in  close  communion  of  sympathy  and  feeling 
with  the  orator.  So  he  might  well  touch  the  chords  of  mutual 
love  and  of  aspiration.  In  Liverpool,  before  a  strange  au- 
dience in  a  strange  hall,  his  coming  heralded  by  scurilous 
placards  and  threats  against  his  life,  the  orator  was  com- 
pelled to  fight  for  even  the  privilege  of  speech  itself.  To  have 
addressed  such  a  crowd  in  terms  of  "holiness"  and  "tempta- 
tion" would  have  been  to  raise  a  riot.  On  the  other  hand,  if 
the  pastor  of  the  Plymouth  pulpit  had  appealed  to  his  con- 
gregation for  "fair  play,"  he  would  have  been  charged  with 
insanity. 

Beecher's  speech  in  Liverpool  also  affords  a  good  illustra- 
tion of  the  need  of  knowing  the  character  and  previous  opinions 
of  an  audience.  His  audience  was  largely  made  up  of  laboring 
men.  They  were  struggling  from  day  to  day  to  make  an  hon- 
est living,  and  their  standard  of  value  was  wages;  they  com- 
monly estimated  ideas  in  terms  of  pounds,  shillings,  and 
pence.  The  master  of  persuasion  knew  their  thoughts  and 
directed  his  appeal  accordingly.  He  founded  his  reasoning 
on  the  basis  of  the  benefits  to  English  industry  and  wages, 
from  the  freeing  of  the  Southern  slaves.  English  industry, 
he  said,  needs  not  cotton,  but  consumers;  slaves  are  not  con- 
sumers, but  make  them  free,  and  they  become  the  patrons 
of  British  cotton  and  linen,  machines  and  books.  Further- 
more, he  spoke  in  terms  that  would  reach  and  stir  a  work- 
ing man. 

"It  is  a  necessity  of  every  manufacturing  and  commercial  people 
that  their  customers  should  be  very  wealthy  and  intelligent.  Let 
us  put  the  subject  before  you  in  the  familiar  light  of  your  own 
local  experience.  To  whom  do  the  tradesmen  of  Liverpool  sell  the 
most  goods  at  the  highest  profit?  To  the  ignorant  and  poor,  or  to 
the  educated  and  prosperous?  (A  voice,  'To  the  Southerners.* 
Laughter.)    The  poor  man  buys  simply  for  his  body;  he  buys  food, 


296  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

he  buys  clothing,  he  buys  fuel,  he  buys  lodging.  His  rule  is  to  buy 
the  least  and  the  cheapest  that  he  can;  he  brings  away  as  little  as 
he  can;  and  he  buys  for  the  least  he  can.  .  .  . 

"A  savage  is  a  man  of  one  story,  and  that  one  story  a  cellar. 
When  a  man  begins  to  be  civilized,  he  raises  another  story.  When 
you  christianize  and  civilize  the  man,  you  put  story  upon  story,  for 
you  develop  faculty  after  faculty,  and  you  have  to  supply  every 
story  with  your  productions.  The  savage  is  a  man  one  story  deep, 
the  civilized  man  is  thirty  stories  deep.  (Applause.)  Now,  if  you 
go  to  a  lodging-house  where  there  are  three  or  four  men,  your  sales 
to  them  may,  no  doubt,  be  worth  something;  but  if  you  go  to  a 
lodging-house  like  some  of  those  which  I  saw  in  Edinburgh,  which 
seem  to  contain  about  twenty  stories  ('Oh,  oh!'  and  interruption), 
every  story  of  which  is  full,  and  all  who  occupy  buy  of  you — which 
is  the  better  customer,  the  man  who  is  drawn  out  or  the  man  who 
is  pinched  up?"> 

7.  Eight  suggestions  for  persuasion  illustrated.  This 
Liverpool  speech  is  generally  used  as  the  basis  of  discussion 
of  the  problem  of  handling  a  hostile  audience — or  of  per- 
suasion in  general.  Baker  and  Huntington  discuss  eight  sug- 
gestions for  persuasion,  which  are  summarized  as  follows :  ^ 

"  1.  Ascertain  the  habits  of  mind  of  your  proposed  audience. 

"  2.  Determine  the  special  interests  and  the  idiosyncrasies 
of  your  audience. 

"3.  Connect  lower  with  higher  motives. 

"4.  Remember  that  the  larger  the  audience  the  higher  the 
motives  to  which  appeal  may  be  made. 

"5.  Startling  an  audience  may  rout  indifference  or  effec- 
tively emphasize. 

"6.  Let  the  nature  of  your  task  determine  the  order  of 
your  persuasion. 

"  7.  Unify  the  persuasion  for  some  definite  purpose. 

"8.  Be  flexible;  adapt  the  work  to  unexpected  exigencies.'* 

After  this  discussion  they  show  how  Beecher  in  this  speech 
exemplified  all  of  these  suggestions  (symbols  not  in  the  origi- 

^  Patriotic  Addresses,  Beecher,  p.  519. 
2  The  Principles  of  Argumentation,  p.  331. 


PERSUASION  •  297 

nal).  "Of  course,  masterly  persuasion  uses  one  or  more  of 
these  suggestions  as  experience  and  intuition  prompt. 
Beecher's  Speech  at  Liverpool  shows  skillful  recognition  of  all 
of  them.  (1)  Beecher  planned  it  on  the  idea  that  an  English 
audience  habitually  likes  fair  play,  courage,  independence, 
and  good  nature.  He  asked  for  the  first  because  he  could 
offer  the  other  three  in  exchange.  (2)  He  constantly  sought 
to  show  the  audience  the  connection  between  his  subject 
and  their  personal  interests.  (3)  He  knew  that  it  is  safest 
to  appeal  to  high  motives,  and  that  when  lower  motives  are 
used  they  must  lead  into  higher.  (4)  His  experience  told 
him  that  in  so  large  an  audience  as  his  he  might  well  connect 
his  special  appeal  with  the  highest  motives.  (5)  He  startled 
his  audience  more  than  once  by  his  frankness,  his  courage, 
or  his  swift  turning  of  the  tables.  (6-7)  The  persuasion  of 
each  division  worked  toward  a  purpose  which  is  stated  first 
in  the  last  paragraphs  of  the  address.  (8)  Nearly  every  page 
illustrates  his  skill  in  grappling  with  conditions  which  could 
not  have  been  foreseen.  Indeed,  as  an  illustration  of  success- 
ful coping  with  problems  of  persuasion  raised  by  the  nature 
of  the  subject,  the  relation  of  the  speaker  to  it  and  to  the 
audience,  and  the  relation  of  the  audience  to  the  subject, 
the  Speech  at  Liverpool  should  be  studied  from  end  to  end."  ^ 

*  The  Principles  of  Argumentation,  p.  330. 


CHAPTER   12 

THE   INTRODUCTION 

OUTLINE 

I.  The  function  of  the  introduction. 
A.  Conviction. 

1.  Definition. 

a.  By  authority. 

b.  Etymology. 

c.  Context. 

d.  Analogy. 

e.  Illustration. 

f.  Exclusion. 

g.  Analysis. 

2.  Explanation,  issues,  and  partition. 

a.  Direct  or  inverted  order. 

b.  Illustration  of  the  three  parts. 

c.  Two  or  more  issues :  parallel  partition. 

d.  Issues  emphasized. 

e.  Excluding  irrelevant  matter. 
B.  Persuasion. 

1.  Calm,  courteous,  conversational. 

2.  Do  not  detract  from  your  theme. 

3.  Strange  or  hostile  audiences. 

4.  Never  lose  temper. 

5.  Inattentive  audience. 

I.  The  function  of  the  introduction  is  to  prepare  the  way 
for  the  work  of  the  discussion  proper.  This  duty  of  the  in- 
troduction is  twofold.  Both  an  intellectual  and  an  emotional 
approach  to  the  problem  must  usually  be  made  in  the  intro- 
duction. The  intellect  must  be  prepared,  so  that  all  the  proofs 
may  have  their  fullest  effect;  the  emotions,  in  order  that  the 
speaker  or  writer  may  from  the  first  be  brought  into  har- 

298 


THE  INTRODUCTION  299 

monious  and  sympathetic  relations  with  his  audience.  So 
the  introduction  must  contain  the  proper  approach  to  both 
conviction  and  persuasion.  Cicero  said  the  purpose  of  the 
introduction  is  to  render  the  audience  ^*benevolos,  attentos, 
dociles'' — well  disposed,  attentive,  ready  to  be  influenced. 
But  it  should  be  remembered,  in  connection  with  this  much 
quoted  remark  that  Cicero  divided  speeches  into  six  parts 
(introduction,  narration,  proposition,  proof,  refutation,  con- 
clusion). By  introduction  he  meant  only  the  opening  re- 
marks whose  function  is  almost  purely  persuasive.  The  work 
in  conviction  to  be  accomplished  in  the  introduction  as  we 
understand  it,  Cicero  took  up  under  "  narration  and  proposi- 
tion." Some  modern  writers  have  given  a  threefold  division 
of  the  function  of  the  introduction.  Professor  F.  B.  Robinson  ^ 
gives  as  the  purpose  of  the  introduction,  "  (A)  to  put  the  au- 
dience in  a  state  of  favorable  feeling;  (B)  to  arouse  interest 
and  secure  attention;  and  (C)  to  prepare  the  audience  to 
understand  the  message."  It  will  be  noticed  that  the  first  of 
these  aims  at  persuasion,  the  second  at  persuasion  and  con- 
viction, and  the  third  at  conviction.  Pattee  ^  says  "  the  work 
of  the  introduction  is  threefold:  (1)  to  conciliate  the  audience; 
(2)  to  explain  the  subject;  and  (3)  to  outline  the  discussion." 
The  first  of  these  is  a  work  in  persuasion,  the  second  and  third 
have  to  do  with  conviction.  We  shall  discuss  the  function  of 
the  introduction  under  the  familiar  division  of  conviction 
and  persuasion,  as  explained  earlier  in  this  book,^  using  ap- 
propriate subdivisions  under  each. 

A.  Conviction.  We  have  seen  that,  with  respect  to 
conviction,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  introduction  to  give  all  the  in- 
formation necessary  for  an  understanding  of  the  discussion; 
also  that  the  parts  usually  necessary  for  the  accomplishment 
of  this  purpose  are,  briefly:  (1)  a  definition  of  terms;  (2)  an 
explanation  of  the  question  in  such  a  way  as  to  lead  up  to  (3) 
the  issues,  and  (4)  the  partition  or  statement  of  the  points 
to  be  proved  in  the  discussion. 

1  Page  31.  2  Page  28.  «  See  eh.  1. 


300  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

1.  Definition  ^  in  argumentation  serves  two  purposes. 
It  serves,  firsU  to  enable  the  writer,  in  the  beginning  of  his 
work  in  preparation,  to  find  out  the  real  meaning  of  the  ques- 
tion. Secondly i  it  serves  to  make  the  meaning  clear  to  the 
reader  or  hearer.  In  the  execution  of  the  former  of  these  two 
purposes  the  definitions  do  not  need  to  be  expressed  at  all; 
it  is  suflBcient  that  the  investigator  find  and  understand  them 
himself.  But  in  presenting  his  proofs  to  others,  the  arguer 
must  consider  the  methods  he  will  need  to  use,  in  order  to 
make  his  definitions  effective  with  the  persons  he  is  seeking 
to  convince.  To  present  a  definition  forcibly  is  not  always 
easy.  A  mere  dictionary  definition,  which  we  have  seen  to 
be  of  little  or  no  value  in  finding  out  the  meaning  of  the  ques- 
tion, is  of  even  less  value  in  the  w^ork  of  presentation.  If  a 
person  does  not  understand  the  meaning  of  a  word  or  phrase, 
as  used  in  a  proposition,  his  confusion  will  not  usually  be 
cleared  by  the  quotation  of  a  mere  sentence  from  a  diction- 
ary. In  the  first  place,  such  a  definition  is  nearly  always 
too  short  and  too  compact  to  be  grasped  in  its  full  meaning, 
in  the  short  time  given  for  the  statement  of  it.  Moreover, 
it  will  probably  not  be  convincing.  If  the  person  who  is  being 
argued  with  is  to  be  made  to  accept  fully  the  definition,  he 
must  be  persuaded  of  its  reasonableness;  he  must  be  made  to 
see  why  the  term  means  what  the  disputant  says,  and  so  be 
brought  to  accept  it  without  doubt  or  qualification.  It  is 
for  these  reasons  that  we  find  all  the  best  argumentative 
writers  and  speakers  taxing  the  resources  of  their  ingenuity 
for  interesting,  clear,  and  forcible  methods  of  presenting  their 
definitions.  The  following  are  some  of  the  most  common 
and  eflPective  methods  used. 

a.  By  authority.  The  arguments  from  authority,  which 
have  already  considered  elsewhere,^  may  be  used  with  good 
effect  in  the  explanation  of  definitions.  We  have  seen  that 
a  dictionarj^  statement  is  of  little  value;  but  there  are  few 

^  See  ante,  p.  186,  quotation  from  Bodkin. 
^  See  chapter  6,  Evidence,  p.  99. 


THE  INTRODUCTION  301 

ways  of  defining  more  persuasive  with  an  audience,  than 
to  quote  to  them  an  explanation  of  the  term,  as  given  by 
some  recognized  speciaHst  in  that  branch  of  affairs  with 
which  the  word  or  phrase  is  concerned.  The  quotation, 
however,  should  not  usually  be  short  or  dogmatic  in  form. 
It  should  be  an  explanation  rather  than  a  mere  sentence 
statement.  Also,  care  should  be  taken,  as  in  any  argument 
from  authority,  that  the  reliability  of  the  person  quoted  is 
fully  recognized,  so  that  the  definition  may  have  the  full 
force  of  expert  evidence.  In  using  this  method,  also,  it  is 
usually  desirable  to  explain  the  quotation,  either  before  or 
after  reading  it,  in  order  to  be  sure  that  it  is  understood  and 
accepted  by  the  persons  addressed.  It  will  be  noticed  in 
the  selection  that  follows,  that  the  speaker,  after  citing  his 
definition,  goes  on  at  considerable  length  to  comment  on  the 
reasonableness  of  the  statements  of  his  authority,  and  to 
show  the  bearing  of  the  definition  on  the  question  before  the 
court.  The  illustration  is  from  the  speech  by  Mr.  William 
A.  Beach  before  a  military  commission  in  Washington,  D.  C, 
1865.  He  is  here  defining  the  term  '*  military  law,"  quoting 
from  O'Brien's  American  Military  Law  (pp.  26-27) : — 

*"  Military  law  may  be  defined  to  be  a  body  of  rules  and  ordinances 
prescribed  by  competent  authority  for  the  government  of  the 
military  state  considered  as  a  distinct  community.  .  .  .  The  gen- 
eral law  claims  supreme  and  undisputed  jurisdiction  over  all.  The 
military  law  puts  forth  no  such  pretensions.  It  aims  solely  to 
enforce  on  the  soldier  the  additional  duties  he  has  assumed.  It 
constitutes  tribunals  for  the  trial  of  breaches  of  military  duty  only. 
It  attempts  not  to  regulate  or  adjust  the  civil  rights  of  those  who 
fall  under  its  cognizance,  nor  does  it  affect  to  redress  civil  injuries 
or  private  wrongs,  unless  they  be,  in  some  degree,  connected  with 
the  safety  and  good  order  of  the  military  state  as  having  a  tendency 
to  disturb  its  peace  and  quiet.  Civil  injuries  or  private  wrongs,  not 
immediately  related  to  the  rights  of  a  soldier  as  such,  are  left,  like 
his  civil  rights,  to  the  redress  of  the  general  or  common  law.'  .  .  . 

"Your  Honors  perceive  how  completely  the  extract  justifies  my 


802  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

reasoning.  It  will  impress  Your  Honors  with  its  obvious  propriety. 
It  assigns  to  Courts  like  yourselves  their  true  position.  It  enables 
them  to  accomplish  their  full  oflSce,  without  interference  with  the 
ordinary  tribunals  of  the  country.  It  disturbs  none  of  the  relations 
of  civil  life.  It  assigns  to  you  exclusively  the  field  of  military  disci- 
pline and  efficiency.  It  maintains  a  wise  harmony  between  the 
necessity  which  called  you  into  existence  and  the  functions  you 
should  exercise."  ^ 

b.  By  etymological  derivation.  The  meaning  of  a  term 
may  often  be  made  clear,  by  tracing  the  etymological  deriva- 
tion of  the  word  or  the  history  of  the  development  of  its  mean- 
ing. This  method  is,  perhaps,  not  so  common  as  many  others, 
for  ambiguity  in  a  word  does  not,  in  argumentation,  usually 
arise  from  any  confusion  of  its  common  meanings  such  as 
might  be  removed  by  a  study  of  its  life  history.  But  wher- 
ever this  method  may  be  used  it  is  always  effective,  because 
such  an  explanation  is  logical  and  clear.  John  Quincy  Adams, 
in  his  Sixteenth  Lecture  on  Rhetoric  and  Oratory  at  Har- 
vard University  in  1807,  thus  defined  the  word  "passion": — 

"There  is,  however,  a  more  restricted  sense  in  which  the  term 
*  passion'  is  used,  and  of  which  the  precisest  idea  will  be  formed  by 
tracing  its  etymology.  In  this  sense  it  is  equivalent  to  sufferance, 
distress,  anguish.  In  this  sense  it  has  emphatically  been  applied  to 
the  last  sufferings  of  the  Saviour;  and  to  this  sense  it  must  be  con- 
fined when  we  are  inquiring  into  those  pathetic  powers  of  oratory 
which  awaken  the  sympathies  of  the  audience.  These  very  words 
themselves,  'pathetic'  and  'sympathy,'  are  both  derived  from  the 
Greek  irdSo^,  of  which  the  Latin  passio  is  merely  a  translation. 
And  the  meaning,  universally  annexed  to  them,  has  kept  closer  to 
their  original  derivation  than  the  Latin  term."  ^ 

Blackstone,  in  Chapter  XXVII  of  his  Commentaries,  de- 
fines "heirlooms"  by  this  method: — 

-  "Heirlooms  are  such  goods  and  personal  chattels  as,  contrary  to 
the  nature  of  chattels,  shall  go  by  special  custom  to  the  heir  along 
^  Great  Speeches  by  Great  Lawyers,  p.  459. 
2  J.  Q.  Adam's  Lectures,  Vol.  I,  pp.  380,  381. 


THE  INTRODUCTION  303 

with  the  inheritance,  and  not  the  executor  of  the  last  proprietor. 
The  termination,  loom,  is  of  Saxon  origin,  in  which  language  it 
signifies  a  limb  or  member;  so  that  an  heirloom  is  nothing  else  but 
a  limb  or  member  of  the  inheritance."  ^ 

c.  From  context.  The  meaning  of  a  term  often  depends 
upon  the  way  in  which  it  is  used  in  connection  with  certain 
other  terms,  in  the  same  sentence  or  paragraph.  Under  such 
conditions,  the  best  way  to  define  the  terms  is  to  explain 
fully  how  they  are  connected  with  one  another.  Such  an 
explanation  is  sure  to  be  forcible,  if  the  reasoning  is  sound, 
for  it  shows  the  person  addressed  just  why  the  term  means 
what  is  alleged.  An  excellent  illustration  of  this  method  was 
given  by  Daniel  Webster  in  his  speech  before  the  Supreme" 
Court  in  the  case  of  Ogden  vs.  Saunders,  1807.  Mr.  Webster 
is  here  defining  the  word  "contracts": — 

"The  most  conclusive  argument,  perhaps,  arises  from  the  con- 
nection in  which  the  clause  stands.  The  words  of  the  prohibition, 
so  far  as  it  applies  to  civil  rights,  or  right  of  property,  are,  that  *  no 
State  shall  coin  money,  emit  bills  of  credit,  make  anything  but 
gold  and  silver  coin  a  tender  in  the  payment  of  debts,  or  pass  any 
law  impairing  the  obligation  of  contracts.'  .  .  .  The  parts  of  the 
prohibition  are  connected  by  the  subject-matter,  and  ought,  there- 
fore, to  be  construed  together.  Taking  the  words  thus  together, 
according  to  their  natural  connection,  how  is  it  possible  to  give  a 
more  limited  construction  to  the  term  'contracts,'  in  the  last  branch 
of  the  sentence,  than  to  the  word  'debts,'  in  that  immediately 
preceding?  Can  a  State  make  anything  but  gold  and  silver  a  tender 
in  payment  of  future  debts.'*  This  nobody  pretends.  But  what 
ground  is  there  for  a  distinction?  No  State  shall  make  anything 
but  gold  and  silver  a  tender  in  the  payment  of  debts,  either  existing 
or  future,  but  that  contracts  spoken  of  are  subsisting  contracts  only. 
Such  a  distinction  seems  to  us  wholly  arbitrary."  ^ 

d.  By  analogy.  It  is  sometimes  effective  to  show  an 
analogy  between  the  terms  to  be  defined  and  some  other  term 

^  Chase's  Blackstone,  p.  536. 

2  The  Works  of  Daniel  Webster,  Vol.  VI,  p.  38. 


304  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

whose  meaning  is  better  known.  By  comparing  the  ambigu- 
ous phrase  with  some  standards  with  which  the  audience  are 
well  acquainted  from  their  everyday  experience,  the  ambi- 
guity is  removed.  Mr.  Seward,  in  his  defence  of  William 
Freeman  before  the  Cayuga  Oyer  and  Terminer,  Auburn, 
N.  Y.,  1846,  defined  "insanity"  by  the  method  of  analogy 
as  follows: — 

"Although  my  definition  would  not  perhaps  be  strictly  accurate, 
I  should  pronounce  insanity  to  be  a  derangement  of  the  mind, 
character,  and  conduct  resulting  from  bodily  disease.  I  take  this 
word  'derangement,'  because  it  is  one  in  common  everyday  use. 
We  all  understand  what  is  meant  when  it  is  said  that  anything  is 
ranged  or  arranged.  The  houses  on  a  street  are  ranged,  if  built 
upon  a  straight  line.  The  fences  on  your  farms  are  ranged.  A 
tower,  if  justly  built,  is  ranged;  that  is,  it  is  ranged  by  the  plummet. 
It  rises  in  a  perpendicular  range  from  the  earth.  A  file  of  men 
marching  in  a  straight  line  are  in  range.  'Range  yourselves,  men,' 
though  not  exactly  artistical,  is  not  an  uncommon  word  of  com- 
mand. Now  what  do  we  mean  when  we  use  the  word  'c^ranged '? 
Manifestly  that  a  thing  is  not  ranged,  is  not  arranged,  is  out  of 
range.  If  the  houses  on  the  street  be  built  irregularly,  they  are 
deranged.  If  the  fences  be  inclined  to  the  right  or  left,  they  are 
deranged.  If  there  be  an  unequal  pressure  on  either  side,  the  tower 
will  lean,  that  is,  it  will  be  deranged.  So  if  a  man  be  insane.  There 
was  a  regular  line  which  he  was  pursuing,  not  the  same  line  which 
you  or  I  follow,  for  all  men  pursue  different  lines,  and  every  sane 
man  has  his  own  peculiar  path.  All  these  paths  are  straight,  and 
all  are  ranged,  though  all  divergent.  ...  If  the  fond  mother  be- 
comes the  murderer  of  her  offspring,  it  is  easy  to  see  that  she  is  de- 
ranged. If  the  pious  man,  whose  steps  were  firm  and  whose  path- 
way led  straight  to  Heaven,  sinks  without  temptation  into  criminal 
debasement,  it  is  easy  to  see  that  he  is  deranged.  But  in  cases 
where  no  natural  instinct  or  elevated  principle  throws  its  light 
upon  our  research,  it  is  often  the  most  difficult  and  delicate  of  all 
human  investigations  to  determine  when  a  person  is  deranged. 

"We  have  two  tests.  First,  to  compare  the  individual  after  the 
supposed  derangement  with  himself  as  he  was  before.  Second,  to 
compare  his  course  with  those  ordinary  lines  of  human  life  which 


THE  INTRODUCTION  305 

we  expect  sane  persons  of  equal  intelligence  and  similarly  situated 
to  pursue."  ^ 

e.  By  illustration.  One  of  the  most  common  ways  of  ex- 
plaining a  term  is  to  give  illustrations  of  the  interpretation 
put  upon  it.  The  greatest  virtue  of  such  a  method  lies  in  its 
vividness.  A  person  will  commonly  remember  a  concrete 
example  long  after  he  has  forgotten  the  statement  of  a  prin- 
ciple. William  Pinckney,  in  his  defense  of  John  Hodges 
before  the  Circuit  Court  of  Maryland,  at  the  opening  of  his 
speech  gave  an  extended  definition  of  "treason."  The  fol- 
lowing is  an  excerpt  from  the  first  part  of  his  explanation: — 

"It  may  be  aflfirmed  as  an  universal  proposition  that  criminal 
intention  is  the  essence  of  every  species  of  crime.  .  .  . 

"Take  the  case  of  a  man  who,  in  time  of  war,  is  charged  with  the 
defense  of  an  important  fortress  or  castle,  which  he  surrenders  to 
an  incompetent  force.  What  more  effectual  means  could  he  have 
adopted  to  aid  the  enemy  than  the  delivery  of  this  fortress?  The 
books  will  tell  you  that  if  he  was  bribed  to  this  desertion  of  his  duty, 
if  he  did  it  with  a  view  to  benefit  the  enemy,  he  is  guilty  of  treason. 
But  if  pusillanimity  was  the  cause,  or  if  it  arose  from  a  false  calcu- 
lation of  his  own  means,  or  the  force  of  the  enemy,  he  is  not  a 
traitor.  You  may  banish  him  with  ignominy  from  the  ranks  which 
he  has  disgraced,  or  try  him  by  martial  law  as  a  coward  or  a  fool; 
but  he  has  committed  no  treason. 

"Suppose  a  powerful  force  to  invade  the  country,  to  which  re- 
sistance is  hopeless.  They  levy  contributions,  they  do  not  proclaim 
that  they  will  hang  me  if  I  neglect  to  comply  with  this  order,  but 
they  threaten  plunder  and  desolation.  I  know  they  have  the  power 
to  execute  that  threat,  and  I  comply  accordingly.  Now  the  paying 
of  money  or  the  furnishing  of  provisions  is  an  assistance;  it  is 
*  giving  aid  and  comfort'  much  more  effectually  than  the  delivery 
of  a  few  prisoners  or  a  deserter.  Yet  no  man  will  call  this  treason, 
because  there  is  no  evidence  of  hostility  to  the  interests  of  the 
country.    The  authorities  say  it  is  not  treason."  ^ 

1  Works  of  William  E.  Seward,  Vol.  I,  p.  425. 

2  Great  Speeches  by  Great  Lawyers,  p.  38. 


306  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

f.  By  exclusion.  The  meaning  of  a  term  is  often  ambig- 
uous because  it  is  commonly  understood  to  include  more  than 
it  really  ought  to  include.  Various  attributes,  closely  con- 
nected with  the  attributes  properly  implied  in  the  term, 
may  easily  become  confused  with  the  term  itself.  The  con- 
fusion may  arise  from  the  misrepresentation  of  an  opponent, 
or — the  common  difficulty — ^from  a  careless  confusion  of 
ideas.  In  either  case,  the  term  is  most  satisfactorily  defined 
by  drawing  the  line  of  distinction  between  the  essential  and 
the  unessential  attributes,  and  by  excluding  the  ideas  that 
are  extraneous,  thus  leaving  the  term  to  include  only  its 
natural  ai^  proper  intent.  An  excellent  example  is  found  in 
the  speech  by  James  T.  Brady  in  defence  of  the  Savannah 
privateers,  before  the  Circuit  Court  of  the  United  States. 
Mr.  Brady  is  here  defining  the  term  "piracy": — 

"What  are  the  circumstances,  what  are  the  acts,  that,  in  view 
of  the  law,  amount  to  piracy?  You  will  understand  me  that, 
for  the  present,  I  entirely  exclude  from  your  consideration  any  of 
the  particular  circumstances  which  are  supposed  to  give  to  the 
actual  crime  perpetrated  a  public  character,  lifting  it  out  of  the 
penal  law  that  you  administer,  and  out  of  the  regions  of  private 
crime,  into  a  field  of  quite  different  considerations.  They  are, 
undoubtedly,  that  the  act  done  shall  be  with  intent  of  depriving 
the  person  who  is  in  possession  of  property,  as  its  owner,  or  as  the 
representative  of  that  owner,  of  that  property.  .  .  .  There  must 
be  actual  violence,  or  the  presence  or  exhibition  of  power  and  in- 
tent to  use  violence,  which  produces  the  surrender  and  delivery 
of  the  property.  Such  are  the  ingredients  of  robbery  and  piracy. 
And,  gentlemen,  these  two  ingredients  are  all;  and  you  must  rob 
one  or  the  other  of  them  of  this,  their  poison,  or  the  crime  is  com- 
pletely proved,  when  the  fact  of  the  spoliation,  with  these  ingredients, 
shall  have  been  proved.  The  use  that  the  robber  or  the  pirate  in- 
tends to  make  of  retaliation,  by  way  of  injury,  by  way  of  provoca- 
tion, by  way  of  any  other  occasion  or  motive  that  seems  justifiable 
to  his  own  conscience  to  any  form  whatever  of  the  higher  law,  has 
nothing  to  do  with  the  completeness  of  the  crime."  ^ 
1  Great  Speeches  by  Great  Lavryers,  p.  381. 


THE  INTRODUCTION  307 

g.  By  analysis.  Any  definition,  by  whatever  method,  be- 
fore it  can  be  presented,  requires  that  the  term  be  analyzed 
and  the  attributes  essential  to  its  meaning  determined  upon. 
The  name  "analysis,"  as  denoting  one  of  the  modes  of  pre- 
senting a  definition,  does  not  mean  that  any  more  careful 
preliminary  analysis  of  the  terms  by  the  writer  or  speaker  is 
required  than  is  necessary  in  any  other  case.  It  means  only 
that  a  definition  is  often  best  presented  by  directly  explaining 
to  the  audience  what  these  essential  attributes  are,  as  they 
have  been  found  by  analysis.  The  method  here  called  by  the 
name  "analysis'*  consists,  then,  in  explaining  the  attributes 
that  are  properly  impHed  in  the  term.  For  example,  Mr. 
Beach,  in  defense  of  Samuel  North,  defined  "crime"  as  fol- 
lows : — 

"It  will  be  conceded  that  all  crime,  punishable  by  human  au- 
thority, consists  in  the  violation  of  some  rule  of  conduct  declared 
and  published  by  some  competent  source.  The  principle  is  funda- 
mental. It  underlies  the  administration  of  criminal  justice  by  all 
tribunals,  whether  military  or  civil.  To  constitute  offense  there 
must  be  law  existing  and  law  violated;  and  the  law  which  declares 
it  must  be  proclaimed  and  public.  If  it  exist  in  the  form  of  positive 
enactment,  it  must  be  published.  If  it  be  customary  law,  it  must 
be  general,  uniform,  acknowledged.  The  citizen  cannot  be  en- 
trapped into  crime.  He  must  be  notified  of  the  demands  of  society 
in  all  the  departments  of  its  action,  whether  of  peace  or  war,  before 
obedience  can  be  exacted,  and  disobedience  punished.  In  a  govern- 
ment of  laws  those  acts  only  are  criminal  which  the  law  condemns; 
and  publicity  is  one  of  its  material  requisites.  The  idea  of  secret 
statutes,  withheld  from  the  subject  whose  conduct  they  are  to 
regulate,  is  hostile  to  every  principle  of  just  government,  and 
excites  the  sternest  indignation."  ^ 

There  are,  of  course,  other  ways  in  which  a  definition  may 

be  presented;  the  foregoing  are  simply  examples  of  some  of 

the  most  desirable  methods.    The  choice  of  method  depends 

entirely  upon  the  circumstances, — on  the  intelligence  of  the 

^  Great  Speeches  by  Great  Lawyer Sy  p.  453. 


308  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

audience,  the  nature  of  the  question,  and  the  nature  of  the 
term  itself. 

2.  Explanation,  issues,  and  partition.  In  considering 
the  presentation  of  the  remaining  parts  of  the  introduction, 
viz.,  the  explanation  of  the  question,  the  issues,  and  the  par- 
tition, the  three  parts  are  best  treated  together.  In  this  part 
of  the  presentation  one  should  give  practically  without 
change  whatever  parts  are  needed  of  the  brief  already  pre- 
pared. If  the  student  does  not  have  the  discussion  of  brief 
drawing  clearly  in  mind,  he  should  refer,  at  this  point,  to  the 
directions  given  for  the  introduction  to  a  brief.  In  any  in- 
troduction the  explanation,  the  issues,  and  the  partition  must 
be  very  closely  related :  the  explanation  of  the  question  must 
make  the  problem  clear  in  such  a  way  as  to  lead  up  to  the 
issues,  and  make  them  seem  the  only  natural  outgrowth  from 
the  very  nature  of  the  case.  It  must  cover  a  narration  of 
whatever  facts  (in  the  history  of  the  case)  are  necessary  for 
an  understanding  of  the  discussion.  It  must  show  the  kind 
of  question  being  dealt  with — what  standards  must  be  used 
in  deciding  it.  This  will  lead  clearly  to  a  statement  of  the 
issues,  which  will  be  the  questions  which  must  be  decided 
in  order  to  decide  this  question  in  the  right  way.  The  par- 
tition, in  like  manner,  must  be  made  to  seem  the  natural 
outgrowth  from  the  issues.  The  purpose  of  the  partition  is, 
to  make  the  persons  to  be  convinced  understand  just  how  the 
proofs  of  the  disputant  meet  the  issues  of  the  case,  and  es- 
tablish his  side  of  them.  Consequently,  the  value  of  the  par- 
tition depends  largely  upon  its  close  and  evident  relation  to 
the  statement  of  the  issues;  sometimes  the  points  of  the  is- 
sues are  identical  with  the  points  of  the  partition. 

a.  Direct  or  inverted  order.  The  more  clearly  your 
audience  understands  in  advance  what  you  believe  the  issues 
to  be,  what  you  think  the  question  really  involves,  what  you 
propose  to  prove,  what  your  plan  of  campaign  is,  the  more 
easily  they  can  follow  you.  Let  them  see  the  road  ahead 
and  know  where  you  propose  to  take  them — unless  you  know 


THE  INTRODUCTION  30* 

they  will  not  like  the  road.  If  they  are  sure  to  be  unwilling 
travellers,  if  they  are  afraid  to  follow  this  path,  disinclined  to 
reach  the  destination  you  have  in  mind,  lead  them  to  it 
gradually,  logically,  persuasively  without  frightening  them 
or  antagonizing  them  in  advance.^  Where  ignorance  is  bliss, 
'tis  folly  to  state  a  partition.  Professor  Raymond  M.  Alden 
discusses  this  point  under  the  heading  "Two  Methods  of 
Approach."  ^  "In  a  sense,  of  course,  the  debater  has  choice 
of  more  than  one  method  in  constructing  his  Introduction. 
He  may  state  definitely  not  only  the  side  of  the  case  which 
he  wishes  to  support,  but  the  sort  of  proof  which  he  intends  to 
offer  in  supporting  it.  He  may  take  the  audience  into  his 
confidence,  and  tell  them  just  what  the  plan  of  his  speech  is 
to  be,  in  order  that  they  may  follow  it  as  he  proceeds  and  see 
that  he  does  just  what  he  proposed  to  do.  Under  ordinary 
circumstances,  this  method  has  great  advantages.  .  .  .  Yet 
there  may  be  cases  where  a  different  plan  is  advisable.  When 
the  cause  to  be  defended  is  an  extremely  unpopular  one, 
when  the  audience  must  be  won — if  at  all — ^by  slow  and  care- 
ful degrees,  or  when  the  proof  to  be  presented  is  of  such  a 
nature  as  not  to  be  appreciated  until  all  the  evidence  is  in, 
then  the  debater  may  adopt  a  more  wary  course.  He  may 
not  explain  the  nature  of  his  argument  at  the  outset,  per- 
haps not  even  admit  which  side  he  intends  to  establish;  but 
may  open  up  the  question  as  though  he  had  little  interest 
in  deciding  it  in  either  one  way  or  the  other,  and  then  lead 
his  hearers  on  by  paths  that  they  have  not  foreseen,  until 
he  brings  them,  unexpectedly  perhaps,  to  the  point  which  he 
wished  them  to  reach.  Such  a  plan  requires  skill,  but  is 
occasionally  of  no  little  value.  The  Introduction,  then,  either 
may  or  may  not  conclude  with  a  clear  statement  of  the  plan 
of  the  speaker's  argument." 

b.  An  illustration  of  the  presentation  of  the  three  parts 
of  the  introduction  here  under  consideration  is  found  in  the 

1  See  pp.  232,  234,  on  "inverted  order." 

2  Alden,  R.  M.,  The  Art  of  Debate,  pp.  139,  140. 


310  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

speech  of  David  Dudley  Field  in  the  ease  of  the  United  States 
vs.  Cruikshank,  2  Otto.  In  this  case  Mr.  Field's  clients  were 
indicted  for  acts  declared  to  be  criminal  by  the  so-called 
Enforcement  Act,  passed  by  Congress  in  1870.  He  is  here 
trying  to  prove  that  this  Enforcement  Act  is  unconstitutional. 
He  said: — 

"Let  us  reduce  and  formulate  the  question,  if  we  can,  so  as  to 
separate  the  incidental  from  the  essential,  in  order  that  our  atten- 
tion may  be  withdrawn  from  all  other  considerations  than  that  of 
the  one  fundamental  and  permanent  theory,  upon  which  this  legis- 
lation must  stand,  if  it  stands  at  all." 

He  then  quoted  and  briefly  explained  the  thirteenth,  four- 
teenth, and  fifteenth  amendments  to  the  Constitution. 
Continuing,  he  said: — 

"Professing  to  act  under  the  authority  of  these  amendments. 
Congress  has  passed  five  acts,  four  only  of  which  were  in  existence 
at  the  time  of  the  indictment  now  under  consideration:  one  called 
the  Civil  Rights  Act,  passed  April  9,  1866;  the  second  called  the 
Enforcement  Act,  passed  May  31,  1870;  the  third,  amending  this, 
passed  February  28,  1871;  and  a  fourth  act,  passed  April  20,  1871." 

He  then  quoted  the  terms  of  these  acts  and  explained  their 
provisions.    Continuing: — 

"By  authority  of  this  legislation  ninety-seven  persons  were  in- 
dicted together  in  the  Circuit  Court  of  the  United  States  for  the 
District  of  Louisiana,  and  three  of  them,  the  present  defendants, 
were  found  guilty  upon  the  first  sixteen  counts.  The  indictment 
was  found  under  the  6th  and  7th  sections  of  the  Enforcement  Act, 
sixteen  counts  being  for  simple  conspiracy  under  the  6th  section, 
and  the  other  sixteen  being  for  conspiracy,  with  overt  acts  resulting 
in  murder." 

He  then  explained  the  sixteen  counts  on  which  his  clients  had 
been  indicted.     Continuing: — 


THE  INTRODUCTION  311 

"This  indictment,  or  that  portion  of  it  upon  which  these  defend- 
ants have  been  convicted,  is  supposed  to  be  justified  by  the  6th 
section  of  the  Enforcement  Act,  and  that  section  is  said  to  rest  upon 
the  late  amendments.  In  considering  the  question,  whether  it  is 
or  is  not  supported  by  them,  I  assume,  what  cannot  be  disputed, 
that  before  the  late  amendments  this  section,  and  the  same  may 
be  said  of  the  other  sections,  would  have  been  beyond  the  com- 
petency of  Congress.  The  point  of  contention,  therefore,  is  whether 
the  amendments  have  conferred  the  power." 

This  last  contains  the  statement  of  the  issue  of  the  case. 
It  is  to  be  observed  how  carefully,  step  by  step,  Mr.  Field 
leads  up  to  this  statement,  so  that  its  accuracy  is  clearly  and 
fully  understood  by  the  court.  It  only  remains  for  him  to 
complete  his  introduction  by  the  statement  of  the  partition. 
After  a  word  of  explanation,  connecting  the  issue  with  the 
points  of  the  partition,  he  finished  as  follows: — 

"My  argument,  therefore,  will  consist  of  an  endeavor  to  establish 
the  following  two  propositions : 

"I.  The  natural  interpretation  of  the  language  of  the  new 
amendments  does  not  justify  the  present  legislation. 

"II.  If  the  natural  interpretation  did  justify  it,  yet,  as  the  lan- 
guage is  susceptible  of  a  different  one,  the  latter  must  be  preferred 
as  that  alone  in  which  it  was  understood  by  the  people." 

c.  Two  or  more  issues — parallel  partition.  In  the  intro- 
duction given  above,  the  circumstances  of  the  case  made  it 
necessary  to  have  the  explanation  of  the  question  long  and 
detailed,  and — as  is  common  in  cases  at  law — the  explanation 
took  the  form  of  a  narration  of  events.  Also  the  nature  of 
the  case  made  it  possible  to  reduce  the  question  to  a  single 
issue.  This  is  not  always  possible.  More  often — as  in  most 
cases  dealing  with  public  policies — the  issues  are  two  or 
three  in  number. 

It  is  to  be  noticed,  in  such  cases,  that  the  points  of  the  par- 
tition may  correspond  exactly  with  the  points  of  the  issues. 
This  is  frequently  desirable.    It  is  a  particularly  clear  method 


312  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

because  it  makes  the  relation  between  the  issues  and  the 
partition  so  evident.  But  it  must  be  remembered  that  the 
two  parts  are  not  identical.  The  issues  are  merely  a  state- 
ment of  the  points  on  which  the  controvery  must  turn,  and  so 
are  unprejudiced  in  nature;  the  partition,  on  the  other  hand, 
is  the  statement  of  the  points  the  disputant  means  to  estab- 
lish in  proving  his  side  of  the  case.  They  are  closely  related, 
but  not  the  same. 

d.  The  issues  emphasized.  In  the  example  given  above, 
the  issues  are  presented  in  the  form  of  a  bare  statement. 
But  often  this  is  not  sufficient.  Usually,  the  critical  point  or 
points  need  to  be  emphasized,  and  so  presented  rhetorically, 
that  they  will  be  impressed  on  the  attention  and  the  memory 
of  the  audience.  For  example,  Mr.  Jeremiah  Black,  in  his 
argument  in  the  case  of  Ex  parte  Milligan,  4  Wall.  2,  presented 
the  issue  of  the  case  briefly  and  forcibly  as  follows : — 

"The  case  before  you  presents  but  a  single  point,  and  that  an 
exceedingly  plain  one.  .  .  .  Keeping  the  character  of  the  charges 
in  mind,  let  us  come  at  once  to  the  simple  question  upon  which 
the  court  below  divided  in  opinion:  Had  the  commissioners  juris- 
diction— were  they  invested  with  legal  authority  to  try  the  relaters 
and  put  them  to  death  for  the  offence  of  which  they  were  accused.'* 
We  answer,  no;  and,  therefore,  the  whole  proceeding  from  beginning 
to  end  was  utterly  null  and  void.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  absolutely 
necessary  for  those  who  oppose  us  to  assert,  as  they  do  assert,  that 
the  commissioners  had  complete  legal  jurisdiction  both  of  the 
subject-matter  and  of  the  parties,  so  that  their  judgment  upon  the 
law  and  the  facts  is  absolutely  conclusive  and  binding,  not  subject 
to  correction  nor  open  to  inquiry  in  any  court  whatever.  Of  these 
two  opposite  views,  you  must  adopt  one  or  the  other;  for  there  is 
no  middle  ground  on  which  you  can  possibly  stand." 

6.  Excluding  extraneous  matter.  One  very  common 
method  of  presenting  the  issues  (as  well  as  an  important  step 
toward  finding  them)  consists  in  excluding  extraneous, 
irrelevant,  or  mutually  admitted  matter.    It  is  the  error  of 


THE  INTRODUCTION  313 

confusing  other  kindred  questions  with  the  question  really 
in  hand  that  most  often  makes  necessary  a  careful  definition 
of  the  issues;  and  this  confusion  may  very  effectively  be 
cleared  away  by  explaining  in  the  introduction  what  these 
kindred  questions  are,  and  just  why  they  ought  to  be  excluded 
from  consideration.  Burke,  in  his  speech  in  the  House  of 
Commons  on  the  Marriage  Act,  1781,  made  clear  the  issue 
of  the  debate  by  excluding  irrelevant  matter.  The  bill  in 
question  provided  that  the  power  of  marrying,  without 
consent  of  parents,  should  not  exist  for  persons  under  twenty- 
one  years  of  age.    Mr.  Burke,  in  his  introduction,  said: — 

"The  question  is  not  now,  whether  the  law  ought  to  acknowledge 
and  protect  such  a  state  of  life  as  minority,  nor  whether  the  con- 
tinuance, which  is  fixed  for  that  state,  be  not  improperly  prolonged 
in  the  law  of  England.  Neither  of  these  in  general  is  questioned. 
The  only  question  is,  whether  matrimony  is  to  be  taken  out  of  the 
general  rule,  and  whether  the  minors  of  both  sexes,  without  the 
consent  of  their  parents,  ought  to  have  a  capacity  of  contracting 
the  matrimonial,  whilst  they  have  not  the  capacity  of  contracting 
any  other  engagement."  ^ 

B.  Persuasion.  The  function  of  conviction  in  the 
introduction  is  to  prepare  the  minds  of  the  audience  for  an 
understanding  of  the  proof  to  be  offered  later  in  the  argument. 
The  function  of  persuasion  is  to  prepare  the  way  for  "favor- 
able attention,"  or  more  strongly,  to  create  a  "will  to  believe." 
The  emotions  of  an  audience  need  to  be  prepared  no  less 
than  their  intellect.  A  man's  emotions  cannot  be  wildly  and 
roughly  attacked  any  more  than  his  reason;  if  the  audience  is 
antagonistic  to  the  speaker  or  out  of  harmony  with  him, 
his  emotional  appeals  will  be  unavailing.  Consequently, 
before  a  speaker  can  control  these  moving  impulses  of  his 
audience,  he  must  establish  with  them  close  relations  of 
sympathetic  attention.  He  must  bring  them  into  close 
sympathy  with  himself  so  that  whatever  moves  him  may  be 
^  Burke  s  Speeches^  p.  402. 


314  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

transmitted  easily  to  them.  Here,  in  the  introduction,  the 
speaker  often  first  touches  on  that  emotion  which  he  wishes 
most  to  affect  in  his  later  efforts,  and  so  prepares  it  for 
stronger  appeals  that  are  to  come.  Persuasion  in  the  intro- 
duction is  also  a  very  valuable  help  in  preparing  for  the  work 
of  conviction  in  the  discussion.  If  an  audience  is  inattentive 
or  hostile  to  a  speaker,  much  of  his  proof  may  pass  by  with- 
out effect;  so,  in  order  to  make  his  audience  listen  and  do 
justice  to  his  demonstrations  in  the  discussion,  he  must 
interest  them  in  his  cause,  and  create  in  them  a  icillingness 
to  he  convinced.  In  general,  then,  persuasion  in  the  intro- 
duction must  bring  the  thought  and  feeling  of  the  audience 
into  working  harmony  with  the  speaker  or  writer. 

The  discussion  of  persuasion  given  in  the  last  chapter  will 
not  be  repeated  here.  Practically  everything  said  there  is 
especially  applicable  to  persuasion  in  the  introduction.  Our 
purpose  here  is  to  make  a  few  fundamental  suggestions  by 
way  of  emphasis  and  practical  guidance,  and  give  a  few  ex- 
amples of  introductory  remarks.  The  persuasive  work  of  the 
introduction  is  of  utmost  importance.  A  bad  impression  may 
prevent  a  fair  hearing — may  prevent  any  hearing  at  all. 
Every  suggestion  made  in  the  last  chapter  should  be  taken 
particularly  to  heart  when  planning  introductions. 

1.  Calm,  courteous,  conversational.  In  the  first  place, 
whenever  possible,  start  with  a  reasonably  calm,  courteous, 
conversational  mode,  in  both  "composition  and  delivery." 
Even  though  the  occasion  will  demand  a  great  show  of  force 
before  you  are  through,  always  repress  it  in  the  beginning, 
except  in  those  rare  instances  (usually  cases  in  which  others 
have  just  spoken  before  you)  in  which  such  an  emotional 
tension  is  reached  that  the  audience  as  well  as  the  speaker 
feels  the  demand  for  indignant  protest,  denunciation,  or 
some  form  of  recognition  of  the  emotional  demands  of  the 
moment.  At  such  a  time  nothing  is  more  disgusting  than 
a  cold,  spineless,  deliberate  "don't  get  excited"  attitude, 
which  springs  from  either  hypocrisy  or  inability  to  grasp  the 


THE  INTRODUCTION  315 

significance  of  the  things  that  have  been  said.  "  The  pretence  of 
indifference  is  no  less  insincere  than  the  pretence  of  feeling."  ^ 
Probably,  however,  more  speakers  make  a  poor  first  impres- 
sion on  account  of  a  loud,  insistent,  false,  hollow,  emotional, 
"speechifying,*'  opening  than  for  any  other  one  reason.  A 
very  good  plan  for  a  speaker  who  is  to  deliver  a  prepared 
speech,  is  to  begin  always  with  a  few  impromptu  sentences, 
spoken  directly  to  the  audience  before  him,  concerning  some- 
thing that  fits  the  particular  occasion, — such  as  a  reference 
to  remarks  made  by  the  chairman  in  introducing  the  speaker. 
It  ought  to  be  easy  for  anyone  to  utter  such  sentences  di- 
rectly in  conversational  mode,  and  once  started,  thus  to  con- 
tinue without  falling  into  indirectness.  Being  calm,  courte- 
ous, and  conversational  does  not  mean  necessarily  being  too 
quiet — or  even  being  quiet  at  all.  It  is  possible  to  speak  very 
loudly,  in  a  calm,  courteous,  conversational  manner.  Direct- 
ness is  the  best  of  the  conversational  manner,  and  it  is  possi- 
ble to  be  perfectly  direct  and  as  loud  as  need  be. 

2.  Do  not  detract  from  your  theme.  For  preparing  intro- 
ductions to  different  types  of  audiences,  consider  the  fun- 
damental principles  of  persuasion  as  given  in  the  last  chapter. 
The  interest,  attention,  friendly  support,  of  audiences  may 
be  won  in  various  ways.  The  most  important  definite 
warning  to  be  given  is :  Do  nothing  to  take  interest  and  attention 
away  from  your  theme.  Do  not  kill  present  interest  by  as- 
suming that  it  does  not  exist  and  trying  to  create  it  in  an 
artificial  way.  Do  not  think  you  have  to  be  funny  in  order 
to  get  the  attention  of  an  intelligent  audience.  Many 
speakers  who  ought  to  know  better  permanently  alienate 
audiences  by  acting  on  this  offensive  assumption. 

Bradbury  ^  gives  some  excellent  advice.  "The  first  few 
sentences  which  a  speaker  utters  before  an  audience,  receive 
more  universal  and  closer  attention  than  anything  which  he 
may  thereafter  say  on  that  particular  occasion,  no  matter 

1  Winans,  p.  109. 

2  The  Structure  of  an  Effective  Public  Speech,  Harry  B.  Bradbury,  pp.  16-19. 


316  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

how  successful  his  oration  may  be.  This  is  a  psychological 
fact  which  is  easy  to  explain.  Curiosity  is  one  of  the  pre- 
dominant characteristics  of  practically  everybody.  .  .  . 
So  when  a  new  speaker  is  introduced  and  begins  to  talk,  the 
dullest  and  least  attentive  person  in  the  audience  listens,  out 
of  sheer  curiosity,  to  hear  what  this  new  speaker  has  to  offer. 
This,  then,  is  the  very  best  opportunity  the  man  on  the  plat- 
form will  have  to  chain  the  attention  of  his  audience  to  the 
subject  which  he  has  in  mind.  How  foolish  to  waste  such  a 
golden  opportunity.  What  unadulterated  folly  to  throw 
away  this  wonderful  chance  by  actually  directing  the  atten- 
tion of  the  audience  to  some  topic  away  from  the  main  one 
which  the  speaker  wishes  to  press  home  and  as  to  which  he 
desires  to  have  the  audience  accept  and  act  upon  his  rec- 
ommendation. How  unwise,  then,  to  start  a  serious  subject 
with  a  funny  story.  Just  to  the  extent  that  the  story  has 
succeeded,  exactly  to  that  extent  has  the  attention  of  the 
audience  been  distracted  from  the  serious  matter  in  hand, 
and  it  has  been  made  that  much  harder  again  to  focus  their 
attention  on  this  matter.  They  will  wait  for  further  funny 
stories  and  unless  they  are  forthcoming  there  is  a  mental 
resentment,  which  requires  Herculean  efforts  and  marked 
ability  to  overcome,  to  the  extent  of  again  directing  intel- 
ligent attention  to  the  serious  questions  under  discussion. 
It  is  barely  possible  that  the  point  of  a  funny  story  may  con- 
tain the  very  essence  of  the  serious  argument  and  thus  form 
a  good  introduction.  But  this  rarely  happens  and  the  prac- 
tice is  dangerous. 

"  Then  if  the  funny  introductory  effort  fails !  This  is  a  calam- 
ity greater  than  the  inexperienced  can  possibly  understand. 
The  golden  opportunity  of  taking  advantage  of  that  fresh 
bloom  of  keen  attention  is  withered  and  dead.  More  than 
that,  the  speaker  must  not  overcome  a  feeling  of  resentment 
and  disgust,  before  he  can  secure  attention  for  the  serious 
portions  of  his  subject. 

**  Wit  and  humor  have  their  places  on  the  public  platform, 


THE  INTRODUCTION  317 

even  in  serious  speeches,  but  they  must  be  used  sparingly, 
and  never  in  the  form  of  a  digressive  funny  story  as  part  of 
the  introductory  sentences.  The  sole  use  of  such  anecdotes 
is  to  illustrate  and  make  more  forceful  a  serious  argument." 
3.  Strange  or  hostile  audiences.  It  sometimes  happens 
that  the  speaker  or  writer  is  a  stranger  to  those  whom  he 
addresses.  Under  such  circumstances  his  first  duty  is  to 
create  some  bond  of  fellow-feeling  with  his  audience.  Here 
modesty  is  clearly  one  indispensable  quality.  To  this  should 
be  added,  when  possible,  the  bonds  of  some  common  interest 
or  common  emotion;  again,  an  appeal  may  well  be  made  for 
a  charitable  hearing  and  for  fair  play.  Sometimes  the  au- 
dience is  worse  than  a  stranger;  it  may  be  an  enemy.  To 
handle  an  audience  that  is  hostile  at  the  outset,  is  the  most 
diflBcult  task  with  which  an  arguer  is  ever  confronted.  It 
calls  for  a  rare  combination  of  courage  and  patience,  of 
modesty  and  self-confidence,  of  tact  and  determination. 
The  emotions  best  appealed  to  under  such  conditions  are 
commonly  those  of  honesty,  courtesy,  or  a  desire  for  fair 
play.  The  skill  needed  on  such  an  occasion  is  well  illustrated 
in  Beecher's  Liverpool  speech  already  discussed.^  A  similar 
plea,  full  of  dignity,  courage,  and  firm  modesty,  is  found  in 
the  opening  words  of  William  Pinckney's  speech  in  the  Mary- 
land Assembly,  in  1788,  in  behalf  of  a  petition  for  the  relief 
of  oppressed  slaves : — 

"Before  I  proceed  to  deliver  my  sentiments  on  the  subject-matter 
of  the  report  under  consideration,  I  must  entreat  the  members  of 
this  House  to  hear  me  with  patience,  and  not  to  condemn  what  I 
may  happen  to  advance  in  support  of  the  opinion  I  have  formed, 
until  they  shall  have  heard  me  out.  I  am  conscious,  sir,  that  upon 
this  occasion,  I  have  long-established  principles  to  combat  and 
deep-rooted  prejudices  to  defeat;  that  I  have  fears  and  apprehen- 
sions to  silence,  which  the  acts  of  former  legislatures  have  sanc- 
tioned, and  that  (what  is  equivalent  to  a  host  of  difficulties)  the 
popular  impressions  are  against  me.     But  if  I  am  honored  with 

1  See  Ch.  11. 


318  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

the  same  indulgent  attention  which  the  House  has  been  pleased  to 
afford  me,  on  past  subjects  of  deliberation,  I  do  not  despair  of  sur- 
mounting all  these  obstacles,  in  the  common  cause  of  justice, 
humanity,  and  policy."  ^ 

4.  Never  lose  temper.  If  prejudice  has  been  created  by 
the  appeals  of  a  preceding  speaker,  these  prejudices  must, 
as  far  as  possible,  be  mitigated  in  the  introduction,  for  such 
an  unfavorable  attitude  may  nullify  the  effect  of  all  proof  or 
persuasion,  as  long  as  the  vision  of  the  audience  is  thus  dis- 
torted. At  such  a  time,  the  "retort  courteous,"  ridicule, 
sarcasm,  or  even  invective  are  good  weapons  of  defense. 
Whatever  weapon  of  reply  is  chosen,  there  is  one  precaution 
that  must  always  be  remembered:  the  disputant  must  never 
permit  himself  to  lose  his  temper  in  the  smallest  degree.  This 
temptation  is  sure  to  arise  in  the  heat  of  any  earnest  dis- 
cussion where  persuasion  plays  any  great  part,  and  it  is  a 
temptation  that  must  be  always  repressed,  for  ill  temper  in 
discussion  hurts  only  him  who  uses  it.  There  are  few  better 
models  of  personal  retort  in  the  history  of  oratory  than  can 
be  found  in  Webster's  famous  Reply  to  Hayne,  in  the  debate 
on  the  Foote  Resolution.^  Another  illustration  of  the  great 
senator's  power  in  personal  debate  is  found  in  his  reply  to 
Calhoun  on  the  22d  of  March,  1838.  Humor,  sarcasm,  and 
defiance  are  wielded  with  power,  yet  all  is  courteous  and 
firmly  dignified. 

"Mr.  President:  I  came  rather  late  to  the  Senate  this  morning, 
and,  happening  to  meet  a  friend  on  the  Avenue,  I  was  admonished 
to  hasten  my  steps,  as  *the  war  was  to  be  carried  into  Africa,'  and 
I  was  expected  to  be  annihilated.  I  lost  no  time  in  following  the 
advice.  Sir,  since  it  would  be  awkward  for  one  to  be  annihilated 
without  knowing  anything  about  it. 

"Well,  Sir,  the  war  has  been  carried  into  Africa.  The  honorable 
member  has  made  an  expedition  into  regions  as  remote  from  the 
subject  of  this  debate  as  the  orb  of  Jupiter  from  that  of  our  earth. 

1  Eloquence  of  the  United  States,  Vol.  V,  p.  92.    E.  and  H.  Clark. 


THE  INTRODUCTION  319 

He  has  spoken  of  the  tariff,  of  slavery,  and  of  the  late  war.  Of  all 
this  I  do  not  complain.  On  the  contrary,  if  it  be  his  pleasure  to 
allude  to  all  or  any  of  these  topics,  for  any  purpose  whatever,  I 
am  ready  at  all  times  to  hear  him. 

"Sir,  this  carrying  the  war  into  Africa,  which  has  become  so 
common  a  phrase  among  us,  is,  indeed,  imitating  a  great  example; 
but  it  is  an  example  which  is  not  always  followed  with  success.  In 
the  first  place,  every  man,  though  he  be  a  man  of  talent  and  genius, 
is  not  a  Scipio;  and  in  the  next  place,  as  I  recollect  this  part  of  Ro- 
man and  Carthaginian  history, — the  gentleman  may  be  more 
accurate,  but  as  I  recollect  it,  when  Scipio  resolved  upon  carrying 
the  war  into  Africa,  Hannibal  was  not  at  home.  Now,  Sir,  I  am 
very  little  like  Hannibal,  but  I  am  at  home;  and  when  Scipio 
Africanus  South  Caroliniensis  brings  the  war  into  my  territories, 
I  shall  not  leave  their  defence  to  Asdrubal,  nor  Syphax,  nor  anybody 
else.  I  meet  him  on  the  shore,  at  his  landing,  and  propose  but  one 
contest. 

"Concurritur;  horse 
Momento  cita  mors  venit,  aut  victoria  Iseta."  * 

5.  Inattentive  audience.  A  hostile  audience  is  less  com- 
mon than  an  inattentive  one.  It  is  well-nigh  impossible  to 
convince  an  audience  whose  minds  are  wandering  away  from 
the  subject  or  who  are  carelessly  half-listening.  At  the  very 
beginning,  if  any  such  danger  is  present, — and  it  is  unfor- 
tunately a  common  danger, — the  attention  of  the  audience 
must  be  roused  and  centred  on  the  topic  of  the  hour.  For 
this  reason,  probably  the  most  common  of  all  forms  of  per- 
suasive introduction  is  that  which  emphasizes  the  importance 
of  the  question  in  discussion.  There  are  many  ways  of  arousing 
interest  in  an  audience.  It  may  be  shown  that  the  question 
is  (a)  of  great  inherent  importance;  that  it  is  of  a  peculiar  sig- 
nificance because  of  its  (b)  relation  to  current  events  and  con- 
ditions; that  it  is  (c)  one  of  the  growing  problems  of  the  future; 
or,  perhaps,  (d)  that  it  has  some  especially  close  bearing  on 
the  interests  of  the  particular  audience.    A  good  example  is 

1  The  Works  ofDanid  Webster,  Vol.  IV.  p.  500. 


320  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

found  in  the  introduction  of  Charles  James  Fox  to  one  of  his 
speeches  on  the  East  India  Bill : — 

"I  did  not  intend.  Sir,  to  have  said  anything  in  addition  to  that 
which  has  been  already  urged  so  ably  in  favor  of  the  resolution 
now  agitated.  In  my  own  opinion,  its  propriety  and  necessity 
are  completely  and  substantially  established.  A  few  particulars, 
suggested  in  the  course  of  the  debate  by  gentlemen  on  the  other 
side  of  the  House,  may  be  thought,  however,  to  merit  some  animad- 
version. And,  once  for  all,  let  no  man  complain  of  strong  language. 
Things  are  now  arrived  at  such  a  crisis  as  renders  it  impossible  to 
speak  without  warmth.  Delicacy  and  reserve  are  criminal  where 
the  interests  of  Englishmen  are  at  hazard.  .  .  . 

"This,  at  least,  has  made  such  an  impression  on  my  mind  that 
I  never  felt  so  much  anxiety;  I  never  addressed  this  House  under 
such  a  pressure  of  impending  mischief;  I  never  trembled  so  much 
for  public  liberty  as  I  now  do.  The  question  before  the  House 
involves  the  rights  of  Parliament  in  all  their  consequences  and 
extent.  These  rights  are  the  basis  of  our  Constitution,  and  form 
the  spirit  of  whatever  discriminates  the  government  of  a  free 
country.     And  have  not  these  been  threatened  and  assaulted?"  ^ 

In  Burke's  masterful  introduction  to  his  speech  on  '*  Con- 
ciliation with  America,"  all  of  the  four  ways  just  mentioned 
(for  emphasizing  the  importance  of  a  question)  are  skillfully 
used.  Consider  the  following,  his  last  paragraph  before 
stating  his  proposition: — 

"To  restore  order  and  repose  to  an  empire  so  great  and  so  dis- 
tracted as  ours,  is,  merely  in  the  attempt,  an  undertaking  that 
would  ennoble  the  flights  of  the  highest  genius,  and  obtain  pardon 
for  the  efforts  of  the  meanest  understanding.  Struggling  a  good 
while  with  these  thoughts,  by  degrees  I  felt  myself  more  firm.  I 
derived,  at  length,  some  confidence  from  what  in  other  circum- 
stances usually  produces  timidity.  I  grew  less  anxious,  even  from 
the  idea  of  my  own  insignificance.  For,  judging  of  what  you  are  by 
what  you  ought  to  be,  I  persuaded  myself  that  you  would  not 
reject  a  reasonable  proposition  because  it  had  nothing  but  its  reason 

1  The  World's  Orators  (England),  pp.  317,  318. 


THE  INTRODUCTION  321 

to  recommend  it.  On  the  other  hand,  being  totally  destitute  of  all 
shadow  of  influence,  natural  or  adventitious,  I  was  very  sure  that, 
if  my  proposition  were  futile  or  dangerous,  if  it  were  weakly  con-^ 
ceived  or  improperly  timed,  there  was  nothing  exterior  to  it,  of 
power  to  awe,  dazzle,  or  delude  you.  You  will  see  it  just  as  it 
is,  and  you  will  treat  it  just  as  it  deserves."  ^ 


EXERCISE .    CHAPTER  12 

INTRODUCTION 

1.  Write  a  complete  introduction,  following  the  suggestions 

of  this  chapter  for  each  of  the  three  speeches  on  the 
campus  topic,  mentioned  in  the  chapter  on  Briefing  and 
Outlining. 

2.  Chose  a  proposition  on  which  men  divide  with  very  strong 

prejudice,  and  write  an  introduction  on  the  same  side 
of  your  proposition  for  each  of  two  different  audiences, 
one  of  which  shall  be  strongly  prejudiced  in  your  favor, 
and  the  other  strongly  prejudiced  against  you. 

3.  Hand  in  a  complete  introduction  to  your  original  forensic. 

^  Burke's  Speech  on  Conciliation  uith  America,  edited  by  Albert  S.  Cook, 
pp.  6,  7. 


CHAPTER  13 

THE   DISCUSSION 

OUTLINE 

A.  The  principles  of  composition  in  the  discussioB. 

B.  Relation  of  discussion  to  brief. 

C.  Variety  in  the  discussion. 

1.  The  forms  of  support. 

a.  Restatement. 

b.  General  illustrations. 

c.  Specific  instance. 

d.  Testimony. 

e.  Reasoning. 

D.  Showing  relations  in  the  discussion. 

E.  Methods  of  emphasis  in  the  discussion. 

1.  Digression. 

2.  Iteration. 

3.  Rhetorical  question. 

F.  Unity  and  coherence  in  the  discussion, 

1.  Three  aids. 

a.  Transitions. 

b.  Summaries. 

c.  Partitions. 

2.  Combined  summary  and  partition. 

A.  Principles  of  composition  in  the   discussion.     The 

work  of  presenting  the  proof  in  the  discussion,  is  largely  a 
matter  of  applying  the  principles  of  composition  to  the  mate- 
rials already  in  hand.  If  the  proofs  have  been  well  selected 
and  arranged,  to  make  them  accomplish  their  purpose  re- 
quires only  the  use  of  words  that  will  effectively  convey  them 
to  the  minds  of  others.  So  that  the  next  requisite  for  forceful 
presentation  is  a  working  knowledge  of  rhetoric  in  general. 

322 


THE  DISCUSSION  323 

B.  Relation  of  the  discussion  to  the  brief.  Perhaps  the 
most  important  question  to  be  dealt  with  in  planning  the  dis- 
cussion is  the  question  of  the  proper  relation  of  the  finished 
composition  to  the  brief.  How  closely  shall  the  brief  be 
followed  in  the  final  presentation?  Shall  the  exact  words  of 
the  brief  be  repeated?  In  answering  this  question  there  are 
two  extremes  that  are  generally  to  be  avoided.  On  the  one 
hand,  rhetorical  embellishment  may  destroy  all  the  advantage 
gained  by  a  good  arrangement.  On  the  other  hand,  the  bare 
bones  of  the  brief  may  be  exposed  so  rudely  as  to  be  offen- 
sive. Of  these  two  faults  the  beginner  undoubtedly  tends 
toward  the  latter;  he  does  not  take  pains  enough  to  make  his 
dish  enticing  or  even  palatable.  The  speech  or  the  finished 
composition  is  too  often  a  mere  repetition  of  heads  and  sub- 
heads, with  the  addition  of  a  few  conjunctions  and  a  trite 
phrase  here  and  there.  This  defect,  while  far  more  pardon- 
able than  that  of  the  speaker  who  talks  at  random  and  buries 
what  little  he  has  to  say  in  the  confusion  of  vague  and  form- 
less rhetoric,  should  be  very  carefully  guarded  against,  be- 
cause it  is  much  more  likely  to  occur.  There  is  little  danger 
that  after  a  student  has  prepared  a  good  brief  he  will  fall  back 
on  formless  rhetoric  in  the  discussion.  In  presenting  an 
argument  to  an  audience,  the  great  thing  for  the  author  of  a 
good  brief  to  guard  against  is  slavery  to  the  brief.  Adapt 
the  discussion  to  the  audience.  Feel  free  to  change  the  order 
of  points,^  to  leave  out  part  of  the  proof  that  is  not  required 
for  a  particular  audience,  and  in  every  way  possible  suit 
the  proof  to  the  audience  according  to  all  the  principles  dis- 
cussed in  chapter  11.  (See  also  discussion  of  persuasion 
and  audience  in  chapter  6.)  If  the  brief  has  been  really  well 
done,  the  discussion  cannot  be  very  bad  unless  the  speaker 
fail  miserably  in  persuasion,  either  positive  or  negative. 

C.  Variety  in  the  discussion.  One  of  the  rhetorical 
elements  most  commonly  lacking,  and  most  needed  in  the 

^  See  Rule  5  for  brief  drawing,  chapter  10,  and  discussion  of  direct  or  in- 
verted order,  chapter  12. 


324  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

discussion,  is  variety.  It  is  sometimes  assumed  that  less 
variety  in  presentation  is  desirable  in  argumentation  than 
in  most  of  the  other  forms  of  composition  or  oratory.  It  is 
said  that  in  a  story  or  in  a  demonstrative  oration/  since  the 
purpose  of  the  writer  or  speaker  is  to  please,  variety  is  indis- 
pensable; but  that  in  argumentation,  since  the  appeal  is 
only  to  the  reason,  variety  is  superfluous.  This  is  funda- 
mentally wrong.  The  appeal  in  argumentation  is  not  simply 
to  the  reason.  Argumentation  that  amounts  to  anything 
(except  in  very  rare  cases,  such  as  we  find  in  mathematics) 
is  concerned  with  both  conviction  and  persuasion.  All  the 
relief,  refreshment,  pleasure,  interest,  and  attention  that 
will  result  from  variety  in  presentation  cannot  but  help  your 
case  with  any  audience.  The  point  to  be  remembered  here 
is  that  in  argument  we  must  strive  deliberately  to  get  variety. 
In  other  forms  of  address  there  may  be  sufficient  variety  in 
the  very  subject-matter  to  give  it  interest;  but  in  most 
elaborate  arguments,  the  natural  coldness  of  logic  needs  to  be 
dressed  more  attractively  to  hold  attention.  It  is  easy,  in 
presenting  proof  after  proof,  to  fall  into  some  formula  of 
statement  or  some  "stereotyped"  method  of  arrangement. 
This  habit  should  be  carefully  avoided,  and  variety  in  word, 
phrase,  and  manner  should  be  sought  from  the  beginning. 

1.  The  forms  of  support.  Some  excellent  suggestions  that 
will  be  helpful  in  gaining  variety  and  avoiding  stereotyped 
methods  of  presenting  argument  will  be  found  in  Phillips* 
Effective  Speaking,  particularly  his  discussion  of  the  four 
forms  of  support.  Chapters  VIII  to  XVI,  inclusive.  We 
quote  two  of  his  keynote  paragraphs : 

''Assertions  May  Demand  Support.  We  make  assertions 
desiring  some  result.  We  wish  the  listener  to  see  our  idea 
clearly,  or  to  feel  it,  or  to  believe  it,  to  act  upon  it,  or  to  find 
pleasure  in  it.  Or  we  may  seek  some  combination  of  these 
Ends.     If  the  utterance  of  the  assertion  alone  attains  our 

^"The  purpose  of  demonstrative  oratory  is  'to  charm  the  senses  with 
words  that  are  fit  and  adequate.' "     Ringwalt,  p.  24. 


THE  DISCUSSION  325 

desired  End  further  remark  is  a  waste  of  time  and  energy. 
If,  however,  the  assertion  does  not  achieve  its  purpose  then, 
as  shown  in  preceding  chapters,  it  must  have  support — 
Cumulation.  As  experience  attests  that  few  assertions,  iso- 
lated, are  effective,  the  main  business  of  the  speaker  is  the 
supporting  of  assertions,  and  his  great  concern  is  how  to  sup- 
port them  so  as  to  achieve  the  desired  End  with  the  least 
expenditure  of  time  and  effort. 

''The  Four  Forms  of  Support.  If  now,  we  examine  the 
characteristics  of  the  matter  used  to  support  assertions  (Cu- 
mulation) we  find  that  it  consists  of  four  kinds.  These  may  be 
named  (a)  Restatement,  (b)  General  Illustration,  (c)  Specific 
Instance,  (d)  Testimony.  Thus,  we  may  say  (Assertion), 
*  Greece  had  great  men,'  and  continue,  *She  had  master 
minds.*  This  is  Restatement.  We  have  said  the  same  thing 
over  again  in  different  words.  We  go  on,  *She  had  orators, 
philosophers,  poets.'  This  is  a  General  Illustration.  We 
have  supported  the  assertion  by  presenting  some  of  its 
general  features.  We  proceed,  *She  had  Demosthenes, 
iEschines,  Aristotle,  Plato,  Homer,  Sophocles.'  This  is 
Specific  Instance.  We  have  strengthened  our  original  as- 
sertion by  actual  cases.  Finally,  we  say,  *Macaulay  says: 
"Her  intellectual  empire  is  imperishable.'"  This  is  Testi- 
mony. We  have  supported  our  assertion  by  corroboration."  ^ 
(e)  Reasoning  may  well  be  added  to  Phillips'  classification 
of  the  forms  of  support.  If  a  speaker  points  out  certain 
evidence  from  which  it  must  be  inferred  that  Greece  had 
great  men  he  is  supporting  his  assertion  in  a  way  not  covered 
by  any  of  the  four  forms  mentioned.  This  fifth  form  is, 
of  course,  very  commonly  used  in  argumentation. 

D.  Showing  relations  in  the  discussion.  In  order  to 
convince,  it  is  not  sufficient  that  the  materials  of  the  proof 
be  well  arranged  in  the  mind  of  the  speaker;  the  arrangement 
must  be  made  clear  to  the  audience.  Variety  and  smoothness 
do  not  require  that  the  relative  importance  of  the  points  of 
1  Phillips,  pp.  88,  89. 


326  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

the  brief,  or  their  connection  with  one  another,  be  obscured 
In  fact,  in  spoken  discourse,  even  more  care  needs  to  be 
taken  in  the  final  presentation  than  in  the  brief  itself,  to 
make  clear  the  importance  and  the  mutual  relation  of  the 
points.  In  the  brief,  the  indenting  of  the  headings  and  sub- 
headings and  the  use  of  the  symbolsy  show  to  the  eye  how  the 
evidence  and  arguments  are  related  to  one  another  and  to 
the  whole  question,  and  distinguish  between  the  important 
and  the  incidental  parts.  But  in  spoken  and  in  full  manu- 
script presentation,  where  there  are  not  headings  or  subhead- 
ings, these  relations  must  he  made  evident  by  words;  the  large 
and  vital  facts  must  be  enforced  by  repetition,  by  illustration, 
by  direct  explanation  of  their  significance,  or  by  some  other 
of  the  many  possible  methods  of  emphasis;  the  relation  of  one 
piece  of  evidence  to  another  must  be  fully  explained,  and  the 
purpose  and  effect  of  various  arguments  must  be  made  evi- 
dent to  the  reader  or  hearer. 

E.  Methods  of  emphasis  in  the  discussion.  1.  Digres- 
sion. Three  methods  of  bringing  out  the  importance  of  cer- 
tain material  which  are  particularly  useful  in  presenting  ar- 
guments, may  well  be  mentioned  and  illustrated.  The  first 
such  method  of  gaining  emphasis  is  by  digressing  in  the  middle 
of  an  argument  to  explain  the  significance  of  a  piece  of  evidence. 
The  following  selection  is  taken  from  the  speech  by  William 
C.  Plunkett  in  the  case  of  Rex  vs.  Forbes  and  others.  The 
defendants  were  on  trial  for  participation  in  a  riot.  They 
were  charged  with  hurling  bottles  and  other  missiles  at  the 
Lord-lieutenant  of  Ireland  in  a  public  theater. 

"When  I  state  that  a  bottle  was  thrown  at  the  king's  representa- 
tive, and  that  implements  of  violence  were  flung  at  his  person,  such 
is  the  state  of  the  public  mind  that  it  is  listened  to  as  if  it  were  a 
mere  bagatelle,  a  jeu  d'esprit,  a  trifle  of  which  the  Lord  Lieutenant 
need  not  take  any  notice,  and  which  is  below  the  attention  of  the 
government  and  the  law  oflicers.  Why,  gentlemen  of  the  jury, 
are  we  awake?  Can  we  be  insensible  to  the  effect  of  such  occur- 
rences upon  the  honor  and  safety  of  the  country?    Can  we  reflect, 


THE  DISCUSSION  327 

without  indignation,  that  such  an  outrage  should  be  committed 
in  a  civilized  country  against  the  person  of  his  majesty's  repre- 
sentative, because  he  had  the  presumption,  in  opposition  to  a 
desperate  gang,  to  execute  the  parting  injunctions  of  the  king  in  a 
manner  not  calculated  to  give  offence  or  excite  animosity?  '*  * 

2.  Iteration.  The  persistent  repetition  of  a  word  or  phrase, 
may  also  be  forcibly  used  to  impress  an  idea  on  a  reader's 
memory.  This  device  is  well  illustrated  in  the  following 
passage  from  Matthew  Arnold: — 

"The  practical  genius  of  our  people  could  not  but  urge  irresistibly 
to  the  production  of  a  real  prose  style,  because  for  the  purposes 
of  modern  life  the  old  English  prose,  the  prose  of  Milton  and  Taylor, 
is  cumbersome,  unavailable,  impossible.  A  style  of  regularity, 
uniformity,  precision,  balance,  was  wanted.  These  are  the  quali- 
ties of  a  serviceable  prose  style.  Poetry  was  a  different  logicy  as 
Coleridge  said,  from  prose.  But  there  is  no  doubt  that  a  style  of 
regularity,  uniformity,  precision,  balance,  will  acquire  a  yet  stronger 
hold  upon  the  mind  of  a  nation  if  it  is  adopted  in  poetry  as  well  as 
in  prose,  and  so  comes  to  govern  both.  This  is  what  happened  in 
France.  To  the  practical,  modern,  and  social  genius  of  the  French 
a  true  prose  was  indispensable.  They  produced  one  of  conspicuous 
excellence,  supremely  powerful  and  influential  in  the  last  century, 
the  first  to  come  and  standing  at  first  alone,  a  modern  prose.  French 
prose  is  marked  in  the  highest  degree  by  the  qualities  of  regularity, 
uniformity,  precision,  balance.  With  little  opposition  from  any 
deep-seated  and  imperious  poetic  instincts,  the  French  made  their 
poetry  also  conform  to  the  law  which  was  moulding  their  prose. 
French  poetry  became  marked  with  the  qualities  of  regularity, 
uniformity,  precision,  balance.  .  .  .  Our  literature  required  a 
prose  which  conformed  to  the  true  law  of  prose;  and  that  it  might 
acquire  this  the  more  surely,  it  compelled  poetry,  as  in  France,  to 
conform  itself  to  the  law  of  prose  likewise.  .  .  .  Poetry,  or  rather 
the  use  of  verse,  entered  in  a  remarkable  degree,  during  the  (eight- 
eenth) century,  into  the  whole  of  the  daily  life  of  the  civilized 
classes;  and  the  poetry  of  the  century  was  a  perpetual  school  of  the 

^  Great  Speeches  by  Great  Latoyers,  p.  638. 


328  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

qualities  requisite  for  a  good  prose,  qualities  of  regularity,  uni« 
formity,  precision,  balance."  ^ 

3.  Rhetorical  question.  There  are  few  methods  of  making 
a  vivid  impression  on  the  attention  and  memory  of  an  au- 
dience, more  forcible  than  the  use  of  the  so-called  rhetorical 
question.  The  rhetorical  question  is  one  in  which  the  answer 
is  implied  in  the  form  and  dehvery  of  the  question;  as,  for 
example,  "Is  the  United  States  a  republic  or  a  despotism?'* 
The  value  of  this  device  lies  largely  in  the  effect  of  variety 
and  incisiveness  which  it  imparts  and  the  dire  tness  it  assists 
in  attaining.  For  what  is  probably  the  most  perfect  and 
elaborate  use  of  the  rhetorical  question  to  be  found  in  Ameri- 
can oratory  see  Carl  Schurz's  great  speech  on  "General 
Amnesty,"  ^  delivered  in  the  United  States  Senate,  Janu- 
ary 30,  1872.  The  following  illustration  is  from  Webster's 
speech  in  the  case  of  Ogden  vs.  Saunders : — 

**We  come  before  the  court  alleging  the  law  to  be  void  and  un- 
constitutional; they  stop  the  inquiry  by  opposing  to  us  the  law 
itself.  Is  this  logical?  ...  Is  it  not  obvious,  that,  supposing  the 
act  of  New  York  to  be  a  part  of  the  contract,  the  question  still 
remains  as  undecided  as  ever.  What  is  that  act?  Is  it  a  law,  or 
is  it  a  nullity?  a  thing  of  force,  or  a  thing  of  no  force?  Suppose  the 
parties  to  have  contemplated  this  act,  what  did  they  contemplate? 
its  words  only,  or  its  legal  effect?  its  words,  or  the  force  which  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States  allows  to  it?  If  the  parties  con- 
templated any  law,  they  contemplated  all  the  law  that  bore  on  their 
contract,  the  aggregate  of  all  the  statute  and  constitutional  provi- 
sions." ' 

F.  Unity  and  coherence  in  the  discussion.  In  addition 
to  the  suggestions  for  gaining  variety  and  emphasis,  in  the 
discussion  it  is  well  to  say  a  word  about  the  special  necessity 

^  Genimg,  The  Working  Principles  of  Rheforic,  p.  304. 

2  To  be  found  in  many  collections.  See  Ringwalt's  Modem  American 
Oratory,  pp.  93-130.    Or  Baker's  Forms  of  Public  Address,  p.  353. 

3  The  Works  of  Daniel  Webster,  Vol.  VI,  p.  30. 


THE  DISCUSSION  329 

for  coherence  and  unity  in  this  part  of  our  argument.  Em- 
phasis puts  stress  upon  the  significant  points  of  the  proof. 
However,  as  we  have  already  seen,  to  be  convincing,  a  speaker 
or  writer  must  make  his  audience  or  readers  accept,  not  this 
point  or  that,  but  his  whole  case.  In  order  thus  to  estabhsh 
the  proposition  as  a  whole,  in  presenting  the  proof  the  differ- 
ent elements  nmst  be  firmly  bound  together  in  one.  Someone 
has  said  that  there  is  "more  force  in  a  stone  than  in  a  hand- 
ful of  sand."  See  to  it  that  your  case  is  a  stone — a  "  pudding- 
stone"  perhaps,  but  still  a  single  stone  capable  of  being 
thrown  at  an  enemy  with  some  accuracy  and  force,  or  of 
being  used  to  block  his  advance  with  some  effect.  The  in- 
troduction and  the  conclusion  are  of  great  service  in  gaining 
this  unity;  but  it  is  dangerous  to  leave  this  work  entirely  to 
these  external  aids.  There  must  be  coherence  and  unity 
within  the  proof,  as  well  as  ropes  and  bands  without.  To 
depend  for  unity  entirely  upon  the  partition  at  the  beginning 
and  the  summary  at  the  end,  is  likely  to  make  it  seem  arti- 
ficial and  forced;  to  gain  an  effect  that  is  natural  and  con- 
vincing, the  unity  must  be  made  evident  in  the  proof  itself. 

1.  Three  valuable  aids  in  getting  unity  and  coherence  in 
the  proof  itself,  are :  (a)  transitions,  (b)  summaries,  (c)  parti- 
tions. It  is  not  true  that  these  devices  are  desirable  in  every 
piece  of  argumentation.  Often  the  proofs  are  of  such  a  nature, 
their  connection  with  one  another  is  so  obvious,  that  sum- 
maries and  partitions  within  the  proof  are  unnecessary; 
sometimes  these  devices  are  positively  undesirable,  because 
they  give  an  air  of  exactness  and  formality  that  is  inappro- 
priate. The  practice  of  such  methods  may  easily  be  carried 
to  an  extreme;  but  the  common  danger  is  that  of  deficiency 
'ather  than  of  excess. 

a.  Transition.  A  speaker  leading  an  audience  along  new 
paths,  needs  to  keep  in  close  touch  with  them,  lest  they  lose 
the  way  and  become  confused.  By  the  use  of  transitional 
phrases,  sentences,  and  paragraphs  he  holds  them  always 
under  a  firm  control,  and  is  enabled  to  guide  them  carefully, 


330  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

so  that  the  way  is  constantly  opening  ahead  at  each  step. 
John  Ward,  in  his  System  of  Oratory,  explains  a  transition 
as  follows: — 

"A  transitioHy  therefore,  is  a  form  of  speech  by  which  the 
speaker  in  a  few  words  tells  his  hearers  both  what  he  has  said 
already  and  what  he  next  designs  to  say.  Where  a  discourse  con- 
sists of  several  parts  this  is  often  very  proper  in  passing  from 
one  to  another,  especially  when  the  parts  are  of  a  considerable 
length;  for  it  assists  the  hearers  to  carry  the  series  of  the 
discourse  in  their  mind,  which  is  a  great  advantage  to  the 
memory.  It  is  likewise  a  great  relief  to  the  attention  to  be 
told  when  an  argument  is  finished  and  what  is  to  be  expected 
next."  1 

Mr.  Ward  also  gives  an  excellent  illustration  of  the  use  of 
the  simple  transition: — 

"Cicero,  as  I  have  had  occasion  to  observe  formerly,  di- 
vides his  oration  for  the  Manilian  law  into  three  parts,  and 
proposes  to  speak,  first  of  the  nature  of  the  war  against  King 
MithridateSy  then  of  its  greatness,  and  lastly  of  the  choice  of  a 
general.  And  when  he  has  gone  thro'  the  first  head,  which  is 
pretty  long,  he  connects  it  with  the  second,  by  this  short 
transition:  Having  shown  the  nature  of  the  war,  I  shall  now 
speak  a  few  things  of  its  greatness.  And  again,  at  the  conclu- 
sion of  his  second  head,  he  reminds  his  hearers  of  his  method 
in  the  following  manner:  /  think  I  have  sufficiently  shewn  the 
necessity  of  this  war  from  the  nature  of  it,  and  the  danger  of  it 
from  its  greatness.  What  remains  is  to  speak  concerning  the 
choice  of  a  general,  proper  to  be  intrusted  with  it."  ^ 

b.  Summary.  The  use  of  the  summaries  within  the  dis- 
cussion contributes  to  unity  and  coherence,  by  gathering 
together  proofs  that  are  closely  associated,  and  relating  them 
clearly  to  the  whole  proposition.  They  bring  the  materials 
thus  summarized  into  one  single  strong  point,  instead  of 
a  number  of  scattered  and  incomplete  points.    Also  the  sum- 

1  John  Ward,  A  System  of  Oratory,  Vol.  I,  p.  290. 

2  Ibid.,  Vol.  I,  p.  291. 


THE  DISCUSSION  331 

mary  contributes  to  clearness,  by  closing  up  the  division  of 
the  proof  that  is  completed,  and  making  it  evident  that  a 
new  line  of  argument  is  to  be  undertaken.  Finally,  these 
occasional  summaries  help  greatly  in  making  intelligible  the 
final  summary  in  the  conclusion. 

In  the  report  of  the  Civil  Service  Commission  of  1871,  is 
an  excellent  example  of  the  short,  simple,  and  direct  style  of 
summary  that  is  most  effective  for  use  within  the  proof  it- 
self:— 

''These  are  some  of  the  serious  and  threatening  evils  of  the 
present  practice  of  treating  the  inferior  posts  of  administration  as 
party  prizes.  It  exasperates  party  spirit  and  perverts  the  election. 
It  tends  to  fill  the  public  service  with  incapacity  and  corruption, 
destroying  its  reputation  and  repelling  good  men.  It  entices  Con- 
gress to  desert  the  duties  to  which  it  is  especially  designated  by 
the  Constitution,  and  tempts  the  Executive  to  perilous  intrigue."  * 

The  writer  then  takes  up  a  new  line  of  argument  (refuta- 
tion) with  the  following  introductory  sentence: — 

"The  arguments  by  which  the  present  pernicious  practice  is 
justified  seem  to  us  wholly  unsound."  ^ 

c.  Partition.  Internal  partitions  perform  much  the  same 
office  as  the  external  partition  of  the  introduction.  They 
turn  the  attention  in  the  desired  direction  and  explain  what  will 
be  done  next,  so  that  the  audience  can  follow  the  line  of 
thought  that  is  to  come.  Webster  showed  his  mastery  of  the 
art  of  being  clear  by  his  frequent  use  of  this  kind  of  partition. 
No  better  model  can  be  found  than  the  following,  taken  from 
his  speech  before  the  Supreme  Court  in  the  case  of  Luther 
vs.  Borden  et  al.:— 

"Having  thus,  may  it  please  your  honors,  attempted  to  state 
the  questions  as  they  arise,  and  having  referred  to  what  has  taken. 

1  George  William  Curtis,  Orations  and  Addresses,  Vol.  II,  p.  43. 


332  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

place  in  Rhode  Island,  I  shall  present  what  further  I  have  to  say 
in  three  propositions : — 

**1.  I  say,  first,  that  the  matters  offered  to  be  proved  by  the 
plaintiff  in  the  court  below  are  not  of  judicial  cognizance;  and  proof 
of  them,  therefore,  was  properly  rejected  by  the  court. 

**2.  If  all  these  matters  could  be,  and  had  been,  legally  proved, 
they  would  have  constituted  no  defence,  because  they  show  nothing 
but  an  illegal  attempt  to  overthrow  the  government  of  Rhode 
Island. 

**3.  No  proof  was  offered  by  the  plaintiff  to  show  that,  in  fact, 
another  government  had  gone  into  operation,  by  which  the  Charter 
government  had  become  displaced."  ^ 

2.  The  summary  and  partition  are  very  effective  in  combi- 
nation ;  the  summary  showing  what  has  been  done,  and  the 
partition  what  remains  to  be  done,  establish  beyond  a  doubt 
the  unity  of  the  demonstration,  and  give  to  the  readers  a  clear 
understanding  of  what  is  being  accomplished.  This  combi- 
nation should,  however,  be  used  with  judgment,  for  it  is  the 
most  formal  of  all  the  methods  of  transition.  It  is  most 
properly  used  where  the  proof  is  very  long,  and  where  the 
quality  most  to  be  sought  for  is  that  of  logical  perfection. 
For  example,  it  is  most  appropriate  in  such  an  effort  as  that 
of  Webster  before  the  Supreme  Court  in  the  case  of  Gibbons 
vs.  Ogden: — 

"I  contend,  therefore,  in  conclusion  on  this  point,  that  the  power 
of  Congress  over  these  high  branches  of  commercial  regulation  is 
shown  to  be  exclusive,  by  considering  what  was  wished  and  in- 
tended to  be  done,  when  the  convention  for  forming  the  Constitu- 
tion was  called;  by  what  was  understood,  in  the  State  conventions, 
to  have  been  accomplished  by  the  instrument;  by  the  prohibitions 
on  the  States,  and  the  express  exception  relative  to  inspection  laws; 
by  the  nature  of  the  power  itself;  by  the  terms  used,  as  connected 
with  the  nature  of  the  power;  by  the  subsequent  understanding 
and  practice,  both  of  Congress  and  the  States;  by  the  grant  of  ex- 
clusive admiralty  jurisdiction  to  the  federal  government;  by  the 

1  The  Works  of  Daniel  Webster,  Vol.  VI,  p.  236. 


THE  DISCUSSION  333 

manifest  danger  of  the  opposite  doctrine,  and  the  ruinous  conse- 
quences to  which  it  directly  leads.  .  .  .  But  I  contend,  in  the 
second  place,  that  whether  the  grant  were  to  be  regarded  as  wholly 
void  or  not,  it  must,  at  least,  be  inoperative,  when  the  rights  claimed 
under  it  come  in  collision  with  other  rights,  enjoyed  and  secured 
under  the  laws  of  the  United  States;  and  such  collision,  I  maintain, 
clearly  exists  in  this  case."  ^ 


EXERCISE.     CHAPTER  13 

THE  DISCUSSION 

1.  Hand  in  complete  discussion  of  one  of  the  speeches  men- 

tioned in  Exercise  1  of  the  last  chapter. 

2.  Write  a  complete  discussion  for  the  favorable  audience 

mentioned  in  Exercise  2  of  the  last  chapter. 

3.  Write   a   complete   discussion   for   the   hostile   audience 

mentioned  in  Exercise  2  of  the  last  chapter. 

4.  Hand  in  the  complete  discussion  for  your  original  forensic. 

1  The  Works  of  Daniel  Webster,  Vol.  VI,  pp.  18, 19. 


CHAPTER  14 

THE   CONCLUSION 

OUTLINE 

I.  The  purpose  of  the  conclusion. 

A.  Conviction. 

1.  Summarize. 

a.  Variety. 

(I)  Formal. 
(II)  Informal. 
(Ill)  Sometimes  persuasive. 

2.  Amplify  and  diminish. 

B.  Persuasion. 

1.  Well  disposed  toward  speaker  or  writer. 

2.  Final  stirring  of  favorable  emotions. 

I.  The  purpose  of  the  conclusion.  Twenty-two  cen- 
turies ago  Aristotle  ^  said  that  the  object  of  the  epilogue  or 
conclusion  was  four-fold:  (1)  to  conciliate  the  audience  in 
favor  of  the  speaker  and  to  excite  them  against  his  adversary; 
(2)  to  amplify  and  diminish;  (3)  to  rouse  the  emotions;  and 
(4)  to  recapitulate.  Time  has  not  changed  the  truth  of  his 
statement;  these  are  to-day  the  offices  of  the  conclusion. 
Clearly,  two  of  these  are  primarily  concerned  with  convic- 
tion and  two  with  persuasion.  To  recapitulate  and  to  ''am- 
plify and  diminish"  are  desirable,  in  order  to  make  complete 
the  intellectual  approach;  to  gain  sympathy  and  to  rouse  the 
feelings  are  desirable,  in  order  successfully  to  make  the  emo- 
tional approach. 

A.  Conviction.  1.  Summarize.  In  argumentation  the 
first  object  of  the  conclusion  is  to  recapitulate  or  summarize. 
The  concluding  summary  is  generally  necessary  in  order  to 

^  Rhetoric.    Jebb  Translation,  p.  198. 
334 


THE  CONCLUSION  335 

make  the  proof  clear  and  forcible.  In  the  first  place  the  points 
made  in  the  discussion  must  finally  be  gathered  together  into 
a  single  point  in  order  to  convince  the  audience  of  the  strength 
of  the  demonstration  as  a  whole;  again,  the  various  points 
must  be  repeated  and  emphasized,  in  order  to  impress  them 
on  the  memory  of  the  audience. 

a.  The  summary  may  take  a  variety  of  forms,  with  varying 
degrees  of  length  and  formality.  In  nearly  all  student  ar- 
gumentation the  summary  needs  to  be  careful  and  detailed; 
the  main  heads  of  the  proof  must  be  repeated,  and  usually 
many  of  the  subordinate  points  of  the  evidence.  Rhetori- 
cally, the  summary  may  take  the  form  of  a  plain  recapitu- 
lation, or  it  may  be  amplified  by  explanation  and  enforce- 
ment. 

(I)  Formal.  Gardiner  ^  has  a  suggestive  paragraph  favor- 
ing shorty  decisive  conclusions — a  type  that  might  well  be 
used  except  when  there  is  a  definite  reason  for  using  another 
kind. 

One  of  the  best  examples  of  a  simple  recapitulation  is 
found  in  the  conclusion  of  Webster's  speech  in  the  case  of 
Ogden  vs.  Saunders: — 

"To  recapitulate  what  has  been  said,  we  maintain,  first,  that 
the  Constitution,  by  its  grants  to  Congress  and  its  prohibitions 
on  the  states,  has  sought  to  establish  one  uniform  standard  of 
value,  or  medium  of  payment.  Second,  that,  by  like  means,  it 
has  endeavored  to  provide  for  one  uniform  mode  of  discharging 
debts,  when  they  are  to  be  discharged  without  payment.  Third, 
that  these  objects  are  connected,  and  that  the  first  loses  much  of 
its  importance,  if  the  last,  also,  be  not  accomplished.  Fourth, 
that,  reading  the  grant  to  Congress,  and  the  prohibition  on  the 
States  together,  the  inference  is  istrong  that  the  Constitution  in- 
tended to  confer  an  exclusive  power  to  pass  bankrupt  laws  on  Con- 
gress. Fifth,  that  the  prohibition  in  the  tenth  section  reaches  to 
all  contracts,  existing  or  future,  in  the  same  way  that  the  other 
prohibition,  in  the  same  section,  extends  to  all  debts,  existing  or 

*  The  Making  of  ArgumeiUs,  p.  187. 


336  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

future.     Sixth,  that,  upon  any  other  construction,  one  great  politi- 
cal object  of  the  Constitution  will  fail  of  its  accomplishment."  ^ 

(II)  Informal.  Usually,  however,  the  summary  is  less 
formal  than  the  above  in  its  phrasing,  and  less  abrupt  in  its 
ending.  The  more  common  style  is  such  as  that  in  Burke's 
speech,  on  a  bill  for  shortening  the  duration  of  ParHaments : — 

"Thus,  in  my  opinion,  the  shortness  of  a  triennial  sitting  would 
have  the  following  ill  effects:  it  would  make  the  member  more 
shamelessly  and  shockingly  corrupt,  it  would  increase  his  depend- 
ence on  those  who  could  best  support  him  at  his  election,  it  would 
wrack  and  tear  to  pieces  the  fortunes  of  those  who  stood  upon  their 
own  fortunes  and  their  private  interest;  it  would  make  the  electors 
infinitely  more  venal,  and  it  would  make  the  whole  body  of  the 
people  who  are,  whether  they  have  votes  or  not,  concerned  in  elec- 
tions, more  lawless,  more  idle,  more  debauched;  it  would  utterly 
destroy  the  sobriety,  the  industry,  the  integrity,  the  simplicity  of 
all  the  people,  and  undermine,  I  am  much  afraid,  the  deepest  and 
best  laid  foundations  of  the  commonwealth."  ^ 

(III)  Sometimes  largely  persuasive.  While  discussing 
summaries,  it  may  be  well  to  observe  that  under  certain  cir- 
cumstances formal  recapitulations  may  be  largely  persuasive. 
It  is  of  course  rarely,  if  ever,  true  that  a  great  argument 
closes  with  a  recapitulation  that  is  mainly  persuasive.  The 
conclusion  of  Wendell  Phillips'  speech  on  Daniel  O'Connell 
is  a  persuasive  summary: 

"For  thirty  restless  and  turbulent  years  he  stood  in  front  of 
them,  and  said,  'Remember,  he  that  commits  a  crime  helps  the 
enemy.'  And  during  that  long  and  fearful  struggle,  I  do  not  re- 
member one  of  his  followers  ever  being  convicted  of  a  political 
offense,  and  during  this  period  crimes  of  violence  were  very  rare. 
There  is  no  such  record  in  our  history.  Neither  in  classic  nor  in 
modern  times  can  the  man  be  produced  who  held  a  million  of  people 

^The  Works  of  Daniel  Webster,  Vol.  VI,  p.  40. 
2  The  Speeches  of  Edmund  Burke,  p.  400. 


TEE  CONCLUSION  337 

In  his  right  hand  so  passive.  It  was  due  to  the  consistency  and 
unity  of  a  character  that  had  hardly  a  flaw.  I  do  not  forget  your 
soldiers,  orators,  or  poets — any  of  your  leaders.  But  when  I  con- 
sider O'Connell's  personal  disinterestedness, — his  rare,  brave 
fidelity  to  every  cause  his  principles  covered,  no  matter  how  un- 
popular, or  how  embarrassing  to  his  main  purpose, — that  clear  far- 
reaching  vision,  and  true  heart  which,  on  most  moral  and  political 
questions,  set  him  so  much  ahead  of  his  times;  his  eloquence,  almost 
equally  effective  in  the  courts,  in  the  senate,  and  before  the  masses; 
that  sagacity  which  set  at  naught  the  malignant  vigilance  of  the 
whole  imperial  bar,  watching  thirty  years  for  a  misstep;  when  I 
remember  that  he  invented  his  vast  success,  bearing  in  mind  its 
nature;  when  I  see  the  sobriety  and  moderation  with  which  he  used 
his  measureless  power,  and  the  lofty,  generous  purpose  of  his  whole 
life, — I  am  ready  to  affirm  that  he  was,  all  things  considered,  the 
greatest  man  the  Irish  race  ever  produced."  ^ 

2.  "  Amplify  and  diminish  "  is  the  name  given  to  the  prac- 
tice of  magnifying  the  importance  of  certain  points  in  the 
discussion,  and  belittling  the  importance  of  others.  In  doing 
this,  a  disputant  may  diminish  certain  of  his  own  proofs  and 
amplify  certain  others,  his  purpose  being  to  bring  out  the 
force  of  the  greater  points,  by  contrast  with  the  lesser.  But 
usually,  the  practice  consists  in  diminishing,  not  one's  own 
proof,  but  the  proof  of  an  opponent.  In  such  a  case,  its 
effectiveness  consists  in  the  direct  contrasting  of  the  argu- 
ments on  the  opposite  sides.  The  decision  of  any  question 
is  determined  by  a  comparison,  in  the  minds  of  those  ad- 
dressed, of  the  relative  weight  of  the  proofs  of  the  two  arguers, 
so  that  a  disputant  may  help  his  cause  just  as  truly,  by  di- 
minishing the  weight  of  the  proof  against  him,  as  by  adding 
to  that  of  his  own.  In  almost  any  question,  there  are  usually 
some  phases  of  it  that  are  favorable  to  one  side,  and  others 
that  are  favorable  to  the  other  side;  on  certain  points,  the 
facts  support  the  affirmative,  on  others,  they  support  the 
negative.    So,  the  beliefs  of  the  audience  or  readers  about  the 

*  Ringwalt,  Modern  American  Oratory,  pp.  218,  219. 


338  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

proposition,  as  a  whole,  will  be  determined  largely  by  their 
opinions  as  to  which  phase,  or  what  points,  are  really  impor- 
tant. Clearly,  then,  it  would  be  the  policy  of  the  aflSrmative 
to  persuade  the  audience  that  the  points  established  in  favor 
of  the  proposition  were  of  more  importance  than  the  points 
established  against  it.  In  this  way  the  affirmative  could 
weaken  its  opponents,  by  belittling  the  significance  of  the 
points  they  had  proved  and  magnifying  the  significance  of 
its  own  points,  just  as  surely  as  it  could  by  a  direct  attack 
upon  their  arguments  or  evidence.  This  is  one  of  the  most 
common  kinds  of  amplifying  and  diminishing.  It  may, 
however,  take  various  forms;  it  may  consist  in  a  contrasting 
of  the  results  of  two  opposite  policies,  a  contrasting  of  the 
evidence  of  the  two  sides,  or  a  contrasting  of  the  motives  of  the 
two  parties;  but  in  all  these  the  purpose  is  the  same,  viz.; 
to  compare  the  two  proofs  as  a  whole,  and  show  the  prepond- 
erance of  the  one  over  the  other.  In  student  debates,  where 
both  the  materials  of  the  discussion  and  the  time  are  narrov/ly 
limited,  so  that  the  conflict  of  the  opposing  proofs  is  peculiarly 
direct,  to  amplify  and  diminish  is  especially  effective. 

IVTr.  Evarts,  in  his  argument  in  the  case  of  the  Savannah 
Privateers,  uses  this  artifice,  diminishing  the  case  of  the  de- 
fense and  amplifying  his  own  case  in  prosecution: — 

"And  now,  here  is  your  duty,  here  your  post  of  fidelity,  not 
against  law,  not  against  the  least  right  under  the  law,  but  to  sus- 
tain, by  whatever  sacrifice  there  may  be  of  sentiment  or  of  feeling, 
the  law  and  the  Constitution.  I  need  not  say  to  you,  gentlemen, 
that  if,  on  a  state  of  facts  which  admits  no  diversity  of  opinion, 
with  these  opposite  forces  arrayed,  as  they  now  are,  before  you — 
the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  the  laws  of  the  United  States, 
the  commission  of  this  learned  court,  derived  from  the  government 
of  the  United  States,  the  venire  and  impanelling  of  this  jury,  made 
under  the  laws  and  by  the  authority  of  the  United  States,  on  our 
side;  met,  on  their  side,  by  nothing  on  behalf  of  the  prisoners,  but 
the  commission,  the  power,  the  right,  the  authority  of  the  rebel 
government,  proceeding  from  Jefferson  Davis — you  are  asked  by 


TEE  CONCLUSION  339 

the  law,  or  under  the  law,  or  against  the  law,  in  some  form,  to 
recognize  this  power,  and  thus  to  say  that  the  vigor,  the  judgment, 
the  sense,  and  the  duty  of  a  jury,  to  confine  themselves  to  their 
responsibility  on  the  facts  of  the  case,  are  worthless  and  yielding 
before  impressions  of  a  discursive  and  loose  and  general  nature. 
Be  sure  of  it,  gentlemen,  that,  on  what  I  suppose  to  be  the  facts 
concerning  this  particular  transaction,  a  verdict  of  acquittal  is 
nothing  but  a  determination  that  our  government  and  its  authority, 
in  the  premises  of  this  trial,  for  the  purposes  of  your  verdict,  are 
met  and  overthrown  by  the  protection  thrown  around  the  prisoners 
by  the  government  of  the  Confederate  States  of  America,  actual 
or  incipient."  ^ 

B.  Persuasion.  1.  Well  disposed  toward  speaker  or 
writer.  The  necessity  of  an  appeal  for  sympathy,^  in  the 
conclusion,  is  too  obvious  to  need  explanation.  When  the 
speech  is  over,  or  the  essay  is  finished,  the  time  has  come  for 
the  hearer  or  reader  to  act  or  deliberate  on  action;  he  must, 
then,  be  favorably  disposed  in  his  feelings  toward  the  speaker 
or  writer,  in  order  to  give  his  side  a  fair  and  favorable  considera- 
tion. All  the  labors  of  persuasion,  in  the  introduction  and  in 
the  discussion,  may  be  lost,  if  the  emotions  aroused  there  are 
allowed  to  lapse  at  the  end.  The  sympathy  for  the  speaker 
and  his  subject,  v^hich  has  already  been  stirred,  must  be  left 
active  in  the  minds  of  the  audience,  when  he  at  length  sub- 
mits his  case  to  their  hands  for  judgment. 

The  conclusion  reaps  the  harvest  of  sympathy,  sowed  in  the 
earlier  parts  of  the  argument.  Aristotle  suggests  that  this 
last  effort  of  persuasion  may  be  an  appeal  by  the  speaker  for 
favor  for  himself  and  his  cause,  or  it  may  be  an  attack  on  the 
character  or  cause  of  an  opponent.  A  good  use  of  these 
methods,  in  combination,  is  found  in  the  argument  of  Ser- 
geant Prentiss  in  defense  of  Edward  C.  Wilkinson,  who  was 
on  trial  for  murder.  In  the  beginning  of  the  selection  he  di- 
rectly attacks  the  instigator  of  the  trial,  and  later,  the  chief 

^  Great  Speeches  by  Great  Lawyers,  p.  420. 
^  See  discussion  of  persuasion  in  chapter  11. 


340  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

witnesses  for  the  prosecution,  closing  with  a  brief  appeal  for 
sympathy  for  himself: — 

"But  there  is  a  murderer;  and,  strange  to  say,  his  name  appears 
upon  the  indictment,  not  as  a  criminal,  but  as  a  prosecutor.  His 
garments  are  wet  with  the  blood  of  those  upon  whose  deaths  you 
hold  this  solemn  inquest.  Yonder  he  sits,  allaying  for  a  moment 
the  hunger  of  that  fierce  vulture,  conscience,  by  casting  before  it 
the  food  of  pretended  regret,  and  false  but  apparent  eagerness  for 
justice.  He  hopes  to  appease  the  manes  of  his  slaughtered  vic- 
tims— victims  to  his  falsehood  and  treachery — by  sacrificing  upon 
their  graves  a  hecatomb  of  innocent  men.  By  base  misrepresenta- 
tions of  the  conduct  of  the  defendants,  he  induced  his  imprudent 
friends  to  attempt  a  vindication  of  his  pretended  wrongs  by  violence 
and  bloodshed.  .  .  . 

"Upon  his  head  rests  not  only  all  the  blood  shed  in  this  un- 
fortunate strife,  but  also  the  soul-killing  crime  of  perjury;  for, 
surely  as  he  lives,  did  the  words  of  craft  and  falsehood  fall  from 
his  lips,  ere  they  hardly  loosened  from  the  Holy  Volume.  But  I 
dismiss  him,  and  do  consign  him  to  the  furies — trusting,  in  all 
charity,  that  the  terrible  punishment  he  must  suffer  from  the  scor- 
pion lash  of  a  guilty  conscience  will  be  considered  in  his  last  account. 

"Johnson  and  Oldham,  too,  are  murderers  at  heart.  But  I  shall 
make  to  them  no  appeal.  There  is  no  chord  in  their  bosoms  which 
can  render  back  music  to  the  touch  of  feeling.  They  have  both 
perjured  themselves.  The  former  cut  up  the  truth  as  coolly  as  if 
he  had  been  carving  meat  in  his  own  stall.  The  latter,  on  the  con- 
trary, was  no  longer  the  bold  and  hot-blooded  knight,  but  the 
shrinking  pale-faced  witness.  Cowering  beneath  your  stern  and 
indignant  gaze,  marked  you  not  how  'his  coward  lip  did  from  its 
colors  fly';  and  how  his  quailing  eye  sought  from  floor  to  rafter 
protection  from  each  honest  glance.  .  .  . 

"Gentlemen  of  the  jury: — I  shall  detain  you  no  longer.  .  .  . 
I  had  hoped,  when  the  evidence  was  closed,  that  the  common- 
wealth's attorney  might  have  found  it  in  accordance  with  his  duty 
and  his  feelings  to  have  entered  at  once  a  nolle  prosequi.  Could  the 
genius  of  'Old  Kentucky'  have  spoken,  such  would  have  been  her 
mandate.  Blushing  with  shame  at  the  inhospitable  conduct  of  a 
portion  of  her  sons,  she  would  have  hastened  to  make  reparation. 


THE  CONCLUSION  341 

"Gentlemen:  Let  her  sentiments  be  spoken  by  you.  I^t  your 
verdict  take  character  from  the  noble  State  which  you  in  part 
represent.  Without  leaving  your  box,  announce  to  the  world  that 
here  the  defence  of  one's  own  person  is  no  crime,  and  that  the 
protection  of  a  brother's  life  is  the  subject  of  approbation  rather 
than  of  punishment. 

"Gentlemen  of  the  Jury:  I  return  you  my  most  profound  and 
sincere  thanks  for  the  kindness  with  which  you  have  listened  to 
me,  a  stranger,  pleading  the  cause  of  strangers.  Your  generous 
and  indulgent  treatment  I  shall  ever  remember  with  the  most 
grateful  emotions.  In  full  confidence  that  you,  by  your  sense  of 
humanity  and  justice,  will  supply  the  many  defects  in  my  feeble 
advocacy,  I  now  resign  into  your  hands  the  fate  of  my  clients.  As 
you  shall  do  unto  them,  so,  under  like  circumstances,  may  it  be 
done  unto  you."  ^ 

2.  Final  stirring  of  favorable  emotions.  But  gaining  sym- 
pathy for  one's  self  is  not  the  whole  of  persuasion.  The  emo- 
tions, which,  as  we  have  seen,  are  the  mainsprings  of  action, 
must  be  given  a  final  stimulus.  It  is,  however,  not  safe  to 
leave  all  appeal  to  the  emotions  to  be  made  in  the  conclusion; 
the  feelings  must  be  stirred  in  the  introduction,  and  kept 
■constantly  active  through  all  the  discussion.  But  there  the 
work  of  persuasion  is  only  begun;  in  order  to  bring  the 
emotions  finally  into  play,  they  must  be  wrought  to  the  high- 
est pitch  of  all  at  the  close,  and  directed  to  the  desired  end. 
Consequently,  in  any  great  oration,  it  is  in  the  peroration 
that  we  find  the  most  impassioned  eloquence;  it  is  here  that 
the  orator  spends  his  powers  freely  in  the  final  appeal.  The 
conclusion  must  complete,  and  give  carrying  force  to  the  work 
of  persuasion,  as  it  does  to  the  work  of  conviction. 

The  emotions  are  so  many,  and  the  possible  ways  of  stir- 
ring them  so  varied,  that  examples  are  not,  perhaps,  of  great 
value.  To  gain  such  power  requires  a  study  of  the  whole 
field  of  the  persuasive  art — a  study  of  human  nature,  a  study 
of  audiences,  a  study  of  the  world's  oratory.     Finally,  to 

^  Great  Speeches  by  Great  Lawyers,  pp.  121-123. 


342  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

develop  the  fruits  of  study  into  real  power,  demands,  in  the 
words  of  Demosthenes,  "Practice!  practice!  practice!" 

To  choose  examples  of  persuasion  in  the  conclusion,  in- 
volves discrimination  among  many  of  the  most  brilliant 
passages  in  the  world's  oratory.  The  following,  from  the 
speech  by  Grattan  on  the  "Declaration  of  Irish  Right,"  is 
not  given  as,  in  any  sense,  the  best;  it  is  simply  an  excellent 
illustration  of  one  kind : — 

"I  might,  as  a  constituent,  come  to  your  bar  and  demand  my 
liberty.  I  do  call  upon  you  by  the  laws  of  the  land,  and  their  viola- 
tion; by  the  instruction  of  eighteen  centuries;  by  the  arms,  inspira- 
tion, and  providence  of  the  present  movement — tell  us  the  rule  by 
which  we  shall  go;  assert  the  law  of  Ireland;  declare  the  liberty  of 
the  land !  I  will  not  be  answered  by  a  public  lie,  in  the  shape  of  an 
amendment;  nor,  speaking  for  the  subject's  freedom,  am  I  to  hear 
of  faction.  I  wish  for  nothing  but  to  breathe  in  this  our  island,  in 
common  with  my  fellow-subjects,  the  air  of  liberty.  I  have  no  am- 
bition, unless  it  be  to  break  your  chains  and  contemplate  your 
glory.  I  never  shall  be  satisfied  so  long  as  the  meanest  cottager  in 
Ireland  has  a  link  of  the  British  chain  clanking  to  his  rags.  He 
may  be  naked,  he  shall  not  be  in  irons.  And  I  do  see  the  time  at 
hand;  the  spirit  has  gone  forth;  the  declaration  of  right  is  planted, 
and  though  great  men  should  fall  oflF,  the  cause  will  live;  and 
though  he  who  utters  this  should  die,  yet  the  immortal  fire  shall 
outlast  the  organ  that  conveys  it,  and  the  breath  of  liberty,  hke 
the  word  of  the  holy  man,  will  not  die  with  the  prophet,  but  survive 
him."  1 

An  emotional  conclusion  of  a  very  different  sort  was  that 
used  by  Phillips  Brooks  in  his  speech  in  behalf  of  the  Chil- 
dren's Aid  Society. 

"I  sometimes  think  how  it  would  be  if  multitude  were  taken 
away  and  we  saw  in  its  simplicity  that  which  often  loses  itself  in 
the  large  variety  in  which  it  is  manifested  to  us.  Suppose  there 
were  but  one  needy  child  in  all  the  world.  Suppose  every  child 
from  China  to  Peru  were  wrapped  in  the  soft  care  and  tender  luxury 
*  Hardwicke,  History  of  Oratory  and  Orators^  p.  138. 


THE  CONCLUSION  343 

which  belong  to  children  in  their  parents'  arms.  Suppose  every 
babe  were  cooing  itself  to  rest  in  its  mother's  embrace,  and  every 
little  boy  were  looking  up  into  the  face  of  a  father's  sympathy  for 
the  first  manifestation  of  a  truth  that  was  to  make  him  strong. 
Then  suppose  that  somewhere,  anywhere,  upon  our  earth,  there 
came  one  cry  of  a  poor,  wronged,  needy  child.  Can  you  not  be 
sure  that  all  humanity  would  lift  itself  up  and  never  be  satisfied 
until  that  child  was  aided?  Is  it  less  pathetic,  is  it  less  appealing, 
because  they  are  here  by  the  million  instead  of  one  or  two?  If  one 
of  those  little  creatures  that  the  doctor  read  to  us  about  had  stood 
alone  in  all  the  generations  of  humanity,  how  infinitely  pathetic  it 
would  have  been!  How  you  all  would  have  stood  up  and  said, 
*  Where  is  that  child?  Where  is  that  child?  Life  shall  not  be  life 
to  us  until  we  have  relieved  it,  until  those  poor  limbs  have  been 
straightened  and  those  arms  made  strong,  until  those  bleared  eyes 
have  been  taught  to  see,  and  that  voice  has  sung  some  of  the  first 
beginnings  of  the  song  of  life.'  Well,  there  are  hundreds  and 
thousands  and  millions  of  them.  They  look  up  to  you  from  the 
gutter  as  you  walk  the  street.  They  look  into  the  face  of  the  good, 
kind  judge  as  he  sits  upon  his  bench.  They  come  stretching  out 
their  poor  sick  arms  to  the  doctors  in  the  hospitals,  and  you  can 
help  them.  You  can  help  them.  Help  them  just  as  you  would  if 
there  were  only  one  of  them,  by  giving  your  sympathy,  your  bless- 
ing, your  loud  praise,  and  your  large  contributions  to  the  Children's 
Aid  Society."  ^ 

EXERCISE.    CHAPTER  14 

THE   CONCLUSION 

1.  Write  conclusions  for  each  of  the  speeches  on  the  campus 

topic  mentioned  in  earlier  chapters. 

2.  Write  the  conclusion  to  the  speech  to  the  favorable  au- 

dience mentioned  in  the  last  two  chapters. 

3.  Write  the  conclusion  to  the  speech  for  the  hostile  audience 

mentioned  in  the  last  two  chapters. 

4.  Hand  in  the  complete  conclusion  to  your  original  forensic. 

*  Essays  and  Addresses,  quoted  by  Denney,  Duncan,  and  McKinney, 
Argum^tation  and  Debate,  pp.  114,  115. 


CHAPTER  15 

REFUTATION 

OUTLINE 

A.  The  nature  of  refutation. 

B.  What  to  refute. 

1.  Answering  too  much. 

a.  Three  objections. 

(I)  Loss  of  time  and  energy. 

(II)  Confusion. 

(III)  Undue  importance  to  parts  of  opponent's  case^ 

2.  Answering  too  Httle. 

3.  Answering  yourself:  "straw  men." 

C.  Three  fundamental  requirements. 

1.  Research. 

2.  Reasoning. 

3.  Rhetoric. 

D.  Position  of  refutation. 

E.  Basic  rule  for  all  refutation. 

F.  Methods  of  refutation. 

1.  Tests  of  evidence. 

2.  Attacks  on  forms  of  arguments. 

3.  Exposing  fallacies. 

4.  Special  rhetorical  devices. 

a.  Reductio  ad  absurdum. 

b.  Dilemma. 

(I)  More  than  two  horns. 

(II)  Faulty  disjunction. 

c.  Residues. 

(I)  Disjunction  must  be  exhaustive. 

d.  Turning  the  tables. 

A.  The    nature    of    refutation.     Refutation  consists  in 
the  destruction  of  opposing  proofs.     As  suggested  in  this 

344 


REFUTATION  345 

definition,  refutation  is,  in  form,  destructive  rather  than 
constructive;  but  in  its  purposes  and  results  it  is  no  less 
serviceable  than  positive  proof.  With  respect  to  any  given 
proposition,  there  are  always  two  contrary  beliefs  that  a 
person  may  hold:  he  may  believe  that  the  proposition  is 
true  or  that  it  is  not  true.  Consequently,  if  we  can  induce 
him  to  reject  the  opposite  of  what  we  uphold,  we  are  thereby 
preparing  him  to  accept  our  own  views.  Negative  argu- 
ment pure  and  simple  is  rarely,  if  ever,  suflScient;  for  belief 
is  always  essentially  positive  in  nature,  so  that  to  destroy 
without  building  up  will  not  serve  our  purpose.  Refutation, 
therefore,  is  properly  auxiliary  and  supplementary  to  posi- 
tive proof.  In  our  attempt  to  convince  or  persuade  any  man, 
we  must  realize  that  he  will,  almost  surely,  have  in  his  own 
mind  many  preconceived  ideas  and  preestablished  opinions 
about  the  matter  in  discussion,  and  that  many  of  those  ideas 
and  opinions  are  liable  to  be  antagonistic  to  what  we  are 
trying  to  make  him  believe.  In  such  circumstances,  our 
success  must  often  depend  upon  our  ability  to  destroy  these 
hostile  conceptions,  thus  preparing  the  way  for  the  accept- 
ance of  our  own  contentions.  The  necessity  for  such  de- 
structive effort  is,  of  course,  peculiarly  pressing  in  any  form 
of  disputation  where  the  arguer  is  confronted  by  some  def- 
inite opponents,  as  in  debate,  or  perhaps  in  a  newspaper 
controversy;  for  here,  the  audience  or  readers  are  con- 
sciously balancing  the  two  sides  of  the  question,  and  they 
must  be  made  to  see  with  perfect  clearness,  that  one  side 
overthrows  and  destroys  the  other.  But  in  any  form  of  ar- 
gumentative discussion  there  are  always  opponents  of  some 
kind,  either  real  or  imaginary,  and  they  must  be  mastered 
before  we  can  hope  to  make  others  fully  accept  our  own  be- 
liefs. 

B.  What  to  refute.  The  partial  or  complete  destruction 
of  such  opposing  opinions  and  arguments  often  calls  for  a 
keener  insight  and  a  more  adroit  attack,  than  does  any  of 
the  positive  work  of  construction.    It  therefore  becomes  of 


346  ARGUMEMTATION  AND  DEBATE 

the  first  importance  to  decide  what,  and  how  much,  one 
ought  to  refute.  Concerning  this  question  John  Quincy 
Adams,  in  his  Lectures  on  Rhetoric  and  Oratory  (Lecture 
XXII), 1  says:— 

"There  are  three  very  common  errors  in  the  management 
of  controversy  against  which  I  think  it  proper  here  to  guard 
you,  and  from  which  I  hope  you  will  hereafter  very  sedulously 
guard  yourselves.  The  first  may  be  termed  answering  too 
much;  the  second  answering  too  little;  and  the  third  answering 
yourself,  and  not  your  opponent." 

1.  Answering  too  much.  Speaking  of  the  first  of  these 
mistakes,  he  says: — 

"You  answer  too  much  when  you  make  it  an  invariable 
principle  to  reply  to  everything  which  has  been  or  could 
be  said  by  your  antagonist  on  the  other  side.  ...  If  you 
contend  against  a  diffuse  speaker,  who  has  wasted  hour  after 
hour  in  a  lingering  lapse  of  words,  which  had  little  or  no 
bearing  upon  the  proper  question  between  you,  it  is  incum- 
bent upon  you  to  discriminate  between  that  part  of  his  dis- 
course which  was  pertinent,  and  that  which  was  superfluous. 
Nor  is  it  less  necessary  to  detect  the  artifice  of  an  adversary, 
who  purposely  mingles  a  flood  of  extraneous  matter  with  the 
controversy,  for  the  sake  of  disguising  the  weakness  of  his 
cause.  In  the  former  of  these  two  cases,  if  you  undertake  to 
answer  everything  that  has  been  said,  you  charge  yourself 
with  all  the  tediousness  of  your  adversary,  and  double  the 
measure  by  an  equal  burden  of  your  own.  In  the  latter  you 
promote  the  cause  of  your  antagonist  by  making  yourself 
the  dupe  of  his  stratagem.  If,  then,  you  have  an  opponent 
whose  redundancies  arise  only  from  his  weakness,  whose 
standard  of  oratory  is  time,  and  whose  measure  of  eloquence 
if  in  arithmetical  proportion  to  the  multitude  of  his  words, 
your  general  rule  should  be  to  pass  over  all  his  general,  un- 
appropriate  declamation  in  silence;  to  take  no  more  notice 
of  it  than  if  it  had  never  been  spoken.  But  if  you  see  that 
1  Volume  II,  pp.  8ie,  83. 


REFUTATION  347 

the  external  matter  is  obtruded  upon  the  subject  with  design 
to  mislead  your  attention,  and  fix  it  upon  objects  different 
from  that  which  is  really  at  issue,  you  should  so  far  take 
notice  of  it  as  to  point  out  the  artifice,  and  derive  from  it  an 
argument  of  the  most  powerful  eflScacy  to  your  own  side." 

a.  Three  objections  to  answering  too  much.  Answering 
too  many  of  the  lesser  arguments  of  an  opponent  should  be 
avoided  for  the  following  three  excellent  and  practical  rea- 
sons: (I)  In  the  first  place,  it  involves  a  loss  of  time  and  energy. 
This  is  particularly  true  in  the  case  of  the  arguments  of  an 
opponent  who  wastes  himself  in  "a  lingering  lapse  of  words," 
which  have  little  or  no  bearing  upon  the  proper  question. 
But  it  is  also  true,  even  when  the  efforts  of  an  opponent  are 
well  directed  at  the  points  in  issue.  The  greater  part  of  the 
materials  in  any  proof  are,  as  w^e  have  seen,  only  secondary 
in  nature;  they  are  of  force  merely  because  they  tend  to 
establish  some  larger,  more  vital  fact.  The  important  thing 
is,  to  reach  and  overthrow  these  more  significant  and  critical 
parts  of  the  proof:  if  they  can  be  destroyed,  the  secondary 
facts  fall  with  them.  To  sink  a  battle-ship  does  not  demand 
that  every  foot  of  its  armor  be  twisted  and  torn,  that  every 
turret  and  smoke-stack  be  demolished;  one  or  two  well- 
aimed  shots  are  enough.  It  is  only  necessary  that  the  yv\- 
nerable  spot  be  well  chosen,  and  that  the  aim  be  sure.  Con- 
sequently it  should  be  the  purpose  of  the  debater,  in  his 
refutation,  to  let  the  lesser  points  of  his  opponent  pass  un- 
heeded, and  to  give  his  attention  only  to  vital  elements. 

(II)  In  the  second  place,  answering  too  much  results  in  con- 
fusion. To  attempt  to  refute  too  many  petty  arguments, 
weakens  the  discrimination  between  the  important  and  the 
unimportant,  which  is  always  necessary  in  argumentation,  if 
we  are  to  make  a  distinct  and  lasting  impression.  Emphasis, 
as  a  means  to  clearness  and  force,  is  just  as  desirable  in 
refutation  as  elsewhere,  and  emphasis  cannot  be  attained,  if 
attention  is  given  alike  to  the  great  and  the  small  points. 

(III)  In  the  third  place,  answering  too  much  gives  undue 


348  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

dignity  and  importance  to  many  points  of  the  other  side.  In- 
significant proofs  are  better  left  insignificant.  To  bring 
them  anew  to  the  attention  of  the  audience,  and  give  them 
the  compHment  of  a  serious  reply,  helps,  rather  than  hinders, 
an  opponent.  One  way  to  dispose  of  a  foolish  or  trivial  point 
is  illustrated  by  Cicero  in  his  defense  of  Q.  Ligarius: — 

"When  Tubero,  in  his  accusation  of  Ligarius  before  Caesar, 
ihad  made  it  part  of  his  charge,  that  Ligarius  was  in  Africa 
during  some  part  of  the  civil  war  between  Caesar  and  Pompey ; 
Cicero  in  his  answer,  not  thinking  it  deserved  a  serious  reply, 
contents  himself  with  barely  mentioning  it  ironically.  For 
thus  he  begins  his  defense  of  Ligarius,  Ccesar,  my  kinsman 
Tubero  has  laid  before  you  a  new  crime,  and  till  this  day  un- 
heard of,  that  Q.  Ligarius  was  in  Africa.'^  ^ 

2.  Answering  too  little.  Of  the  second  fault,  which  con- 
sists in  answering  too  little,  Mr.  Adams  says: — 

"The  second  error  in  controversy,  against  which  I  am 
anxious  of  warning  you,  is  that  of  answering  too  little.  It  is 
not  unfrequently  found  united  with  that  against  which  I 
have  last  admonished  you.  When  too  much  of  our  strength 
is  lavished  upon  the  outworks,  the  citadel  is  left  proportion- 
ately defenceless.  If  we  say  too  much  upon  points  extrinsic 
to  the  cause,  we  shall  seldom  say  enough  upon  those  on  which 
it  hinges.  To  avoid  this  fault,  therefore,  it  is  as  essential  to 
ascertain  which  are  the  strong  parts  of  your  adversary's 
argument  as  it  is  to  escape  the  opposite  error  of  excess.  To 
this  effect  it  is  also  a  duty  of  the  first  impression  to  obtain  a 
control  over  your  own  prejudices  and  feelings.  Nothing  is 
so  sure  to  blind  us  to  the  real  validity  of  the  reasons  alleged 
against  us,  as  our  passions.  It  is  so  much  easier  to  despise, 
than  to  answer  an  opponent's  argument,  that  wherever  we 
can  indulge  our  contempt,  we  are  apt  to  forget  that  it  is  not 
refutation."  ^  Sarcasm  and  scorn  may  be  aids  to  refutation, 
but  they  are  not  substitutes  for  it.    In  refutation,  then,  the 

1  John  Ward,  A  System  of  Oratory,  Vol.  II,  p.  366. 

2  Adams,  Lectures  on  Rhetoric  and  Oratory,  Vol.  II,  p.  88. 


REFUTATION  349 

first  essential  is  to  understand  what  are  the  few  vital  points 
of  the  other  side;  to  analyze  your  adversary's  case,  pick  out 
his  "strong  parts/'  and  answer  them. 

3.  Answering  yourself:  "Straw  men":  Concerning  the 
last  and  very  common  error,  which  consists  in  "answering 
yourself, "  the  comment  made  by  Mr.  Adams  cannot  be  over- 
emphasized : — 

*'But  the  most  inexcusable  of  all  the  errors  in  confutation 
is  that  of  answering  yourself,  instead  of  your  adversary, 
which  is  done  whenever  you  suppress,  or  mutilate,  or  obscure, 
or  misstate,  his  reasoning,  and  then  reply  not  to  his  positions, 
but  to  those  which  you  have  substituted  in  their  stead.  This 
practice  is  often  the  result  of  misapprehension,  when  a  dis- 
putant mistakes  the  point  of  the  argument  urged  by  his 
adversary;  but  it  often  arises  also  from  design,  in  which  case 
it  should  be  clearly  detected  and  indignantly  exposed.  The 
duty  of  a  disputant  is  fairly  to  take  and  fully  to  repel  the 
idea  of  his  opponent,  and  not  his  own.  To  misrepresent  the 
meaning  of  your  antagonist  evinces  a  want  of  candor  which 
the  auditory  seldom  fail  to  perceive,  and  which  engages  their 
feelings  in  his  favor.  When  involved  in  controversy,  then, 
never  start  against  yourself  frivolous  objections  for  the  sake 
of  showing  how  easily  you  can  answer  them.  Quinctilian 
relates  an  anecdote  of  the  poet  Accius,  which  every  contro- 
versial writer  or  speaker  will  do  well  to  remember.  Accius 
was  a  writer  of  tragedies,  and  being  once  asked  why  he,  whose 
dialogue  was  celebrated  for  its  energy,  did  not  engage  in  the 
practice  of  the  bar,  answered,  because  in  his  tragedies  he 
could  make  his  characters  say  what  he  pleased;  but  that  at  the 
bar  he  should  have  to  contend  with  persons  who  would  say 
anything  but  what  he  pleased.  There  can  be  no  possible 
advantage  in  supposing  our  antagonist  a  fool.  The  most 
probable  effect  of  such  an  imagination  is  to  prove  ourselves 
so."  1 

The  words  of  Accius  should  be  observed  by  every  student 
^  Lectures  on  Rhetoric  and  Oratory,  Vol.  II,  pp.  90,  91. 


350  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

of  argumentation.  It  is  easy  to  set  up  "straw  men'*  and 
knock  them  down,  but  it  is  dangerous  and  contemptible. 
To  suggest  possible  arguments,  unless  you  are  sure,  either 
that  they  have  already  been  advanced,  or  that  they  must  be 
advanced  by  the  other  side,  is  foolish.  If  the  arguments  are 
worth  while,  do  not  help  your  adversary  by  suggesting  them; 
if  they  are  not  worth  while,  it  is  a  waste  of  time  to  notice 
them.  Furthermore,  it  gives  an  opponent  the  opportunity 
to  ridicule  the  effort,  by  admitting  or  ignoring  the  points 
thus  suggested. 

C.  Three  fundamental  requirements.  Refutation  has  the 
same  three  fundamental  requirements  as  positive  argument. 
It  must  not  be  presumed  that  refutation  is  a  separate  and 
distinct  kind  of  argumentation.  To  refute  demands  skill  in 
the  three  Rs  of  argumentation:  research,  reasoning,  and 
rhetoric. 

1.  Research.  "The  first  principle  of  refutation  is,  then: 
Know  all  the  ramifications  of  the  discussion  in  which  you  take 
part.  Preparedness  on  both  sides  of  the  case  is  the  first 
essential  of  strong  refutation."  ^  One  needs  adequate  in- 
formation to  refute  an  opponent.  The  man  who  is  informed 
on  a  question  in  controversy  can  best  correct  the  mistakes  of 
an  adversary.  Thorough  knowledge  of  all  phases  of  the 
question  is  needed,  and  since,  in  Webster's  phrase,  "acquisi- 
tion is  never  extemporaneous,"  a  wise  debater  will  not  rely 
on  readiness  of  tongue  alone  in  this  department  of  argumenta- 
tion. Being  "quick  with  a  gun"  is  of  Httle  use  when  one  has 
no  gun  at  all — or  an  unloaded  one. 

2.  Reasoning.  Sound  reasoning,  straight  thinking,  is 
needed  in  refutation.  Any  slip  here  when  one  is  "  correcting  " 
the  reasoning  of  others  is  doubly  disastrous.  Clear  thinking 
(and  common  honesty)  will  keep  you  from  "answering  your- 
self," will  enable  you  to  show  your  readers  or  hearers  just 
what  you  are  refuting.  Only  straight  thinking  will  keep  your 
shots  true.    Often  most  careful  analysis  of  an  opposing  ar- 

1  Baker  and  Huntington,  Principles  of  Argumentation,  p.  171. 


REFUTATION  351 

gument  is  needed  in  order  to  pick  out  the  exact  point  to  be 
refuted,  or  to  show  the  exact  clash  of  discussion.  Sometimes 
throwing  the  argument  into  the  form  of  a  syllogism  will  make 
strikingly  clear  the  basic  structure  of  a  confused  argument. 
Lincoln  used  this  device  against  Douglas  in  the  debate  at 
Galesburg: 

"Now,  remembering  the  provision  of  the  Constitution  which  I 
have  read,  affirming  that  that  instrument  is  the  supreme  law  of 
the  land;  that  the  judges  of  every  state  shall  be  bound  by  it,  any 
law  or  constitution  of  any  state  to  the  contrary  notwithstanding; 
that  the  right  of  property  in  a  slave  is  affirmed  in  that  Constitution, 
is  made,  formed  into,  and  cannot  be  separated  from  it  without 
breaking  it;  durable  as  the  instrument,  part  of  the  instrument, — 
what  follows  as  a  short  and  even  syllogistic  argument  from  it?  I 
think  it  follows,  and  I  submit  to  the  consideration  of  men  capable 
of  argumenting,  whether  as  I  state  it,  in  syllogistic  form  the  argu- 
ment has  any  fault  in  it.'^ 

"Nothing  in  the  constitution  or  laws  of  any  state  can  destroy  a 
right  distinctly  and  expressly  affirmed  in  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States. 

"The  right  of  property  in  a  slave  is  distinctly  and  expressly 
affirmed  in  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States. 

"Therefore,  nothing  in  the  constitution  or  laws  of  any  state  can 
destroy  the  right  of  property  in  a  slave. 

"I  believe  that  no  fault  can  be  pointed  out  in  that  argument; 
assuming  the  truth  of  the  premises,  the  conclusion,  so  far  as  I  have 
capacity  at  all  to  understand  it,  follows  inevitably.  There  is  a 
fault  in  it,  as  I  think,  but  the  fault  is  not  in  the  reasoning;  the  false- 
hood, in  fact,  is  a  fault  in  the  premises.  I  believe  that  the  right 
of  property  in  a  slave  is  not  distinctly  and  expressly  affirmed  in 
the  Constitution,  and  Judge  Douglas  thinks  it  is."  ^ 

3.  Rhetoric.     Lastly,  all  that  goes  to  make  effective  ex- 
pression, rhetoric — oral  or  written,  is  of  unusual  importance 
in  refutation.    Careless,  inaccurate,  disorganized  style,  or  a 
weak  and  listless  delivery,  will  counteract  the  good  offices 
^  Quoted  from  Foster's  Argumentation^  pp.  183,  184. 


352  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

of  both  thorough  knowledge  and  sound  reasoning.  Fact  is 
the  bullet,  reasoning  is  the  aim,  and  expression  (we  trust  no 
untoward  application  of  our  figure  will  be  made)  is  the  force 
that  drives  the  bullet  to  its  mark. 

D.  Position  of  refutation.  With  respect  to  the  method 
of  handling  refutation,  a  common  word  of  advice  is,  to  fol- 
low up  refutation  with  positive  proof.  This  suggestion, 
however,  is  of  a  general  nature  and  is  open  to  exceptions. 
But  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  refutation  is  destructive; 
it  demolishes,  but  does  not  build  up.  To  make  men  act  or 
thoroughly  believe,  it  is  not  enough  to  make  them  see  there  is 
no  reason  why  they  should  not  be  convinced;  they  must  be 
made  to  see  that  there  is  a  positive  reason  why  they  should 
be  convinced.  Consequently,  pure  refutation  is  weak  and 
lacks  the  strongest  elements  of  conviction;  it  is  a  necessary 
help,  but  is  not  sufficient  in  itself.  It  is,  therefore,  generally 
an  anti-climax  to  place  refutation  at  the  end  of  the  discus- 
sion, or  at  the  end  of  any  important  division  of  the  argument. 
Positive  proof  rather  than  refutation  should  be  given  the 
most  emphatic  place. 

This  leads  to  the  matter  of  the  arrangement  of  refutation. 
With  respect  to  the  strength  and  the  weakness  of  the  points 
of  refutation,  the  same  rules  apply  as  in  positive  proof;  the 
emphatic  places  are  the  beginning  and  the  end.  If,  then,  the 
answer  to  be  made  is  strong,  it  may  well  be  put  first  or  to- 
ward the  last.  Weaker  answers  are  best  hidden  in  the  mid- 
dle. However,  it  often  happens  that  an  opponent  makes  a 
point  or  presents  some  idea,  which  must  be  overthrown  before 
the  speaker  or  writer  can  proceed  with  his  own  proof.  In  such 
circumstances,  clearly  the  answer  to  the  point  must  be  made 
at  the  very  beginning.  Doubt  often  arises  as  to  whether  it  is 
best  to  make  the  answer  a  distinct  point  in  the  discussion, 
or  to  introduce  it  merely  as  an  incident  to  some  other  point. 
This  depends  upon  the  importance  of  the  argument  to  be 
answered,  and  so  is  a  question  of  personal  judgment  in  each 
particular  case.    In  general,  however,  such  answers  are  best 


REFUTATION  353 

given  in  connection  with  those  parts  of  one's  own  proof  with 
which  they  are  naturally  associated.  In  fact,  they  should 
always  be  considered  wherever  they  happen  to  arise  in  the 
course  of  one's  own  argument,  except  where  there  is  a  pecu- 
liar, definite  reason  (such  as  extreme  importance  of  the  point 
made  or  effective  challenge  of  previous  speaker)  for  setting 
this  rule  aside.  Then  usually  such  refutation  should  be  given 
before  constructive  argument.  It  is  therefore  true  in  gen- 
eral that,  with  the  exceptio^  of  the  most  vital  of  the  proofs 
of  the  opposition,  refutation  is  best  made  as  the  occasion  for 
the  answer  arises  in  the  course  of  one's  own  demonstration. 
These  individual  points  that  may  be  taken  up  as  they  arise 
are  sometimes  called  ''special  refutation.'^  But  if  the  answer 
to  an  opponent's  argument  is,  under  the  circumstances,  of 
such  importance  as  to  make  any  large  part  of  the  question 
depend  upon  it,  there  should  be  no  hesitation  in  making  it 
one  of  the  main  points  of  the  proof,  and  emphasizing  it  as  such. 
Such  a  main  point  may  be  taken  up  wherever  it  most  logi- 
cally fits  into  the  case.  These  large  fundamental  points 
that  make  an  important  part  of  the  case  are  sometimes 
called  ''general  refutation.'' 

E.  Basic  rule  for  all  refutation.  Before  taking  up  any 
of  the  particular  methods  there  is  one  principle  of  refutation 
that  should  be  emphasized.  Always  make  perfectly  clear  to  the 
audience  or  reader ,  just  what  is  the  point  that  is  to  he  attacked, 
and  the  nature  of  the  attack  to  he  made.  Show  what  you  are 
going  to  refute,  and  how  you  are  going  to  refute  it.  Repeat 
what  your  opponent  has  said  and  then  say  that  you  will 
show  this  to  be  false,  irrelevant,  unimportant,  untrustworthy, 
etc.,  as  the  case  may  be.  The  statement  to  which  objection 
is  made  should  always  be  distinctly  stated  at  the  start,  and  its 
place  in  the  case — its  relation  to  main  points,  issues,  or  prop- 
osition— should  be  clearly  shown.  This  statement  should  be 
supplemented,  while  the  reply  is  being  presented,  by  what- 
ever explanations  are  necessary,  in  order  to  make  evident 
the  purposes  and  results  of  the  answer.    It  must  be  made 


354  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

clear  that  there  are  two  opposing  arguments  which  directly 
meet,  and  that  one  overthrows  the  other.  The  force  of  ref- 
utation is  destructive,  and  it  cannot  achieve  its  full  effect 
unless  the  audience  understands  just  what  is  to  be  destroyed, 
and  just  how  the  refutation  accomplished  the  destruction. 

A  study  of  forensic  and  deliberative  oratory  shows  the 
painstaking  care  to  observe  this  rule  used  by  the  ablest  speak- 
ers and  writers.  The  following  is  an  example  of  Webster's 
method  in  forensic  refutation,  a  model  of  clearness  in  intro- 
ducing refutation.  The  quotation  is  from  his  speech  in  the 
case  of  Ogden  vs.  Sai^nders: — 

"Here  we  meet  the  opposite  arguments,  stated  on  different  occa- 
sions in  different  terms,  but  usually  summed  up  in  this,  that  the 
law  itself  is  a  part  of  the  contract,  and  therefore  cannot  impair  it. 
What  does  it  mean. '^  Let  us  seek  for  clear  ideas.  It  does  not  mean 
that  the  law  gives  any  particular  construction  to  the  terms  of  the 
contract,  or  that  it  makes  the  promise,  or  the  consideration,  or  the 
time  of  performance,  other  than  is  expressed  in  the  instrument 
itself.  It  can  only  mean  that  it  is  to  be  taken  as  a  part  of  the  con- 
tract or  understanding  of  the  parties,  that  the  contract  itself  shall 
be  enforced  by  such  laws  and  regulations  respecting  remedy  and 
for  the  enforcement  of  contracts  as  are  in  being  in  the  State  where 
it  is  made  at  the  time  of  entering  into  it.  This  is  meant,  or  nothing 
very  clearly  intelligible  is  meant,  by  saying  the  law  is  part  of  the 
contract.  .  .  . 

"Against  this  we  contend: — 

"  1st.  That,  if  the  proposition  were  true,  the  consequence  would 
not  follow. 

"2nd.  That  the  proposition  itself  cannot  be  maintained."  ^ 

To  take  an  illustration  from  a  deliberative  oration:  Web- 
ster, in  replying  to  Calhoun  in  the  Senate,  on  the  question  of 
the  protective  tariff,  divided  his  speech  into  five  parts,  cor- 
responding to  the  five  main  points  of  his  opponent.  The 
following  are  the  sentences  introductory  to  these  parts  re- 
spectively:— 

1  The  Works  of  Daniel  Webgter,  Vol.  VI,  p.  29. 


REFUTATION  355 

"I.  In  treating  of  protection,  or  protective  duties,  the  first  prop- 
osition of  the  honorable  member  is,  that  all  duties  laid  on  imports 
really  fall  on  exports;  that  they  are  a  toll  paid  for  going  to  market. 

"  II.  Another  opinion  of  the  honorable  member  is,  that  increased 
production  brings  about  expansion  of  the  currency,  and  that  such 
increase  makes  a  further  increase  necessary.  His  idea  is,  that,  if 
some  goods  are  imported,  the  amount  of  exports  still  keeping  up, 
the  whole  export  being  thus  paid  for  by  the  import,  specie  must  be 
brought  to  settle  the  balance;  that  this  increase  of  specie  gives  new 
powers  to  the  banks  to  discount;  that  the  banks  thereupon  make 
large  issues,  till  the  mass  of  currency  becomes  redundant  and 
swollen;  that  this  swollen  currency  augments  the  price  of  articles  of 
our  own  manufacture,  and  makes  it  necessary  to  raise  prices  still 
higher,  and  this  creates  a  demand  for  the  imposition  of  new  duties. 
This,  as  I  understand  it,  is  the  honorable  member's  train  of  thought. 

"III.  There  is  a  third  general  idea  of  the  honorable  gentleman, 
upon  which  I  would  make  a  few  observations.  It  is,  that  the  South 
and  West  are  the  great  consumers  of  the  products  of  the  manufac- 
tures of  the  North  and  East;  that  the  capacity  of -the  South  to  con- 
sume depends  on  her  great  staples;  and  that  the  sale  of  these 
depends  mainly  on  a  foreign  market. 

"IV.  A  fourth  sentiment  of  the  honorable  member  is,  that  the 
removal  of  all  duties  increases  the  exportation  of  articles  manu- 
factured at  home. 

"V.  Finally,  the  honorable  member  is  of  the  opinion  that  the 
whole  system  of  protection  was  prostrated,  and  is  prostrated,  cut 
up,  root  and  branch,  and  exterminated  forever,  by  the  State  inter- 
position of  South  Carolina."  ^ 

F.  Methods  of  refutation.  Refutation  is  the  destruc- 
tion of  opposing  proofs.  Any  method  by  which  the  proof  of 
an  opponent  may  be  v^^eakened  or  destroyed  is  a  "method  of 
refutation.**  There  are  four  different  sets  of  such  methods  in 
argumentation.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind,  however,  that 
these  are  not  mutually  exclusive  lists.  In  many  points  they 
practically  coincide,  being  simply  different  names  for  the 
same  things,  because  these  things  are  looked  at  from  differ- 

1  The  Works  of  Daniel  Webster,  Vol.  IV,  pp.  528-538. 


356  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

ent  standpoints.  We  have  considered  three  of  these  sets 
under  evidence,  forms  of  argument,  and  fallacies.  The  fourth 
is  "special  rhetorical  devices."  It  is  needless  to  do  more 
than  mention  the  first  three  here. 

1.  Tests  of  evidence.  Showing  that  the  evidence  presented 
by  an  opponent  is  unsound — in  some  way  fails  to  meet  the 
proper  tests  of  such  evidence — is  effective  refutation.  (See 
Chapter  6.) 

2.  Attack  on  the  forms  of  arguments.  Demonstrating  the 
weakness  of  any  argument  by  the  use  of  the  tests  discussed 
in  Chapter  7  is  also  an  excellent  method  of  refuting  an  ad- 
versary. 

3.  Fallacies.  When  we  expose  a  fallacy  in  another's  ar- 
gument we  are  using  a  very  common  and  very  effective 
method  of  refuting  him.     (See  Chapter  8.) 

4.  Special  rhetorical  devices.  The  fourth  list  of  special 
rhetorical  devijces,  not  found  in  any  of  these  other  listsi 
is  usually  given  separately  as  an  enumeration  of  the  methods 
of  refutation.  These  devices  are  (a)  redudio  ad  absurdum, 
(b)  dilemma,  (c)  residues,  and  (d)  turning  the  tables. 

a.  Reductio  ad  absurdum.  One  of  the  most  commonly 
used  methods  of  refutation  is  that  of  reducing  an  argument 
to  an  absurdity,  or,  as  it  is  named,  the  reductio  ad  absurdum. 
The  refuter  adopts  for  the  moment  the  line  of  argument  of 
his  opponent;  then,  by  carrying  it  out  to  its  logical  conclu- 
sion, shows  that  it  results  in  an  absurdity.  For  example, 
"When  a  lawy^er  asserted  in  court  that  a  corporation  can 
make  no  oral  contract  because  it  has  no  tongue,  the  judge 
exposed  the  fallacy  by  saying,  simply,  **Then,  according 
to  your  own  argument,  a  corporation  could  not  make  a  writ- 
ten contract  because  it  has  no  hand.'"  ^ 

Cicero  uses  this  method  in  the  following: — 

"Nor,  if  Publius  Crassus  was  both  an  orator  and  a  lawyer,  is 
the  knowledge  of  the  civil  law  for  that  reason  included  in  the 

1  Foster,  p.  177. 


REFUTATION  367 

power  of  speaking.  For  if  any  man,  who,  while  exceUing  in  any  art 
or  science,  has  acquired  another,  shall  hold  that  his  additional 
knowledge  is  a  part  of  that  in  which  he  previously  excelled,  we  may, 
by  such  a  mode  of  argument,  pretend  that  to  play  well  at  tennis  is 
a  part  of  the  knowledge  of  civil  law,  because  Publius  Mucins  was 
skilled  in  both."  i 

Macaulay  makes  striking  use  of  this  device: — 

*'  Many  politicians  of  our  time  are  in  the  habit  of  laying  it  down 
as  a  self-evident  proposition,  that  no  people  ought  to  be  free  till 
they  are  fit  to  use  their  freedom.  The  maxim  is  worthy  of  the 
fool  in  the  old  story,  who  resolved  not  to  go  into  the  water  until 
he  had  learned  to  swim.  If  men  are  to  wait  for  liberty  until  they 
become  wise  and  good  in  slavery,  they  may  indeed  wait  forever.'*  2 

This  method  is  effective  because  of  its  simplicity  and  di- 
rectness; it  also  has  in  it  an  element  of  ridicule  that  is  per- 
suasive against  an  opponent.  William  Ellery  Channing,  in 
a  reply  to  Henry  Clay  on  the  slavery  question,  used  this 
method  as  follows: — 

"But  this  property,  we  are  told,  is  not  to  be  questioned  on 
account  of  its  long  duration.  *Two  hundred  years  of  legislation 
have  sanctioned  and  sanctified  negro  slaves  as  property.'  Nothing 
but  respect  for  the  speaker  could  repress  criticism  on  this  unhappy 
phraseology.  We  will  trust  it  escaped  him  without  thought.  But 
to  confine  ourselves  to  the  argument  from  duration;  how  obvious 
the  reply!  Is  injustice  changed  into  justice  by  the  practice  of  ages.'* 
Is  my  victim  made  a  righteous  prey  because  I  have  bowed  him 
to  the  earth  till  he  cannot  rise?  For  more  than  two  hundred  years 
heretics  were  burned,  and  not  by  mobs,  not  by  Lynch  law,  but  by 
the  decrees  of  councils,  at  the  instigation  of  theologians,  and  with 
the  sanction  of  the  laws  and  religions  of  nations;  and  was  this  a 
reason  for  keeping  up  the  fires,  that  they  had  burned  two  hundred 
years?  In  the  Eastern  world,  successive  despots,  not  for  two  hun- 
dred years,  but  for  twice  two  thousand,  have  claimed  the  right  of 
life  and  death  over  millions,  and,  with  no  law  but  their  own  will, 

*  Quoted  by  Foster,  p.  177.  ^  Quoted  by  Foster,  p.  178. 


358  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

have  beheaded,  bowstrung*  starved,  tortured  unhappy  men  without 
number  who  have  incurred  their  wrath;  and  does  the  lapse  of  so 
many  centuries  sanctify  murder  and  ferocious  power?  " 

Again: — 

"But  the  great  argument  remains.  It  is  said  that  this  property 
must  not  be  questioned,  because  it  is  estabhshed  by  law.  'That  is 
property  which  the  law  declares  to  he  property.'  ^  Thus  human  law 
is  made  supreme,  decisive,  in  a  question  of  morals.  Thus  the  idea 
of  an  eternal,  immutable  justice  is  set  at  naught.  Thus  the  great 
rule  of  human  life  is  made  to  be  the  ordinance  of  interested  men. 
But  there  is  a  higher  tribunal,  a  throne  of  equal  justice,  immovable 
by  the  conspiracy  of  all  human  legislatures.  *That  is  property 
which  the  law  declares  to  be  property.'  Then  the  laws  have  only 
to  declare  you,  or  me,  or  Mr.  Clay,  to  be  property,  and  we  become 
chattels  and  are  bound  to  bear  the  yoke!  Does  not  even  man's 
moral  nature  repel  this  doctrine  too  intuitively  to  leave  time  or 
need  for  argument?"  ^ 

b.  The  dilemma  is  one  of  the  oldest  of  all  known  rhetorical 
forms.  As  a  method  of  refutation,  it  consists  in  reducing  an 
issue  to  an  alternative,  and  then  showing  that  both  members 
of  the  alternative  are  untenable.  These  two  members  are 
called  the  "horns  of  the  dilemma.*'  The  refuter  says  in  sub- 
stance: "Now,  with  respect  to  this  point  at  issue,  there  are 
two  and  only  two  possibilities,  viz.,  A  and  B.  But  A  is  not 
true,  and  B  is  not  true;  consequently  your  contention  fails." 
In  order  to  make  the  dilemma  conclusive,  obviously  two 
things  are  necessary :  (I)  The  horns  of  the  dilemma  must  in- 
clude all  the  possibilities  in  the  case,  i.  e.,  the  alternative  must 
he  exact.    (II)  Both  memhers  of  the  alternative  must  he  destroyed. 

James  Wilson,  speaking  in  the  convention  for  the  province 
of  Pennsylvania,  in  vindication  of  the  colonies,  January, 
1775,  used  the  dilemma  as  follows: — 

"In  the  first  place,  then,  I  say  that  the  persons  who  allege  that 

1  The  italics  are  by  Mr.  Clay. 

2  The  Works  of  William  E.  Channing,  D.  D.,  Vol.  V,  pp.  48,  49. 


REFUTATION  359 

those  employed  to  alter  the  charter  and  constitution  of  Massachu- 
setts Bay  act  by  virtue  of  a  commission  from  his  majesty  for  that 
purpose,  speak  improperly,  and  contrary  to  the  truth  of  the  case. 
I  say  they  do  not  act  by  virtue  of  such  commission;  I  say  it  is  im- 
possible they  can  act  by  virtue  of  such  a  commission.  What  is 
called  a  commission  either  contains  particular  directions  for  the 
purpose  mentioned,  or  it  contains  no  such  particular  directions.  In 
either  case  can  those,  who  act  for  that  purpose,  act  by  virtue  of  a 
commission?  In  one  case,  what  is  called  a  commission  is  void;  it 
has  no  legal  existence;  it  can  communicate  no  authority.  In  the 
other  case,  it  extends  not  to  the  purpose  mentioned.  The  latter 
point  is  too  plain  to  be  insisted  on:  I  (will)  prove  the  former."  ^ 

Jeremiah  S.  Black,  in  defense  of  the  right  of  trial  by  jury, 
thus  attacked  the  contention  of  his  opponents,  which  was 
that  the  law  of  nations  was  binding  in  the  trial  of  the  cause 
in  question: — 

"Our  friends  on  the  other  side  are  quite  conscious  that  when 
they  deny  the  binding  obligation  of  the  Constitution  they  must  put 
some  other  system  of  law  in  its  place.  Their  brief  gives  us  notice 
that,  while  the  Constitution,  and  the  acts  of  Congress,  and  Magna 
Charta,  and  the  common  law,  and  all  the  rules  of  natural  justice 
shall  remain  under  foot,  they  will  try  American  citizens  according 
to  the  law  of  nations!  But  the  law  of  nations  takes  no  notice  of  the 
subject.  If  that  system  did  contain  a  special  provision  that  a 
government  might  hang  one  of  its  own  citizens  without  a  judge  or 
jury,  it  would  still  be  competent  for  the  American  people  to  say, 
as  they  have  said,  that  no  such  thing  should  ever  be  done  here. 
That  is  my  answer  to  the  law  of  nations."  ^ 

(I)  More  than  two  horns.  Sometimes  the  possibilities 
with  respect  to  the  point  in  issue  cannot  be  reduced  to  two. 
There  may  be  a  choice  offered  of  any  one  of  three  or  more 
possible  conditions,  or  courses  of  action.  In  such  a  case,  to 
state  the  issue  in  the  form  of  a  dilemma,  presenting  a  single 
alternative,  would  not  be  an  exact  disjunction,  and  so  would 

1  Eloquence  of  the  United  States,  Vol.  V,  p.  56.    E.  and  H.  Clark. 

2  Great  Speeches  by  Great  LawyerSt  p.  507. 


360  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

be  fallacious;  to  be  truthful  it  is  always  necessary  to  state 
all  the  possibilities  of  choice,  whatever  their  number.  When 
more  than  two  possibilities  are  to  be  considered,  the  method 
is,  properly  speaking,  not  a  dilemma;  but  the  modus  operandi 
is  similar.  Webster,  in  his  argument  in  the  case  of  the  Prov- 
idence Railroad  Co.  vs.  City  of  Boston,  made  a  division  into 
three  possibilities.  Mr.  Webster  is  here  contending  against 
the  proposition  that  a  certain  street  or  piece  of  land  is  a  pub- 
lic highway: — 

"If  this  street,  or  land,  or  whatever  it  may  be,  has  become  and 
now  is  a  public  highway,  it  must  have  become  so  in  one  of  three 
ways,  and  to  these  points  I  particularly  call  your  honors'  attention. 

"1st.  It  must  either  have  become  a  highway  by  having  been 
regularly  laid  out  according  to  usage  and  law;  or 

"2d.  By  dedication  as  such  by  those  having  the  power  to  dedicate 
it,  and  acceptance  and  adoption  so  far  as  they  are  required;  or 

"3d.  As  a  highway  by  long  user,  without  the  existence  of  proof 
of  any  original  laying  out,  or  dedication. 

"It  is  not  pretended  by  any  one  that  the  land  in  question  is  a 
highway,  upon  the  last  of  these  grounds.  I  shall  therefore  confine 
myself  to  the  consideration  of  the  other  two  questions;  namely, 
'Was  there  ever  a  formal  and  regular  laying  out  of  a  street  here.'^ 
or  was  there  ever  a  regular  and  sufficient  dedication  and  accept- 


(II)  If  the  disjunction  of  the  dilemma  is  faulty  an  opening 
is  left  for  an  opponent  which  may  result  in  great  discomfiture 
to  the  author  of  the  defective  dilemma. 

"Thus  Lincoln,  in  his  speech  on  the  Dred  Scott  Decision, 
refused  to  accept  either  of  the  horns  of  the  dilemma  presented 
by  Douglas.    Lincoln  said  of  Douglas: — 

"He  finds  the  Republicans  insisting  that  the  Declaration  of 
Independence  includes  all  men,  black  as  well  as  white,  and  forthwith 
he  boldly  denies  that  it  includes  negroes  at  all,  and  proceeds  to 
argue  gravely  that  all  who  contend  it  does,  do  so  only  because 

1  Works  of  Daniel  Webster,  Vol.  VI,  p.  186. 


REFUTATION  361 

they  want  to  vote,  to  eat,  and  sleep,  and  marry  with  negroes.  He 
will  have  it  that  they  cannot  be  consistent  else.  Now  I  protest 
against  the  counterfeit  logic  which  concludes  that  because  I  do  not 
want  a  black  woman  for  a  slave,  I  must  necessarily  want  her  for  a 
wife.    I  need  not  have  her  for  either.    I  can  just  leave  her  alone."  ^ 

c.  The  method  of  residues,  like  that  of  the  dilemma,  is 
founded  upon  a  division  of  the  point  in  question  into  parts. 
The  difference  is  that  in  the  dilemma  all  the  parts  are  de- 
stroyed, whereas,  in  the  method  of  residues,  one  of  the  parts 
is  left  standing.  By  the  method  of  residues,  the  matter  in 
dispute  is  divided  into  two  or  more  sections,  which  include 
all  the  possibilities  in  the  case;  then  all  but  one  of  these  are 
demolished,  the  one  left  standing  being  the  aspect  of  the  is- 
sue which  the  refuter  wishes  to  establish.  "There  are," 
says  the  refuter,  "three  possibilities,  A,  B,  and  C.  But  A 
and  B  are  false,  consequently  the  presumption  is  that  C  is 
true.*'  This  method  is  not,  strictly  speaking,  a  method 
of  refuting.  It  is  rather  a  method  of  using  refutation:  the 
ultimate  purpose  of  the  speaker  or  writer  is  not  destructive, 
but  constructive;  he  destroys  some  of  the  parts  into  which 
he  divides  the  question,  in  order  that  he  may  establish  the 
remaining  part.  He  uses  refutation  to  accomplish  his  end; 
but  the  end  itself  is  constructive  proof. 

(I)  Division  must  be  exhaustive.  The  first  requisite  in  us- 
ing the  method  of  residues  is,  that  the  division  of  the  whole  into 
parts  shall  be  exhaustive.  The  strength  of  the  method  de- 
pends entirely  upon  the  assumption,  that  all  the  possibilities 
in  the  case  are  destroyed  save  one.  If,  then,  the  disputant 
omits,  in  his  division,  to  mention  one  of  the  possibilities,  he 
has  proved  nothing,  for  it  still  remains  uncertain  which  pos- 
sibility is  true, — the  one  he  seeks  to  establish  or  the  one  he 
failed  to  mention.  Again,  in  order  to  make  the  work  com- 
plete, it  is  necessary  that  the  residuary  part  be  enforced  by 
positive  demonstration.    The  refuting  of  all  but  one  of  the 

1  Foster,  pp.  182,  183. 


362  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

possibilities,  leaves  a  presumption  that  the  remaining  pos- 
sibility is  true;  but  there  may  well  be  a  suspicion  that  even 
this  last  part  too  is  false,  or  that  there  is  some  fallacy  in  the 
division.  Consequently,  to  be  at  all  convincing  the  residuary 
part  must  be  enforced  by  positive  proof. 

An  excellent  example  of  the  use  of  the  method  of  resi- 
dues, is  that  found  in  Thomas  H.  Huxley's  Lectures 
on  Evolution,  delivered  in  New  York  in  1876.  Professor 
Huxley  was  here  endeavoring  to  establish  the  theory  of  evo- 
lution, as  the  true  theory  respecting  past  history  of  the  uni- 
verse. In  his  first  lecture  he  divided  the  question  into  three 
possible  hypotheses  as  follows: — 

*'So  far  as  I  know,  there  are  only  three  hypotheses  which  ever 
have  been  entertained,  or  which  well  can  be  entertained,  respecting 
the  past  history  of  Nature.  I  will,  in  the  first  place,  state  the 
hypotheses,  and  then  I  will  consider  what  evidence  bearing  upon 
them  is  in  our  possession,  and  by  what  light  of  criticism  that  evi- 
dence is  to  be  interpreted. 

"Upon  the  first  hypothesis,  the  assumption  is,  that  phenomena 
of  Nature  similar  to  those  exliibited  by  the  present  world  have 
always  existed;  in  other  words,  that  the  universe  has  existed  from 
all  eternity  in  what  may  be  broadly  termed  its  present  condition. 

"The  second  hypothesis  is,  that  the  present  state  of  things  has 
had  only  a  limited  duration;  and  that,  at  some  period  in  the  past,  a 
condition  of  the  world,  essentially  similar  to  that  which  we  now 
know,  came  into  existence,  without  any  precedent  condition  from 
which  it  could  have  naturally  proceeded.  The  assumption  that 
successive  states  of  Nature  have  arisen,  each  without  any  relation 
of  natural  causation  to  an  antecedent  state,  is  a  mere  modification 
of  this  second  hypothesis. 

"The  third  hypothesis  also  assumes  that  the  present  state  of 
things  has  had  but  a  limited  duration;  but  it  supposes  that  this 
state  has  been  evolved  by  a  natural  process  from  an  antecedent 
state,  and  that  from  another,  and  so  on;  and,  on  this  hypothesis, 
the  attempt  to  assign  any  limit  to  the  series  of  past  changes  is, 
usually,  given  up.'*  ^ 

*  Popular  Science  Monthly,  Vol.  X,  p.  44. 


REFUTATION  363 

He  then  proceeded,  in  his  series  of  lectures,  to  overthrow 
the  first  two  hypotheses,  leaving  the  third — the  theory  of 
evolution — standing  as  the  residuary  part,  and  finally  he 
supported  this  theory  by  positive  proof  of  its  probability. 

Burke,  in  his  speech  on  Conciliation  with  Americay  used 
the  method  of  residues.    He  began: — 

"Sir,  if  I  were  capable  of  engaging  you  to  an  equal  attention,  I 
would  state,  that  as  far  as  I  am  capable  of  discerning,  there  are 
but  three  ways  of  proceeding  relative  to  this  stubborn  spirit  which 
prevails  in  your  Colonies,  and  disturbs  your  government.  These 
are: — to  change  that  spirit,  as  inconvenient,  by  removing  the 
causes;  to  prosecute  it  as  criminal;  or,  to  comply  with  it  as  neces- 
sary. I  would  not  be  guilty  of  an  imperfect  enumeration;  I  can 
think  of  but  these  three.  Another  has  indeed  been  started,  that  of 
giving  up  the  Colonies;  but  it  met  so  slight  a  reception  that  I  do 
not  think  myself  obliged  to  dwell  a  great  while  upon  it.  It  is  nothing 
but  a  little  sally  of  anger,  like  the  frowardness  of  peevish  children, 
who,  when  they  cannot  get  all  they  would  have,  are  resolved  to 
take  nothing." 

He  then  considered  the  first  two  ways  at  length  and  proved 
them  impracticable,  and  concluded : — 

"If  then  the  removal  of  the  causes  of  this  spirit  of  American 
liberty  be,  for  the  greater  part,  or  rather  entirely  impracticable; 
if  the  ideas  of  criminal  process  be  inapplicable,  or  if  applicable 
are  in  the  highest  degree  inexpedient,  what  way  yet  remains?  No 
way  is  open,  but  the  third  and  last,  to  comply  with  the  American 
spirit  as  necessary;  or,  if  you  please,  to  submit  to  it  as  a  necessary 
evil."   2 

d.  "  Turning  the  tables  "  is  simply  showing  that  some- 
thing presented  by  your  opponent  really  supports  your  case 
and  not  his.  It  is  "stealing  his  thunder."  To  turn  the  argu- 
ment of  an  opponent  against  him  is  not  often  possible.  But 
circumstances  sometimes  give  the  opportunity.  A  piece  of 
1  Cook's  edition,  pp.  30.  31.  « Ibid.,  pp.  38,  39. 


364  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

testimony  may  be  used  by  a  writer,  when  he  has  not  fully 
considered  all  the  interpretations  that  may  be  put  upon  it. 
It  not  infrequently  happens  that  evidence,  or  an  argument,  is 
introduced  to  give  support  to  some  particular  point,  and, 
in  its  bearing  on  that  phase  of  the  question,  the  evidence  may 
be  favorable  to  the  speaker  or  writer  who  introduces  it;  but 
as  the  discussion  proceeds,  it  may  turn  out  that,  with  respect 
to  some  other  phase  of  the  question,  the  evidence  or  the  ar- 
gument may  be  interpreted  in  another  way,  adversely  to  its 
inventor.  The  effect  of  such  an  unexpected  turn  of  affairs 
is  obvious;  the  opponent  is  "hoist  with  his  own  petard." 
The  very  manner  of  introducing  the  proof  adds  to  its  effect- 
iveness. Webster,  in  the  Girard  Will  Case,  used  this  method 
in  attacking  one  of  the  proofs  of  the  defendants : — 

"The  arguments  of  my  learned  friend,  may  it  please  your  honors, 
in  relation  to  the  Jewish  laws  as  tolerated  by  the  statutes,  go  to 
maintain  my  very  proposition;  that  is,  that  no  school  for  the  in- 
struction of  youth  in  any  system  which  is  in  any  way  derogatory  to 
the  Christian  religion,  or  for  the  teaching  of  doctrines  that  are  in 
any  way  contrary  to  the  Christian  religion  is,  or  ever  was,  regarded 
as  a  charity  by  the  courts.  It  is  true  that  the  statutes  of  Toleration 
regarded  a  devise  for  the  maintenance  of  poor  Jewish  children,  to 
give  them  food  and  raiment  and  lodging,  as  a  charity.  But  a  devise 
for  the  teaching  of  the  Jewish  religion  to  poor  children,  that  should 
come  into  the  Court  of  Chancery,  would  not  be  regarded  as  a 
charity,  or  entitled  to  any  peculiar  privileges  from  the  court."  ^ 

Lincoln  "turned  the  tables"  admirably  in  his  speech  at 
Cooper  Union  in  February,  1860. 

"Some  of  you  delight  to  flaunt  in  our  faces  the  warning  against 
sectional  parties  given  by  Washington  in  his  Farewell  Address.  Less 
than  eight  years  before  Washington  gave  that  warning  he  had,  as 
President  of  the  United  States,  approved  and  signed  an  act  of 
Congress  enforcing  the  prohibition  of  slavery  in  the  Northwestern 
Territory,  which  act  embodied  the  policy  of  the  government,  upon 

1  The  Works  of  Daniel  Webster,  Vol.  VI,  p.  166. 


HEFUTATION  365 

that  subject,  up  to  and  at  the  very  moment  he  penned  that  warning; 
and  about  one  year  after  he  penned  it,  he  wrote  Lafayette  that  he 
considered  that  prohibition  a  wise  measure,  expressing  in  the  same 
connection  his  hope  that  we  should  at  some  time  have  a  confederacy 
of  free  states. 

"Bearing  this  in  mind  and  seeing  that  sectionalism  has  since 
arisen  upon  this  same  subject,  is  that  warning  a  weapon  in  your 
hands  against  us  or  in  our  hands  against  you?  Could  Washington 
himself  speak,  would  he  cast  the  blame  of  that  sectionalism  upon 
us  who  sustain  his  policy,  or  upon  you  who  repudiate  it?  We  re- 
spect that  warning  of  Washington  and  we  commend  it  to  you, 
together  with  his  example  pointing  to  the  right  application  of  it."  * 


EXERCISE.    CHAPTER  15 

REFUTATION 

Hand  in  if  possible  three  examples  of  poor  refutation  which 
answers  too  much,  too  little,  or  answers  "straw  men," 
taken  from  current  periodicals,  lectures,  text-books,  etc. 

Hand  in  two  original  examples  of  each  of  the  four  special 
rhetorical  devices  for  refutation. 


Quoted  by  Foster,  p.  189. 


PART  III.    DEBATE 
CHAPTER  16 

THE  NATURl:   OF   DEBATE 

OUTLINE 


A. 

Definition. 

B. 

Relation  to  argumentation. 

C. 

The  work  of  preparation. 

D. 

"Contest  Debates"  and  debates  in  "Real  Lifco'' 

1.  The  immediate  purpose  of  each  type. 

2.  Getting  nearer  to  the  truth. 

3.  Three  types  of  decisions. 

a.  The  juryman's  vote. 

b.  The  legislator's  vote. 

c.  The  critic's  vote. 

4.  Sport  or  game. 

5.  Convictions. 

6.  Preparation  of  contest  debates. 

E. 

The  aflfirmative  case. 

F. 

The  negative  case.    Four  types. 

1.  Pure  refutation. 

2.  Defense  of  present. 

3.  Adjustment. 

4.  Counter  proposition. 

a.  State  clearly. 

b.  Actually  counter. 

G. 

Personal  attitude  and  bearing. 

1.  Personal  tone. 

2.  Self-control. 

3.  Sarcasm  and  ridicule. 

4.  Personal  inconsistency. 

A.  Definition.     In  the  preceding  chapters  the  principles 
that-  have  been  set  forth  apply  equally  to  written  and  to 

367 


368  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

spoken  argumentation.  But  in  that  form  of  discussion  com- 
monly known  as  debate,  which  consists  in  a  direct  oral  ar- 
gumentative contest  between  two  opposing  sides,  on  a  definite 
question,  at  a  definite  time,  some  of  these  principles  must  un- 
dergo slight  adaptations,  and  to  them  must  be  added  other 
new  principles. 

B.  Relation  to  argumentation.  A  good  argumentative 
essayist  is  not  necessarily  a  good  debater,  any  more  than  a 
good  writer  is  necessarily  a  good  speaker.  To  begin  with,  a 
debater  in  addition  to  knowing  the  principles  of  argumenta- 
tion must  know  something  of  the  arts  of  public  speech;  he  may 
not  be  positively  eloquent,  but  he  must  know  how  to  express 
himself  before  an  audience  with  a  reasonable  degree  of  ease 
and  force.  But  public  speaking  is  not  all.  A  man  who  can 
write  and  memorize  and  deliver  a  good  argumentative  address 
is  not  necessarily  a  good  debater.  The  latter  must  have  all 
the  skill  of  the  former,  and  in  addition,  he  mu^t  know  how  to 
conduct  his  case  on  the  platform.  He  must  know  the  **  rules  of 
the  game,"  and  must  be  able  to  meet  the  many  situations 
in  offense  and  defense  as  they  arise  in  the  contest.  In  other 
words,  the  debater,  in  addition  to  being  a  good  speaker,  mus* 
be  something  of  a  general.  In  polemic  w^arfare  there  are  am- 
buscades,  unexpected  reenforcements  for  the  enemy,  and 
critical  situations  of  various  kinds  some  of  which  cannot  be 
foreseen.  To  meet  these  contingencies  and  master  them 
demands  a  clear  head,  quick  judgment,  firm  decision,  and 
a  certain  amount  of  bold  self-confidence.  There  is,  moreover, 
a  strategy  of  debate  which  must  be  learned  by  study  and 
experience.  How  to  open  the  battle,  when  to  use  ligh: 
cavalry  and  when  to  use  artillery,  when  to  attack,  when  to 
give  way,  how  to  plan  an  ambuscade,  how  to  retreat — a 
knowledge  of  these  things  belongs  no  less  to  the  debater 
than  to  the  military  commander. 

C.  The  work  of  preparation  for  debate  is  often  very 
different  in  many  ways  from  that  for  written  argument.  In 
preliminary  reading,  attention  must  be  given  to  matters  that 


THE  NATURE  OF  DEBATE  369 

might  under  other  conditions  safely  be  neglected.  In  selecting 
evidence,  the  choice  must  often  be  determined  by  the  special 
conditions;  evidence  that  is  good  in  an  essay,  is  often  in- 
effective in  spoken  argument.  In  outlining  the  case,  the 
choice  of  the  main  headings  and  the  arrangement  of  the  points 
must  be  planned,  with  regard  to  the  exigencies  and  the 
strategy  of  the  contest.  Then,  also,  'preparation  for  the 
refutation  of  an  opponent's  arguments  must  be  much  more 
thorough.  To  attempt  to  make  fixed  and  inexorable  rules 
for  many  of  these  processes  would  be  a  mistake;  uniformity 
of  method  in  many  phases  of  debating  is  undesirable,  as  well 
as  impossible.  Consequently,  the  principles  in  the  following 
chapters  are  for  the  most  part  general  rather  than  specific. 
Further,  it  should  be  understood  that  debate  is  not  a  form 
of  argumentation  entirely  separate  and  distinct  from  other 
forms.  Every  principle  enunciated  in  the  preceding  chapters, 
on  argumentation  in  general,  has  full  force  in  debate.  The 
suggestions  to  be  given  are  merely  additional. 

D.  "  Contest  debates  "  and  debates  in  "real  life."  ^  Let 
us  understand  perfectly  what  is  meant  by  debating.  Broadly 
speaking,  wherever  in  this  book  we  refer  to  debating,  we 
mean  real  debating — the  actual  discussion  of  actual  problems 
in  real  life.  It  is  as  training  for  this  sort  of  debating  that  a 
course  in  debate  should  be  conducted.  (Indeed,  the  training 
for  the  debates  of  real  life  is  the  ultimate  purpose  of  the  formal 
contest  debate.)  But  before  proceeding  to  a  careful  consid- 
eration of  the  general  principles  of  debating,  which  are  the  same 
in  both  "contest"  and  "real  life"  debates,  let  us  consider 

*  For  full  discussion  of  this  topic  see  as  follows  in  the  Quarterly  Journal 
of  Public  Speaking:  Editorial  "A  disconcerted  editor  and  others,"  by  J.  M. 
O'Neill,  Vol.  I,  No.  1,  p.  79;  "Debating  as  related  to  non-academic  life," 
by  W.  H.  Davis,  Vol.  I,  No.  2,  p.  105;  Editorial  by  J.  M.  O'Neill,  "Able 
non-debaters,"  Vol.  I,  No.  2,  p.  201;  Editorial  by  J.  M.  O'Neill,  "Judges 
again,"  Vol.  I,  No.  3,  p.  305;  "Is  debating  primarily  a  game?"  by  W.  H. 
Davis,  Vol.  II,  No.  2,  p.  171;  Editorial  by  J.  M.  O'Neill,  "Game  or  Counter- 
feit Presentment,"  Vol.  II,  No.  2,  p.  193;  Some  of  the  material  used  in  this 
chapter  was  first  published  in  these  editorials.    J.  M.  O'N. 


370  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

some  of  the  limitations  of  contest  debating.  There  are  cer- 
tain differences  in  attending  circumstances,  between  con- 
tests and  real  life,  which  necessitate  a  different  conception  as 
to  the  immediate  purpose  of  the  contests  and  proper  manner 
of  judging  them. 

1.  The  immediate  purpose  of  each  type.  The  broad  ob- 
jects back  of  contest  debating  are  properly  the  training  and 
valuable  experience  received  by  each  one  participating,  the 
reward  of  merit  to  students  who  excel  in  class  work  and 
trials,  the  setting  of  good  examples  of  debating  before  large 
bodies  of  students,  etc.  But  the  immediate  purpose  of  the 
debaters  in  any  given  contest  is,  and  should  be,  to  demon- 
strate their  superior  ability  (in  debate)  over  their  opponents. 
Keeping  this  truth  in  mind  will  help  to  clear  up  many  dif- 
ficulties and  misconceptions  in  regard  to  contest  debating. 

The  immediate  purpose  of  any  debate  in  real  life,  on  the 
other  hand,  is  to  bring  about  the  right  settlement  of  the  ques- 
tion.   The  judges  should  be  concerned  with  nothing  else. 

The  decision  in  "real  life'*  should  be  on  "the  case"  not 
on  the  abihty  of  the  debaters  concerned.  In  contest  debating 
such  a  purpose  is  obviously  not  aimed  at,  and  therefore  a 
decision  on  "the  case"  is  highly  undesirable.  Here  the  deci- 
sion should  always  be  on  the  comparative  ability  of  the  debaters 
on  the  opposing  teams.  .  This  statement  does  not  mean  that 
in  regard  to  the  principles  of  argumentation  already  discussed 
(or  the  additional  principles  of  debating  presented  in  this 
section),  there  is  any  fundamental  difference  in  real  life  and 
in  contest  debates.  But  in  one  situation  debating  is  to  be 
judged,  in  the  other  the  question  is  to  be  settled.  The  same 
rules  and  principles  apply  to  the  debating  in  both  situations. 
As  far  as  the  debaters  and  audience  are  concerned  the  con- 
test should  he  conducted  exactly  as  though  the  audience  were 
to  settle  the  question.  But  the  judges  should  award  the  debate 
to  the  team  that  has  done  the  work  better — to  the  better 
debaters — not  to  the  team  they  agree  with  as  to  the  merits 
of  the  case. 


THE  NATURE  OF  DEBATE  371 

2.  "  Getting  nearer  to  the  truth  "poor  basis  for  contest 
decision.  A  decision  for  an  affirmative  team  should  not 
mean  that  the  affirmative  team  "got  nearer  to  the  truth"  as 
it  is  sometimes  put.  It  should  mean  that  the  affirmative  team 
is  on  the  whole  composed  of  better  debaters  than  the  negative 
team.  The  trouble  with  the  other  basis  for  decisions  is  that 
before  the  judges  can  determine  which  side  is  right — which 
side  gets  nearer  the  truth — they  must  necessarily  determine 
what  is  right — what  the  truth  is.  Of  course  the  truth  to  any 
judge  is  the  side  of  the  question  that  he  happens  to  believe 
in.  Surely,  then,  a  team  that  argues  directly  away  from  the 
truth  has  no  chance  against  a  team  that  argues  for  the  truth, 
no  matter  how  feebly.  So  the  result,  in  any  case  so  judged, 
must  be  that  each  judge  will  vote  for  the  team  that  upholds 
the  side  of  the  question  that  he  happens  to  favor.  Then  the 
decision  records  simply  the  private  opinions  of  the  judges  on 
the  question  discussed.  Anyone  interested  in  these  opinions 
could  probably  get  them  by  mail  at  a  great  saving  of  time  and 
money.  It  is  neither  right  nor  complimentary  to  the  judges 
to  expect  them  to  have  no  opinions  on  the  questions  debated, 
or  to  expect  the  debaters  under  the  limitations  of  a  contest 
debate  to  change  the  opinions  of  the  judges.  The  proper 
question  to  be  answered  by  the  award  is,  "Which  institution 
has  the  better  debating  team?"  Each  judge  should  know 
enough  about  debating  (regardless  of  his  knowledge  or  opin- 
ions in  economics,  politics,  theology,  etc.)  to  give  an  expert 
opinion  on  the  comparative  ability  of  the  opposing  teams, 
entirely  aside  from  his  private  opinion  on  the  question  de- 
bated, either  before  or  after  the  deabte.  Of  course,  judges 
should  be  chosen  who  know  enough  about  real  debating  to 
know  that  skill  does  not  consist  in  glibness  of  tongue,  trickery 
of  phraseology,  nor  superficiality  of  thought. 

3.  Three  t3rpes  of  decisions.  What  are  the  possible 
types  of  decisions?  There  are  three.  A  judge  may  conceiv- 
ably vote  in  any  one  of  three  different  ways.  He  may  give 
a  "juryman's  vote,"  a  "legislator's  vote,"  or  a  "critic's  vote." 


372  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

a.  The  juryman's  vote.  A  juryman  is  supposed  to  exclude 
from  his  consideration  all  except  the  evidence  duly  admitted 
in  a  given  trial,  and  to  vote  on  that  regardless  of  his  preju- 
dices, convictions,  evidence  privately  gained,  or  real  feeling 
as  to  right  or  wrong.  His  question  is  not  "Is  this  defendant 
really  guilty?'*  but  "Is  this  defendant  guilty  according  to 
the  law  and  evidence  advanced  here  in  this  trial?"  Is  this 
the  type  of  vote  we  want  from  a  judge  in  an  intercollegiate 
debate?  Decidedly  not.  First,  the  side  having  the  burden 
of  proof  would  be  almost  sure  to  lose,  simply  because  the  time 
allowed  is  too  short  to  prove  the  cases  undertaken  by  the  af- 
firmatives in  intercollegiate  debate.  There  is  time  enough 
for  a  good  discussion,  time  enough  for  some  fine  training  and 
experience,  time  enough  for  a  keen  game,  but  not  to  prove 
the  case  to  jurymen  who  exclude  all  but  the  evidence  of- 
fered on  that  occasion.  Second,  it  is  bad  to  aim  at  this  type 
of  decision,  because  it  is  practically  impossible  to  get  this  atti- 
tude of  mind  on  the  part  of  the  judges.  Even  if  men  do  some- 
times perform  this  feat  in  the  courtroom  (when  aided  by  the 
rigidity  of  procedure,  the  rulings  of  the  judge,  the  oaths,  and 
the  immediate,  recognized,  important  results  of  their  deci- 
sions) it  is  absurd  to  expect  it  in  intercollegiate  debate.  So 
the  decision  will  be  simply  the  juryman's  opinion  of  the 
merits  of  the  question,  his  old  opinions,  perhaps  strengthened 
or  weakened  but  essentially  unchanged  by  the  debate.  So 
his  decision  means  nothing  as  far  as  the  given  contest  is 
concerned.  The  result  is  usually  the  same  actually  as  that 
discussed  next — the  legislator's  vote. 

b.  The  legislator's  vote  is  supposed  to  be  strictly  on  the 
merits  of  the  question  (as  seen  by  himself  or  by  a  constituency 
which  has  instructed  him,  usually  the  former).  He  is  not 
confined  to  the  evidence  offered  in  a  given  debate  in  the 
house,  but  relies  on  all  the  information  that  he  has.  He 
thinks  (or  is  supposed  to  think)  of  what  he  has  read,  what 
he  has  experienced,  what  he  has  heard  elsewhere,  and  "all 
things  considered"  he  votes  as  he  believes  on  the  question. 


THE  NATURE  OF  DEBATE  373 

It  is  neither  the  case  made  out  by  one  side,  nor  the  skill  ol 
the  debaters  in  the  discussion  that  determines  his  vote. 
He  believes  so  and  so,  and  votes  accordingly.  It  is  self- 
evident  that  such  a  registering  of  the  judge's  private  behefs 
on  the  question  is  of  no  use  in  intercollegiate  debate.  It 
has  nothing  to  do  with  the  work  of  the  teams,  and  is  usually 
unrelated  to  what  was  done  in  the  debate,  because  of  the 
impossibility  of  actually  reversing  a  judge's  opinion  on  a  big 
question  in  the  time  allowed. 

c.  The  critic's  vote.  The  other  possibility  (as  far  as  we 
know  the  only  other  one)  is  a  critic's  vote,  or  expert's  vote, 
giving  expert  opinion  as  to  the  comparative  excellence  of  the 
debating  done.  Such  a  judge  knowing  well  all  the  limita- 
tions of  formal  contest  debating  says  when  the  contest  is 
over  which  side  has  the  better  team.  This  type  of  decision 
is  the  only  correct  one.  It  is  the  only  one  that  can  be  won 
or  lost  by  the  debaters.  Political  creeds,  social  philosophies, 
have  nothing  to  do  with  it.  The  team  doing  the  best  work 
not  the  team  lucky  enough  to  fit  in  with  the  beliefs  of  the 
judges,  gets  the  prize.  Such  decisions  encourage  good 
genuine  discussions,  and  discourage  jockeying  for  judges  and 
aiming  cases  at  the  known  predilections  of  the  members  of 
the  board.  Of  course,  such  critics'  decisions  should  when- 
ever possible  be  given  by  experts  in  debating.  No  one  should 
be  called  on  to  judge  a  debate  who  is  unfamiliar  with  the 
nature  of  such  contests.  Judges  should  be  chosen  as  care- 
fully as  referees  and  umpires,  and  on  same  general  grounds. 
Of  course,  decisions  should  always  be  rendered  by  ballot 
without  consultation.  The  debating  should  all  be  done  by 
the  team.  The  judges  should  judge  without  discussions. 
(See  Appendix  C  for  sample  ballot  with  instructions  to 
judges.) 

4.  Sport  or  game.  The  custom  has  grown  in  recent 
years  of  referring  to  contest  debating  as  a  sport  or  a  game} 
This  seems  to  us  a  proper  thing  because  essentially  true. 
^  See  footnote  at  beginning  of  this  chapter. 


374  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

This  conception  helps  us  to  keep  the  right  attitude  toward  it, 
helps  judges  to  decide  on  proper  grounds,  and  frees  us  from 
much  cant  and  hypocrisy. 

5.  Convictions  of  the  debaters.  Another  point  on  which 
there  has  been  some  confusion  has  been  the  question  of  the 
convictions  of  debaters.  There  has  been  of  late  years  much 
careless  talking  on  this  point  by  people  who  have  not  under- 
stood the  conditions  governing  intercollegiate  debates.  They 
fail  to  realize  that  the  purpose  of  these  contests  is  to  afford 
opportunity  for  keen  competition  and  training  for  the  discus- 
sions of  real  life.  The  fear  that  a  young  man  is  morally  in- 
jured by  debating  on  the  side  of  the  question  which  does  not 
coincide  with  his  convictions  has  very  little  basis. 

It  is  not  the  proper  business  of  the  colleges  to  turn  out 
"young  men  with  ardent  convictions  on  the  side  of  the  right," 
so  far  as  the  particular  kind  of  questions  usually  used  in  in- 
tercollegiate debates  is  concerned.  ^Vhich  is  the  "side  of  the 
right"  in  the  armament  question?  the  tariff  question.'^  the 
recall  of  judicial  decisions?  the  ship-subsidy  question?  gov- 
ernment ownership  of  railroads?  Those  who  have  college 
debating  in  charge  in  the  class  room  or  as  an  extra-curricular 
activity  should  not  be,  professionally,  advocates  of  either 
side.  Sir  Roger's  judicial  attitude  is  altogether  better.  It 
is  our  business  rather  to  see  that  that  which  "might  be 
said  on  both  sides,"  be  it  little  or  much,  is  discovered, 
analyzed,  organized,  and  presented  clearly,  honestly,  intel- 
ligently. 

It  certainly  is  the  duty  of  the  colleges  to  turn  out  "young 
men  who  can  make  a  good  argument"  on  either  side  of  such 
questions  without  regard  to  their  convictions.  T\Tiether  a 
man  will  argue  against  his  convictions  in  actual  life,  where 
the  "merits  of  the  question"  are  really  to  be  decided,  is  a 
very  different  thing.  Surely  he  must  be  mentally  capable  of 
doing  it.  To  be  able  to  argue  well  on  one  side  of  these  eco- 
nomic and  political  questions,  a  man  must  be  capable  of  ar- 
guing on  the  other  side.    Argument  that  is  worth  while  has  an 


THE  NATURE  OF  DEBATE  375 

intellectual  basis.  It  is  built  upon  facts  and  intelligent 
inferences  rather  than  on  ardent  convictions.  Skill  in  the 
use  of  the  facts  and  inferences  available  may  be  gained  on 
either  side  of  a  question  without  regard  to  convictions.  In- 
struction and  practice  in  debate  should  give  young  men  this 
skill.  And  where  these  matters  are  properly  handled,  stress 
is  not  laid  on  getting  the  speaker  to  think  rightly  in  regard 
to  the  merits  of  either  side  of  these  questions — but  to  think. 
accurately  on  both  sides.  Stress  is  laid  on  getting  the  student 
to  investigate  thoroughly  (which  includes  impartially),  to 
choose  evidence  wisely,  to  organize  his  case  logically,  and  to 
discuss  it  intelligently.,  While  students  are  studying  and 
practicing  for  the  purpose  of  gaining  facility  in  these  things, 
the  less  attention  paid  to  ardent  convictions  the  better. 
Requiring  a  student  to  present  the  best  possible  case  for  the 
side  of  a  political  or  economic  question  in  which  he  thinks  he 
doesn't  believe  is  to  be  highly  recommended  as  an  educative 
process.  If  only  all  our  lawmakers  could  be  compelled  to 
undergo  severe  training  in  just  this  exercise  how  much 
easier  it  would  be  for  them  to  distinguish  facts  from  preju- 
dices, and  to  learn  to  draw  intelligent  inferences  from  the 
former  and  to  disregard  the  latter.  This  is  "vocational 
training  for  conscienceless  politics"  in  the  same  way  that 
studying  pharmacy  prepares  students  to  become  poisoners, 
that  athletics  prepares  for  all  sorts  of  physical  violence, 
and  that  medical  colleges  prepare  for  quackery  and  mal- 
practice. 

Of  course  we  grant  that  the  debater  who  can  add  to  the 
intellectual  preparation  mentioned  above,  real  conviction 
and  emotional  enthusiasm  will  have  a  better  chance  to  show 
his  powers  on  the  platform.  We  like  him  to  have,  whenever 
possible  (and  appropriate),  that  true  eloquence  which  Web- 
ster says  labor  and  learning  toil  for  in  vain.  So  in  making 
up  contest  teams  in  debate  the  convictions  of  the  debaters, 
when  they  have  convictions,  are  probably  always  considered 
— ^not,  however,  for  the  purpose  of  safe-guarding  morals. 


376  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

Since  the  triangular  system  (allowing  each  college  to  have  a 
team  on  each  side)  is  almost  universal  now,  it  probably  very 
rarely  happens  that  a  student  who  has  ardent  convictions 
talks  against  them  in  an  intercollegiate  contest.  But  it 
would  not  undermine  his  moral  character  if  he  did. 

6.  The  preparation  of  contest  debates  should  be  thorough. 
Debaters  who  rely  on  ghb  talking  to  the  exclusion  of  thor- 
ough knowledge  will  be  defeated  in  well-judged  contests. 
Debaters  should  know  and  follow  the  principles  of  argumen- 
tation. Intelligent  and  effective  debating  follows  them  every- 
where. The  only  coaching  allowed  should  be  done  by  well- 
trained  teachers  of  argumentation  and  debate,  and  should 
be  confined  to  criticism  and  suggestion — never  going  to  ac- 
tual work  in  getting  up  the  debate.  Students  who  do  not 
know  already  how  to  prepare  a  debate — who  are  not  ac- 
quainted with  principles  and  conventions  of  argumentation 
and  debate  should  not  be  on  debating  teams.  Supervision 
and  criticism  by  regular  teachers  ought  to  be  good.  Special 
coaching  by  men  hired  for  that  purpose  is  usually  bad.  It 
is  well  to  have  debates  arranged  in  triangular  leagues  so 
that  each  institution  will  have  one  team  on  each  side  of  the 
question.  Then  practice  debates — full  debates — can  be  had 
frequently.  This  is  the  best  possible  preparation  for  the  plat- 
form. Speeches  should  not  be  written  at  all  under  these  cir- 
cumstances. The  debaters  should  use  an  outline  only,  which 
will  grow  and  change  as  the  case  develops.  Debaters  so  pre- 
pared will  be  at  home  on  the  platform  in  the  debate  and 
audiences  will  be  spared  that  almost  universally  stupid  pro- 
duction— a  memorized  speech  in  a  debate. 

E.  The  affirmative  case.  The  work  of  the  affirmative 
in  a  debate  differs  somewhat  from  that  of  the  negative.  The 
affirmative  has  the  burden  of  proof  in  all  properly  worded 
questions.  The  affirmative  case  then  must  establish  the 
affirmative  of  all  issues — all  potential  issues  not  admitted 
by  the  negative.  The  question  should  be  analyzed  to  find  the 
issues  (see  chapter  4).     Then  a  partition  should  be  decided 


THE  NATURE  OF  DEBATE  377 

upon  that  will  back  up  the  affirmative  of  all  issues  on  which 
there  is  a  fight. 

F.  The  negative  case.  Four  types.  The  negative,  on 
other  hand,  has  a  somewhat  different  problem.  Sometime, 
somehow,  the  negative  must  block  at  least  one  issue.  This  is 
essential  for  any  negative  case.  But  as  it  is  difficult  to  tell 
just  how  effectively  (in  the  opinion  of  others)  one  has  suc- 
ceeded in  blocking  any  given  issue,  the  negative  usually  wants 
to  put  up  as  strong  a  case  as  the  circumstances  will  allow — not 
as  weak  a  case  as  will  actually  block  the  affirmative.  The 
negative  usually  fights  on  each  possible  issue  that  allows  a 
good  chance  of  opposition.  This  gives  an  impression  of 
greater  strength  in  the  negative  case  as  a  whole.  Viewed 
from  this  standpoint  there  are  four  types  of  negative  cases 
possible. 

1.  Pure  refutation.  The  first,  and  weakest,  negative  is 
a  case  of  pure  refutation.  The  negative  simply  attacks  what 
the  affirmative  offers  and  seeks  to  destroy  it  without  taking 
any  responsibility  for  "  the  situation."  It  in  effect  says  to  the 
affirmative,  "You  are  wrong,  that's  all.  We  are  not  saying 
what  is  right,  but  your  proposition  is  no  good."  It  is  simple 
denial.  It  is  simply  resting  on  their  presumption  and  trying 
by  pure  refutation  to  prevent  the  affirmative  from  establish- 
ing a  prima  facie  case.  Such  case,  is,  of  course,  only  permis- 
sible when  it  can  be  made  out  beyond  any  question.  Where 
it  is  possible  to  show  the  affirmative  is  hopelessly  wrong  that 
may  be  all  that  is  necessary  for  the  time  being.  This  type 
should  never  be  used  when  there  is  any  good  or  truth  at  all 
in  the  affirmative  contentions.  It  is  practically  never  found 
in  contest  debating. 

2.  Defense  of  the  present.  The  second  type  of  negative  is 
a  positive  "defense  of  the  present"  (in  addition  to  refutation 
of  course).  The  affirmative  is  wrong  because  no  change  is 
needed  at  all.  There  is  nothing  wrong  in  the  present  situa-* 
tion.  No  crime  has  been  committed.  There  is  no  graft,  no 
inefficiency.    "Whatever  is  is  right."    This  is  Httle  better 


378  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

than  pure  refutation  of  the  affirmative,  but  does  have  the 
added  element  of  actually  defending  the  negative  presump- 
tions.   This  might  be  called  a  "stand  pat"  case. 

3.  Adjustment.  The  third  case  is  one  of  adjustment, 
repairs,  some  changes,  but  not  an  adoption  of  the  affirmative 
case.  It  is  a  liberal  view  of  the  situation,  ready  to  make  what 
changes  are  necessary.  Admitting  the  present  is  not  perfect, 
but  still  denying  that  the  affirmative  is  right,  it  substantially 
defends  the  present.  This  is  a  very  common  type  of  nega- 
tive in  contest  debating  and  everywhere  else.  This  case  is 
also  cumulative,  adding  "repairs"  to  "defense"  and  "ref- 
utation." 

4.  Counter  proposition.  The  most  radical  case  possible 
for  a  negative  is  that  of  a  counter  proposition.  This  is  ad- 
mitting that  there  is  a  situation  which  demands  remedy, 
admitting  a  cause  for  action,  but  advocating  a  different 
remedy.  The  counter  proposition  is  the  most  daring  and 
radical  case.  There  are  two  principles  that  must  always  be 
lived  up  to  in  this  case:  (a)  The  counter  proposition  must  be 
stated  unth  perfect  clearness.  The  negative  has  to  take  the 
burden  of  proof  on  this  proposition,  and  for  safety  and  clear- 
ness the  proposition  must  be  carefully  worded  and  stated. 
(b)  A  counter  proposition  must  be  counter.  It  must  be  in- 
consistent with  the  proposition  of  the  affirmative.  If  the 
affirmative  can  say,  "We  have  no  objection  to  the  theory 
proposed  by  the  negative,  but  it  does  not  answer  our  case," 
then  the  counter  proposition  is  useless.  It  must,  in  order  to 
be  any  good,  be  antagonistic  to  that  which  the  affirmative 
case  is  advocating.  It  is  an  "affirmative  defense"  in  legal 
phrase,  and  must  effectively  negative  the  affirmative,  as  the 
"affirmative  defense"  of  insanity  is  a  complete  negative  in 
a  murder  trial.  Here  the  defense  takes  the  burden  of  proof 
and  has  to  prove  insanity,  while  the  prosecution  takes  the 
Viewpoint  of  the  presumption  of  sanity,  and  becomes  for  the 
time  a  negative.  This  situation  must  be  paralleled  in  general 
argumentation  when  we  are  using  a  counter  proposition. 


THE  NATURE  OF  DEBATE  379 

It  is  the  duty  of  the  negative  to  clash  with  the  affirmative, 
therefore  if  the  counter  proposition  is  such  that  the  affirma- 
tive can  accept  it  the  negative  is  responsible  for  the  failure 
to  meet.  It  is  not  enough  that  the  counter  proposition  be 
different;  it  must  be  vitally  inconsistent  with  the  affirmative 
plan. 

G.  Personal  attitude  and  bearing.  Personality  counts 
for  a  great  deal  in  debate,  and  problems  in  personal  bearing 
and  personal  attitude  suggest  themselves  generally  through- 
out the  whole  course  of  the  debate.  It  is  deemed  well,  there- 
fore, to  present  here,  before  taking  up  the  different  parts  of 
the  debate,  certain  considerations  and  illustrations  of  personal 
attitude  and  bearing  in  debate. 

1.  The  personal  tone  to  be  cultivated  in  debate  is  a  serious 
matter,  and  a  matter  concerning  which  many  flagrant  mis- 
takes are  made.  The  personal  element  in  debate  is  large. 
There  the  speaker  usually  stands  as  the  immediate  sponsor 
for  all  that  he  says  and  does;  he  is  an  advocate,  personally 
responsible  for  every  opinion  he  advances:  the  man  and  the 
cause  are  inextricably  bound  together.  This  condition  of 
affairs  has  two  results;  the  first  is,  that  the  audience  will  be 
greatly  influenced  by  the  personality  of  the  speaker;  the 
second,  that  there  is  a  temptation  to  attack  an  opponent  for 
his  personality  as  well  as  for  the  principles  he  advocates. 
The  two  main  purposes  of  a  debater  are  to  win  sympathy  for 
himseff  and  his  cause  and  to  discountenance  his  opponent 
and  the  opposing  cause.  But  unfortunately  these  two  pur- 
poses may  conflict  with  each  other.  Sarcasm,  ridicule,  and 
even  personalities  are  undoubtedly  admissible  and  helpful, 
under  certain  circumstances  and  when  properly  handled,  in 
discrediting  an  opponent;  but  inappropriately  introduced  or 
improperly  handled,  they  are  as  harmful  in  discrediting  the 
man  who  uses  them.  These  are  dangerous  weapons,  treach- 
erously two-edged  *.  a  blow  well  directed  will  cut  and  maim  an 
enemy,  but  a  slip  or  a  blunder  will  surely  turn  the  blow  against 
its  author.    With  respect  to  personalities,  i.  e.,  attacks  on  the 


380  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

character  or  actions  of  a  man,  Shakespeare  offers  a  good 

motto : — 

".  .  .  .     Beware 
Of  entrance  to  a  quarrel;  but,  being  in, 
Bear't  that  the  opposed  may  beware  of  thee." 

An  audience  always  sympathizes  with  the  man  who  sticks  to 
the  question  and  treats  his  "friends  of  the  other  side"  with' 
courtesy  and  good  humor;  if  a  case  cannot  be  won  on  its 
merits,  rarely  can  it  be  won  by  resort  to  personalities.  On 
the  other  hand,  an  audience  invariably  respects  a  man  who 
can  defend  himself,  and  who  has  in  him  the  spirit  of  fight 
that  resents  a  foul  blow.  A  debater  must  never  give  ground, 
even  if  his  opponent  resorts  to  weapons  that  he  himself  scorns 
to  use.  In  repelling  such  a  personal  attack  there  is  one  tempt- 
ation,— the  temptation  to  answer  abuse  with  abuse.  The 
man  who  has  the  quarrel  forced  on  him  has  the  sympathy  of 
the  audience  at  the  start,  and,  if  he  is  wise,  he  will  take  care 
to  retain  that  sympathy  by  keeping  his  dignity  and  self- 
control.  If  he  descends  to  the  level  chosen  by  his  assailant, 
and  combats  poison  with  poison,  he  has  thrown  away  his 
advantage  and  must  fight  on  even  terms.  A  model  of  per- 
sonal tone  may  be  found  in  Lincoln's  conduct  of  his  debate 
with  Douglas.  Fully  to  appreciate  his  good-humored  self- 
control  and  his  simple,  but  resolute,  dignity,  requires  the 
reading  of  the  speeches  of  Senator  Douglas,  filled  as  they  are 
with  misrepresentation  and  personal  abuse.  In  his  speech  at 
Springfield,  July  17,  Mr.  Lincoln  said: — 

"Having  made  that  speech  with  the  most  kindly  feeling  toward 
Judge  Douglas,  as  manifested  therein,  I  was  gratified  when  I  found 
that  he  had  carefully  examined  it  and  had  detected  no  error  of 
fact,  nor  any  inference  against  him,  nor  any  misrepresentations,  of 
which  he  thought  fit  to  complain.  In  neither  of  the  two  speeches 
I  have  mentioned  did  he  make  any  such  complaint.  I  will  thank 
any  one  who  will  inform  me  that  he,  in  his  speech  to-day,  pointed 
out  anything  I  had  stated,  respecting  him,  as  being  erroneous.    I 


THE  NATURE  OF  DEBATE  381 

presume  there  is  no  such  thing.  I  have  reason  to  be  gratified  that 
the  care  and  caution  used  in  that  speech  left  it  so  that  he,  most  of 
all  others  interested  in  discovering  error,  has  not  been  able  to  point 
out  one  thing  against  him  which  he  could  say  was  wrong.  He  seizes 
upon  the  doctrines  he  supposes  to  be  included  in  that  speech,  and 
declares  that  upon  them  will  turn  the  issue  of  this  campaign.  He 
then  quotes,  or  attempts  to  quote,  from  my  speech.  I  will  not  say 
that  he  wilfully  misquotes,  but  he  does  fail  to  quote  accurately.  His 
attempt  at  quoting  is  from  a  passage  which  I  believe  I  can  quote 
accurately  from  memory.  I  shall  make  the  quotation  now,  with 
some  comments  upon  it,  as  I  have  already  said,  in  order  that  the 
judge  shall  be  left  entirely  without  excuse  for  misrepresenting  me. 
I  do  so  now,  as  I  hope,  for  the  last  time.  I  do  this  in  great  caution, 
in  order  that  if  he  repeats  his  misrepresentations,  it  shall  be  plain 
to  all  that  he  does  so  wilfully.  If,  after  all,  he  still  persists,  I  shall 
be  compelled  to  reconstruct  the  course  I  have  marked  out  for  myself, 
and  draw  upon  such  humble  resources  as  I  have  for  a  new  course, 
better  suited  to  the  real  exigencies  of  the  case.  I  set  out,  in  this 
campaign,  with  the  intention  of  conducting  it  strictly  as  a  gentle- 
man, in  substance  at  least,  if  not  in  the  outside  polish.  The  latter 
I  shall  never  be,  but  that  which  constitutes  the  inside  of  a  gentle- 
man I  hope  I  understand,  and  am  not  less  inclined  to  practise  than 
others.  It  was  my  purpose  and  expectation  that  this  canvass  would 
be  conducted  upon  principle,  and  with  fairness  upon  both  sides, 
and  it  shall  not  be  my  fault  if  this  purpose  and  expectation  shall 
be  given  up.  ^ 

Later,  in  his  opening  speech  in  the  sixth  joint  debate,  at 
Quincy,  October  13,  he  said: — 

"He  reminds  me  of  the  fact  that  he  entered  upon  this  canvass 
with  the  purpose  to  treat  me  courteously;  that  touched  me  some- 
what. It  sets  me  thinking.  I  was  aware,  when  it  was  first  agreed 
that  Judge  Douglas  and  I  were  to  have  these  seven  joint  discus- 
sions, that  they  were  the  successive  acts  of  a  drama — perhaps  I 
should  say,  to  be  enacted  not  merely  in  the  face  of  audiences  like 
this,  but  in  the  face  of  the  nation,  and  to  some  extent  by  my  relation 
to  him,  and  not  from  anything  in  myself,  in  the  face  of  the  world; 

*  Lincoln-Douglas  Debates^  p.  58. 


382  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

and  I  am  anxious  that  they  should  be  conducted  with  dignity  anA 
in  the  good  temper  which  should  be  befitting  the  vast  audience 
before  which  it  was  conducted.  But  when  Judge  Douglas  got  home 
from  Washington  and  made  his  first  speech  in  Chicago,  the  evening 
afterward  I  made  some  sort  of  reply  to  it.  His  second  speech  was 
made  at  Bloomington,  in  which  he  commented  upon  my  speech 
at  Chicago,  and  said  that  I  had  used  language  ingeniously  contrived 
to  conceal  my  intentions,  or  words  to  that  effect.  Now,  I  under- 
stand that  this  is  an  imputation  upon  my  veracity  and  candor. 
I  do  not  know  what  the  Judge  understood  by  it;  but  in  our  first 
discussion  at  Ottawa  he  led  off  by  charging  a  bargain,  somewhat 
corrupt  in  character,  upon  Trumbull  and  myself — that  we  had  en- 
tered into  a  bargain,  one  of  the  terms  of  which  was  that  Trumbull 
was  to  abolitionize  the  old  Democratic  party,  and  I  (Lincoln)  was 
to  abolitionize  the  old  Whig  party — I  pretending  to  be  as  good  an 
old-line  Wliig  as  ever.  Judge  Douglas  may  not  understand  that 
he  implicated  my  truthfulness  and  my  honor  when  he  said  I  was 
doing  one  thing  and  pretending  another;  and  I  misunderstood  him 
if  he  thought  he  was  treating  me  in  a  dignified  way,  as  a  man  of 
honor  and  truth,  as  he  now  claims  he  was  disposed  to  treat  me. 
Even  after  that  time,  at  Galesburgh,  when  he  brings  forward  an 
extract  from  a  speech  made  at  Charleston,  to  prove  that  I  was  trying 
to  play  a  double  part — that  I  was  trying  to  cheat  the  public,  and 
get  votes  upon  one  set  of  principles  at  one  place  and  upon  another 
set  of  principles  at  another  place — I  do  not  understand  but  that  he 
impeached  my  honor,  my  veracity,  and  my  candor,  and  because  he 
does  this,  I  do  not  understand  that  I  am  bound,  if  I  see  a  truthful 
ground  for  it,  to  keep  my  hands  off  him.  As  soon  as  I  learned  that 
Judge  Douglas  was  disposed  to  treat  me  in  this  way,  I  signified  in 
one  of  my  speeches  that  I  should  be  driven  to  draw  upon  whatever 
of  humble  resources  I  might  have  to  adopt  a  new  course  with  him. 
I  was  not  entirely  sure  that  I  should  be  able  to  hold  my  own  with 
him,  but  I  at  least  had  the  purpose  made  to  do  as  well  as  I  could 
upon  him;  and  now  I  say  that  I  will  not  be  the  first  to  cry  'hold.' 
I  think  it  originated  with  the  Judge,  and  when  he  quits,  I  probably 
will.  But  I  shall  not  ask  any  favors  at  all.  He  asks  me,  or  rather 
he  asks  the  audience,  if  I  wish  to  push  this  matter  to  the  point  of 
personal  difficulty.  I  tell  him,  no.  He  did  not  make  a  mistake  in 
one  of  his  early  speeches,  when  he  called  me  an  'amiable'  man, 


TEE  NATURE  OF  DEBATE  383 

though  perhaps  he  did  when  lie  called  me  an  'intelligent'  man.  It 
really  hurts  me  very  much  to  suppose  that  I  have  wronged  anybody 
on  earth.  I  again  tell  him,  no!  I  very  much  prefer,  when  this  can- 
vass shall  be  over,  however  it  may  result,  that  we  at  least  part  with- 
out any  bitter  recollections  of  personal  difficulties. 

"The  Judge,  in  his  concluding  speech  at  Galesburg,  says  that 
I  was  pushing  this  matter  to  a  personal  difficulty,  to  avoid  the 
responsibility  for  the  enormity  of  my  principles.  I  say  to  the  Judge 
and  this  audience  now,  that  I  will  again  state  our  principles  as  well 
as  I  hastily  can  in  all  their  enormity,  and  if  the  Judge  hereafter 
chooses  to  confine  himself  to  a  war  upon  these  principles,  he  will 
probably  not  find  me  departing  from  the  same  course."  ^ 

With  these  models  of  personal  dignity  contrast  the  follow- 
ing extract  from  the  speech  by  Senator  Pettit  in  the  debate  in 
the  Senate  on  the  Fugitive  Slave  Law,  June  26,  1854 : — 

"Now,  sir,  to  give  this  clause  of  the  Declaration  of  Independence 
any  other  construction  than  that  which  I  have  given  it,  is  an  evi- 
dent, a  self-evident,  a  palpable  lie.  What  is  the  language?  That 
*all  men  are  created  equal.'  Are  they  created  equally  tall,  equally 
broad,  equally  long,  equally  short?  Are  they  created  politically 
equal?  Are  they  created  physically  equal?  Are  they  created  men- 
tally equal?  Are  they  created  morally  equal?  ...  I  ask  the  chair, 
then,  whether  the  Senator  from  Massachusetts  (Mr.  Sumner),  with 
his  odium  on  his  lips,  is  the  equal  of  his  revolutionary  sires?  Is  he 
the  equal  of  Adams,  of  Hancock,  of  Warren,  who  was  the  first 
martyr  in  the  great  cause  of  liberty,  of  freedom,  and  of  union?  Is  he 
the  equal  of  these  men?  I  had  rather  ask  you,  Mr.  President,  for 
I  think  you  would  answer  'no,'  and  he  might  answer  'yes.'  .  .  . 
I  ask  that  Senator,  then,  or  I  ask  you,  sir,  whether  that  Senator  is 
the  equal  of  the  late  lamented  Daniel  Webster,  who  preceded  him 
here  long  years  ago?  ...  I  believe  as  a  mere  mental  man — and 
I  speak  of  him  in  no  other  capacity — Webster  had  not  his  equal  on 
this  continent,  if  he  had  in  Europe  or  on  any  other  continent.  Is 
that  Senator  his  equal?  He  might  as  well  say  that  the  jackal  is  the 
equal  of  the  lion,  or  that  the  buzzard  is  the  equal  of  the  eagle. 

"When  you,  sir  (addressing  Mr.  Sumner)  find  no  man  beneath 
*  Lincoln-Douglas  Debates,  p.  196. 


384  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

you;  when  those  who  are  near  you — your  own  class  of  men — can 
find  no  man  beneath  you;  when  you  shall  claim  as  your  equal  the 
man  who  rolls  in  the  gutter,  whom  God  has  deprived  in  his  own 
organization  and  creation  of  all  mental  power  and  capacity;  when 
you  shall  claim  that  he  who  wallows  in  the  gutter  with  the  vilest 
and  most  worthless  is  your  equal,  then  your  interpretation  of  the 
doctrine  is  true.  Let  me  go  farther.  If  the  Almighty  ever  intended 
to  create  the  Senator  the  equal  with  the  mighty  and  lamented 
Webster,  I  must  say  that  he  made  a  gross  blunder  and  a  most 
egregious  mistake.  .  .  .  Sir,  I  am  inclined  to  believe  that,  in  a 
moral  point  of  view,  that  Senator  cannot  find  one  beneath  himself, 
taking  his  own  declaration  to-day.  He  who  will  swear  here  in  this 
body,  appealing  to  God  for  the  truth  of  what  he  says,  to  support 
the  Constitution  of  the  Union,  and  then  boldly  proclaim  that  he 
will  not  do  it,  has  sunk,  in  my  estimation,  to  a  depth  of  humiliation 
and  degradation  which  it  would  not  be  enviable  for  the  veriest  serf 
or  the  lowest  of  God's  creatures  to  occupy.  It  may  be  in  that  point 
of  view  the  Senator  regards  all  others  as  his  equal;  but  there  are 
some  who  are  not  willing  to  regard  that  Senator  as  their  equal,  and 
who  will  never  be  coerced  into  any  such  admission."  i 

2.  Self-control.  The  difference  between  these  two 
speeches  is  the  difference  between  gentlemanly  self-control 
and  coarse  vituperation.  A  debater  must  never  allow  himself, 
no  matter  how  great  the  provocation,  to  be  carried  over  the 
bounds  that  confine  the  gentleman;  coarseness,  even  though 
it  appear  but  for  a  moment,  is  always  harmful.  Coarseness 
in  debate  is  most  often  a  matter  of  loss  of  temper.  A  man  of 
low  character  may  be  expected  to  show  forth  his  nature  at 
any  time;  but  for  any  high-minded  man,  the  thing  that 
usually  brings  him  to  grief  is  the  loss  of  his  temper.  Good 
humor  is  a  great  asset  in  any  controversy.  He  who  loses  his 
temper  in  a  debate,  loses  his  best  defense.  One  can  be  in- 
dignant, offended,  disgusted,  without  loss  of  temper.  Any 
loss  of  control,  any  exhibition  of  anger  and  peevishness  is 
almost  sure  to  detract.  A  debater  should  learn  how  to  be 
"severe  and  parliamentary  at  the  same  time." 

*  Congressional  Debates,  Vol.  28,  Part  II,  p.  1518. 


THE  NATURE  OF  DEBATE  385 

3.  Sarcasm  and  ridicule.  Good  humor  is  even  more  nec- 
essary if  one  is  to  use  sarcasm  or  ridicule.  The  line  must  not 
be  drawn  so  strictly  against  these  weapons  as  against  per- 
sonalities pure  and  simple.  Sarcasm  in  a  skilful  hand  is  a 
formidable  weapon,  and  ridicule  can  often  win  a  point  where 
nothing  else  would  avail.  But  it  must  always  be  remembered 
that  these  are  light  arms.  They  are  fine- wrought,  flexible 
foils,  and  they  must  be  wielded  with  a  light  hand.  They 
are  not  suited  for  the  slashing  and  cutting  of  broad-sword 
play.  To  fence  with  them  a  man  must  be  quick,  light  of 
hand,  and,  above  all,  cool  and  self-controlled.  Some  men 
cannot  use  sarcasm  and  ridicule  at  all,  and  no  man  can  afford 
to  use  them  carelessly.  Ill  temper  in  the  use  of  these  weapons 
is  both  careless  and  clumsy.  It  always  results  in  a  wild  aim 
and  looks  like  foul  play.  Sarcasm  and  ridicule  are  most 
effective  when  directed  against  conceit  and  affectation. 
A  speaker  who  allows  his  conceit  to  rise  to  the  surface,  or 
who  assumes  a  tone  of  grandiloquence  or  bombast,  has  ex- 
posed a  weak  spot  in  his  armor.  And  there  is  no  weapon 
that  will  so  readily  find  the  spot  and  strike  through  it  as  one 
of  these  light  side-arms  of  forensic  combat.  The  following 
is  one  of  the  best  illustrations  of  the  use  of  ridicule  that  can 
be  found  in  American  oratory.  It  is  so  interesting  and  so 
worthy  of  study  with  respect  to  its  general  tone,  its  vivid 
rhetoric,  and  its  telling  choice  of  figures  of  speech  as  to  justify 
the  giving  of  the  passage  nearly  in  full.  A  certain  General 
Crary,  on  February  14,  1840,  in  the  debate  in  the  House  on 
the  Cumberland  Road  Bill,  attacked  General  William  Henry 
Harrison  for  alleged  deficiencies  as  a  military  commander, 
severely  criticising  his  conduct  of  the  battle  of  Tippecanoe 
and  of  various  other  campaigns.  Thomas  Corwin  of  Ohio 
replied  in  a  speech  of  which  the  following  is  a  part.  Mr. 
Crary  was  so  overwhelmed  that  John  Quincy  Adams,  a  few 
days  after,  referred  to  him  as  "the  late  Mr.  Crary." 

*'In  all  other  countries,  and  in  all  former  times,  a  gentleman  who 
would  either  speak  or  be  listened  to  on  the  subject  of  war,  involving 


386  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

subtle  criticisms  and  strategy,  and  careful  reviews  of  marches,  sieges, 
battles,  regular  and  casual,  and  irregular  onslaughts,  would  be 
required  to  show,  first,  that  he  had  studied  much,  investigated 
fully,  and  digested  the  science  and  history  of  his  subject.  But  here, 
sir,  no  such  painful  preparation  is  required;  witness  the  gentleman 
from  Michigan!  He  has  announced  to  the  House  that  he  is  a  militia 
general  on  the  peace  establishment!  That  he  is  a  lawyer  we  know, 
tolerably  well  read  in  Tidd's  'Practice'  and  Espinasse's  *Nisi  Prius.' 
These  studies,  so  happily  adapted  to  the  subject  of  war,  with  an 
appointment  in  the  militia  in  time  of  peace,  furnish  him  at  once 
with  all  the  knowledge  necessary  to  discourse  to  us,  as  from  high 
authority,  upon  all  the  mysteries  of  the  'trade  of  death.'  Again, 
Mr.  Speaker,  it  must  occur  to  every  one,  that  we,  to  whom  these 
questions  are  submitted  and  these  military  criticisms  are  addressed, 
being  all  colonels  at  least,  and  most  of  us,  like  the  gentleman  him- 
self, brigadiers,  are,  of  all  conceivable  tribunals,  best  qualified  to 
decide  any  nice  points  connected  with  military  science.  I  hope 
the  House  will  not  be  alarmed  with  the  impression  that  I  am  about 
to  discuss  one  or  the  other  of  the  military  questions  now  before  us 
at  length,  but  I  wish  to  submit  a  remark  or  two,  by  way  of  preparing 
us  for  a  proper  appreciation  of  the  merits  of  the  discourse  w^e  have 
heard.  I  trust  we  are  all  brother-oflScers,  that  the  gentleman  from 
Michigan,  and  the  two  hundred  and  forty  colonels  or  generals  of 
this  honorable  House,  will  receive  what  I  have  to  say  as  coming 
from  an  old  brother  in  arms,  and  addressed  to  them,  in  a  spirit  of 
candor, 

"  '  Such  as  becometh  comrades  free. 
Reposing  after  victory.' 

"Sir,  we  all  know  the  military  studies  of  the  military  gentleman 
from  Michigan  before  he  was  promoted.  I  take  it  to  be  beyond  a 
reasonable  doubt  that  he  had  perused  with  great  care  the  title  page 
of  'Baron  Steuben.'  Nay,  I  go  further;  as  the  gentleman  has  in- 
cidentally assured  us  that  he  is  prone  to  look  into  musty  and  neg- 
lected volumes,  I  venture  to  assert,  without  vouching  in  the  least 
from  personal  knowledge,  that  he  has  prosecuted  his  researches  so 
far  as  to  be  able  to  know  that  the  rear  rank  stands  right  behind  the 
front.  This,  I  think,  is  fairly  inferable  from  what  I  understood  him 
to  say  of  the  two  lines  of  encampment  at  Tippecanoe.  Thus  we  see, 
Mr.  Speaker,  that  the  gentleman  from  Michigan,  being  a  militia 


THE  NATURE  OF  DEBATE  387 

general,  as  he  has  told  us,  his  brother  oflScers,  in  that  simple  state- 
ment has  revealed  the  glorious  history  of  toils,  privations,  sacrifices, 
and  bloody  scenes,  through  which,  we  know  from  experience  and 
observation,  a  militia  oflScer,  in  time  of  peace,  is  sure  to  pass.  We 
all  in  fancy  now  see  the  gentleman  from  Michigan  in  that  most 
dangerous  and  glorious  event  in  the  life  of  a  militia  general  on  the 
peace  establishment — a  parade  day!  That  day,  for  which  all  the 
other  days  of  his  life  seem  to  have  been  made.  We  can  see  the 
troops  in  motion — umbrellas,  hoes,  and  axe-handles,  and  other  like 
deadly  implements  of  war,  overshadowing  all  the  fields,  when  lo! 
the  leader  of  the  hosts  approaches ! 

"* Far  off  his  coming  shines!' 

His  plume,  which,  after  the  fashion  of  the  great  Bourbon,  is  of 
awful  length,  reads  its  baleful  history  in  the  bereaved  necks  and 
bosoms  of  forty  neighboring  henroosts.  Like  the  great  Suwaroff, 
he  seems  somewhat  careless  in  forms  or  points  of  dress;  hence  his 
epaulettes  may  be  on  his  shoulders,  back,  or  sides,  but  still  gleaming, 
gloriously  gleaming  in  the  sun.  Mounted  he  is,  too,  let  it  not  be 
forgotten.  Need  I  describe  to  the  colonels  and  generals  of  this 
honorable  House  the  steeds  which  heroes  bestride  on  these  occa- 
sions? No!  I  see  the  memory  of  other  days  is  with  you.  You  see 
before  you  the  gentleman  from  Michigan,  mounted  on  his  crop- 
eared,  bushy-tailed  mare,  the  singular  obliquity  of  whose  hinder 
limbs  is  best  described  by  that  most  expressive  phrase,  *  sickle 
hams' — for  height  just  fourteen  hands,  *all  told';  yes,  sir,  there 
you  see  his  *  steed  that  laughs  at  the  shaking  of  the  spear';  that  is 
his  war  horse,  *  whose  neck  is  clothed  in  thunder.'  Mr.  Speaker, 
we  have  glowing  descriptions  in  history  of  Alexander  the  Great 
and  his  war  horse  Bucephalus,  at  the  head  of  the  invincible  Mace- 
donian phalanx;  but  sir,  such  are  the  improvements  of  modern  times, 
that  every  one  must  see  that  our  militia  general,  with  his  crop-eared 
mare  with  bushy  tail  and  sickle  hams,  would  totally  frighten  off  a 
battle  field  a  hundred  Alexanders.  But,  sir,  to  the  history  of  the 
parade  day.  The  general,  thus  mounted  and  equipped,  is  in  the 
field  and  ready  for  action.  On  the  eve  of  some  desperate  enterprise, 
such  as  giving  order  to  shoulder  arms,  it  may  be,  there  occurs  a 
crisis,  one  of  those  accidents  of  war,  which  no  sagacity  could  foresee 
nor  prevent.    A  cloud  rises  and  passes  over  the  sun!    Here  is  an 


388  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

occasion  for  the  display  of  that  greatest  of  all  traits  in  the  history 
of  a  commander — the  tact  which  enables  him  to  seize  upon  and 
turn  to  good  account  unlooked-for  events  as  they  arise.  Now  for 
the  caution  wherewith  the  Roman  Fabius  foiled  the  skill  and 
courage  of  Hannibal!  A  retreat  is  ordered,  and  troops  and  general, 
in  a  twinkling,  are  found  safely  bivouacked  in  a  neighboring  gro- 
cery." ^ 

With  respect  to  all  three  of  the  methods  mentioned  above, 
viz.,  personalities,  sarcasm,  and  ridicule,  it  is  to  be  remarked 
that  they  are  only  occasional  weapons.  They  are  not  sub- 
stitutes for  proof  or  for  the  substance  of  argument.  They 
are  merely  auxiliaries.  It  is  often  easier  to  malign  or  laugh 
at  an  opponent  than  to  answer  him,  but  it  does  not  accom- 
plish the  same  end. 

4.  Personal  inconsistency.  The  charge  of  personal  in- 
sistency belongs  in  debate  more  truly  than  elsewhere.  As 
we  have  already  seen,  in  debate  the  speakers  generally  stand 
as  personally  responsible  advocates  of  the  opinions  they 
espouse.  Consequently,  if  it  can  be  shown  that  a  speaker 
is  inconsistent  in  his  opinions,  the  shot  often  strikes  home. 
If  it  is  proved  that  a  speaker  upholds  views  that  he  formerly 
condemned,  or  that  his  actions  belie  his  words,  his  motives 
are  clearly  impeached  and  his  sincerity  or  veracity  is  at  least 
open  to  suspicion.  This  charge  may  be  used  as  a  means  of 
ridicule,  making  light  of  the  pretended  earnestness  of  an 
opponent,  or  it  may  be,  used  as  the  foundation  of  a  serious 
charge  of  fraud  or  hyprocrisy.  Lincoln  used  it  in  his  speech 
at  Chicago,  July  10,  to  ridicule  an  excess  of  oratorical  enthu- 
siasm on  the  part  of  Senator  Douglas.  Speaking  of  the 
Dred  Scott  Decision,  he  said : — 

"The  sacredness  that  Judge  Douglas  throws  around  this  decision, 
is  a  degree  of  sacredness  that  has  never  been  before  thrown  around 
any  other  decision.  I  have  never  heard  of  such  a  thing.  .  .  .  But 
Judge  Douglas  will  have  it  that  all  hands  must  take  this  extraor- 

*  Hardwicke,  History  of  Oratory  and  Orators,  pp.  368-371. 


THE  NATURE  OF  DEBATE  389 

dinary  decision,  made  under  these  extraordinary  circumstances, 
and  give  their  vote  in  Congress  in  accordance  with  it,  yield  to  it, 
and  obey  it  in  every  possible  sense.  Circumstances  alter  cases.  Do 
not  gentlemen  here  remember  the  case  of  that  same  Supreme  Court, 
some  twenty-five  or  thirty  years  ago,  deciding  that  a  National 
Bank  was  constitutional.'*  I  ask  if  somebody  does  not  remember 
that  a  National  Bank  was  declared  to  be  constitutional  .f*  Such  is 
the  truth,  whether  it  be  remembered  or  not.  The  Bank  charter 
ran  out,  and  a  recharter  was  granted  by  Congress.  That  recharter 
was  laid  before  General  Jackson.  It  was  urged  upon  him,  when  he 
denied  the  constitutionality  of  the  Bank,  that  the  Supreme  Court 
had  decided  that  it  was  constitutional;  and  that  General  Jackson 
then  said  that  the  Supreme  Court  had  no  right  to  lay  down  a  rule 
to  govern  a  coordinate  branch  of  the  Government,  the  members 
of  which  had  sworn  to  support  the  Constitution — that  each  member 
had  sworn  to  support  that  Constitution  as  he  understood  it.  I 
will  venture  here  to  say,  that  I  have  heard  Judge  Douglas  say 
that  he  approved  of  General  Jackson's  act.  What  has  now  become 
of  all  his  tirade  about  'resistance  to  the  Supreme  Court'?"  ^ 

Senator  Hayne,  in  his  second  speech  on  the  Foote  Reso- 
lution, used  this  device  differently,  rather  making  it  the 
foundation  of  a  serious  charge  of  inconsistency  and  apos- 
tasy:— 

*'I  am  not  at  all  surprised,  however,  at  the  aversion  of  the  gentle- 
man to  the  very  name  of  tariff.  I  doubt  not  that  it  must  always 
bring  up  some  very  unpleasant  recollections  to  his  mind.  If  I  am 
not  greatly  mistaken,  the  Senator  from  Massachusetts  was  a  leading 
actor  at  a  great  meeting  got  up  in  Boston  in  1820  against  the  tariff. 
It  has  generally  been  supposed  that  he  drew  up  the  resolutions 
adopted  by  that  meeting,  denouncing  the  tariff  system  as  unequal, 
oppressive,  and  unjust,  and,  if  I  am  not  much  mistaken,  denying 
its  constitutionality.  Certain  it  is  that  the  gentleman  made  a 
speech  on  that  occasion  in  support  of  those  resolutions,  denouncing 
the  system  in  no  very  measured  terms;  and,  if  ray  memory  serves  me, 
calling  its  constitutionality  in  question.    I  regret  that  I  have  not 

^  Lincoln-Douglas  Debates^  pp.  20,  21. 


390  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

been  able  to  lay  my  hands  on  those  proceedings,  but  I  have  seen 
them,  and  I  cannot  be  mistaken  in  their  character.  At  that  time, 
sir,  the  Senator  from  Massachusetts  entertained  the  very  sentiments 
in  relation  to  the  tariff  which  the  South  now  entertains.  We  next 
find  the  Senator  from  Massachusetts  expressing  his  opinion  on  the 
tariff  as  a  member  of  the  House  of  Representatives  from  the  city 
of  Boston  in  1824.  On  that  occasion,  sir,  the  gentleman  assumed  a 
position  which  commanded  the  respect  and  admiration  of  his  coun- 
try. He  stood  forth  the  powerful  and  fearless  champion  of  free 
trade.  He  met,  in  that  conflict,  the  advocates  of  restriction  and 
monopoly,  and  they  'fled  from  before  his  face.'  With  a  profound 
sagacity,  a  fulness  of  knowledge,  and  a  richness  of  illustration  that 
has  never  been  surpassed,  he  maintained  and  established  the  prin- 
ciples of  commercial  freedom  on  a  foundation  never  to  be 
shaken.  .  .  .  Then  it  was  that  he  erected  to  free  trade  a  beautiful 
and  enduring  monument,  and  'inscribed  the  marble  with  his  name.* 
It  is  with  pain  and  regret  that  I  now  go  forward  to  the  next  great 
era  in  the  political  life  of  that  gentleman,  when  he  was  found  upon 
the  floor  supporting,  advocating,  and  finally  voting  for  the  tariff  of 
1828 — that  'bill  of  abominations.'  By  that  act,  sir,  the  Senator 
from  Massachusetts  has  destroyed  the  labors  of  his  whole  life,  and 
given  a  wound  to  the  cause  of  free  trade,  never  to  be  healed.  Sir, 
when  I  recollect  the  position  which  that  gentleman  once  occupied, 
and  that  which  he  now  holds  in  public  estimation,  in  relation  to 
this  subject,  it  is  not  at  all  surprising  that  the  tariff  should  be 
hateful  to  his  ears.  Sir,  if  I  had  erected  to  my  own  fame  so  proud  a 
monument  as  that  which  the  gentleman  built  in  1824,  and  I  could 
have  been  tempted  to  destroy  it  with  my  own  hands,  I  should  hate 
the  voice  that  should  ring  'the  accursed  tariff'  in  my  ears.  I  doubt 
not  the  gentleman  feels  very  much  in  relation  to  the  tariff  as  a 
certain  knight  did  to  'instinct,'  and  with  him  would  be  disposed  to 
exclaim — 

"'Ah,  no  more  of  that  Hal,  and  thou  lov'st  me.'"  ^ 

It  is  evident  that  in  some  kinds  of  debate  this  particular 
form  of  attack  finds  no  place.  In  intercollegiate  debate,  or 
before  a  jury,  it  is  rarely  opportune,  because  the  personal 

1  Debates  in  Congress,  Vol.  VI,  Part  I,  p.  49.  Gales  and  Seaton,  Washing- 
ton. 1830. 


THE  NATURE  OF  DEBATE  391 

opinions  of  the  speakers  in  these  situations  have  little  "to 
do  with  the  case."  The  speakers  are  merely  instruments  of 
competition  or  of  justice,  in  presenting  whatever  is  to  be  said 
on  either  side  of  the  question,  and  so  are  not  open  to  personal 
attacks. 


CHAPTER  17 

THE  MAIN   SPEECHES 

OUTLINE 

A..  Main  speeches  and  brief. 

B.  Preparatory  practice. 

C.  Divisions  of  debate. 

1.  The  introduction. 

a.  First  affirmative. 

b.  First  negative. 

(I)  Adaj/t  to  circumstances. 

c.  Definitions. 

d.  Issues. 

e.  Partition. 

2.  The  discussion. 

a.  Main  heads. 

b.  Repetition. 

c.  Summaries  and  partitions. 

d.  Asking  questions. 

(I)  To  get  definite  answers. 

(II)  To  waste  time. 

(III)  To  force  into  a  dilemma. 

3.  The  conclusion. 

a.  Strategy. 

b.  Summary. 

c.  Balanced  summary. 

A.  Main  speeches  and  brief.  The  main  speeches  in 
any  debate  should  not  be  planned  until  after  a  complete 
brief  of  the  case  has  been  prepared.  The  brief  should,  of 
course,  be  one,  not  three,  even  if  there  are  three  speakers. 
This  is  true  both  of  contest  debates  and  actual  debates  in  the 
affairs  of  life.  There  should  be  one  complete  brief  of  the 
case.    Then  this  brief  should  be  divided  as  seems  best  among 

392 


THE  MAIN  SPEECHES  393 

whatever  number  of  speakers  is  to  present  the  case.  Each 
speaker  should  take  his  section  and  prepare  an  outHne  of  it, 
and  talk  from  the  outline.  The  brief  should  not  be  taken  as  the 
necessary  outline  of  the  case.  Speeches  delivered  from  a  good 
brief  as  an  outline  are  apt  to  be  wooden  and  tiresome. 

B.  Preparatory  practice.  The  practice  in  preparation 
for  contest  debate  should  consist  of  numerous  debates  be- 
tween opposing  teams.  The  now  almost  universal  plan  of 
triangular  debates  makes  this  feasible,  as  each  institution 
has  a  team  on  each  side.  Each  team  should  try  all  possible 
schemes  of  attack  and  defense — always  covering  in  some  way 
or  other  the  case  as  briefed,  but  using  as  many  different  kinds 
of  outlines  as  can  be  invented.  A  speaker  who  is  at  all  fluent 
and  quick-witted  should  rarely  even  write  a  manuscript  in 
preparation  for  a  debate.  He  should  debate  from  an  outline 
as  often  as  possible  and  learn  to  adapt  his  remarks  to  what- 
ever form  the  discussion  takes.  Probably,  if  slow-minded  and 
halting  speakers  must  go  into  contest  debates,  they  will  have 
to  write  and  memorize  their  arguments,  but  this  is  hardly 
worth  calling  debating,  and  should  always  be  given  little 
credit  by  judges  of  contest  debates.  In  class  work  in  de- 
bates no  student  should  ever  write  a  manuscript.^  Briefs 
and  outlines  should  be  the  only  "  paper  basis'*  for  class 
debates. 

C.  Divisions  of  the  debate.  The  debate  should  be  one — 
should  have  absolute  unity.  It  should  be  fundamentally 
the  same  if  delivered  by  one  or  two  or  three  speakers.  We, 
therefore,  discuss  the  main  speeches  here  from  the  stand- 
point of  introduction,  discussion,  and  conclusion,  not  from 
that  of  first,  second,  and  third  speaker.  If  there  are  three 
speakers,  the  first  usually  gives  the  introduction  and  part 
of  the  discussion,  the  second  more  of  the  discussion,  and  the 
third  the  rest  of  the  discussion  and  the  conclusion.    The  situa- 

*  Please  note  that  this  is  not  saying  that  practice  in  written  argumentation 
is  not  valuable.  It  is;  and  should  be  indulged  in  before  students  take  a 
course  in  debating.    It  is  not  the  best  preparation  for  a  debate. 


394  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

tion  will  not  be  essentially  different  with  one  or  two  or  even 
four  speakers  on  a  side. 

1.  The  Introduction 

a.  First  affirmative.  In  a  debate  to  have  the  first  speech 
is  a  privilege.  This  privilege,  which  arises  from  the  influence 
of  the  speech  upon  the  remainder  of  the  debate,  is  twofold. 
First,  the  speaker  has  an  opportunity  to  make  the  first  im- 
pression on  the  audience;  and,  secondly,  he  has  an  opportu- 
nity to  direct  the  course  of  the  debate.  This,  then,  is  the  duty 
of  a  speaker  opening  a  debate,  whom,  for  convenience,  we 
will  call  the  "first  speaker  on  the  aflSrmative,"  viz,  to  win  a 
fair  hearing  for  himself  and  his  side  of  the  proposition.  Posi- 
tive persuasion  to  win  sympathy  is  usually  dangerous  here, 
but  what  we  have  called  negative  persuasion  is  of  the 
utmost  importance.  Avoid  giving  an  unfavorable  impres- 
sion. Be  clear,  calm,  reasonable,  fair  to  opponents,  accurate 
and  thorough  in  explanations.  In  this  manner  explain  the 
case,  set  forth  the  issues,  accept  the  burden  of  proof,  out- 
line your  case  as  far  as  seems  advisable,  and  then  start  the 
argument.  It  often  happens  in  debate  that  there  is  one 
method  of  analyzing  and  discussing  the  question  that  is  ad- 
vantageous to  the  affirmative,  and  another  method  that  is 
advantageous  to  the  negative.  Consequently,  to  force  an 
opponent  to  discuss  the  question  according  to  your  plan, 
to  compel  him  to  fight  you  on  your  own  grounds,  is  a  point 
won.  To  return  to  a  military  comparison,  in  war  it  is  a  great 
advantage  to  be  able  to  have  the  choice  of  position;  and  this 
advantage  generally  goes  to  the  army  that  is  first  on  the  field. 
A  well-prepared,  aggressive  first  speaker  can  so  explain  the 
origin  and  history  of  the  question,  and  so  present  the  issues, 
as  to  compel  his  opponent  to  accept  his  analysis  of  the  case, 
provided  of  course  that  he  presents  a  fair  and  legitimate 
interpretation,  but  a  weak  or  apologetic  opening  affirmative 
may  well  miss  this  opportunity,  and  allow  the  negative 
practically  to  control  the  discussion.     By  such  an  opening 


THE  MAIN  SPEECHES  395 

th  J  affirmative  can  lose  its  chief  advantage  over  the  negative. 
The  affirmative  should  remember  that  the  proposition,  and 
the  burden  of  proving  it,  is  theirs;  it  is  their  case.  They  have 
a  right  (within  the  limits  of  legitimate  interpretation),  to 
establish  it  as  they  see  fit.  To  allow  the  negative  to  take  this 
opportunity  awaj^  from  them  is  an  indication  of  great  incom- 
petence. Rhetorically,  an  opening  speaker  should  use  a  grac- 
ful  and  finished,  but  never  ornate  or  "high-flown,"  diction. 
His  general  tone  should  be  conciliatory.  Above  all,  his  ex- 
position should  be  lucid  and  interesting,  avoiding  fine  dis- 
tinctions and  technicalities  in  explaining  the  question. 

b.  First  negative.  The  duty  of  the  speaker  in  opposition, 
who  may  be  called  the  "first  speaker  on  the  negative,'*  is 
clear.  He  may  adopt  the  same  tone  and  rhetorical  style  as 
the  opening  speaker, — clear,  smooth,  and  conciliatory;  or  he 
may  under  some  circumstances,  take  a  different  attitude,  an 
attitude  of  open  belligerency  from  the  start.  But  he  must, 
whatever  the  method,  attempt  to  counteract  the  influence  of 
his  opponent  who  has  introduced  the  debate.  This  is  a  diffi- 
cult task,  calling  for  tact  and  aggressive  force.  Sometimes, 
though  not  often  in  contest  debating,  his  opponent  will  have 
excited  the  audience  against  him,  or  will  have  won  their 
sympathy  for  himself;  then  the  speaker  must  counteract 
these  effects  by  the  use  of  sarcasm,  wit,  invective,  or  what- 
ever resources  he  may  command.  If  the  opening  speaker 
has  seemed  to  establish  an  interpretation  of  the  question 
unfavorable  to  the  negative,  he  must  offer  battle  at  the  very 
start,  and  overthrow  this  interpretation  by  showing  that, 
"the  preceding  speaker  has  misread  history  and  misunder- 
stood the  facts,"  that  he  has  "failed  to  present  the  real 
issues  involved,"  or  "unfortunately  failed  to  grasp  the  real 
question,"  etc.  Whatever  the  situation  he  finds  left  by  his 
opponent,  he  must  adapt  himself  to  it  and  attempt  to  change 
it  to  his  own  advantage.  He  must  take  matters  as  he  finds 
them.  The  one  thing  that  he  must  not  do  is  to  ignore  what 
has  been  said.     He  must  not  take  the  platform  and  start 


396  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

his  case  as  if  nothing  had  been  said.  He  is  the  second  speaker 
in  the  discussion,  and  unless  he  can  adapt  his  speech  to  what 
has  been  said,  he  is  a  very  poor  debater,  whatever  else  he 
may  be.  At  such  a  time,  a  lecture  or  an  essay  is  worse  then 
nothing.  The  whole  value  of  the  introduction  of  a  first 
speaker  on  the  negative,  depends  on  its  adaptation  to  the 
circumstances.  Somehow  he  must  recognize  the  interpreta- 
tion of  the  first  affirmative  and  either  accept  it  as  satisfac- 
tory, or  challenge  it  as  unsound.  If  the  latter,  he  must 
proceed  at  once  to  show  why  unsound  and  to  explain  the  in- 
terpretation of  the  negative. 

An  illustration  directly  in  point  may  be  taken  from  the 
famous  Lincoln-Douglas  debates  of  1858.  The  circum- 
stances of  this  controversy  are  well  known.  It  occurred 
during  the  most  intense  period  of  the  slavery  struggle, 
just  before  the  opening  of  the  War  of  the  Rebellion.  The 
country  was  stirred  to  a  passionate  interest,  by  the  fight 
in  Congress  over  the  admission  of  Kansas  into  the  Union, 
by  the  conflict  between  slavery  and  anti-slavery  factions  in 
that  state,  and  by  the  Dred  Scott  decision,  just  declared  by 
the  Supreme  Court.  Lincoln  and  Douglas  were  rival  candi- 
dates for  an  Illinois  senatorship.  They  were  recognized  rep- 
resentatives of  the  two  great  political  factions  of  the  North, 
and  the  whole  country  soon  became  the  spectators  of  the 
contest.  Douglas,  in  his  opening  speech  at  Chicago,  July  9, 
1858,  had  mentioned,  "An  unholy  and  unnatural  alliance," 
and  had  advocated  popular  sovereignty,  "the  right  of  the 
people  of  each  territory  to  decide  for  themselves  whether 
slavery  shall  or  shall  not  exist  within  their  limits."  In  Lin- 
coln's reply  he  "turned  the  tables"  on  Judge  Douglas  in  a 
typical  Lincoln  introduction  leading  up  to  the  main  issue. 

"My  fellow-citizens:  On  yesterday  evening,  upon  the  occasion  of 
the  reception  given  to  Senator  Douglas,  I  was  furnished  with  a  seat 
very  convenient  for  hearing  him,  and  was  otherwise  very  courteously 
treated  by  him  and  his  friends,  and  for  which  I  thank  him  and 


THE  MAIN  SPEECHES  397 

them.  During  the  course  of  his  remarks  my  name  was  mentioned 
in  such  a  way  as,  I  suppose,  renders  it  at  least  nor  improper  that 
I  should  make  some  sort  of  reply  to  him.  I  shall  not  attempt  to 
follow  him  in  the  precise  order  in  which  he  addressed  the  assembled 
multitude  upon  that  occasion,  though  I  shall  perhaps  do  so  in  the 
main. 

"There  was  one  question  to  which  he  asked  the  attention  of  the 
crowd,  which  I  deem  of  somewhat  less  importance — at  least  of 
propriety  for  me  to  dwell  upon — than  the  others,  which  he  brought 
in  near  the  close  of  his  speech,  and  which  I  think  it  would  not  be  en- 
tirely proper  for  me  to  omit  attending  to,  and  yet  if  I  were  not  to 
give  some  attention  to  it  now,  I  should  probably  forget  it  altogether. 
While  I  am  upon  this  subject,  allow  me  to  say  that  I  do  not  intend 
to  indulge  in  that  inconvenient  mode  sometimes  adopted  in  public 
speaking,  of  reading  from  documents;  but  I  shall  depart  from  that 
rule  so  far  as  to  read  a  little  scrap  from  his  speech  which  notices 
this  first  topic  of  which  I  shall  speak — that  is,  provided  I  can  find 
it  in  the  paper. 

"  *I  have  made  up  my  mind  to  appeal  to  the  people  against  the 
combination  that  has  been  made  against  me!  the  Republican  leaders 
have  formed  an  alliance,  an  unholy  and  unnatural  alliance,  with  a 
portion  of  unscrupulous  federal  office-holders.  I  intend  to  fight 
that  allied  army  wherever  I  meet  them.  I  know  they  deny  the  al- 
liance, but  yet  these  men  who  are  trying  to  divide  the  Democratic 
party  for  the  purpose  of  electing  a  Republican  Senator  in  my  place, 
are  just  as  much  the  agents  and  tools  of  the  supporters  of  Mr. 
Lincoln.  Hence  I  shall  deal  with  this  allied  army  just  as  the  Rus- 
sians dealt  with  the  allied  forces  at  Sebastopol — that  is,  the  Rus- 
sians did  not  stop  to  inquire,  when  they  fired  a  broadside,  whether 
it  hit  an  Englishman,  a  Frenchman,  or  a  Turk.  Nor  will  I  stop  to 
inquire,  nor  shall  I  hesitate,  whether  my  blows  shall  hit  these 
Republican  leaders  or  theu-  allies,  who  are  holding  the  federal  oflSces 
and  yet  acting  in  concert  with  them.* 

"Well,  now,  gentlemen,  is  not  that  very  alarming?  Just  to  think 
of  it!  right  at  the  outset  of  his  canvass,  I,  a  poor,  kind,  amiable 
gentleman,  I  am  to  be  slain  in  this  way.  Why,  my  friend,  the 
Judge,  is  not  only,  as  it  turns  out,  not  a  dead  lion,  nor  even  a  living 
one — ^he  is  the  rugged  Russian  Bear! 

"But  if  they  will  have  it — for  he  says  that  we  deny  it — that 


398  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

there  is  any  such  alliance,  as  he  says  there  is — and  I  don't  propose 
hanging  very  much  upon  this  question  of  veracity — but  if  he  will 
have  it  that  there  is  such  an  alliance — that  the  Administration  men 
and  we  are  allied  and  we  stand  in  thfe  attitude  of  English,  French 
and  Turk,  he  occupying  the  position  of  the  Russians,  in  that  case, 
I  beg  that  he  will  indulge  us  while  we  barely  suggest  to  him  that 
these  allies  took  Sebastopol.  .  .  . 

"Popular  sovereignty!  everlasting  popular  sovereignty!  Let  us 
for  a  moment  inquire  into  this  vast  matter  of  popular  sovereignty," 
etc.i 

(I)  Adaptation  to  circumstances.  We  have  said,  that  the 
value  of  the  introduction  of  a  first  speaker  on  the  negative 
depends  upon  the  adaptation  to  circumstances.  This  is  also 
true  of  the  introduction  to  any  speech,  after  the  opening 
speech.  The  very  essence  of  debate,  as  contrasted  with 
simple  written  argumentation,  consists  in  seeing  situations 
and  meeting  them.  A  series  of  arguments  on  a  proposition 
does  not  necessarily  constitute  a  debate.  A  debater  who 
demonstrates  and  argues  regardless  of  what  the  opposition 
is  doing,  is  like  a  fencer  who  lunges  right  and  left  without 
looking  at  his  opponent.  Very  seldom  is  it  safe  to  enter  the 
discussion  without  taking  notice  of  what  has  been  said  and 
done  by  preceding  speakers,  or  without  laying  some  founda- 
tion of  sympathy  and  understanding  with  the  audience. 

For  example,  contrast  the  two  following  introductions. 
They  are  both  from  the  same  man,  Senator  Robert  Y.  Hayne 
of  South  Carolina.  They  were  both  delivered  in  the  same 
debate,  the  debate  in  the  Senate  in  1830,  on  the  famous 
Foote  Resolution.  But  there  is  this  difference :  the  first  is  the 
introduction  to  Mr.  Hayne's  opening  speech;  the  second  is 
part  of  the  introduction  to  a  second  speech,  delivered  at  a 
later  stage  of  the  discussion,  after  he  had  been  attacked  and 
his  position  assailed  by  such  senators  as  Benton  and  Webster. 
The  contrast  shows  the  difference  in  tone  and  method  adapted 
to  the  different  situations. 

*  Lincoln-Douglas  Debates,  pp.  14,  15. 


THE  MAIN  SPEECHES  399 

Mr.  Hayne*s  opening  speech  began  as  follows: — 

"It  has  been  said,  and  correctly  said,  by  more  than  one  gentle- 
man, that  resolutions  of  inquiry  were  usually  suffered  to  pass  with- 
out opposition.  The  parliamentary  practice  in  this  respect  was 
certainly  founded  in  good  sense  and  sound  policy,  which  regarded 
such  resolutions  as  intended  merely  to  elicit  information,  and  there- 
fore entitled  to  favor.  But  I  cannot  give  my  assent  to  the  proposi- 
tion so  broadly  laid  down  by  some  gentlemen,  that  because  nobody 
stands  committed  by  a  vote  for  inquiry,  that,  therefore,  every 
resolution  proposing  an  inquiry,  no  matter  on  what  subject,  must 
pass  almost  as  a  matter  of  course,  and  that,  to  discuss  or  oppose 
such  resolutions,  is  unparliamentary.  The  true  distinction  seems 
to  be  this:  where  information  is  desired  as  the  basis  of  legislation, 
or  where  the  policy  of  any  measure,  or  the  principles  it  involves, 
are  really  questionable,  it  was  always  proper  to  send  the  subject 
to  a  committee  for  investigation;  but  where  all  the  material  facts 
are  already  known,  and  there  is  fixed  and  settled  opinion  in  respect 
to  the  policy  to  be  pursued,  inquiry  was  unnecessary,  and  ought 
to  be  refused.  No  one,  he  thought,  could  doubt  the  correctness  of 
the  position  assumed  by  the  gentleman  from  Missouri,  that  no 
inquiry  ought  ever  to  be  instituted  as  to  the  expediency  of  doing 
*a  great  and  acknowledged  wrong.'  I  do  not  mean,  however,  to 
intimate  an  opinion  that  such  is  the  character  of  this  resolution. 
The  application  of  these  rules  to  the  case  before  us  will  decide  my 
vote,  and  every  Senator  can  apply  them  for  himself  to  the  decision 
of  the  question,  whether  the  inquiry  now  called  for  should  be 
granted  or  refused.  With  that  decision,  whatever  it  may  be,  I 
shall  be  contented. 

"I  have  not  risen,  however,  Mr.  President,  for  the  purpose  of 
discussing  the  propriety  of  instituting  the  inquiry  recommended  by 
the  resolution,  but  to  offer  a  few  remarks  on  another  and  much 
more  important  question,  to  which  gentlemen  have  alluded  in  the 
course  of  this  debate — I  mean  the  policy  which  ought  to  be  pursued 
in  relation  to  the  public  lands.  Every  gentleman  who  has  had  a 
seat  in  Congress  for  the  last  two  or  three  years  ^  or  even  for  the  last 
two  or  three  weeks,  must  be  convinced  of  the  great  and  growing 
importance  of  this  question.  More  than  half  of  our  time  has  been 
taken  up  with  the  discussion  of  propositions  connected  with  the 


400  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

public  lands;  more  than  half  of  our  acts  embrace  provisions  growing 
out  of  this  fruitful  source.  Day  after  day  the  changes  are  rung 
on  this  topic,  from  the  grave  inquiry  into  the  right  of  the  new 
States  to  the  absolute  sovereignty  and  property  in  the  soil,  down 
to  the  grant  of  a  preemption  of  a  few  quarter  sections  to  actual 
settlers.  In  the  language  of  a  great  orator  in  relation  to  another 
'  vexed  question,'  we  may  truly  say,  '  that  year  after  year  we  have 
been  lashed  round  the  miserable  circle  of  occasional  arguments  and 
temporary  expedients!'  No  gentleman  can  fail  to  perceive  that 
this  is  a  question  no  longer  to  be  evaded;  it  must  be  met — fairly 
and  fearlessly  met.  A  question  that  is  pressed  upon  us  in  so  many 
ways;  that  intrudes  in  such  a  variety  of  shapes;  involving  so  deeply 
the  feelings  and  interests  of  a  large  portion  of  the  Union;  insinuating 
itself  into  almost  every  question  of  public  policy,  and  tinging  the 
whole  course  of  our  legislation,  cannot  be  put  aside  or  laid  asleep. 
We  cannot  long  avoid  it;  we  must  meet  and  overcome  it,  or  it  will 
overcome  us.  Let  us,  then,  be  prepared  to  encounter  it  in  a  spirit 
of  wisdom  and  of  justice,  and  endeavor  to  prepare  our  own  minds 
and  the  minds  of  the  people  for  a  just  and  enlightened  decision. 
The  object  of  the  remarks  I  am  about  to  offer  is  merely  to  call  public 
attention  to  the  question,  to  throw  out  a  few  crude  and  undigested 
thoughts,  as  food  for  reflection,  in  order  to  prepare  the  public  mind 
for  the  adoption,  at  no  distant  day,  of  some  fixed  and  settled  policy 
in  relation  to  the  public  lands.  I  believe  that,  out  of  the  western 
country,  there  is  no  subject  in  the  whole  range  of  our  legislation 
less  understood,  and  in  relation  to  which  there  exists  so  many 
errors,  and  such  unhappy  prejudices  and  misconception. 

"There  may  be  said  to  be  two  great  parties  in  this  country,  who 
entertain  very  opposite  opinions  in  relation  to  the  character  of  the 
policy  which  the  Government  has  heretofore  pursued,  in  relation 
to  the  public  lands,  as  well  as  to  that  which  ought,  hereafter,  to  be 
pursued."  ^ 

The  introduction  to  his  second  speech,  in  part,  was: — 

"When  I  took  occasion,  two  days  ago,  to  throw  out  some  ideas 
with  respect  to  the  policy  of  the  Government  in  relation  to  the 
public  lands,  nothing  certainly  could  have  been  farther  from  my 

*  Debates  in  Congress,  Vol.  VI,  Part  I,  pp.  21-32. 


THE  MAIN  SPEECHES  401 

thoughts  than  that  I  should  be  compelled  again  to  throw  myself 
upon  the  indulgence  of  the  Senate.  Little  did  I  expect  to  be  called 
upon  to  meet  such  an  argument  as  was  yesterday  urged  by  the 
gentleman  from  Massachusetts  (Mr.  Webster).  Sir,  I  questioned 
no  man's  opinions;  I  impeached  no  man's  motives;  I  charged  no 
party,  or  State,  or  section  of  country,  with  hostility  to  any  other; 
but  ventured,  I  thought  in  a  becoming  spirit,  to  put  forth  my  own 
sentiments  in  relation  to  a  great  national  question  of  public  policy. 
Such  was  my  course.  The  gentleman  from  Missouri  (Mr.  Benton), 
it  is  true,  had  charged  upon  the  Eastern  States  an  early  and  con- 
tinued hostility  towards  the  West,  and  referred  to  a  number  of 
historical  facts  and  documents  in  support  of  that  charge.  Now, 
sir,  how  have  these  different  arguments  been  met.''  The  honorable 
gentleman  from  Massachusetts,  after  deliberating  a  whole  night 
upon  his  course,  comes  into  this  chamber  to  vindicate  New  England, 
and,  instead  of  making  up  his  issue  with  the  gentleman  from  Mis- 
souri, on  the  charges  which  he  had  preferred,  chooses  to  consider 
me  as  the  author  of  those  charges,  and,  losing  sight  entirely  of  that 
gentleman,  selects  me  as  his  adversary,  and  pours  out  all  the  vials 
of  his  mighty  wrath  upon  my  devoted  head.  Nor  is  he  willing  to 
stop  there.  He  goes  on  to  assail  the  institutions  and  policy  of  the 
South,  and  calls  in  question  the  principles  and  conduct  of  the  State 
which  I  have  the  honor  to  represent.  When  I  find  a  gentleman  of 
mature  age  and  experience,  of  acknowledged  talents  and  profound 
sagacity,  pursuing  a  course  like  this,  declining  the  contest  offered 
from  the  West,  and  making  war  upon  the  unoffending  South,  I 
must  believe,  I  am  bound  to  believe,  he  has  some  object  in  view 
that  he  has  not  ventured  to  disclose.  Why  is  this?  Has  the  gentle- 
man discovered  in  former  controversies  with  the  gentleman  from 
Missouri  that  he  is  overmatched  by  that  Senator.'*  And  does  he 
hope  for  a  more  easy  victory  over  a  more  feeble  adversary?  Has 
the  gentleman's  distempered  fancy  been  disturbed  by  gloomy  fore- 
bodings of  'new  alliances  to  be  formed,'  at  which  he  hinted?  Has 
the  ghost  of  the  murdered  Coalition  come  back,  like  the  ghost  of 
Banquo,  to  *sear  the  eye-balls'  of  the  gentleman,  and  will  it  not 
Mown  at  his  bidding'?  Are  dark  visions  of  broken  hopes,  and 
honors  lost  forever,  still  floating  before  his  heated  imagination? 
Sir,  if  it  be  his  object  to  thrust  me  between  the  gentleman  from, 
Missouri  and  himself,  in  order  to  rescue  the  East  from  the  contest 


402  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

it  has  provoked  with  the  West,  he  shall  not  be  gratified.  Sir,  I  will 
not  be  dragged  into  the  defence  of  my  friend  from  Missouri.  The 
South  shall  not  be  forced  into  a  conflict  not  its  own.  The  gentleman 
from  Missouri  is  able  to  fight  his  own  battles.  The  gallant  West 
needs  no  aid  from  the  South  to  repel  any  attack  which  may  be 
made  on  them  from  any  quarter.  Let  the  gentleman  from  Massa- 
chusetts controvert  the  facts  and  argument?  of  the  gentleman  from 
Missouri — if  he  can;  and  if  he  win  the  victory,  let  him  wear  its 
honors:  I  shall  not  deprive  him  of  his  laurels."  ^ 

c.  Definition  of  terms  in  the  introduction  is  especially 
important  in  debate.  We  have  seen  that  the  purpose  of 
all  preliminary  definition  is  to  enable  the  reader  or  hearer 
readily  to  comprehend  the  terms  used  in  the  discussion.  In 
written  argumentation,  if  the  reader  runs  across  a  word  or 
phrase  that  he  does  not  understand,  he  can  pause  and  think 
it  over  till  he  does  understand,  or  he  can  even  lay  aside  the 
essay  for  a  time  until  he  can  find  out  the  meaning  elsewhere. 
But  in  spoken  discourse  it  is  different.  The  audience  must 
catch  the  meaning  of  every  phrase  and  every  idea  as  it  falls 
from  the  lips  of  the  speaker,  or  they  will  not  get  it  at  all, 
and  the  effect  of  the  whole  argument  will  be  lost.  Conse- 
quently, the  greatest  care  must  be  taken  that  no  term  is  left 
ambiguous.  The  methods  of  defining  have  already  been 
explained;  it  only  needs  to  be  emphasized  that  definition  is 
more  important  in  debate  than  in  any  other  form  of  discussion. 

d.  Issues  in  debate.  For  a  similar  reason  the  issues  and 
explanation  of  the  question  are  important.  And  there  is  this 
additional  reason  for  giving  attention  to  the  issues :  in  debate 
a  great  multiplicity  of  facts  and  arguments  is  thrown  together 
in  a  short  time;  and  an  audience  may  easily  become  perplexed 
in  the  midst  of  such  confusion,  unless  they  are  given  some 
standard  of  judgment.  An  audience  cannot  see  the  force  or 
bearing  of  arguments,  unless  they  understand  what  are  the  vital 
points  in  the  question.  If  they  know  the  issues,  they  can 
appreciate  the  meaning  of  any  important  fact  that  is  pre- 

1  Debater  in  Congress,  Vol.  VI,  Part  I,  p.  43. 


THE  MAIN  SPEECHES  403 

sented,  and  they  will  be  likely  to  remember  it;  but  an  au- 
dience, left  free  to  judge  things  according  to  their  own  pre- 
vious knowledge  and  preconceived  opinions,  cannot  be  relied 
on  to  judge  rightly  as  to  what  is  worth  remembering.  For 
these  reasons  the  issues  should  always  be  presented  in  the  in- 
troduction in  someforrriy  and  further,  it  is  wise  to  repeat  them 
in  various  forms  in  the  discussion,  keeping  them  always  clearly 
before  the  audience. 

e.  Partition  in  debate.  The  desirability  of  the  partition 
is  always  a  matter  of  judgment,  depending  entirely  on  the 
circumstances.  It  always  contributes  to  clearness;  but  it  is 
sometimes  unwise  to  reveal  in  detail  to  the  enemy  the  line 
of  attack  you  intend  to  pursue.  There  is  no  ethical  considera- 
tion that  demands  a  full  statement  of  plan  at  the  very  outset. 
When  to  divulge  matter  should  be  determined  by  the  cir- 
cumstances. The  interests  of  the  audience  and  of  your  own 
side  should  determine — not  the  interests  of  your  opponents. 
The  only  thing  demanded  by  ethics  and  good  sportsmanship 
is  that  you  give  your  opponents  time  to  ansiver  each  point, 
provided  they  are  prepared.  You  are  under  no  obligation 
to  give  them  time  to  prepare  an  answer.  This  would  only 
encourage  lazy  and  careless  preparation.  Each  side  should 
be  ready  for  anything  the  other  side  can  say — and  should 
be  given  a  fair  chance  to  show  they  are  ready.  Sometimes 
a  distinct  partition  is  impossible;  for  example,  in  the 
Lincoln-Douglas  debates  a  definite  partition  would  have 
been  awkward  and  inappropriate,  for  no  particular  question 
was  under  discussion,  the  debates  being  informal  and  ex- 
temporaneous, and  really  but  a  running  fight.  In  general  a 
partition  of  some  kind  is  desirable,  unless  there  is  some  objec- 
tion to  it,  such  as  those  suggested  above.  A  partition  need 
not  be  formal  in  character;  it  does  not  necessarily  imply  a 
division  of  the  proof  into  three,  four,  or  five  parts,  stating 
exactly  what  is  to  be  proved.  The  partition  may  be  very 
cursory  and  informal,  merely  suggesting  for  the  sake  of  clear- 
ness the  general  course  to  be  followed  in  the  discussion;  for 


404  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

example,  in  the  following,  taken  from  the  introduction  to 
Charles  Sumner's  speech  in  the  Senate,  May  19  and  20,  1866, 
on  the  '*Bill  for  the  Admission  of  Kansas  into  the  Union," 
Mr.  Sumner  makes  a  partition,  which  adds  greatly  to  the 
clearness  and  force  of  the  speech,  but  which,  at  the  sam^ 
time,  has  no  air  of  formality  and  reveals  nothing  of  the  char-, 
acter  of  the  arguments  to  follow: — 

"Such  is  the  Crime  and  such  the  criminal  which  it  is  my  duty 
to  expose;  and,  by  the  blessings  of  God,  this  duty  shall  be  done 
completely  to  the  end.  But  this  will  not  be  enough.  The  Apologies, 
which,  with  strange  hardihood  are  offered  for  the  Crime,  must  be 
torn  away,  so  that  it  shall  stand  forth  without  a  single  rag  or  fig-leaf 
to  cover  its  vileness.  And,  finally,  the  True  Remedy  must  be 
shown.  The  subject  is  complex  in  relations,  as  it  is  transcendent 
in  importance;  and  yet,  if  I  am  honored  by  your  attention,  I  hope 
to  present  it  clearly  in  all  its  parts,  while  I  conduct  you  to  the 
inevitable  conclusion  that  Kansas  must  be  admitted  at  once,  with 
her  present  Constitution,  as  a  State  of  this  Union,  and  give  a  new 
star  to  the  blue  field  of  our  National  Flag.  And  here  I  derive 
satisfaction  from  the  thought  that  the  cause  is  so  strong  in  itself 
as  to  bear  even  the  infirmities  of  its  advocates;  nor  can  it  require 
anything  beyond  that  simplicity  of  treatment  and  moderation  of 
manner  which  I  desire  to  cultivate.  Its  true  character  is  such 
that,  like  Hercules,  it  will  conquer  just  so  soon  as  it  is  recognized. 

"  My  task  will  be  divided  under  three  different  heads :  first,  THE 
CRIME  AGAINST  KANSAS,  in  its  origin  and  extent;  secondly, 
THE  APOLOGIES  FOR  THE  CRIME;  and,  thirdly,  THE  TRUE 
REMEDY."  1 

2.  The  Discussion 

a.  Main  heads.  In  drawing  a  brief  for  use  in  debate,  par- 
ticular care  should  be  taken  in  the  selection  of  the  main  heads. 
Not  only  should  the  question  be  divided  accurately  and 
logically,  but  also  attention  should  be  given  to  the  forms  of 
statement  of  the  headings.  These  main  headings  are  sure  to 
be  the  objective  points  of  the  attack  of  the  other  side,  and 
1  Works  of  Charles  Sumner,  Vol.  IV,  pp.  143,  144. 


THE  MAIN  SPEECHES  405 

they  must  be  made  strong  enough  to  stand  the  shock.  If  an 
opponent  can  force  you  to  take  back  a  phrase,  or  to  acknowl- 
edge an  exaggeration  in  any  of  your  fundamental  proposi- 
tions, he  has  scored  a  point,  and  the  audience  will  always 
give  him  credit  for  it,  often  more  credit  than  he  really  de- 
serves. Carelessness  or  rhetorical  flourish  must  never  be 
permitted  to  make  a  main  heading  say  either  more  or  less 
than  exactly  what  is  meant.  Intrenchments  are  not  built 
because  they  look  well,  but  because  they  can  be  held  against 
attack;  main  headings  are  not  made  because  they  sound  well, 
but  because  they  offer  definite  points  of  resistance  to  an 
opponent. 

Senator  Douglas,  in  the  debates  mentioned  above,  with 
his  habitually  bombastic  style  of  oratory,  made  many  wild 
charges  and  assertions.  Often  the  point  he  aimed  to  establish 
was  valid,  but,  through  carelessness  or  over-excitement,  he 
exaggerated.  He  had  an  able  opponent,  and  every  blunder 
and  every  exaggeration  was  laid  bare,  much  to  his  discom- 
fiture and  humiliation.  Lincoln,  on  the  other  hand,  as  he 
himself  admitted  in  the  discussion,  prepared  with  sedulous 
care  the  statement  of  every  important  proposition  he  ad- 
vanced. His  propositions  were  attacked  and  his  attitude  was 
repeatedly  misrepresented  by  Senator  Douglas,  but  reply  was 
difficult;  he  had  only  to  read  the  exact  words  of  his  former 
speeches  and  reiterate  his  statements,  thus  at  the  same  time 
reenforcing  his  own  position  and  exposing  the  trickery  of  his 
opponent.  For  example,  in  the  following  selection  Lincoln 
replies  to  such  an  attack  on  one  of  his  fundamental  proposi- 
tions:— 

"Out  of  this  Judge  Douglas  builds  up  his  beautiful  fabrication — 
of  my  purpose  to  introduce  a  perfect,  social,  and  political  equality 
between  the  white  and  black  races.  His  assertion  that  I  made  an 
*  especial  objection'  ...  to  the  decision  (the  Dred  Scott  decision) 
on  this  account  is  untrue  in  point  of  fact. 

"Now,  while  I  am  upon  this  subject,  and  as  Henry  Clay  has 
been  alluded  to,  I  desire  to  place  myself  in  connection  with  Mr. 


406  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

Clay  as  nearly  right  before  this  people  as  may  be.  I  am  quite  aware 
what  the  Judge's  object  is  here  by  all  these  allusions.  He  knows 
that  we  are  before  an  audience,  having  strong  sympathies  south- 
ward by  relationship,  place  of  birth,  and  so  on.  He  desires  to  place 
me  in  an  extremely  abolition  attitude.  He  read  upon  a  former 
occasion,  and  alludes  without  reading  to-day,  to  a  portion  of  a 
speech  which  I  delivered  in  Chicago.  In  his  quotations  from  that 
speech,  as  he  has  made  them  upon  former  occasions,  the  extracts 
were  taken  in  such  a  way  as,  I  suppose,  brings  them  within  the 
definition  of  what  is  called  garbling — taking  portions  of  a  speech 
which,  when  taken  by  themselves,  do  not  present  the  entire  sense 
of  the  speaker  as  expressed  at  the  time.  I  propose,  therefore,  out 
of  that  same  speech  to  show  how  one  portion  of  it  which  he  skipped 
over  (taking  an  extract  before  and  an  extract  after)  will  give  a 
different  idea,  and  the  true  idea  I  intended  to  convey.  .  .  . 

"Allow  me  .  .  .  briefly  to  present  one  extract  from  a  speech  of 
mine,  more  than  a  year  ago,  at  Springfield,  in  discussing  this  very 
same  question,  soon  after  Judge  Douglas  took  his  ground  that  ne- 
groes were  not  included  in  the  Declaration  of  Independence: — 

"  'I  think  the  authors  of  that  notable  instrument  intended  to 
include  all  men,  but  they  did  not  mean  to  declare  all  men  equal 
in  all  respects.  They  did  not  mean  to  say  all  men  were  equal  in 
color,  size,  intellect,  moral  development,  or  social  capacity.  They 
defined  with  tolerable  distinctness  in  what  they  did  consider  all 
men  created  equal — equal  in  certain  inalienable  rights,  among  which 
are  life,  liberty,  and  the  pursuit  of  happiness.  This  they  said,  and 
this  they  meant.  They  did  not  mean  to  assert  the  obvious  untruth, 
that  all  men  were  actually  enjoying  that  equality,  or  yet,  that 
they  were  about  to  confer  it  immediately  upon  them.  In  fact, 
they  had  no  power  to  confer  such  a  boon.  They  meant  simply  to 
declare  the  rigkty  so  that  the  enforcement  of  it  might  follow  as  fast 
as  circumstances  should  permit. 

"  'They  meant  to  set  up  a  standard  maxim  for  free  society  which 
should  be  familiar  to  all:  constantly  looked  to,  constantly  labored 
for,  and  even,  though  never  perfectly  attained,  constantly  approxi- 
mated, and  thereby  constantly  spreading  and  deepening  its  in- 
fluence, and  augmenting  the  happiness  and  value  of  life  to  all 
people,  of  all  colors,  everywhere.' 

*' There  again  are  the  sentiments  I  have  expressed  in  regard  to 


THE  MAIN  SPEECHES  407 

the  Declaration  of  Independence  upon  a  former  occasion — senti- 
ments which  have  been  put  in  print  and  read  wherever  anybody 
cared  to  know  what  so  humble  an  individual  as  myself  chose  to 
say  in  regard  to  it."  ^ 

b.  Repetition.  Another  evidence  of  the  skill  of  these 
two  debaters  is  found  in  the  constant  repetition  by  both,  of 
sentences  and  phrases  containing  their  main  propositions. 
In  speech  after  speech,  and  many  times  over  in  each  speech, 
Senator  Douglas  repeated  his  cry  of  "popular  sovereignty, 
the  right  of  the  people  of  a  State  to  settle  the  question  of 
slavery  for  themselves,"  and  his  demand  for  "obedience  to 
the  decision  of  the  highest  tribunal  in  the  land,  the  Supreme 
Court.'*  Lincoln  we  find  reiterating  with  equal  persistence 
his  statements  that  "a  house  divided  against  itself  cannot 
stand;  this  government  cannot  endure  permanently  half 
slave  and  half  free";  that  "slavery  is  wrong";  that  "slavery 
must  be  put  where  it  was  put  at  the  foundation  of  the  govern- 
ment, in  the  course  of  ultimate  extinction."  It  is  well  to  bear 
in  mind  in  preparing  a  case,  the  desirability  of  this  repetition 
in  oral  debate.  An  audience  cannot  turn  back  to  compare 
statements  and  refresh  memory.  The  speaker  must  by 
various  devices  "  keep  his  case  up  "  clearly  before  the  audience 
all  the  time.  Repetition  is  one  of  the  most  serviceable  of 
such  devices.  Every  main  heading  should,  as  far  as  possible, 
be  stated  in  such  rhetorical  form  that  it  can  be  easily  and 
forcibly  repeated;  it  should  be  stated  briefly  and  in  clear  and 
simple  language.  Sometimes  it  is  effective  to  compress  the 
idea  into  a  single  word  or  phrase;  as,  for  illustration,  Charles 
Sumner  did  in  his  speech  in  the  Senate  on  the  "  Crime  against 
Kansas,"  a  speech  referred  to  above: — 

"And  with  this  exposure  I  take  my  leave  of  the  Crime  against 
Kansas.  Emerging  from  all  the  blackness  of  this  Crime,  where  we 
seem  to  have  been  lost,  as  in  a  savage  wood,  and  turning  our  back 
upon  it,  as  upon  desolation  and  death,  from  which,  while  others 

^  Lincoln-Douglas  Debates,  p.  224. 


d08  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

have  suffered,  we  have  escaped,  I  come  now  to  THE  APOLOGIES 
which  the  Crime  has  found.  .  .  . 

"They  are  four  in  number,  and  fourfold  in  character.  The  first 
is  the  Apology  tyrannical;  the  second,  the  Apology  imbecile;  the 
third,  the  Apology  absurd;  and  the  fourth,  the  Apology  infamous; 
that  is  all.  Tyranny,  imbecility,  absurdity,  and  infamy  all  unite  to 
dance,  like  the  weird  sisters,  about  this  Crime. 

"The  Apology  tyrannical  is  founded  on  the  mistaken  act  of  Gov- 
ernor Reeder,  in  authenticating  the  Usurping  Legislature,"  etc. 

Again,  later  in  hLs  speech,  he  said: — 

"As  the  Apologias  were  fourfold,  so  are  the  proposed  Remedies 
fourfold;  and  they  range  themselves  in  natural  order,  under  designa- 
tions which  so  truly  disclose  their  character  as  even  to  supersede 
argument.  First,  we  have  the  Remedy  of  Tyranny;  next,  the  Remedy 
of  Folly;  next,  the  Remedy  of  Injustice  and  Civil  War;  and  fourthly, 
the  Remedy  of  Justice  and  Peace.  There  are  four  caskets;  and  you 
are  to  deitermine  which  shall  be  opened  by  Senatorial  votes. 

"There  is  the  Remedy  of  Tyranny,  which,  like  its  complement, 
the  Apology  of  Tyranny, — though  espoused  on  this  floor,  especially 
by  the  Senator  from  Illinois, — proceeds  from  the  President,  and  is 
embodied  in  a  special  message,"  etc.^ 

This  method  has  the  virtue  of  vividness.  Each  of  the 
phrases  chosen  is  striking  and  likely  to  stick  in  the  memory; 
it  can  be  readily  repeated  and  almost  turned  into  a  sort  of 
war-cry.  But  care  must  be  taken  in  choosing  the  phrase,  to 
see  that  it  is  appropriate  and  that  it  expresses  the  full  mean- 
ing of  the  speaker.  Furthermore,  the  audience  must  always 
be  made  to  understand  just  what  the  phrase  implies;  the 
word  "heading"  always  suggests  a  name  rather  than  a 
proposition,  and  is  liable  to  be  vague  or  ambiguous  if  left 
unexplained.  Mr.  Summer,  in  the  speech  quoted  above,  was 
careful,  in  every  case,  to  state  in  fair  and  full  language  the 
exact  proposition  he  intended  to  attack  or  support;  for  ex- 
ample, after  stating,  as  quoted  above,  the  four  apologies  made 

1  WarJes  of  Charles  Sumner,  Vol.  VI,  pp.  184  and  185. 


THE  MAIN  SPEECHES  40'A 

by  his  opponents,  naming  them,  respectively,  "the  apology 
tyrannical,  the  apology  imbecile,  the  apology  absurd,  and 
the  apology  infamous,"  he  goes  on  to  explain  the  meaning 
of  each  name  as  follows: — 

"Next  comes  the  Apology  imbecile,  which  is  founded  on  the  al- 
leged want  of  power  in  the  President  to  arrest  this  Crime.  It  is 
openly  asserted,  that,  under  existing  laws,  the  Chief  Magistrate 
has  no  authority  to  interfere  in  Kansas  for  this  purpose.  .  .  . 

"Next  comes  the  Apology  absurd,  which  is,  indeed,  in  the  nature 
of  pretext.  It  is  alleged  that  a  small  printed  pamphlet,  containing 
the  '  Constitution  and  Ritual  of  the  Grand  Encampment  and  Regi- 
ments of  the  Kansas  Legion,'  was  taken  from  the  person  of  one 
George  F.  Warren,  who  attempted  to  avoid  detection  by  chewing 
it.  The  oaths  and  grandiose  titles  of  the  pretended  legion  are  also 
set  forth,  and  this  poor  mummery  of  a  secret  society,  which  existed 
only  on  paper,  is  gravely  introduced  on  this  floor,  in  order  to  ex- 
tenuate the  Crime  against  Kansas.  It  has  been  paraded  in  more 
than  one  speech,  and  even  stuffed  into  the  report  of  the  Com- 
mittee," etc.i 

c.  Summaries  and  partitions.  The  desirability  and  proper 
use  of  summaries  and  partitions  in  the  discussion,  has  been 
already  treated  in  the  chapters  on  Presentation.  But  it 
should  be  said  here,  in  addition,  that  the  best  opportunity 
and  the  greatest  demand  for  using  these  artifices  is  found  in 
debate.  Something  of  this  kind  is  necessary  to  bring  order 
out  of  chaos.  In  the  confusion  of  argument,  answer,  and 
rejoinder,  of  evidence  and  counter  evidence,  of  big  things  and 
little  things,  crowded  together  and  following  one  another  in 
rapid  succession,  the  effect  on  the  audience  easily  becomes 
kaleidoscopic;  they  see  the  combinations  of  shapes  and  colors 
tossing  about  before  their  eyes,  but  there  is  nothing  in  par- 
ticular to  be  impressed  by,  or  to  remember.  These  defects 
can  be  avoided  in  large  measure  by  the  use  of  internal  sum- 
maries, i.  e.,  summaries  at  various  points  within  the  proof, 
which  serve  to  pick  out  the  really  important  things  in  the 

1  Works  of  Charles  Sumner,  Vol.  IV,  pp.  187  and  192. 


410  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

question  and  impress  them  clearly  upon  the  attention  and 
memory.  Furthermore,  used  in  conjunction  with  partitions, 
they  keep  the  audience  always  informed  just  where  they  are 
and  where  they  are  to  be  led  next.  At  every  turn  in  the  course 
of  the  debate  there  are  many  roads  branching  out  in  various 
directions.  A  summary  or  a  partition,  or  the  two  in  combina- 
tion, makes  clear  to  the  listener  that  he  has  reached  the 
end  of  one  road  and  put  it  behind  him,  and  that  he  is  now 
to  turn  in  a  certain  new  direction  for  a  time.  Particularly 
when,  in  debate,  some  point  has  been  discussed  back  and 
forth  foi*  a  time  between  the  opposing  sides,  it  is  almost 
necessary  to  summarize  what  has  been  said  on  each  side, 
to  compare  the  opposing  proofs,  and  make  clear  what  you 
would  have  the  audience  believe  is  the  result  of  it  all.  It  is 
only  in  this  way  that  matters  can  be  brought  to  some  con- 
clusion, and  the  audience  made  ready  to  turn  their  attention 
elsewhere. 

d.  Asking  questions.  A  common  stratagem  of  debate  is 
the  asking  of  questions.  By  this  is  not  meant  the  figure  of 
speech  known  as  the  "rhetorical  question."  The  stratagem 
consists  rather  in  directly  asking  questions  that  really  call  for 
an  answer.  This  is  usually  engaged  in  during  the  give  and 
take  of  the  discussion.  The  purposes  of  resorting  to  this 
stratagem  are  three:  (I)  To  compel  an  opponent  to  take  a 
definite  position  on  some  issue:  (II)  to  tempt  him  to  waste 
time  on  trivial  matters,  or  (III)  to  force  him  into  a  dilemma, 
where  he  may  be  caught  whichever  way  he  answers. 

(I)  To  get  definite  answers.  To  accomplish  the  first  of 
these  aims,  the  value  of  a  question  is  obvious.  A  debater  often 
encounters  an  opponent  whose  power  lies  less  in  his  ability 
to  prove  an  issue  than  in  his  ability  to  evade  it.  Such  an 
opponent  is  facile  in  shifting  ground  and  can  readily  becloud 
the  point  in  dispute.  He  is  like  a  cuttlefish  that  squirts  the 
water  full  of  a  black  excretion  and  escapes  in  the  darkness.  In 
exposing  and  cornering  such  a  man,  there  is  hardly  a  better 
way  to  "pin  him  down"  than  to  compress  the  point  in  issue 


TEE  MAIN  SPEECHES  411 

into  a  single,  clear,  direct  question  and  demand  an  answer. 
The  question,  of  course,  needs  to  be  framed  in  such  a  way 
that  it  cannot  be  readily  evaded  or  distorted  from  its  intended 
meaning;  also,  in  asking  the  question,  it  should  be  presented 
in  such  a  forcible  and  imperative  manner  that  a  failure  to 
answer  will  be  unsafe.  But,  with  these  precautions,  in  the 
face  of  a  question  clearly  worded  and  strongly  put,  an  oppo- 
nent will  find  it  difficult  to  evade  the  issue. 

(II)  To  waste  time.  To  propound  questions  for  an  oppo- 
nent to  waste  time  upon  is  good  tactics  under  some  circum- 
stances, and  the  disposition  of  such  a  question  is  a  good  test 
of  a  debater's  ability.  A  question  put  with  an  air  of  taunt  or 
challenge  is  a  great  temptation;  an  inexperienced  or  impul- 
sive debater  may  often  be  drawn  into  the  trap  of  answering 
at  any  cost.  This  trick  is  sometimes  tried  in  intercollegiate 
debate,  where  the  time  is  limited  and  a  waste  of  even  a  minute 
is  a  serious  matter.  A  debater  should  realize  the  nature  of 
this  stratagem,  not  only  in  order  to  be  able  to  try  it  himself, 
but  in  order  to  be  able  to  appreciate  it  when  he  is  the  intended 
victim.  There  is  one  rule  that  is  truly  a  golden  rule  for  an 
inexperienced  debater,  "Stick  to  the  point."  There  are  three 
ways  of  evading  such  questions.  One  way  is  to  ignore  them, 
a  method  which  is  sometimes  not  safe  if  the  questions  have 
been  well  presented,  and  if  the  audience  seems  to  be  impressed 
with  them.  Another  is  to  avoid  them  by  evasive  ambiguous 
answers,  a  method  which  calls  for  much  tact  and  shrewdness. 
The  third,  is  to  expose  them  by  explaining  the  motives  of  the 
propounder  of  the  questions,  to  show  that  the  questions  are 
not  important,  but  merely  intended  as  snares. 

(ni)  To  force  into  a  dilemma.  The  third  purpose  that 
may  be  served  by  the  asking  of  a  question  is  that  of  forcing 
an  opponent  into  a  dilemma,  where  he  may  be  caught,  how- 
ever he  answers.  Lincoln,  with  great  shrewdness,  drove 
Senator  Douglas  into  such  a  situation  in  the  joint  debates 
in  1858.  Briefly,  the  circumstances  were  these:  Lincoln 
assumed  at  the  start  a  position  of  hostility  to  the  Dred  Scott 


412  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

Decision,  which  declared,  in  substance,  that  Congress  had  no 
power  to  exclude  slavery  from  any  of  the  territories.  Senator 
Douglas  attacked  Mr.  Lincoln  bitterly  for  his  position  in  the 
matter,  declaring  that  any  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court 
was  final  and  sacred,  and  that  any  man  who  rejected  or  de- 
nounced such  a  decision  was  "unpatriotic,  disloyal,  revolu- 
tionary," etc.  It  also  happened  that  Mr.  Lincoln  had  charged 
Senator  Douglas  with  being  concerned  with  certain  other 
Democrats  in  a  conspiracy  to  **  nationalize  slavery."  He  gave 
evidence  tending  to  expose  such  a  conspiracy,  and  showed  that 
but  one  thing  was  wanted  to  make  it  complete,  viz.,  a  decision 
of  the  Supreme  Court,  declaring  that  a  state  of  the  Union 
could  not  exclude  slavery  from  its  limits;  and  he  further- 
more charged  Senator  Douglas  with  planning  and  working 
to  procure  such  a  decision.  Under  the  circumstances,  Mr. 
Lincoln  propounded  the  following  question:  *'If  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States  shall  decide  that  States  cannot 
exclude  slavery  from  their  limits,  are  you  in  favor  of  acquies- 
ing  in  it,  adopting  it,  and  following  it  as  a  rule  of  political 
action?"  Senator  Douglas  was  caught.  If  he  answered  in 
the  affirmative,  he  seemed  to  substantiate  the  charge  of  con- 
spiracy to  get  such  a  decision,  and  gave  Mr.  Lincoln  an 
opportunity  to  drive  home  his  attack;  on  the  other  hand,  if 
he  answered  in  the  negative,  he  was  committing  the  very  act 
which  he  had  denounced  in  Mr.  Lincoln  as  unpatriotic,  revo- 
lutionary and  heretical,  viz.,  opposing  a  decision  of  the 
Supreme  Court.  But  one  course  was  open,  and  the  wily 
debater  adopted  it;  he  evaded  the  question.  In  his  speech 
at  Freeport,  August  27,  he  said: — 

"The  third  question  which  Mr.  Lincoln  presented  is,  if  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  shall  decide  that  a  State  of 
this  Union  cannot  exclude  slavery  from  its  own  limits,  will  I  submit 
to  it?  I  am  amazed  that  Lincoln  should  ask  such  a  question.  ('A 
schoolboy  knows  better.')  Yes,  a  schoolboy  does  know  better. 
Mr.  Lincoln's  object  is  to  cast  an  imputation  upon  the  Supreme 
Court.    He  knows  that  there  never  was  but  one  man  in  America, 


THE  MAIN  SPEECHES  413 

claiming  any  degree  of  intelligence  or  decency,  who  ever  fot  a  mo- 
ment pretended  such  a  thing.  It  is  true  that  the  Washington 
Union,  in  an  article  published  on  the  17th  of  last  December,  did 
put  forth  that  doctrine,  and  I  denounced  the  article  on  the  floor 
of  the  Senate  in  a  speech  which  Mr.  Lincoln  now  pretends  was 
against  the  President.  The  Union  had  claimed  that  slavery  had  a 
right  to  go  into  the  free  states,  and  that  any  provision  in  the  con- 
stitution or  laws  of  the  free.  States  to  the  contrary  were  null  and 
void.  I  denounced  it  in  the  Senate,  as  I  said  before,  and  I  was  the 
first  man  who  did.  Lincoln's  friends,  Trumbull,  and  Seward,  and 
Hale,  and  Wilson,  and  the  whole  black  Republican  side  of  the 
Senate,  were  silent.  They  left  it  to  me  to  denounce  it.  And  what 
was  the  reply  made  to  me  on  that  occasion  .^^  Mr.  Toombs  of 
Georgia  got  up  and  undertook  to  lecture  me  on  the  ground  that 
I  ought  not  to  have  deemed  the  article  worthy  of  notice,  and  ought 
not  to  have  replied  to  it;  that  there  was  not  one  man,  woman,  or 
child  south  of  the  Potomac,  in  any  slave  State,  who  did  not  repu- 
diate any  such  pretension.  Mr.  Lincoln  knows  that  that  reply  was 
made  on  the  spot,  and  yet  he  now  asks  this  question.  He  might  as 
well  ask  me,  suppose  Mr.  Lincoln  should  steal  a  horse,  would  I 
sanction  it;  and  it  would  be  as  genteel  in  me  to  ask  him,  in  the 
event  he  stole  a  horse,  what  ought  to  be  done  with  him.  He  casts 
an  imputation  upon  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  by 
supposing  that  they  would  violate  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States.  I  tell  him  that  such  a  thing  is  not  possible.  It  would  be 
an  act  of  moral  treason  that  no  man  on  the  bench  could  ever  de- 
scend to.  Mr.  Lincoln  himself  would  never  in  his  partisan  feelings 
so  far  forget  what  was  right  as  to  be  guilty  of  such  an  act."  ^ 

3.  The  Conclusion 

With  respect  to  the  conclusion,  little  needs  to  be  said  more 
than  has  already  been  said  in  the  book  on  Presentation. 
The  importance  of  the  conclusion  in  debate  is  obvious.  It 
is  undoubtedly  an  advantage  to  be  so  placed  as  to  be  able 
to  direct  the  course  of  things  to  come;  but  it  is  a  greater  ad- 
vantage to  be  so  placed  ai§  to  be  able  to  review  and  sum  up  the 
things  that  are  past.  To  the  .last  speaker  is  given  the  oppor- 
^  Lincoln-Douglas  Debates,  p.  96. 


414  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

tunity  of  leaving  his  interpretation  of  the  facts,  and  his  sum- 
mary of  the  important  points,  fresh  in  the  minds  of  his  au- 
dience. So  that  a  closing  speaker  is  even  better  situated  than 
an  opening  speaker,  to  obtain  the  acceptance  of  his  method 
of  dividing  the  question  and  his  statement  of  the  issues;  that 
is,  he  is  in  such  a  position  that  he  can  finally  persuade  the 
audience  to  look  at  the  question  through  his  eyes.  Moreover, 
on  any  contested  point  he  has  the  privilege  of  the  last  word. 

a.  Strategy  in  conclusion.  Oftentimes  a  speaker,  if  he 
knows  beforehand  that  he  is  to  have  the  privileges  of  the  final 
reply,  can  with  good  effect  hold  some  of  his  fire  till  the  end 
and  surprise  the  enemy  with  new  evidence  when  reenforce- 
ment  is  badly  needed.  This  is  a  bit  of  strategy  that  can  be 
practiced  in  many  situations.  For  example,  in  intercollegiate 
debate,  or  any  similar  prearranged  contest  where  the  jiumber 
and  order  of  speakers  is  fixed,  it  is  not  unusual  that  one  side 
keeps  back  its  best  refutation  of  some  point  in  the  discussion 
till  its  last  speech.  By  this  means  the  opposing  side  may 
perhaps  be  led  to  think  that  the  point  has  been  conceded  and 
so  be  tempted  to  keep  silence  themselves.  x\gain,  it  is  a  wise 
stratagem  when  a  speaker  feels  that  he  has  the  weaker  end 
of  the  proof  on  a  point :  if  he  reveals  his  answer  too  early,  his 
opponents  may  make  a  rejoinder  and  lay  bare  the  weakness; 
but  by  waiting  till  later  he  shelters  the  weakest  parts  of  his 
case.  When  it  is  necessary  to  fight  with  crippled  soldiers  in 
the  ranks,  they  should  be  given  the  most  protected  positions. 
It  will,  however,  be  kept  clearly  in  mind  that  what  is  said  in 
this  paragraph,  when  applied  to  rebuttal  speeches,  refers 
only  to  answers  that  are  to  be  made  to  opponents*  arguments; 
for  it  is  generally  conceded  that  a  debater  ought  not  to  introduce 
new  positive  arguments  in  his  rebuttal.  But  one  has  a  perfect 
right  to  answer  arguments  when  he  pleases. 

b.  Summarizing.  From  the  viewpoint  of  conviction,  the 
first  duty  of  a  speaker  who  closes  the  argument  for  his  side 
of  the  case,  is  to  summarize  the  whole  proof.  We  have  al- 
ready spoken  several  times  of  the  confusion  natural  to  de- 


THE  MAIN  SPEECHES  415 

bate,  a  confusion  arising  from  the  rapid  succession  of  argu- 
ments and  evidence,  and  from  the  conflicts,  crossings,  and 
interminglings  of  the  proofs  and  ideas  of  both  sides.  We 
refer  to  it  again  only  to  emphasize  the  value  of  concluding 
summaries.  After  people  have  listened  for  any  consid- 
erable time,  to  the  presentation  of  a  mass  of  heterogeneous 
facts  and  ideas,  they  need  to  have  their  conceptions  of  the 
case  as  a  whole  straightened  out  again,  and  to  have  their 
memories  refreshed  with  a  new  understanding  of  the  points 
that  are  important.  The  auditors  cannot  be  relied  on  to  carry 
in  mind  to  the  end  the  things  that  are  vital;  their  vision  is 
sure  to  become  clouded  by  details,  and  they  turn  with  relief 
to  a  man  who  will  clear  up  matters  and  set  them  right.  For 
this  reason  the  hearers  can  be  counted  on  to  give  careful 
attention  to  a  concluding  summary,  and  so  they  are  more 
likely  to  remember  it  than  almost  anything  else  in  the  debate. 
The  desirability  of  the  summary  is  made  greater  by  the  fact 
that,  in  the  debate,  the  proof  of  either  side  is  scattered  along 
through  the  discussion;  it  consequently  becomes  necessary, 
if  the  proof  is  to  be  properly  unified,  that  these  broken  threads 
be  woven  together  at  the  end  by  a  summary.  In  some  cir- 
cumstances a  mere  recapitulation  by  the  last  speaker  is  not 
enough.  In  debates  where  there  is  "team-work,'*  it  is  often 
desirable  that  each  speaker  in  his  conclusion  should  summa- 
rize what  has  preceded.  This  keeps  the  hearers  always  in 
close  touch  with  the  proof,  and  gives  them  an  understanding 
of  just  what  is  being  accomplished  at  each  forward  step;  then 
when  the  end  is  finally  reached,  the  case,  as  a  whole,  is  em- 
bedded in  their  minds,  and  the  final  summary  is  much  more 
intelligible  and  effective.  The  mistake  may  easily  be  made  of 
making  a  summary  too  long  or  too  detailed.  To  be  effective 
it  needs  always  to  be  direct ,  incisive ,  and  as  brief  as  is  consistent 
with  clearness.  To  be  diffuse  or  tediously  technical  destroys 
the  aggressive  force  that  is  indispensable.  Any  kind  ot 
recapitulation  must  be  as  sharp,  as  firm,  and  as  bold  as  the 
blows  of  the  hammer.    Such  a  conclusion  is  exemplified  in 


416  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

the  following  peroration  of  a  speech  by  Sir  Robert  Peel,  in  the 
debate  in  the  House  of  Commons  on  the  bill  relieving  the  dis- 
abilities of  the  Jews.  It  is  especially  to  be  noticed  for  its  skil- 
ful repetition  and  emphasis  of  the  central  idea  of  the  whole 
speech,  viz.,  forgiveness  and  reparation   for  past  wrongs: 

"It  is  for  these  reasons — because  I  believe  it  to  be  in  conformity 
with  the  enlarged  and  comprehensive  spirit  of  the  British  Con- 
stitution— that  these  disqualifications  should  no  longer  exist;  be- 
cause I  rejoice  in  the  opportunity  of  making  reparation  for"  the 
injuries  and  persecutions  of  former  times;  because  I  think  the  Jew 
has  fairly  earned  the  privileges  which  it  is  proposed  to  extend  to 
him,  by  patience  and  forbearance,  by  tried  fidelity  and  loyalty; 
but  above  all,  because  I  am  a  member  of  a  Christian  people,  because 
I  am  a  member  of  a  Christian  legislature,  I  will  perform  an  act 
which  I  believe  to  be  in  strict  conformity  with  the  spirit  and  pre- 
cepts of  the  Christian  religion.  We  are  commanded  by  that  re- 
ligion, as  the  condition  of  our  own  forgiveness  to  forgive  those  who 
have  trespassed  against  us.  That  duty  is  not  in  this  case  imposed 
upon  us;  but  there  is  another  duty  as  sacred  in  point  of  moral 
obligation,  and  more  trying  to  human  pride,  namely,  that  we  should 
forgive  those  against  whom  we  have  trespassed.  Sir,  I  shall  give 
my  cordial  support  to  the  bill  before  the  House."  ^ 

c.  Balanced  summary.  Of  all  the  forms  of  summaries 
that  may  be  used,  the  most  effective  in  debate  is  "the  bal- 
anced summary,"  that  which  in  an  earlier  part  we  have 
called  '* amplifying  and  diminishing."  The  distinguishing 
characteristic  of  debate  is  the  directness  of  conflict  between 
the  opposing  sides.  The  audience  is  kept  constantly  balanc- 
ing one  argument  against  another  and  swaying  back  and 
forth  with  the  struggle  of  the  contending  factions.  Conse- 
quently in  the  end  their  judgment  is  always  relative.  It  is 
not  that  one  side  is  strong  or  weak,  but  that  it  is  on  the  whole 
stronger  or  weaker  than  the  other.  So  it  is  clearly  wiser  to 
assist  the  audience  in  this  comparison  and  try  to  make  them 
see  the  relative  strength  of  the  two  sides  as  you  wish  them 
1  World's  Orators  (England),  Part  III,  p.  211. 


THE  MAIN  SPEECHES  417 

to  make  the  comparison  by  themselves,  according  to  what- 
ever standards  may  happen  to  be  uppermost  in  their  minds. 
Sometimes,  if  a  speaker  feels  that  he  has  the  weaker  side  of  the 
proof,  it  is  more  politic  for  him  to  leave  his  hearers  in  uncer- 
tainty, and  to  cover  up  the  logical  conclusion  that  would 
result  from  such  a  comparison.  This  is  good  tactics,  for  ex- 
ample, when  a  man  adopts  a  policy  of  obstruction,  i.  e.,  when 
he  finds  that  he  has  not  a  strong  positive  case,  and  so  resorts 
to  the  trick  of  lying  in  wait  and  throwing  up  objections 
against  his  opponent.  If  all  his  objections  were  carefully 
analyzed  and  logically  summed  up,  they  would  not  really 
amount  to  much;  so  his  only  hope  lies  in  the  general  discredit 
he  may  throw  upon  the  proof  against  him.  In  such  a  situa- 
tion he  would  suffer  by  a  contrast  of  point  with  point,  and 
he  would  gain  by  leaving  matters  in  confusion.  This  is,  of 
course,  a  great  confession  of  weakness  and  is  very  danger- 
ous wdth  opponents  good  enough  to  recognize  and  expose  it. 
But,  assuming  that  a  speaker  has  a  fair  side  of  the  argument, 
to  amplify  and  diminish  is  advisable.  It  makes  the  proof  com- 
plete and  presents  definitely  a  statement  of  the  conclusion 
that  must  be  drawn.  It  is  a  final  charge,  where  all  the  forces 
of  your  own  side  are  gathered  together  and  thrown  directly 
against  the  enemy.  A  good  illustration  of  its  effectiveness 
is  found  in  the  conclusion  of  Senator  Douglas's  speech  at 
Chicago,  July  9,  1858:— 

"Thus  you  see,  my  fellow-citizens,  that  the  issues  between  Mr. 
Lincoln  and  myself,  as  respective  candidates  for  the  U.  S.  Senate, 
as  made  up,  are  direct,  unequivocal,  and  irreconcilable.  He  goes 
for  uniformity  in  our  domestic  institutions,  for  a  war  of  sections, 
until  one  or  the  other  shall  be  subdued.  I  go  for  the  great  principle 
of  the  Kansas-Nebraska  bill,  the  right  of  the  people  to  decide  for 
themselves. 

"On  the  other  point,  Mr.  Lincoln  goes  for  a  warfare  on  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  because  of  their  judicial 
decision  in  the  Dred  Scott  case.  I  yield  obedience  to  the  decision 
of  that  court — to  the  final  determination  of  the  highest  judicial 


418  ARGUMENTATION  AND   DEBATE 

tribunal  known  to  our  constitution.  He  objects  to  the  Dred  Scott 
decision  because  it  does  not  put  the  negro  in  the  possession  of  the 
rights  of  citizenship  on  an  equality  with  the  white  man.  I  am  op- 
posed to  negro  equality.  I  repeat  that  this  nation  is  a  white  people — 
a  people  composed  of  European  descendants — a  people  that  have 
established  this  government  for  themselves  and  their  posterity,  and 
I  am  in  favor  of  preserving  not  only  the  purity  of  the  blood,  but  the 
purity  of  the  government  from  any  mixture  or  amalgamation  with 
inferior  races.  I  have  seen  the  effects  of  this  mixture  of  superior 
and  inferior  races — this  amalgamation  of  white  men  and  Indians 
and  negroes;  we  have  seen  it  in  Mexico,  in  Central  America,  in 
South  America,  and  in  all  the  Spanish-American  States,  and  its 
result  has  been  degeneration,  demoralization,  and  degradation  below 
the  capacity  for  self-government. 

"I  am  opposed  to  taking  any  step  that  recognizes  the  negro 
man  or  the  Indian  as  the  equal  of  the  white  man.  I  am  opposed  to 
giving  him  a  voice  in  the  administration  of  the  government.  I 
would  extend  to  the  negro,  and  the  Indian,  and  to  all  dependent 
races  every  right,  every  privilege,  and  every  immunity  consistent 
with  the  safety  and  welfare  of  the  white  races;  but  equality  they 
never  should  have,  either  political  or  social,  or  in  any  other  respect 
whatever. 

"My  friends,  you  see  that  the  issues  are  distinctly  drawn.  I 
stand  by  the  same  platform  that  I  have  so  often  proclaimed  to 
you  and  to  the  people  of  Illinois  heretofore.  I  stand  by  the  Demo- 
cratic organization,  yield  obedience  to  its  usages,  and  support  its 
regular  nominations.  I  indorse  and  approve  the  Cincinnati  plat- 
form, and  I  adhere  to  and  intend  to  carry  out,  as  part  of  that  plat- 
form, the  great  principle  of  self-government,  which  recognizes  the 
right  of  the  people  in  each  State  and  Territory  to  decide  for  them- 
selves their  domestic  institutions.  In  other  words,  if  the  Lecompton 
issue  shall  arise  again,  you  have  only  to  turn  back  and  see  where 
you  have  found  me  during  the  last  six  months,  and  then  rest  as- 
sured that  you  will  find  me  in  the  same  position,  batthng  for  the 
same  principle,  and  vindicating  it  from  assault,  from  whatever 
quarter  it  may  come,  so  long  as  I  have  the  power  to  do  it."  ^ 

In  this  summary  the  speaker  has  stated  with  fair  accuracy 
1  Lincdn-Douglas  Debates,  pp.  12,  13. 


THE  MAIN  SPEECHES  419 

the  points  of  difference  between  him  and  his  opponent,  but 
he  has  so  stated  them  as  to  present  his  own  side  always  in 
the  better  Hght.  He  places  the  arguments  side  by  side,  but 
he  states  the  points  in  a  manner  favorable  to  himself;  and  at 
the  close  he  drives  home  the  fact  and  the  idea  that  lies  at  the 
foundation  of  his  own  case,  thus  leaving  in  the  minds  of  his 
hearers  an  impression  that,  on  the  whole,  their  votes  and 
their  support  should  be  given  to  his  cause. 


CHAPTER  18 

REBUTTAL   SPEECHES 

OUTLINE 

A.  Rebuttal  explained. 

B.  No  new  constructive  points. 

C.  The  preparation  of  rebuttal. 

1.  Must  be  prepared  in  advance. 

2.  Memorized  preparation. 

3.  Know  the  other  side. 

4.  Be  ready  for  surprises. 

D.  Effect  of  time  limit. 

E.  Answer  whole  case. 

1.  Find  fundamental  points. 

2.  Show  audience. 

F.  Have  a  clear  and  careful  method. 

G.  Be  fair  to  opponents. 

A.  Rebuttal  explained.  General  refutation  has  already 
been  defined  as  the  destruction  of  opposing  proofs.  It  is 
either  evidence  or  argument  presented,  not  for  the  purpose 
of  directly  advancing  your  own  case,  but  of  blocking  or 
destroying  the  case  of  your  opponent.  It  is  now  the  almost 
universal  practice  in  contest  debating  (and  is  very  common 
in  actual  debates  in  assemblies  of  various  sorts)  to  provide  for 
special  second  speeches  to  be  made  after  the  main  cases  have 
been  presented,  for  the  purpose  of  presenting  such  material. 
Such  speeches  are  called  rebuttal  speeches.  In  law  rebuttal 
is  "the  giving  of  evidence  on  the  part  of  a  plaintiff  (affirma- 
tive) to  destroy  the  effect  of  evidence  introduced  by  the 
defendant  (negative)  in  the  same  suit."  (Webster's  Diet.) 
In  some  debates,  both  contest  and  real,  this  legal  precedent 
is  more  closely  followed,  and  the  affirmative  only  has  rebuttal 
speeches.     Of  course,  all  speakers  on  both  sides  may  have 

420 


REBUTTAL  SPEECHES  421 

more  or  less  refutation  in  the  main  speeches.  Since  the  order 
of  speaking  and  the  nature  of  negative  cases  gives  the  nega- 
tive speakers  superior  opportunities  for  refutation  in  the  main 
speeches,  it  is  well  to  give  the  affirmative  some  compensating 
advantages  in  rebuttal.  So  even  where  both  sides  have  equal 
rebuttal  speeches,  the  negative  leads  in  rebuttal,  giving  the 
affirmative  the  last  rebuttal  speech.  Refutation  is  the  broader 
term  (as  we  use  them)  and  rebuttal  is  the  refutation  that  is 
given  in  a  special  speech  which  has  properly  no  (or  very 
little)  constructive  material  in  it. 

B.  No  new  constructive  points  of  importance  should  be 
allowed  in  the  rebuttal  speeches.  Only  such  material  as  can 
be  used  against  the  opponents'  case  should  be  permitted.  It 
has  already  been  suggested  that  it  is  well  in  a  debate  where 
a  man  may  speak  more  than  once  to  hold  material  in  reserve 
for  rebuttal.  It  is,  of  course,  possible  to  repeat  or  refer  to 
arguments  and  evidence  already  given,  but  such  repetition 
or  reference  must  be  subordinate  to  rebuttal  and  used  de- 
structively, not  constructively.  But  the  repetition  of  old 
materials  is  never  quite  so  strong  as  the  production  of  new. 
So  that  it  is  sometimes  good  strategy,  even  at  the  cost  of 
taking  something  away  from  the  strength  of  a  first  speech, 
to  hold  back  some  good  evidence  as  a  reserve.  But  the  judges 
of  contest  debates  should  always  penalize  debaters  who  sim- 
ply repeat  or  continue  their  main  speeches  during  the  time 
allowed  for  rebuttal.  All  that  has  been  said  concerning 
refutation  in  argumentation  (in  chapter  15)  applies  to  re- 
buttal speechs  in  debate.  It  is  not  repeated  here,  not  because 
it  is  less  important,  but  because  it  has  been  sufficiently  dis- 
cussed in  that  chapter.  Refutation  is  the  very  essence  of 
debate,  and  the  power  to  refute  well  is  one  to  be  sought  by  a 
debater  as  earnestly  as  he  would  seek  any  single  power  that 
a  public  speaker  may  hope  to  possess. 

C.  The  preparation  of  rebuttal  should  be  very  carefully 
done.  This  does  not  mean,  however,  that  rebuttal  speeches 
should  be  memorized,  or  even  written  out. 


422  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

1.  The  rebuttal  must  be  prepared  in  advance.  The  mate- 
rial out  of  which  to  fashion  rebuttal  speeches  should  be  care- 
fully gathered  and  arranged  for  rapid  use.  Many  contest  de- 
baters fail  in  this  phase  of  their  work.  In  debate,  rebuttal  is  no 
less  important  than  positive  proof;  in  intercollegiate  debates  it 
is  most  often  the  rebuttal  that  is  decisive;  in  any  discussion  it 
is  the  "last  speech*'  that  is  coveted;  Webster's  famous  Reply 
to  Hayne  was  almost  pure  refutation.  And  it  is  very  sel- 
dom that  successful  refutation  is  impromptu.  Good  rebuttal 
speeches  are  practically  always  extempore,  not  impromptu, 
nor  memorized.  An  anecdote  in  point  is  told  concerning 
one  of  the  most  brilliant  advocates  of  the  English  bar.  This 
lawyer  was  one  day  arguing  an  important  case  before  one  of 
the  highest  tribunals  of  the  country.  In  the  course  of  the 
trial  he  was  made  the  object  of  an  attack,  personal  and  politi- 
cal in  nature,  from  his  opponent,  the  attorney  for  the  prose- 
cution. The  attack  was  bitter,  but  forcible  and  persuasive. 
It  seemed  to  be  unexpected  by  any  one;  the  court  was  sur- 
prised, but  manifestly  affected.  The  advocate  arose  to  make 
reply,  and  in  his  introduction,  with  perfect  calmness  and 
great  eloquence,  he  answered  every  charge,  retrieved  the 
lost  favor  of  the  court,  and  overpowered  his  assailant  with  an 
irresistible  invective.  After  this  trial  was  finished,  one  of  the 
judges — a  personal  friend — expressed  his  surprise  and  ad- 
miration at  the  extraordinary  eloquence  of  the  reply,  declar- 
ing the  retort  to  be  one  of  the  most  brilliant  passages  ever 
heard  in  an  English  court  of  law,  and  added,  that  he  had 
never  believed  such  impromptu  oratory  to  be  within  the  lim- 
its of  human  powers.  In  answer  to  these  congratulations,  the 
advocate  invited  the  justice  to  accompany  him  to  his  law 
chambers.  Entering  his  library,  he  walked  to  a  desk,  opened 
a  drawer,  and  took  from  it  a  manuscript;  it  was  his  speech  of 
the  morning  written  out  in  full,  nearly  word  for  word  as  he 
had  delivered  it.  He  had  foreseen  a  contingency  that  nobody 
else  had  expected  or  deemed  possible,  and  had  made  ready  to 
meet  the  situation.     He  won  because  he  had  prepared  in 


REBUTTAL  SPEECHES  423 

advance.     And  the  circumstances   of  his   situation   made 
practically  memorized  preparation  proper. 

2.  Memorized  preparation,  however,  should  rarely  be  at- 
tempted by  beginners,  especially  in  contest  debating.  There 
is,  in  the  first  place,  too  great  danger  that  the  opposition  will 
not  say  just  what  you  are  prepared  to  answer — and  there  is 
in  debate  no  greater  exhibition  of  stupidity,  no  greater  indica- 
tion of  weakness,  than  is  afforded  by  a  memorized  rebuttal 
that  does  not  fit.  Preparation  of  material  to  meet  extem- 
poraneously any  stand  taken  by  the  opposition  is  good 
preparation.  Anything  else  is  weak  and  dangerous.  Daniel 
Webster  declared  that  all  the  material  of  his  Reply  to  Hayne 
tad  been  gathered,  and  waiting  in  his  desk  for  months  before 
the  debate.  Speaking  of  Senator  Hayne,  he  said  to  a  friend : 
"If  he  had  tried  to  make  a  speech  to  fit  my  notes,  he  could 
not  have  hit  it  better.  No  man  is  ever  inspired  with  the 
occasion;  I  never  was."  Mere  words  and  gestures  do  not 
make  refutation  any  more  than  they  make  positive  proof. 
There  must  be  just  as  much  evidence  in  the  one  as  in  the 
other.  Rebuttal  demands  as  careful  a  choice  of  weapons 
and  as  accurate  a  method  of  handling  them  as  any  other 
kind  of  proof.  Invention,  selection,  and  arrangement  de- 
mand as  much  preliminary  planning  here,  as  elsewhere. 

3.  Know  the  other  side.  Clearly,  the  primary  necessity 
in  preparing  refutation  is  to  know  just  what  points  we  may 
be  called  upon  to  answer;  we  must  have  a  clear  and  accurate 
understanding  of  the  points  our  opponents  need  to  establish, 
and  of  the  methods  they  may  adopt  in  the  attempt.  Would 
any  capable  general  ever  lay  the  plans  for  a  battle  without 
first  considering  the  position  of  his  enemy,  his  location,  his 
points  of  strength  and  weakness?  As  we  have  discovered 
earlier,  the  selecting  of  the  main  heads  of  brief  in  debate, 
depends  very  largely  upon  what  the  opposition  may  be  able 
to  "do  about  it."  Those  points  must  be  chosen  for  em- 
phasis, points  that  hit  hardest  and  straightest  at  the  necessary 
proofs  of  the  other  side  (when  we  are  able  to  tell  in  advance 


424  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

what  such  necessary  proof  will  be) ;  and  at  the  same  time  we 
must  remember  that  these  main  heads  will  surely  be  attacked, 
and  we  must  take  up  a  position  that  is  defensible  against 
assault.  All  this  means  a  study  and  comparison  of  the  two 
sides  of  the  question,  so  as  to  find  out  what  arguments  need 
to  be  attacked,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  how  one's  own  ar- 
guments may  be  best  defended  against  the  particular  attack 
the  other  side  will  have  to  make. 

4.  Be  ready  for  surprises.  But  it  is  rarely  possible  to 
foresee  every  argument  that  an  opponent  may  advance.  No 
two  persons  reason  just  alike:  an  opponent  may  well  look 
at  the  question  from  some  peculiar  standpoint,  or,  as  more 
often  happens,  he  may  plan  a  surprise.  Then,  too,  there  are 
many  minor  questions  that  are  raised  in  such  a  discussion, 
which  it  is  hardly  worth  while  trying  to  anticipate,  or  which 
escape  notice  in  preparation.  Commonly,  these  minor  points 
are  best  left  unanswered;  but  sometimes  circumstances  make 
them  worth  notice.  Whatever  the  reason,  it  is  certain  that 
all  the  incidents  of  a  debate  cannot  be  foreseen;  we  must 
always  expect  the  unexpected.  A  successful  debater  must 
always  be  ready  to  meet  strange  situations,  and  to  manufac- 
ture more  or  less  of  refutation  and  of  proof  on  the  scene  of 
action.  Now,  a  disputant  who  has  read  only  on  those  phases 
of  the  question  that  are  of  interest  to  him,  or  who  undertakes 
only  those  parts  of  the  discussion  that  he  treats  in  his  own 
proof,  is  helpless  in  such  circumstances.  He  has  no  resources 
to  draw  upon.  If  the  discussion  were  in  writing,  he  might 
think  it  over,  consult  new  authorities,  and  plan  his  answer; 
but  in  debate  there  is  no  such  opportunity.  He  must  act 
at  once.  He  is  in  the  predicament  of  a  military  expedition 
that  sets  out  on  a  long  campaign,  with  a  day's  rations  and 
no  base  of  supplies.  When  a  debater  is  thus  surprised,  his 
only  hope  must  lie  in  having  a  thorough  knowledge  of  the 
question  as  a  whole,  and  in  all  its  details,  a  knowledge  so 
thorough  as  to  be  ready  at  the  call  of  any  exigency.  Further- 
more, a  broad  understanding  of  the  foundations  and  general 


REBUTTAL  SPEECHES  425 

conditions  of  the  question  is  necessary,  in  order  to  be  able 
to  estimate  rightly  the  force  and  bearing  of  arguments 
that  are  made  by  opponents.  A  superficial  preparation 
always  distorts  the  mental  vision  of  a  speaker,  and  confuses 
in  his  mind  the  real  issues  in  the  discussion.  But  debate  de- 
mands an  especially  clear  perception  and  quick  judgment  of 
what  is  vital;  the  debater  must  think  as  quickly  and  act  as 
decisively  as  the  broker  on  the  exchange;  superficial  in- 
formation or  a  confused  understanding  mean  as  sure  disaster 
in  the  one  case  as  in  the  other.  A  debater  in  action  must  be 
able,  when  any  argument  or  any  evidence  is  brought  against 
him,  to  estimate  in  a  few  seconds  just  what  the  matter 
amounts  to,  how  it  is  related  to  his  own  case,  how  much  to 
say  about  it,  and  where — in  what  part  of  his  speech — to  an- 
swer it.  Here  a  stock  of  ready-made  arguments  becomes  useless. 
Only  a  deep  understanding  of  the  subject  to  the  very  bottom  can 
give  the  clear,  ready  insight,  and  the  steady  judgment  that  alone 
avails. 

D.  Effect  of  time  limit.  These  foregoing  suggestions  are 
especially  applicable  in  preparation  for  school  or  college  de- 
bates. There  the  limitations  of  time  are  very  stringent:  not 
the  smallest  fraction  of  a  minute  can  be  lost  in  confusion  or 
unnecessary  deliberation;  the  answer  must  be  in  the  debater's 
head  as  soon  as  the  argument  has  left  his  opponent's  lips. 
This  necessity  for  such  preparation,  important  everywhere, 
here  intensified  by  the  circumstances,  constitutes  one  of  the 
most  valuable  phases  of  contest  debating. 

E.  Answer  whole  case.  Too  much  emphasis  cannot  be 
given  to  the  remarks  in  chapter  15  concerning  what  to  answer 
in  refutation.  It  is  probably  worth  while  here  to  discuss  this 
question  with  particular  reference  to  the  rebuttal  speeches  in 
formal  debate.  The  great  fundamental  principle  which 
should  guide  the  preparation  of  all  rebuttal  speeches  is :  An- 
swer the  whole  case  of  the  other  side.  One  of  the  fatal  weak- 
nesses in  the  power  of  any  debater,  and  a  weakness  that  is 
almost  invariably  displayed  by  a  beginner,  is  the  weakness 


426  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

of  attacking  only  a  part  of  an  opponent's  proof.  It  is  easiest, 
in  refutation  to  pick  out  the  weak  points  of  the  opposition 
and  attack  them,  leaving  the  more  formidable  points  stand- 
ing: it  demands  less  careful  preparation,  and  a  less  accurate 
analysis  of  the  case  of  the  other  side;  and  it  often  seems  to 
make  the  greatest  impression  on  the  audience.  Consequently 
there  is  a  temptation  to  pick  up  the  more  obvious  errors  of  an 
opponent  and  dramatically  expose  them,  or  to  seize  upon 
some  foolish  word  or  phrase  and  ridicule  it;  it  brings  a  laugh 
or  a  burst  of  applause,  whereas,  in  an  attempt  to  refute  any 
of  the  stronger  proofs,  success  is  not  so  easy,  for  the  audience, 
feeling  that  there  are  two  sides  to  the  issue,  are  not  so  readily 
convinced.  But  in  the  end,  the  audience  will  probably  adhere 
to  the  man  who  has  made  them  believe  that  his  case,  as  a 
whole,  is  the  stronger.  Consequently,  to  achieve  final  success, 
the  debater  must  endeavor  to  make  them  see,  not  that  he  has 
destroyed  an  argument  here  and  there,  but  that  he  has  over- 
whelmed the  proof  against  him,  in  its  entirety. 

1.  Find  the  fundamental  points.  In  order  to  make  an 
attack  upon  the  whole  case  of  the  other  side,  two  things  are  nec- 
essary. In  the^r^^  place,  the  speaker  must  analyze  the  entire 
'proof  of  his  opponents  and  pick  out  the  few  basic  points  in  it. 
It  is  necessary  to  determine  upon  the  few  fundamental 
points  of  an  opponent's  proof,  for  the  same  reason  that  it  is 
necessary  to  determine  upon  those  of  one's  own.  It  is  nec- 
essary for  the  sake  of  clearness;  to  give  the  same  attention  to 
the  large  and  the  small  points  of  the  other  side  perplexes  a 
hearer  in  his  undertsanding  of  the  question  as  a  whole.  It 
is  necessary  for  the  sake  of  emphasis;  it  is  only  by  neglecting 
or  slighting  trivial  facts  and  dwelling  upon  the  important 
ones,  that  the  vital  points  of  the  question  can  be  brought  out 
into  a  clear  light.  It  is  necessary  for  the  sake  of  saving  time; 
rebuttal  speeches  are  usually  short,  and  definitely  limited. 
To  give  attention  to  the  facts  of  secondary  importance  is  to 
waste  part  of  these  precious  minutes.  If  the  vital  points 
of  an  opponent's  contentions  are  destroyed,  his  subordinate 


REBUTTAL  SPEECHES  427 

points  fall  with  them  and  so  do  not  need  special  rebuttal. 
These  main  contentions  must  be  answered  if  an  opponent 
is  to  be  defeated  at  all,  and,  if  they  are  answered,  to  do  more  is 
superfluous. 

2.  Show  audience  that  these  points  cover  the  case.  But 
it  is  not  enough  for  a  debater  merely  to  pick  out  in  his  own 
mind  the  important  points  of  the  other  side,  and  proceed  to 
refute  them,  he  must,  in  the  second  place,  make  it  clear  to  the 
audience  that  in  answering  these  points  he  is  meeting  the  whole 
case  against  him — that  these  are  the  foundations  of  the  oppos- 
ing case.  To  give  the  rebuttal  its  full  effect  requires  that  the 
audience  be  made  to  see  that  the  speaker  is  attacking  the 
entire  proof  in  opposition,  and  that,  if  he  succeeds,  he  has 
won  his  case.  To  do  this  requires  that  the  arguments  to  be 
answered  shall  be  stated  clearly  beforehand,  and  that  they 
shall  be  explained  in  such  a  way  as  to  make  it  evident  that  in 
them  is  contained  the  whole  case  of  the  other  side.  It  is  very 
often  desirable,  as  a  means  of  making  it  evident  that  the 
whole  case  of  the  other  side  is  being  attacked,  to  analyze 
openly  before  the  audience  the  proof  of  an  opponent,  and 
explain  just  what  his  argument  as  a  whole  amounts  to.  For 
instance,  a  speaker  in  rebuttal  might  well  begin  in  some  such 
manner  as  this:  ''Everything  of  any  importance  that  my 
opponent  has  had  to  say  on  this  question  may  be  reduced  to 
these  three  propositions,  viz.,  first,  etc.,  second,  etc.,  third;" 
"my  opponent's  case,  as  far  as  it  has  been  presented  to  us 
can  be  stated  in  his  own  words,  as  follows,"  etc.  In  some 
such  way  the  audience  may  be  made  to  have  faith  in  the 
speaker's  sincerity,  and  in  the  importance  of  his  efforts  in 
rebuttal,  and  so  be  made  ready  to  acknowledge  the  full  force 
of  his  refutation. 

For  example,  Webster,  in  his  Reply  to  Hayne  in  the  debate 
on  the  Foote  Resolution,  devoted  the  body  of  his  speech  to 
the  refutation  of  Senator  Hayne's  theory  of  states'  rights 
under  the  Constitution.  Before  entering  on  this  task,  he 
set  forth  in  full  the  case  presented  by  Senator  Hayne,  stating 


428  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

all  the  essential  propositions  of  his  doctrine,  and  making  it 
evident  that  taken  together  they  embraced  everything  that 
demanded  refutation: — 

"There  yet  remains  to  be  performed  by  far  the  most  grave  and 
important  duty,  which  I  feel  to  be  devolved  on  me  by  this  occasion. 
It  is  to  state,  and  to  defend,  what  I  conceive  to  be  the  true  principles 
of  the  constitution  under  which  we  are  here  assembled.  I  might 
well  have  desired  that  so  weighty  a  task  should  have  fallen  into 
other  and  abler  hands.  I  could  have  wished  that  it  should  have 
been  executed  by  those  whose  character  and  experience  give  weight 
and  influence  to  their  opinions,  such  as  cannot  possibly  belong  to 
mine.  But,  sir,  I  have  met  the  occasion,  not  sought  it;  and  I  shall 
proceed  to  state  my  own  sentiments,  without  challenging  for  them 
any  particular  regard,  with  studied  plainness,  and  as  much  precision 
as  possible. 

*'I  understand  the  honorable  gentleman  from  South  Carolina  to 
maintain,  that  it  is  a  right  of  the  State  Legislatures  to  interfere, 
whenever,  in  their  judgment,  this  Government  transcends  its  con- 
stitutional limits,  and  to  arrest  the  operation  of  its  laws. 

"I  understand  him  to  maintain  this  right,  as  a  right  existing  under 
the  constitution;  not  as  a  right  to  overthrow  it,  on  the  ground  of 
extreme  necessity,  such  as  would  justify  violent  revolution. 

"I  understand  him  to  maintain  an  authority,  on  the  part  of  the 
states,  thus  to  interfere,  for  the  purpose  of  correcting  the  exercise 
of  power  by  the  General  Government,  of  checking  it,  and  of  com- 
pelling it  to  conform  to  their  opinion  of  the  extent  of  its  powers. 

"I  understand  him  to  maint:ain  that  the  ultimate  power  of  judg- 
ing of  the  constitutional  extent  of  its  own  authority  is  not  lodged 
exclusively  in  the  General  Government,  or  any  branch  of  it;  but 
that,  on  the  contrary,  the  States  may  lawfully  decide  for  them- 
selves, and  each  state  for  itself,  whether  in  a  given  case,  the  act 
of  the  General  Government  transcends  its  power. 

*'I  understand  him  to  insist  that,  if  the  exigency  of  the  case,  in 
the  opinion  of  any  State  Government,  require  it,  such  State  Gov- 
ernment may,  by  its  own  sovereign  authority,  annul  an  act  of  the 
General  Government,  which  it  deems  plainly  and  palpably  un- 
constitutional." 1 

1  Congressional  Debates,  Vol.  VI,  Part  I,  pp.  72,  73. 


REBUTTAL  SPEECHES  429 

F.  Have  a  clear  and  careful  method.  The  natural  tend- 
ency of  young  debaters  in  rebuttal  is  toward  carelessness  of 
method.  It  is  true,  even  of  more  experienced  men,  that 
speakers  who  are  very  careful  in  arranging  and  presenting 
their  original  proofs,  when  they  come  to  the  work  of  refuta- 
tion, forget  themselves  and  degenerate  into  a  weak  informal- 
ity, wandering  from  the  point  and  mixing  up  their  materials 
without  regard  for  clearness  of  statement,  the  proper  arrange- 
ment of  evidence,  or  the  natural  sequence  of  the  proofs. 
Rebuttal  is  no  more  informal  than  any  other  kind  of  demon- 
stration, and  requires  just  as  much  care  in  presentation. 
The  materials  for  it  must  be  selected  as  judiciously,  arranged 
as  logically,  and  stated  as  clearly.  A  young  debater  does  well 
to  watch  himself  consciously  till  he  has  formed  firm  habits 
of  the  right  kind. 

G.  Be  fair  to  opponents.  The  final  word  in  regard  to 
rebuttal  speeches  is:  Be  fair,  courteous,  good  humored^  and 
honest  in  dealing  with  the  opposing  case.  State  the  opposing 
arguments  fairly.  Do  not  color  them  to  suit  yourself  by 
rephrasing,  or  substituting,  or  inserting  words  not  used  by 
your  antagonist.  In  the  use  of  charts  and  maps,  in  asking  to 
examine  evidence,  in  giving  them  an  opportunity  to  examine 
your  evidence,  be  courteous.  You  will  hurt  your  own  case, 
and  make  your  audience  uncomfortable  by  being  churlish 
and  ill-tempered.  It  is  probably  not  necessary  to  advocate 
and  advise  common  honesty.  An  honest  man  will  be  an 
honest  debater.  Manufacturing  evidence,  garbling  quota- 
tions, falsifying  references,  misstating  facts — these  things 
are  not "  strategy,"  and  "  part  of  the  game."  They  are  simply 
cheap  dishonesty — plain  lies.  No  self-respecting  debater 
will  indulge  in  such  practices.  In  contest  debating  when  the 
stupid  or  dishonest  are  detected  in  such  practices,  permanent 
disbarment  from  platform  activities  should  be  the  minimum 
penalty. 


CHAPTER  19 

DELIVERY 

OUTLINE 

A.  Oral  presentation  in  debate. 

B.  Four  methods. 

1.  Reading. 

2.  Memorizing. 

a.  Place  for  memorized  speeches. 

b.  Writing  as  a  preparation. 

3.  Impromptu. 

4.  Extemporaneous. 

a.  Advantages. 

(I)  Flexibility  of  speech. 

(II)  Fit  mood  of  audience. 

(III)  Physical  advantage. 

(IV)  Use  of  inspiration  from  audience. 

b.  Dangers. 

(I)  Exaggeration. 

(II)  Repetition  of  substance. 

(III)  Monotony  of  form. 

c.  Dangers  may  be  overcome. 

d.  Combining  memoriter  and  extempore:  "Block  Sys- 

tem." 

e.  Specific  suggestions  for  extemporaneous  debating. 

(I)  Notes. 

(II)  Outlines. 

(III)  Charts. 

(IV)  Platform  hints. 

(V)  Practice. 

A.  Oral  presentation  in  debate.  All  that  has  to  do  with 
oral  delivery  is  of  great  importance  in  debate.  To  know  how 
to  investigate  a  problem,  gather  and  arrange  argument  and 

430 


DELIVERY  431 

evidence,  and  write  a  convincing  and  persuasive  speech  does 
not  make  one  a  debater.  A  good  debater  must  be  able  to  do 
all  this,  and  in  addition  must  be  able  to  speak  well  in  public 
— must  be  able  to  present  his  case  orally  to  an  audience. 
In  getting  ready  for  this  final  and  crucial  part  of  his  work, 
the  fundamental  question  the  debater  has  to  meet  is:  "How 
much  shall  I  write — How  far  shall  I  put  my  preparation  into 
written  form?"  This  is  an  important  question:  habits  ill- 
formed  in  this  particular  have  been  responsible  for  the  fail- 
ures of  many  preachers,  lecturers,  and  advocates.  On  the 
other  hand,  correct  habits  are  equally  potent  for  success. 
Moreover,  every  beginner  should  realize  that  strength  or 
weakness  in  this  respect  is  truly  a  matter  of  habit,  for  practices 
adopted  early  grow  fast  and  soon  become  difficult  to  aban- 
don. Even  at  the  cost  of  hard  work  and  discouraging  fail- 
ures, a  young  debater  should  begin  right. 

B.  Four  methods.  When  we  come  to  consider  this  ques- 
tion, we  find  there  are  four  possible  methods:  (1)  reading 
manuscript,  (2)  delivering  a  written  manuscript  from  memory , 
(3)  impromptu  speaking  without  any  previous  preparation 
whatever,  (4)  extempore  speaking  from  notes  or  outline. 

1.  Reading.  The  first  method,  that  of  writing  out  a  com- 
plete speech,  and  reading  it  verbatim,  should  never  be  followed 
by  a  debater  in  contest  debating  or  in  actual  controversy 
in  court  or  assembly.  It  is  contrary  to  the  purpose  and  spirit 
of  debate.  A  debate  is  two-sided;  it  consists  of  the  clash  and 
interplay  of  the  opponents.  Without  mutual  adaptation  and 
adjustment  there  can  be  no  real  debate.  Two  written  ar- 
guments on  opposite  sides  of  a  question  do  not  constitute  a 
debate.  But  not  only  this,  not  only  does  this  method  pre- 
clude meeting  an  opponent,  but  it  also  shuts  one  away  from 
the  audience.  There  can  be  little,  if  any,  contact  with  the 
audience.  The  inter-communication  between  speaker  and 
hearer  that  gives  vitality  to  the  speech  is  absolutely  pre- 
cluded. There  may  be  occasions  on  which  a  man  is  justified 
in  reading  a  manuscript  to  an  audience,  but  such  an  occasion 


432  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

is  never  found  in  debate.  Any  one  who  has  ever  heard  a 
preacher  read  his  sermons,  sentence  by  sentence,  from  a 
manuscript,  need  not  be  told  that  in  the  scrimmage  of  a  de- 
bate such  a  practice  would  be  fatal.  This  method  lacks  all 
the  spontaneity,  all  the  power  of  adaptation  to  circumstances, 
all  the  aggressiveness  that  is  essential. 

2.  Memorizing.  The  second  method,  that  of  delivering  a 
written  speech  from  memory  has,  of  course,  most  of  the 
disadvantages  of  the  reading  method.  Considered  as  a 
method  to  be  adopted  permanently  and  for  regular  use, 
memorizing  must  undoubtedly  be  condemned.  The  most 
obvious  defect  of  such  a  practice  is  the  lack  of  adaptability 
to  circumstances.  We  have  already  seen  that  a  large  element 
of  debating  power  lies  in  the  ability  to  appreciate  and  grapple 
with  situations;  but  a  speaker  who  has  learned  the  sentences 
he  is  to  deliver  is  powerless  if  anything  unexpected  arises,  or 
if  his  written  speech  does  not  happen  to  fit  the  occasion. 
Again,  the  memoriter  method  involves  a  great  and  largely 
useless  physical  strain.  It  demands  the  most  severe  mental 
and  nervous  exertion  in  committing  the  speech,  in  worrying 
over  the  chances  of  forgetting,  and  in  delivery.  One's  energy 
should  be  more  intelligently  expended  in  debate.  So  serious 
a  strain  does  it  require,  that  a  continuance  of  such  practices 
tends  to  diminish  spontaneity  and  quickness  of  thought, 
which  gradually  impairs  the  fineness  and  clearness  of  the 
whole  mind.  Memorizing  also  prevents,  in  a  great  degree,  the 
necessary  closeness  of  contact  between  speaker  and  audience. 
It  demands  a  remarkable  degree  of  elocutionary  skill  to  in- 
fuse into  committed  passages  the  variety  and  the  spontaneity 
of  extempore  speaking.  The  memoriter  speaker  all  too  easily 
becomes  an  actor,  posing  and  soHloquizing — an  attitude  fatal 
to  power  in  debate,  for  it  destroys  the  leadership  which  we 
have  seen  is  indispensable  in  the  work  of  persuasion.  Then, 
too,  all  the  inspiration  that  should  come  from  the  reflex 
action  of  the  audience  is  lost.  The  declaimer,  instead  of 
being  stirred  and  directed  by  any  manifestations  of  thought 


DELIVERY  433 

or  emotion  on  the  part  of  his  hearers,  is  liable  to  be  confused 
by  such  influences,  and  is  constantly  fearful  of  their  appear- 
ance. Memorized  debating  is  too  likely  to  be  an  exhihitiony 
not  a  communication.  There  is  probably  little  danger  to-day 
that  debaters  will  read  manuscripts,  but  the  evil  of  memo- 
rized speeches  still  continues.  Teachers  and  coaches  should 
insist  that  debaters  refrain  from  memorizing — even  perhaps 
from  writing  speeches.  Many  college  debaters  are  handi- 
capped by  being  allowed  to  get  the  habit  of  memorizing. 
This  means  that  they  never  reach  their  full  power.  They  are 
like  healthy  men  who  wear  always  appliances  meant  for 
cripples,  for  fear  that  they  may  sometime  need  them.  The 
result  is  a  chronic  weakness  that  makes  the  artificial  support 
necessary.  Any  person  who  has  intelligence  enough  to  have 
a  right  to  hope  to  be  a  debater,  has  intelligence  enough  to 
learn  how  to  debate  extemporaneously.  Would-be  debaters 
should  compel  themselves  to  learn  the  best  method — and 
teachers  should  tolerate  no  other  method  in  practice. 

a.  Place  for  memorized  speeches.  It  must  be  clearly  un- 
stood  that  we  are  not  saying  here  that  there  are  no  proper 
occasions  whatever  for  memorized  speeches.  Indeed,  there, 
are  many  that  call  for  such — or  at  least  on  which  such 
speeches  are  perfectly  appropriate.  But  these  are  never 
debates.  They  are  rather  great  formal  demonstrative  oc- 
casions of  some  sort,  at  which  experienced  speakers  are  called 
on  for  the  "oration  of  the  day."  Experienced  speakers  are 
more  safe  in  memorized  speaking.  It  is  very  difficult  for  a 
young  speaker  who  has  not  had  extensive  platform  experi- 
ence, to  deliver  a  memorized  speech  with  that  directness — 
that  sense  of  communication — which  is  the  very  soul  of  ef- 
fective speaking.  An  experienced  judge  can  usually  tell  the 
exact  point  at  which  a  young  speaker  turns  from  extempore 
to  memoriter  speaking — and  this  is  almost  without  exception 
a  change  from  better  to  worse.  Experienced  speakers  when 
not  debating  may  use  memorized  speeches.  Debaters  and 
beginners  should  avoid  this  method. 


434  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

b.  Writing  speeches  as  part  of  the  preparation  of  a  debate 
is  sometimes  an  excellent  thing.  Often  it  is  dangerous.  It 
is  good  for  the  debater  who  has  the  courage  to  throw  the 
manuscript  into  the  waste  basket  (or  file  it  away),  as  soon  as 
he  has  it  as  he  wants  it  in  form,  length,  etc.  When  this  stage 
is  reached  an  outline  of  the  manuscript  should  be  made 
and  the  manuscript  put  out  of  sight  and  kept  there.  Then 
the  speaking  in  practice  should  be  from  the  outline  without 
any  attempt  to  recall  the  words  of  the  manuscript.  Of  course, 
it  is  true  here  as  elsewhere,  that  the  practice  of  writing  is  a 
great  benefit  to  any  speaker  who  is  strong  enough  to  be 
master  of  what  he  has  written.  Of  course,  a  complete  and 
accurate  brief  should  always  be  written  as  the  basis  of  any 
debate.  Especially  to  a  debater  in  the  early  stages  of  his  ca- 
reer, the  writing  of  briefs,  and,  sometimes,  finished  speeches, 
is  of  the  greatest  value.  Enough  has  already  been  said  in  the 
preceding  parts  of  this  book  to  make  it  evident  that  argumen- 
tation is  a  distinct  art  with  rules  and  methods  peculiar  to 
itself.  Upon  the  understanding  of  these  methods  and  the  ob- 
servation of  these  rules  success  depends,  and  in  bringing  one's 
self  to  comprehend  these  various  principles,  and  to  develop 
habits  in  conformity  with  them,  the  practice  of  writing  is 
very  valuable.  In  preparing  a  careful  and  detailed  brief, 
which  shall  present  all  of  his  proof  in  its  full  strength  to  a 
reader,  a  student  must  at  every  step,  from  the  statement  of 
the  proposition  to  the  final  summary,  be  conscious  of  the  prin- 
ciples he  is  following  and  of  his  reasons  for  doing  so;  he  has 
time  and  opportunity  to  realize  just  why  he  introduces  his 
proof  in  a  certain  way,  why  he  selects  certain  evidence,  why 
he  arranges  his  material  in  accordance  with  a  certain  plan. 
Furthermore,  what  is  written  can  be  subsequently  examined 
for  defects  and  virtues.  In  this  way  a  student  can  detect  his 
weaknesses  and  set  himself  to  remedy  them.  Finally,  a  per- 
son who  is  writing  thinks  more  closely  and  concisely,  and 
uses  more  exact  language  than  one  who  is  speaking,  and  so 
develops  the  qualities  of  straightforward,  logical  reasoning, 


DELIVERY  435 

and  of  clear,  accurate  use  of  words.  It  does  not  follow  that 
a  debater  should  write  all  he  says,  or  that  he  should  always 
keep  up  the  practice  of  writing  as  a  means  of  self-training. 
Study  and  experience  gradually  turn  these  qualities  men- 
tioned above  into  habits  of  mind,  and  the  habits  once  formed 
are  a  permanent  asset.  But,  for  the  debater  in  the  formative 
period  of  his  career,  the  regular  writing  of  briefs  and  manu- 
scripts is  invaluable. 

3.  Impromptu.  Little  need  be  said  about  the  third  meth- 
od, impromptu  speaking — without  any  previous  preparation 
whatever.  This  is  not  likely  in  a  debate  unless  it  happens 
to  be  unavoidable  as  is  sometimes  the  case  in  real  life — never, 
of  course,  in  contest  debating.  The  power  of  impromptu 
speech  is  not  to  be  disparaged,  and  it  is  undoubtedly  true 
that  many  veteran  speakers  can  debate  a  proposition  with 
very  brief  preparation  and  from  a  very  few  notes;  but  such 
powers  are  begotten  of  long  practice  and  self-cultivation;  for 
a  beginner  to  make  such  men  the  models  for  his  own  early 
efforts  is  foolhardy,  and  always  has  unfortunate  results.  To 
make  such  a  venture  at  the  start,  would  be  like  attempting 
to  learn  to  swim  by  jumping  into  mid-ocean  at  the  first 
lesson;  the  well-nigh  certain  result  is  to  be  lost  in  a  flood  of 
bad  habits.  From  such  beginnings  are  produced  the  ram- 
bling, incoherent,  inconclusive  speakers  that  are  always  in- 
ferior or  mediocre  in  debate.  The  weakness  of  such  arguers 
is  that  they  are  wholly  lacking  in  the  element  of  f onn :  they 
never  learn  how  to  conserve  their  strength  to  spend  it  to  some 
purpose;  they  waste  their  forces  because  they  have  never 
learned  how  to  marshal  and  direct  them. 

4.  Extemporaneous  speaking  should  undoubtedly  be  the 
ideal  of  the  debater.  A  distinction  should  always  be  made 
between  extemporaneous  speaking  and  impromptu  speaking. 
An  impromtu  speech  is  wholly  unpremeditated;  the  speaker 
rises  on  the  moment  and  talks  off-hand,  not  having  delib- 
erated on  the  subject  at  all.  But  "extemporaneous,"  as  the 
term  is  now  used,  is  a  name  applied  to  any  speech  for  which 


436  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

the  language  and  details  of  rhetorical  form  have  not  been 
previously  prepared.  But  the  more  fundamental  preparation 
must  have  been  exhaustive.  Extemporaneous  speaking  is 
the  highest  type,  the  most  difficult,  most  effective,  and  de- 
mands the  most  thorough  preparation.  The  speaker  is  al- 
ways assumed  to  be  prepared  on  the  question,  and  he  may  or 
may  not  use  notes  or  outline. 

a.  The  advantages  of  this  extempore  method  are  many 
and  great:  (I)  The  first  advantage — and  first  in  order  of  im- 
portance— is  the  power  of  adaptation — the  flexibility — which 
it  gives  to  the  speaker.  The  debater  who  depends  for  his  lan- 
guage upon  nothing  but  his  ever  present  power  of  making  up 
his  words  as  he  goes,  can  at  any  time  omit  any  of  his  ideas  or 
arguments  that  the  circumstances  make  unnecessary;  he 
can  put  into  his  proof  anything  that  an  unexpected  turn  of 
affairs  requires;  he  can,  if  expedient,  adopt  a  wholly  new  line 
of  demonstration.  (II)  Furthermore,  the  extemporizer  can 
fit  himself  to  the  mood  of  his  audience:  if  he  sees  they  do  not 
understand  a  point,  he  can  stop  to  explain  and  enforce  it 
upon  them;  if  they  seem  personally  hostile  or  inattentive,  he 
can  resort  to  persuasion  to  remedy  the  situation.  At  all 
times,  he  can  hold  his  position  as  leader  of  the  assembly  both 
in  thought  and  in  feeling.  He  can  reason  with  his  audience. 
(Ill)  Then,  too,  extemporizing  carries  with  it  great  physical 
advantages.  "The  voice  of  the  speaker  is  deeper,  stronger, 
dnd  more  flexible,  and  the  effort  required  to  produce  it  much 
less.  The  head  being  held  erect,  there  is  no  constriction  of 
the  throat,  the  lungs  are  fully  expanded,  and  the  respiratory 
muscles  are  free  to  perform  their  functions."  ^  (IV)  Again, 
the  inspiration  of  sympathy  from  the  audience  comes  loith  itsfidl 
poiver  only  to  the  extemporizer.  William  Pitt  truly  said  that 
"eloquence  is  not  in  the  man;  it  is  in  the  assembly."  The  re- 
sponse of  hearer  to  speaker  may  disturb  a  declaimer  but  it  gives 
added  strength  to  the  extemporizer,  helping  him  to  mount 
to  eloquence  with  a  greater  boldness  and  self-confidence. 
^  Buckley,  Extemporaneous  Oratory,  p.  13. 


DELIVERY  43') 

b.  The  dangers  of  extemporaneous  speaking  should  be 
borne  in  mind  as  well  as  the  great  benefits  that  flow  from  it. 
There,  are  three  that  a  young  speaker  needs  particularly  to 
guard  against.  (I)  The  first  is  exaggeration.  The  youthful  ora- 
tor, to  whom  word  and  idea  usually  come  with  tantalizing  dif- 
ficulty, when  at  length  he  begins  to  feel  the  flow  of  words  com- 
ing full  and  free  to  his  lips,  is  too  liable  to  be  caught  up  in  the 
onward  rush  and  carried  much  further  than  he  intends ;  swollen 
by  the  rising  enthusiasm,  the  tide  of  eloquence  mounts  higher 
and  higher  till  it  sweeps  over  the  bounds  of  accuracy,  even  of 
truthfulness,  and  turns  into  a  flood  of  hyperbole.  Then  it  is 
that  a  speaker  makes  statements  that  he  is  afterward  forced 
to  take  back,  calls  his  opponent  bad  names,  and  in  general 
forgets  his  self-control.  Lord  Chatham,  with  all  his  long 
experience  and  constant  practice,  said  that  he  did  not  dare 
to  speak  extemporaneously  with  a  state  secret  lurking  in  his 
mind,  "for  in  the  Sibylline  frenzy  of  his  oratory  he  knew  not 
what  he  said."  ^  A  common  form  of  misrepresentation  con- 
sists in  stating  evidence  carelessly.  If  a  speaker  has  in  his 
mind  the  general  nature  and  effect  of  certain  facts,  but  has 
not  decided  just  how  to  put  them  into  words,  he  finds  him- 
self sorely  tempted  to  color  the  facts  with  a  little  rhetorical 
flourish,  to  make  a  "few"  into  a  "great  many,"  to  augment 
"a  score"  into  "hundreds,"  or  to  transform  "often"  into 
"always."  Such  exaggeration  may,  with  constant  practice, 
become  something  of  a  habit,  so  that  the  tendency  should  be 
repressed  at  the  start. 

(II)  A  second  danger  is  that  of  awkward  repetition  of  sub- 
stance. The  danger  of  repeating  ideas,  of  rambling  around 
and  covering  the  same  point  a  number  of  times,  ought  to  be 
obviated  by  careful  planning  and  outlining.  This  kind  of 
repetition  should  not  be  a  common  fault  in  extemporaneous 
speaking.  If  a  speaker  permits  himself  to  become  indolent 
in  his  choice  of  phrases,  however,  he  will  surely  find  that 
certain  combinations  of  words  will  be  constantly  coming  to 
*  Matthews,  Orators  and  Oratory^  p.  109. 


438  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

his  lips  till  they  become  tiresome.  This  often  results  in  a 
confusion  of  thoughts :  one  stock  phrase  is  made  to  represent 
several  different  ideas;  two  ideas  that  are  similar  but  not 
exactly  alike  are  both  expressed  in  these  same  hackneyed 
terms,  simply  because  the  speaker  is  too  careless  to  know  the 
distinction,  or  has  the  habit  of  stating  things  with  only 
approximate  truth.  This  danger,  of  course,  threatens  partic- 
ularly a  speaker  whose  range  of  words  is  small;  and  for  such 
a  man  the  fault  may  be  overcome  by  resorting  to  the  dic- 
tionary, to  the  reading  of  good  literature  and  good  orations, 
or  to  any  expedient  for  the  increase  of  the  vocabulary.  The 
same  fault  appears  in  the  awkward  repetition  of  introductory 
and  transitional  phrases,  such  as:  *'Let  us  next  consider," 
"My  next  point  is,"  "In  the  next  place,"  "Along  this  same 
line,"  "Thus  we  see,"  etc.  A  speaker  composing  as  he  goes, 
does  not  realize  how  often  these  phrases  are  reiterated;  but 
it  is  noticeable  to  the  audience. 

(Ill)  A  third  danger  is  that  of  monotony  of  form — the  fault 
of  explaining  or  reasoning  out  everything  in  the  same  way. 
It  is  very  easy  to  adopt  a  sort  of  logical  formula  in  accordance 
with  which  argument  after  argument  is  unfolded.  A  certain 
mode  of  reasoning  in  his  own  mind  is  peculiar  to  the  speaker, 
and  when  before  an  audience  it  is  natural  to  explain  the 
matter  to  others  just  as  he  explained  it  to  himself.  The  effect 
of  such  repetition  is  much  the  same  as  that  which  a  reader 
gets  from  page  after  page  of  syllogisms  in  a  treatise  on  formal 
logic.  The  reasoning  is  clear  and  accurate,  but  uninteresting 
and  tiresome. 

c.  Dangers  may  be  overcome.  Such  dangers  as  these, 
though  they  must  surely  be  met,  should  not  be  a  source  of  dis- 
couragement. The  dangers  attendant  upon  other  methods  of 
public  speaking  are  equally  numerous  and  usually  far  more 
formidable.  The  young  extemporizer  to  whom  the  beginning 
seems  hard,  may  well  bear  in  mind  an  example  cited  by  Dr. 
Buckley  from  Mr.  Gilchrist's  Life  of  Richard  Cobden: — 

"I  saw  Richard  Cobden  sitting  beside  John  Bright  in  the 


DELIVERY  439 

House  of  Commons.  Perhaps  no  more  persuasive  speaker, 
whose  power  depended  largely  upon  a  clear  and  earnest 
statement  of  facts,  has  ever  sat  in  the  British  Parliament. 
Speaking  of  the  Treaty  of  Commerce  with  France  in  1860, 
Mr.  Gladstone  six  years  later  said,  *I  don't  believe  that  the 
man  breathed  upon  earth  at  that  epoch,  or  now  breathes 
upon  earth,  that  could  have  effected  that  great  measure  with 
the  single  exception  of  Mr.  Cobden.* 

"His  was  the  triumph  of  the  pure  extemporizer.  In  1864 
he  wrote  to  Mr.  Delane,  editor  of  the  London  Times: — 

"  *It  is  known  that  I  am  not  in  the  habit  of  writing  a  word 
beforehand  of  what  I  speak  in  public.  Like  other  speakers, 
practice  has  given  me  as  perfect  self-possession  in  the  pres- 
ence of  an  audience  as  if  I  were  writing  in  my  closet.  Now 
my  ever  constant  and  overruling  thought  while  addressing  a 
public  meeting — the  only  necessity  which  long  experience  of 
the  arts  of  the  controversialist  has  impressed  upon  my  mind 
— is  to  avoid  the  possibility  of  being  misrepresented,  and 
prevent  my  opponents  from  raising  a  false  issue,  a  trick  as  old 
as  Aristotle.' 

"Yet  this  master  persuader  of  hard-headed  business  men 
was  nervous  and  confused  in  his  first  speech;  in  fact,  he 
practically  broke  down,  and  the  chairman  had  to  apologize 
for  him.  For  some  time  afterward  he  was  so  discouraged  by 
his  maiden  effort  that  if  he  had  been  allowed  to  follow  the 
bent  of  his  inclination,  he  would  never  again  have  appeared 
as  a  public  speaker?"  ^ 

d.  Combining  memoriter  and  extempore:  "Block  sys- 
tem." It  is  possible  to  combine  some  memorizing  with 
extemporaneous  speaking;  and  under  some  conditions  the 
combination  may  be  effective.  The  peroration  of  an  otherwise 
extempore  speech  may  sometimes  be  memorized  with  good 
results.  A  beginner  may  find  this  a  helpful  means  of  weaning 
himself  from  declamation,  and  taking  on  the  strength  of  ex- 
temporaneous speech.  And  even  an  experienced  speaker  may 
^  Buckley,  Extemporaneous  Oratory,  pp.  369,  370. 


440  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

memorize  certain  passages  which  require  delicate  treatment 
of  any  kind,  the  preparation  of  which  he  does  not  wish  to 
leave  to  the  moment  of  utterance.  Such  passages  may  be  in- 
terspersed through  an  extemporaneous  speech  without  losing 
the  advantages  of  this  method.  Some  people  advocate  mem- 
orizing most  of  the  introduction  and  conclusion  and  extempo- 
rizing the  discussion.  This  is  close  to  what  has  been  called 
"the  block  system" — that  is,  practically  the  whole  debate  is 
memorized  in  sections.  The  different  sections  may  be  shifted 
to  suit  the  demands  of  the  occasion,  or  some  of  them  may  be 
dropped  out.  This  method  gives  a  certain  kind  of  flexibility, 
but  the  speaker  is  after  all  declaiming  memorized  material 
most  of  the  time.  This  is  bad  from  the  standpoint  of  debat- 
ing. Some  memorized  passages  may  be  used  if  there  is  need, 
provided  they  are  not  the  greater  part  of  the  speech,  and 
provided  the  speaker  can  keep  from  leaning  too  much  on 
such  helps.  But  as  a  permanent  practice,  by  which  the  at- 
tempt is  made  to  mix  the  two  and  deceive  an  audience  into 
thinking  the  whole  to  be  extempore,  this  method  is  likely  to 
be  a  failure.  An  excellent  criticism  is  given  by  Dr.  James 
M.  Buckley,  in  his  book  on  Extemporaneous  Oratory  for  Pro- 
fessional and  Amateur  Speakers: — 

"A  joint  use  of  the  extemporaneous  and  the  recitative  has 
marked  advantages,  and  is  to  be  commended  to  those  who 
cannot  trust  themselves  wholly  to  the  former.  But  it  is 
extremely  difficult  to  adjust  it  gracefully  and  forcefully. 
Transitions  of  style  are  usually  obvious,  extemporized  por- 
tions being  spoken  more  swiftly  or  more  slowly  than  the  re- 
cited. Emphasis  and  accent  are  different,  and  gesticulation 
undergoes  a  noticeable  change.  The  reciter  is  prone  to  pro- 
ceed more  rapidly  than  when  he  extemporizes;  at  other  times, 
according  to  the  strength  of  his  memory  or  his  excitability 
when  uttering  words  not  previously  prepared,  he  may  speak 
more  slowly.  A  lawyer  delivered  a  Fourth  of  July  oration, 
in  preparation  for  which  he  had  composed  perhaps  ten  epi- 
grams and  half  as  many  paragraphs,  some  consisting  of  at 


DELIVERY  441 

least  three  times  that  number  of  sentences,  and  had  com- 
mitted these  to  memory,  expecting  to  extemporize  the  con- 
nective tissue.  What  he  had  learned  he  recited  perfectly; 
what  he  extemporized  he  delivered  Under  slight  embarrass- 
ment, and  his  course  resembled  that  of  a  man  crossing  a 
bridge,  some  of  the  planks  of  which  were  weak  and  others 
strong.  He  fairly  leaped  when  he  came  to  one  of  his  com- 
mitted paragraphs,  and  it  was  obvious  that  he  rejoiced  in 
spirit,  but  more  than  once  his  hesitation  and  awkwardness 
were  pitiable."  ^ 

e.  Specific  suggestions  to  be  followed  in  all  debating,  par- 
ticularly in  extemporaneous  debating,  and  which  have  not 
already  been  made,  are  contained  in  the  following  paragraphs: 

(I)  Notes.  We  have  said  that  in  extemporaneous  speak- 
ing a  speaker  may  or  may  not  use  notes.  For  a  beginner  in 
any  kind  of  oratory  it  is  desirable  that  some  notes  be  used,  if 
the  speech  is  to  be  one  of  any  length  or  intricacy.  The  prej- 
udice that  still  exists  in  some  places  against  the  use  of  notes 
by  a  speaker  should  be  disregarded.  It  is  founded  on  false 
standards  and  a  misconception  of  a  speaker's  purpose.  The 
speaker  should  be  trying  to  convey  thought  effectively  to 
the  audience — not  trying  to  exhibit  his  power  of  memory  or 
other  personal  qualities.  When  a  speaker  has  an  important 
case  to  present  to  an  audience  it  is  very  foolish  to  use  much 
of  his  energy  in  remembering  matters  that  can  better  be 
carried  on  a  card  or  two.  Especially  young  speakers  should 
always  relieve  themselves  of  the  worry  and  strain  of  memo- 
rized delivery  and  carry  an  outline  and  notes  to  the  platform. 
They  should  not  even  attempt  to  carry  a  memorized  outline 
of  any  length.  It  takes  a  mature  mind  and  much  experience, 
to  enable  a  man  to  carry  the  complete  outline  of  a  speech,  in 
such  a  way  as  to  guard  against  the  forgetting  of  points,  on 
the  one  hand,  and  wandering  from  the  subject,  on  the  other. 
And  particularly  in  debate,  where  the  situation  is  ever  chang- 
ing and  where  so  much  depends  upon  the  circumstances  of 
1  Buckley,  Extemporaneous  Oratori/y  pp.  25,  26. 


442  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

the  moment,  it  is  doubtful  if  even  a  veteran  can  work  effect- 
ively without  notes.  Outlines  and  notes  should  be  used  in 
intercollegiate  and  other  contest  and  practice  debates  for  the 
purpose  of  bringing  the  experience  as  close  as  possible  to 
actual  debates  in  real  life,  and  of  giving  the  best  training  for 
these.  Long  and  detailed  arguments  are  not  presented  in 
courts,  legislatures,  hearings,  etc.,  without  notes.  Our  de- 
bates should  be  as  close  as  possible  to  the  best  of  these  dis- 
cussions. 

(II)  Outlines.  A  complete  brief  should  never  be  used 
as  an  outline  of  a  speech.  After  the  brief  is  completed  a 
short  outline  should  be  made  up  for  any  speech,  using  such 
parts  of  the  brief  as  are  needed.  The  outline  should  be  pre- 
pared with  a  particular  audience,  occasion,  time  limit,  etc., 
in  view.  The  brief  ignores  all  these.  The  outline  should  take 
up  points,  present  material,  in  whatever  order  seems  best 
for  a  particular  situation,  absolutely  regardless  of  the  order 
followed  in  the  brief  or  of  the  rules  of  brief  drawing.  And 
finally,  the  outline  should  be  capable  of  alteration  and  should 
be  adjusted  to  the  occasion  just  before  the  speaker  takes 
the  platform.  For  instance,  in  an  intercollegiate  debate  a 
speaker  should  follow  carefully  all  that  is  said  before  his 
turn  comes  and  should  make  whatever  changes  in  his  out- 
lines are  demanded  by  the  changing  situation.  Points  may 
be  dropped  out,  put  in,  or  re-arranged.  The  outline  should 
be  short,  typewritten,  with  wide  spacing  (to  allow  for 
changes),  on  4  x  6  cards.  With  the  outline,  but  preferably 
on  other  cards,  should  be  all  quotations  and  statistics  to  be 
used.  A  debater  should  never  present  memorized  quotations 
(except  very  short  ones)  or  memorized  statistics,  to  an  au- 
dience. It  is  foolish  to  burden  the  memory  this  way.  It  is 
careless,  for  one  is  likely  to  forget.  It  is  artificial  and  can 
have  no  excuse  other  than  that  of  being  an  attempt  to  meet 
a  prejudice  against  notes,  or  of  showing  ofiF  one's  memory. 
Judges  are  likely  to  be  suspicious  of  memorized  quotations 
and  statistics.     We  have  heard  debaters  reel  off  identical 


DELIVERY  443 

figures  or  quotations  at  two  different  places  in  the  same 
speeches.  All  were  memorized  and  the  wrong  set  came  out, 
and  the  debaters  went  on  with  their  declamation,  with  no 
thought  of  what  they  were  saying.  Use  a  short  and  flexible 
outline y  and  use  notes  for  all  quotations  and  statistics. 

(III)  Charts.  Use  charts  and  diagrams  to  hang  up  before 
the  audience  on  these  conditions:  (A)  that  there  is  no  under- 
standing to  the  contrary  with  your  opponents;  (B)  that  you 
are  willing  to  leave  the  chart  up  after  you  use  it  in  order  that 
your  opponents  may  use  it  as  they  wish;  (never  put  up  a 
chart  and  then  take  it  down  before  your  opponent  has  a 
chance  to  use  it) ;  (C)  that  you  can  make  certain  important 
things  clearer  in  less  time  w^ith  a  chart  than  without  it.  When 
these  conditions  are  present  there  is  no  reason  why  charts 
and  diagrams  should  not  be  used.  A  slight  warning  may  well 
be  given,  however,  for  contest  debates.  Charts  are  much 
more  dangerous  for  a  negative  team  than  for  an  affirmative, 
because  the  latter  has  the  last  opportunity  to  discuss  the 
chart  before  the  audience.  If  a  negative  hangs  up  a  chart, 
and  the  affirmative  puts  off  refutation  of  it  till  the  last  speech 
(as  they  have  a  perfect  right  to  do)  the  negative  has  no 
chance  to  answer.  Unless  the  negative  feels  sure  of  the  chart, 
it  is  better  not  to  use  one. 

(IV)  Platform  hints.  It  is  impossible  in  this  book  to 
discuss  platform  speaking  at  any  length.  Various  suggestions 
have  been  given  by  the  way.  All  would-be  debaters  should 
learn  how  to  be  effective  speakers.  Regular  courses  of  in- 
struction in  speaking  are  the  best  means  of  getting  the  right 
start.  Actual  practice  with  real  audiences  is  the  only  means 
of  getting  real  proficiency  in  the  art. 

(V)  Practice.  A  regular  course  in  practical  debating — 
actual  speaking  in  regular  debates,  with  personal  criticism 
by  a  competent  instructor — is  the  proper  meatis  to  use  in 
getting  started  right  as  a  debater.  Continued  practice  after 
one  knows  what  to  try  to  do,  is  the  only  way  to  become 
skilful.     Extended  practice  before  one  knows  what  to  do  is 


444  ARGUMENTATION  AND  DEBATE 

likely  to  produce  more  harm  than  good.  It  develops  the 
habit  of  loose,  rambling,  superficial,  assertive  talking,  which 
is  the  antithesis  of  intelligent  debating.  So-called  debates  on 
big  questions,  for  which  only  a  few  hours  are  spent  in  prep- 
aration are  wholly  evil  as  far  as  learning  to  debate  is  concerned. 
With  this  warning  in  mind,  we  may  well  follow  the  advice 
given  by  a  friend  to  Edward  Everett  Hale  at  the  opening  of 
his  career.  "If  you  want  to  be  a  good  public  speaker,  when- 
ever anyone  is  fool  enough  to  ask  you  to  speak,  you  be  fool 
enough  to  do  it." 


APPENDIX 

A.  Bibliography. 

B.  Pleading. 

C.  Instructions  to  Judges  with  Sample  Ballot. 

D.  Rules  for  Legal  Brief  Drawing. 

E.  1.  Material  for  a  Short  Brief. 
2.  Material  for  a  Long  Brief. 


APPENDIX  A 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

References  to  the  following  Publications  are  made  in  footnotes  in 

the  text 

Adams,  J.  Q.,  Lectures  on  Rhetoric  and  Oratory,  Cambridge,  Mass., 
Hilliard  &  Metcalf,  1810. 

Alden,  R.  M.,  The  Art  of  Debate,  New  York,  Henry  Holt  &  Co., 
1900. 

Aristotle,    Rhetoric,    Jebb's    Translation,    Cambridge,    England, 
University  Press,  1909. 

Baker,  G.  P.,  The  Forms  of  Public  Address,  New  York,  Henry 
Holt  &  Co.,  1904. 

Baker,  G.  P.,  and  Huntington,  H.  B.,  The  Principles  of  Argumenta- 
tion (Revised  Edition),  New  York,  Ginn  &  Co.,  1905. 

Baldwin,  J.  M.,  Elements  of  Psychology,  New  York,  Holt,  1891. 

Ballantine,  H.  W.,  The  Apportionment  of  Proof,  and  the  Burden 
of  Rebuttal,  Law  Notes,  December,  1912. 

Beecher,  H.  W.,  Plymouth  Pulpit,  8th  Series,  New  York,  March- 
Sept.,  1872. 

Beecher,  H.  W.,  Patriotic  Addresses,  New  York,  1891. 

Best,  On  Evidence,  Chamberlayne's  Ed.,  Boston,  Boston  Book 
Co.,  1908. 

Bodkin,  R.  C,  How  to  Reason,  Dublin,  Browne  &  Nolan,  1907. 

445 


446  APPENDIX  A 

Bode,  B.  H.,  An  Outline  of  Logic,  New  York,  Henry  Holt  &  Co^ 
1910. 

Bradbury,  H.  B.,  The  Structure  of  an  Effective  Public  Speech, 
Greenfield,  Mass.,  T   Morey  &  Sons,  1915. 

Brooks,  Phillips,  Essays  and  Addresses,  New  York,  1894. 

Buckley,  Extemporaneous  Oratory,  Eaton  &  Main,  1898. 

Burke,  Edmund,  Speech  on  Conciliation  with  America,  Cook's 
Edition,  New  York,  Longmans,  Green  &  Co.,  1896. 

Channing,  W.  E.,  Works,  Boston,  G.  G.  Channing,  1849. 

Chase's  Blackstone. 

Clark,  E.  and  H.,  Eloquence  of  the  United  States,  Middletown, 
Conn.,  1827. 

Clark,  S.  H.,  and  Blanchard,  F.  M.,  Practical  Public  Speaking,  New 
York,  Charles  Scribner's  Sons,  1899. 

Collins,  J.  C,  Jonathan  Swift,  London,  1893. 

Congressional  Debates. 

Creighton,  J.  E.,  Introductory  Logic,  New  York,  Macmillan  Co., 
1907. 

Curtis,  G.  W.,  Orations  and  Addresses,  New  York,  Harper,  1893. 

Debates  in  Congress,  Washington,  Gales  &  Seaton,  1830. 

Denney,  J.  V.,  Duncan,  C.  S.,  and  McKinney,  F.  C,  Argumenta- 
tion and  Debate,  New  York,  American  Book  Company, 
1910. 

Foster,  W.  T.,  Argumentation  and  Debating,  New  York,  Houghton- 
Mifflin  Co.,  1908. 

Gardiner,  J.  H.,  The  Making  of  Arguments,  New  York,  Ginn  &  Co., 
1912. 

Genung,  J.  F.,  Practical  Rhetoric,  Boston,  Ginn  &  Co.,  1896. 

Genung,  J.  F.,  The  Working  Principles  of  Rhetoric,  Boston,  Ginn, 
1901. 

Gough,  H.  B.,  Formulas  for  the  Special  Issue,  The  Public  Speaking 
Review,  Vol.  3,  No.  3. 

Great  Speeches  by  Great  Lawyers,  W.  L.  Snyder,  New  York, 
Baker,  Voorhis  &  Co.,  1904. 

Greenleaf,  On  Evidence,  Thirteenth  Edition. 

Hardwicke,  History  of  Oratory  and  Orators,  New  York,  G.  P.  Put- 
nam Sons,  1896. 

Hibben,  Logic,  Deductive  and  Inductive,  New  York,  Charles  Scrib- 
ner's Sons,  1905. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  447 

Hill,  A.  S.,  Principles  of  Rhetoric  (Revised  Edition),  New  Yorl^ 

American  Book  Co.,  1895. 
Howell's  Stale  Trials. 
Hughes,  On  Evidence. 
Hyslop,  J.  H.,  Elements  of  Logic,  New  York,  Charles  Scribner's 

Sons,  1901. 
James,  William,  Psychology,  Briefer  Course,  New  York,  Henry  Holt 

&  Co.,  1913. 
Jevons,  W.  S.,  Lessons  in  Logic,  New  York,  Macmillan  Co.,  1913. 
Ketcham,  V.  A.,  Argumentation  and  Debate,  New  York,  Macmillan 

Co.,  1914. 
Lamb,  Charles,  Essays  of  Elia,  London,  J.  M.  Dent  &  Co.,  1897. 
Lamont,   Hammond,   English   Composition,   New  York,   Charles 

Scribner's  Sons,  1907. 
Lincoln-Douglas  Debates,  Columbus,  Ohio,  FoUett,  Foster  &  Co., 

1860. 
Matthews,  W.,  Oratory  and  Orators,  S.  C.  Griggs  &  Co.,  Chicago, 

1879. 
Matthews,  Brander,  Notes  on  Speech  Making,  New  York,  Long- 
mans, Green  &  Co.,  1901. 
Maxcy,  C.  L.,  The  Brief,  New  York,  Houghton-Mifflin  Co.,  1916. 
Mill,  System  of  Logic,  New  York,  Harper,  1874. 
Minto,  Logic,  Inductive  and  Deductive,  London,  1893. 
Newcomer,  A.  G.,  Elements  of  Rhetoric,  New  York,  Henry  Holt 

&  Co.,  1906. 
O'Grady,  Hardress,  Matter,  Form,  and  Style,  New  York,  Dutton, 

1913. 
Pattee,  G.  K.,  Practical  Argumentation,  New  York,  The  Century 

Co.  (Revised  Edition),  1916. 
Pelsma,  J.  R.,  The  Special  Issues,  Public  Speaking  Review,  Vol.  3, 

No.  3. 
Phelps,  Austin,  English  Style  in  Public  Discourse,  New  York, 

Charles  Scribner's  Sons,  1912. 
Phillips,  A.  E.,  Effective  Speaking,  Chicago,  The  Newton   Co., 

1910. 
Quarterly   Journal   of   Public   Speaking,    Chicago,   University   of 

Chicago  Press,  1915- 
Ringwalt,  R.  C,  Modern  American  Oratory,  New  York,  Henry 

Holt  &  Co.,  1898. 


^48  APPENDIX  A 

Robinson,  F.  B.,  Effective  Public  Speaking,  Chicago,  LaSalle 
Extension  University,  1915. 

Robinson,  Lewis,  M.  D.,  Everyday  Cruelty,  Fortnightly  Review, 
July,  1894. 

Robinson,  W.  C,  Forensic  Oratory,  Boston,  Little,  Brown  &  Co., 
1893. 

Seward,  William  H.,  Works,  Boston,  1887. 

Sidgwick,  A.,  The  Process  of  Argument,  London,  1893. 

Stephen,  H.  J.,  On  Pleading,  Edited  by  Samuel  Williston,  Cam- 
bridge, Mass.,  The  Harvard  Law  Review  Publishing  Associa- 
tion, 1895. 

Spencer,  Herbert,  Philosophy  of  Style. 

Sumner,  Charles,  Works,  Boston,  Lee  and  Sheppard,  1872. 

Thayer,  J.  B.,  Preliminary  Treatise  on  Evidence,  Boston,  Little, 
Brown  &  Co.,  1898. 

Ward,  John,  System  of  Oratory,  London,  1759. 

Webster,  Daniel,  Works,  Boston,  Little  Brown  &  Co.,  1851. 

Whateley,  Richard,  Elements  of  Rhetoric  (Reprint),  Louisville, 
Ky.,  John  T.  Morton  &  Company. 

Wilson,  Woodrow,  Speech  to  the  New  York  Southern  Society,  1910, 
in  Wood's  After-Dinner  Speeches. 

Winans,  J.  A.,  Public  Speaking,  New  York,  The  Century  Co.,  1915. 

World's  Orators,  New  York,  G.  P.  Putnam  Sons,  1900. 


APPENDIX  B 

PLEADING 

This  brief  statement  presents  *'  in  a  general  view,  the  nature 
of  the  process  of  pleading,  and  the  manner  of  coming  to 
issue,"  in  common  law.  This  is  adapted  from  the  first  part 
of  Chapter  I  of  Stephen  on  Pleading^  edited  by  Samuel 
WiUiston,  Cambridge,  Mass.:  The  Harvard  Law  Review 
PubHshing  Association,  1895.  It  is  given  here  in  the  belief 
that  it  will  aid  students  in  gaining  an  understanding  of  the 
doctrine  of  issues,  and  it  will  make  clear  certain  references  in 
the  text  in  the  chapters  on  "Issues"  and  "Burden  of  Proof." 

1.  Plaintiff  (Affirmative)  makes  declaration  of  his  cause  of 

action — states  the  nature  and  quality  of  his  case. 

2.  Defendant  (Negative)  answers  either: 

a.  Demurrer.    Even  supposing  facts  to  be  true,  denies 

plaintiff  in  point  of  law  has  rights  he  claims. 
Tender  of  issue  in  law,  necessarily  accepted  by 
plaintiff. 

or 

b.  Plea. 

(1)  Dilatory. 

(a)  To  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court — denies 

jurisdiction. 

(b)  In  suspension  of  action — shows  some 

ground  for  not  proceeding  with  suit 
now. 

(c)  In  abatement — shows  declaration  im- 

properly drawn — does  not  deny  right 
of  action  itself. 

(2)  Peremptory — in    bar    of    the   action — denies 

right  of  action  altogether. 
449 


450  APPENDIX  B 

(a)  Traverse — denies  all  or  some  essential 

part  of  the  averments  of  fact  in  the 
declaration.  Tender  of  issue  of  fact 
(which  plaintiff  must  accept  or  demur 
to  the  traverse  as  insufficient  in  law) , 
which  raises  an  issue  in  law  which  is 
necessarily  accepted. 

(b)  Confession  and  avoidance — admits  facts 

of  declaration  but  alleges  new  facts 
which   obviate   or   repel   their   legal 
effect. 
At  this  point  if  the  defendant  has  demurred  or  pleaded  by 
way  of  traverse  the  parties  are  now  at  issue  either  on  the  law 
or  on  the  facts  involved.    If  the  defendant  take  either  of  the 
other  possibilities — a  dilatory  plea  or  a  plea  of  way  of  con- 
fession and  avoidance^  then  the 
3.  Plaintiff  answers: 

a.  Demurrer — tender  issue  in  law  as  above, 

b.  Replication, 

(1)  Traverse — tender  issue  of  fact  as  above, 

(2)  Confession  and  avoidance. 

"If  the  replication  be  by  way  of  traverse,  it  is  necessary 
(as  in  the  case  of  the  plea)  that  it  should  tender  issue.  So, 
if  the  plaintiff  demur,  an  issue  in  law  is  necessarily  tendered; 
and,  in  either  case,  the  ultimate  result  is  a  joinder  in  issue; 
upon  the  same  principles  as  above  explained  with  respect 
to  the  plea.  But  if  the  replication  be  in  confession  and 
avoidance,  the  defendant  may  then,  in  his  turn,  either  demur, 
— or,  by  a  pleading,  traverse,  or  confess  and  avoid,  its  allega- 
tions.   If  such  pleading  take  place,  it  is  called  the  rejoinder. 

"  In  the  same  manner,  and  subject  to  the  same  law  of  pro- 
ceeding, viz.,  that  of  demurring,  or  traversing,  or  pleading  in 
confession  and  avoidance,  is  conducted  all  the  subsequent 
altercation,  to  which  the  nature  of  the  case  may  lead;  and  the 
order  and  denominations  of  the  alternate  allegations  of  fact 


PLEADING  451 

(or  pleadings)  throughout  the  whole  series,  are  as  follows: — 
declaration^  plea^  replication^  re  joinder  ^  surrejoinder  y  rebutter 
and  surrebutter.  After  the  surrebutter,  the  pleadings  have 
no  distinctive  names;  for  beyond  that  stage  they  are  very 
seldom  found  to  extend. 

"To  whatever  length  of  series  the  pleadings  may  happen 
to  lead,  it  is  obvious  that  by  adherence  to  the  plan  here  de- 
scribed, one  of  the  parties  must  at  some  period  of  the  proc- 
ess, more  or  less  remote,  be  brought  either  to  demur  or  to 
traverse;  for,  as  no  case  can  involve  an  inexhaustible  store  of 
new  relevant  matter,  there  must  somewhere  be  a  limit  to 
pleading  in  the  way  of  confession  and  avoidance.  .  .  . 

"As  the  parties  will  at  length  arrive  at  demurrer  or  trav- 
erse, so,  whenever  a  traverse  is  at  length  produced,  it  comprises 
a  tender  of  issue  (as  in  the  above  examples) ;  and  a  demurrer 
also  necessarily  involves  a  tender  of  issue;  the  consequence  of 
which  is,  in  either  case,  a  joinder  in  issue,  exactly  upon  the 
same  principle  as  above  explained  with  respect  to  the  plea; 
so  that  the  parties  arrive  at  issue,  after  a  longer  series  of  plead- 
ings, precisely  in  the  same  manner  as  when  the  process  termi- 
nates at  the  earliest  possible  state.  Such  is,  in  a  general 
view,  the  nature  of  the  process  of  pleading,  and  the  manner 
of  coming  to  issue."  ^ 

^  Stephen  on  Pleading,  Williston's  edition,  pp.  5(^5^, 


APPENDIX  C 

judges'  ballot  with  instructions 

The  following  instructions  to  judges  should  be  printed  or 
typewritten  on  the  ballot  given  to  each  judge  at  the  opening 
of  the  debate,  and  a  copy  of  this  should  be  sent  to  each  one 
with  the  invitation  to  act  as  judge. 

The  annual  inter-collegiate  debate.    Uni- 

versity OF  ,  affirmative.     University  of  , 

negative. 

Friday,  March    ,  19    . 

Resolved:  etc. 

Instructions 
To  the  Judge: 

You  are  called  here  as  one  who  understands  debating,  to 
give  an  opinion  as  to  the  comparative  ability  in  debate  shown 
by  the  teams  taking  part  in  this  contest.  Your  question  is 
which  team  shows  a  higher  average  skill  in  debating — not  sim- 
ply which  presents  the  stronger  evidence,  nor  which  side  you 
agree  with  either  before  or  after  the  debate.  Ability  in  de- 
bate, or  skill  in  debate,  covers  knowledge  of  available  ma- 
terial, analysis,  reasoning,  rhetoric,  proper  debate  tactics, 
and  ability  to  talk  to  an  audience.  You  are  the  sole  judge 
as  to  what  weight  shall  be  given  to  these  various  elements. 
Copies  of  these  ballots  are  to  be  preserved  for  the  guidance 
and  instruction  of  the  contestants  and  others  who  are  to 

452 


JUDGES'  BALLOT  WITH  INSTRUCTIONS         453 

follow  them.     Therefore  in  giving  your  reasons  for  your 
decision  please  be  as  specific  as  possible. 

Ballot 

It  is  my  decision  that  the  debate  should  be  awarded  to  the 
team  for  the  following  reasons: 


(ample  space  should  be  left  here  on  ballot.) 


(Signed)  Judge. 


APPENDIX  D 

RULES   FOR   LEGAL   BRIEF   DRAWING 

This  very  complete  set  of  rules  for  legal  brief  drawing 
appears  as  an  appendix  to  Problems  in  ContractSy  ^  by  Dean 
H.  W.  Ballantine  of  the  University  of  Illinois  Law  School, 
formerly  Professor  of  Law  in  the  University  of  Wisconsin. 
A  comparison  of  these  rules  with  those  given  in  chapter  10 
will  show  the  difference  between  legal  brief  drawing  and  brief 
drawing  on  general  argumentation. 

Directions  for  Briefmaking 

"The  following  twenty-one  rules  cover  the  work  of  drawing 
outline  or  skeleton  briefs.  Each  rule  here  should  be  strictly 
observed.  Students  should  memorize  these  rules  as  stated 
and  should  understand  the  reasons  for  them. 

General  Rules 

1.  Divide  the  brief  into  three  parts,  marked  respectively — 
introduction,  argument,  and  conclusion. 

2.  Arrange  the  arguments  in  the  brief  in  logical  order  in 
the  form  of  headings  and  subheadings. 

3.  State  each  heading  and  subheading  or  argument  in  the 
form  of  assertions  or  propositions  of  fact  or  law,  not  of  mere 
vague  topics. 

4.  Let  each  heading  and  subheading  or  argument  contain 
but  a  single  assertion  or  proposition,  in  order  to  insure  con- 
densation and  careful  analysis. 

5.  Arrange  every  coordinate  series  of  statements  in  order 

^  (Rochester,  N.  Y.:  Lawyers  Cooperative  Publishing  Co.,  1916.) 

454 


RULES  FOR  LEGAL  BRIEF  DRAWING  455 

of  climaXy  unless  this  violates  time  order  in  expository  matter 
or  logical  order  in  argumentative  matter. 

6.  Indicate  the  relation  between  the  headings  and  subhead- 
ings by  means  of  margins,  and  letters,  numbers,  or  other 
symbols. 

7.  Let  no  heading  or  subheading  be  marked  with  more 
than  one  symbol. 

8.  Indicate  accurately  all  references,  citations,  and  sources 
of  information  relied  upon  in  the  brief  under  the  proper 
heading  or  subheading. 

Rules  for  Introduction 

9.  In  the  first  part  of  the  introduction  give  all  the  facts 
and  information  necessary  for  an  understanding  of  the  case. 
Distinguish  the  main  issues  by  briefly  stating  admitted  mat- 
ter, excluding  irrelevant  matter,  and  contrasting  the  principal 
contentions  of  the  one  side  with  those  of  the  other;  thus 
showing  the  essential  points  to  be  established  or  overthrown. 

10.  At  the  end  of  the  introduction  make  a  terse  statement 
of  the  precise  issues  presented  by  the  case  which  the  court 
must  decide,  and  of  the  divisions  and  order  in  which  they 
will  be  taken  up. 

11.  Let  the  introduction  contain  only  statements,  the 
truth  of  which  must  be  acknowledged  by  both  sides  for  the 
purposes  of  the  argument. 

Rules  for  Argument 

12.  Let  the  argument  proper  state  the  gist  of  all  the  reasons 
and  authorities  relied  upon  in  the  case. 

13.  In  the  argument  let  each  main  heading  read  as  an  af- 
firmation of  or  as  a  reason  for  one  of  the  issues  to  be  estab- 
lished. 

14.  Let  each  subheading,  or  series  of  subheadings,  read  as 
a  reason  for  the  truth  of  the  heading  above  it. 

15.  Support  the  main  propositions  or  arguments  by  enough 
subordinate  propositions  to  give  the  various  reasons  for  the 


.456  APPENDIX  D 

main  contentions,  and  in  like  manner  support  the  subordinate 
propositions,  if  there  are  further  points  to  be  made. 

16.  Cite  cases  and  authorities  under  the  specific  subordi- 
nate propositions  which  they  sustain. 

17.  Use  great  care  to  make  the  propositions  of  the  argu- 
ment as  concise,  cogent,  and  pointed  as  possible.  Avoid 
gHttering  generalities,  platitudes,  repetitions,  and  trite  or 
sweeping  assertions,  which  carry  no  thought  or  conviction. 

18.  A  careful  analysis  and  a  logical  argument  of  a  case  on 
principle,  supported  by  two  or  three  strong  cases  on  the 
essential  points  is  the  way  to  win.  Beware  of  too  many  cases 
or  of  any  case  which  does  not  hit  the  nail  on  the  head.  The 
court  has  only  limited  time  and  patience. 

19.  Objections  to  be  refuted  should  be  dealt  with  as  they 
arise.    Hold  your  opponent  strictly  to  the  proof  of  his  case. 

20.  In  phrasing  refutation  the  heading  should  state  clearly 
the  argument  to  be  answered. 

Rule  for  Conclusion 

21.  The  conclusion  should  contain  a  summary  of  the 
essential  points  of  the  argument. 

"Note:  The  skeleton  brief  here  suggested  is  intended  as  the 
mere  iron  framework  or  outline  guide  of  a  complete  written 
or  oral  argument.  The  training  in  the  observance  of  these 
rules  will  compel  searching  analysis,  conciseness,  thorough- 
ness and  a  clear  order  and  method  of  treatment  which  should 
appeal  at  once  to  any  court.  The  complete  argument  may 
be  readily  built  up  upon  this  framework,  with  such  attri- 
butes of  style,  emphasis,  elaboration,  illustration,  and  per- 
suasion as  may  be  appropriate. 

'*I  am  indebted  for  the  substance  of  several  of  these  rules 
to  a  forthcoming  work  on  Argumentation  by  my  colleague. 
Professor  J.  M.  O'Neill.  For  illustrations  of  outline  briefs 
see  also  W.  T.  Foster,  Argumentation  and  Debatingy  Chap.  9, 
and  App.  IV  and  V,  pp.  359,  371." 


APPENDIX  E.  1 

MATERIAL  FOR  A  SHORT  BRIEF 

A  Neglected  Industry 

(From  the  Boston  Transcript) 

The  value  of  the  goat  as  a  domestic  animal  and  a  beneficial 
factor  in  the  agricultural  industry  has  at  various  times  been 
discussed  in  these  columns.  Our  belief  in  that  value  has  been 
based  on  the  habits  of  the  animal  and  its  natural  adaptation 
to  the  conditions  to  be  found  in  our  farming  sections,  espe- 
cially in  New  England.  According  to  our  Washington 
despatches,  already  published,  a  similar  condition  has  been 
borne  in  upon  the  minds  of  some  of  our  federal  authorities. 
The  bureau  of  statistics  of  the  department  of  commerce  and 
labor  shows  that  we  have  been  importing  goat  skins  from  va- 
rious countries  during  the  past  decade  at  the  rate  of  fifty 
millions  a  year.  This  shows  the  extent  of  the  market  for  one 
of  the  items  in  the  goat's  potential  value. 

But  the  department  has  also  been  impressed  by  consular 
testimony  with  respect  to  the  worth  of  the  flesh  as  an  addi- 
tion to  the  meat  supply  of  the  country  and  suggests  that  for 
such  a  purpose  alone  goat  raising  would  be  a  profitable  in- 
dustry. We  are  somewhat  inclined  to  doubt  that,  but  the 
main  question  does  not  depend  upon  proof  of  it.  The  meat 
is  certainly  wholesome.  We  have  scriptural  authority  and 
precedent  for  that  and  doubtless  it  would  be  popular  were  its 
use  more  common.  But  why  not,  suggests  the  bureau,  keep 
within  our  own  country  the  twenty-five  millions  that  we  pay 
for  the  skins  alone .^^  Then  there  are  the  fleeces,  for  which 
there  is  a  steady  and  growing  demand.  To  grow  these  at  their 
best  no  doubt  requires  care,  as  it  does  to  produce  almost 
anything  of  good  quality,  but  there  is  warrant  for  exercising 
it  in  the  fact  that  it  pays. 

467 


458  APPENDIX  E 

Thus  in  a  direct  inventory  we  find  meat  for  the  eater, 
fleeces  for  raiment,  and  skins  for  shoes  and  other  goods,  with 
possibly  a  side  fine  of  very  digestible  milk  for  infants  and 
invalids.  But  that  is  only  a  part  and  perhaps  not  the  most 
important  part  of  the  case  that  can  be  made  out  in  favor  of 
the  more  general  use  of  these  too  much  neglected  animals. 
The  goat  has  been  represented  as  having  a  fondness  for  tin 
cans  and  old  junk  of  various  kinds  as  articles  of  diet.  This 
is  giving  him  more  credit  or  more  criticism  than  he  deserves. 
While  his  appetite  is  healthy  and  his  digestion  excellent,  he 
is  purely  a  vegetarian,  though  within  that  limitation  he  is 
very  thorough.  There  is  hardly  a  New  England  farm  of 
average  size  on  which  a  flock  of  goats  could  not  be  kept  for 
nothing  during  seven  or  eight  months  in  the  year.  From  the 
time  that  the  leaves  appear  on  the  trees  and  undergrowth 
in  the  spring  until  they  depart  in  the  fall,  the  goat  will  take 
care  of  himself  if  let  alone. 

It  is  for  this  reason  that  he  is  able  to  render  a  great  service. 
Not  only  does  he  live  off  the  country  but  in  doing  so  he  en- 
riches instead  of  impoverishes  it  He  is  a  browser  rather  than 
a  grazer,  preferring  leaves  to  grass,  and  supports  abounding 
life  on  what  the  farmer  not  only  does  not  need  but  does  not 
want.  He  forces  back  the  constantly  invading  army  of  brush 
and  if  the  flock  is  large  enough  it  will  clean  out  growths  about 
the  trees  of  the  forest  and  improve  conditions  generally. 
They  are  natural  foresters,  a  fact  that  has  been  recognized 
by  those  in  charge  of  some  of  the  western  reserves,  where 
they  have  been  kept  to  eat  fire  lanes  for  long  distances.  If 
goats  were  stationed  in  suflScient  numbers  in  the  woodlands 
of  Massachusetts  we  should  not  suffer  from  forest  fires  to  the 
extent  that  has  been  our  portion  for  some  years  past,  because 
they  would  leave  little  for  the  fire  to  feed  upon.  What  other 
servants  can  the  farmer  find  that  will  work  diligently  through 
the  productive  season  to  improve  his  land,  protect  his  forests, 
and  keep  themselves? 


APPENDIX  E.  2 

material  for  a  long  brief 

Samuel  W.  McCall  on  Reciprocity  with  Canada 
House  of  Representatives,  Friday,  April  21,  1911 

(From  the  Congressional  Record) 

Mr.  Chairman:  In  arising  to  close  the  debate  in  behalf  of 
those  members  upon  this  side  of  the  House  who  believe  in  the 
policy  of  the  present  bill,  I  desire  to  say  that  I  think  the 
House  is  to  be  congratulated  upon  the  illuminating  discussion 
to  which  it  has  had  an  opportunity  to  listen.  The  speeches 
delivered  upon  both  sides  of  the  question  and  upon  both  sides 
of  the  aisle  have  been  worthy  of  the  subject — a  subject  which, 
as  was  said  by  the  gentleman  from  Illinois  yesterday,  is  one 
of  the  most  important  ever  before  the  American  Congress. 
The  bill  has  important  international  aspects  and  features  of 
an  economic  character  that  call  for  the  careful  consideration 
of  every  member.  It  does  not  make  an  appeal  for  the  use  of 
the  heroics  of  the  hustings,  but  for  the  best  thought  each  one 
of  us  is  capable  of  giving  it. 

I  listened  with  great  interest  to  the  speech  of  the  gentleman 
from  Maine  [Mr.  Hinds] — the  first  speech  that  he  has  had  an 
opportunity  to  deliver  in  this  House,  of  which  he  has  been 
almost  the  directing  agency  for  neariy  twenty  years.  It  was 
a  speech  beautiful  in  structure,  such  a  speech  as  is  made  out 
of  a  full  mind,  and  it  was  entirely  worthy  of  the  subject 
which  he  discussed.  I  say  that,  although  I  profoundly  dis- 
believe in  the  conclusions  which  he  maintained.  I  regretted 
to  notice,  however,  the  pessimistic  tone  that  the  gentleman 
adopted  with  reference  to  the  American  farmer.  But  it  is  not 
strange  that,  having  been  in  a  position  where  for  twer*-'' 

469 


460  APPENDIX  E 

years  he  could  not  escape  from  listening  to  the  debates,  he 
should  have  caught  the  minor  key  in  which  the  praises  of  the 
farmer  are  usually  sung  upon  this  floor. 

According  to  his  eulogists  here,  the  American  farmer  is  a 
very  serious  minded  individual,  with  his  wife  and  numerous 
progeny  gathered  about  him — and  I  observe  that  these  eulo- 
gists usually  bless  him  with  a  bountiful  offspring — desperately 
and  with  great  solemnity  endeavoring  to  cling  to  a  precarious 
existence.  These  orators  lament  over  his  rugged  qualities, 
they  almost  brood  over  his  virtues,  and  as  for  his  faults,  he 
has  none,  for  he  is  a  being  to  whom  it  is  impossible  to  sin. 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  have  had  some  experience  with  the  Amer- 
ican farmer.  I  have  seen  him  in  his  native  lair.  It  was  my 
great  good  fortune  to  live  for  a  number  of  years  in  my  boy- 
hood upon  one  of  those  glorious  farms  in  northwestern  Illinois 
— a  $200-an-acre  farm,  as  the  gentleman  from  Indiana  called 
it — one  of  those  prairie  farms,  not  the  flat  farms  that  you  have 
farther  to  the  west,  but  where  you  have  the  billows  of  the 
prairie  tumbling  about  you.  One  of  those  farms  which,  when 
they  are  under  cultivation,  present  a  scene  of  pastoral  beauty 
and  of  fertility  such  as  can  scarcely  be  found  anywhere  in  the 
world.  I  have  seen  farmers  actually  burn  corn  for  fuel,  as 
has  been  so  dramatically  stated  in  this  debate.  Why,  it  has 
been  presented  here,  as  if  it  showed  the  destitution  of  the 
American  farmer  and  his  straitened  circumstances  that  he 
actually  burned  corn  for  fuel.  I  have  seen  him  burn  corn. 
Sometimes  he  would  overcrop  with  one  grain  and  could  not 
sell  it  profitably,  but  he  was  pretty  sure  to  get  even  on  some 
other  grain;  and  instead  of  brooding  over  the  burning  of  corn, 
more  probably  the  farmer  would  sit  cheerily  smoking  his  pipe 
in  the  light  of  its  blazing  fire  and  his  sons  would  rejoice  that 
they  did  not  have  to  chop  wood. 

The  American  farmer  is  not  the  sad-eyed  monstrosity, 
always  staring  destiny  in  the  face,  that  we  have  had  painted 
here.  The  farmers,  as  I  knew  them,  were  a  prosperous, 
independent,  and  happy  race  of  men.    I  have  known  many 


MATERIAL  FOR  A  LONG  BRIEF  461 

farmers,  and  I  have  known  some  men  even  on  Wall  Street, 
and  I  have  made  up  my  mind  that  they  both  belong  to  the 
same  race,  and  that  there  is  about  as  much  human  nature  in 
the  one  class  as  in  the  other.  I  have  sometimes  thought 
that  if  the  numbers  were  reversed  and  that  if  we  had  5,000,000 
voters  on  Wall  Street  and  only  a  few  hundred  farmers,  our 
statesmen  would  sing  the  homely  virtues  of  J.  P.  Morgan  and 
his  crew  and  would  bestow  upon  them  some  of  these  lugu- 
brious eulogiums  of  which  the  American  farmer  has  been  so 
long  the  patient  victim.  And  their  worst  enemy  could  hardly 
wish  them  a  harder  fate. 

Now,  it  is  argued  against  this  bill — and  I  do  not  propose 
to  weary  the  House  with  a  repetition  of  the  statistics  we 
have  heard — that  just  as  the  opening  up  of  the  Western 
States  depressed  agriculture  in  New  England  so  the  open- 
ing up  of  our  markets  to  Canadian  produce  will  have  the 
same  effect  upon  the  agriculture  of  the  country,  and  es- 
pecially upon  the  agriculture  of  the  West.  There  is  no  sim- 
ilarity whatever  between  the  two  cases.  From  1870  to 
1890,  you  will  remember,  we  built  railroads  simply  for  the 
sake  of  building  railroads.  We  threw,  sometimes  in  a  single 
year,  many  thousands  of  miles  of  railroad  across  the  most  fer- 
tile land  on  the  face  of  the  globe,  land  that  was  uninhabited. 
Railroads  went  in  advance  of  civilization,  and  in  order  to  get 
business  they  sent  their  agents  all  over  Europe  stimulating 
immigration;  and  it  so  happened  that  the  financial  and  com- 
mercial depression  from  1873  to  1878  threw  hundreds  of 
thousands  of  men  out  of  employment  in  the  East,  and  they 
found  places  upon  the  western  farms.  We  had  brought  under 
cultivation,  and  their  produce  thrown  upon  our  markets 
almost,  as  it  were,  in  a  day,  great  and  fertile  states  of  this 
Union,  and  in  order  to  permit  the  farmers  to  live,  the  rail- 
roads gave  them  unnaturally  low  rates  to  the  markets  of  the 
country  and  to  those  abroad. 

It  was  said  by  Prof.  Meyer  that  a  bushel  of  wheat  could 
be  carried  more  cheaply  from  Chicago  to  Liverpool  than  from 


462  APPENDIX  E 

Budapest  to  Prague,  a  distance  in  a  straight  line  of  only  175 
miles.  A  man  in  Illinois  could  get  into  the  markets  of  Boston 
more  cheaply  than  a  man  who  lived  in  Worcester  County  in 
Massachusetts.  The  result  of  this  abnormally  low  rate  was 
practically  to  transport  the  prairies  of  the  West  into  the  sub- 
urbs of  New  York  and  Boston.  And,  of  course,  agriculture 
was  depressed  in  New  England,  not  merely  from  that  cir- 
cumstance, but  because  of  the  conditions  there  which  were 
adverse  to  agriculture  as  it  was  then  conducted. 

I  saw  agriculture  not  only  in  the  West,  but  when  I  was  a 
young  boy  my  father  sent  me  to  New  England  to  school,  and 
I  had  an  opportunity  there  to  see  how  they  farmed  in  New 
England.  In  the  West  a  farmer  could  turn  a  furrow  for  a 
mile,  if  his  farm  went  that  far,  without  taking  his  hand  from 
the  plow:  but  in  New  England  the  farmer  would  urge  his 
horses,  and  more  often  his  oxen,  for  a  few  feet  and  then  would 
have  to  turn  out  for  a  stump  or  stone.  He  would  try  to  select 
smooth  little  patches  upon  the  hillside.  While  a  New  Eng- 
land hillside,  with  its  alternation  of  little  rye  fields  and  corn- 
fields and  pasture  and  meadow  and  woodland,  presents  a  very 
beautiful  mosaic  to  the  eye,  it  certainly  is  not  favorable  to 
agriculture.  And  it  was  inevitable  that  under  the  adverse 
natural  conditions  and  with  the  antiquated  methods  which 
the  New  England  farmers  employed  they  could  not  compete 
with  the  rich  and  fertile  prairie  lands  of  the  West. 

Now,  how  is  it  with  Canada.^  Why,  there  is,  as  I  have  said, 
no  parallel  between  the  two  cases.  Champlain  laid  the  foun- 
dations of  Port  Royal  and  Quebec  before  the  Pilgrims  landed 
upon  Plymouth  Rock.  That  country  is  as  old  as  this 
country. 

For  one  hundred  and  fifty  years  it  has  been  a  part  of  the 
wealthiest  empire  in  the  world,  and  yet  to-day  it  has  less  than 
8,000,000  people,  and  instead  of  capitalists  putting  in  their 
money,  thrusting  railroads  across  the  cold  fields  of  Canada, 
Canada  has  been  compelled  largely  to  build  her  railroads  out 
of  her  own  treasury,  and  although  she  has  given  enormous 


MATERIAL  FOR  A  LONG  BRIEF  463 

land  grants  and  vast  sums  of  money  she  to-day  has  only 
about  25,000  miles  of  railroads  in  the  whole  Dominion. 

Canada  has  not  the  slightest  advantage  over  the  West  in 
fertility  or  in  aptitude  for  agriculture.  The  advantage  is 
all  the  other  way.  The  part  of  Canada  gentlemen  fear  is  a 
country  of  a  single  crop.  A  single  crop  will  sack  the  soil. 
The  farms  in  the  Canadian  northwest  are  scarcely  habitable 
for  a  good  many  months  in  the  year.  Agriculture  in  our  West 
can  be  carried  on  under  far  better  conditions  than  there. 

The  lands  there  are  not  so  cheap  as  they  were  in  the  West 
when  it  was  settled.  Rich  prairie  land  sold  in  the  United 
States  for  $5  and  less  an  acre.  I  happen  to  know  a  case  where 
a  very  intelligent  business  man  of  New  England  desired  to 
buy  a  half  section  of  unbroken  land  for  each  of  his  two  sons. 
He  bought  it  nearly  two  years  ago,  selecting  it  with  great 
judgment  and  care,  and  he  was  compelled  to  pay  the  Can- 
adian Pacific  Railroad  Co.  $25  an  acre,  and  another  young 
man  bought  some  land  two  weeks  afterwards  and  it  had 
risen  to  $30  an  acre;  and  that  prairie  land  has  since  been  going 
up  in  price.  These  young  gentlemen  who  started  out  to 
build  their  fortunes  found  that  they  had  to  pay  a  very  high 
price  for  their  horses,  had  to  hire  a  man  to  look  after  their 
farms  in  the  winter,  began  with  a  drought  and  a  poor  crop, 
and  at  the  present  time  they  still  have  their  fortunes  to 
acquire. 

But  suppose  our  young  men  do  go  to  Canada,  and  many 
of  them  have  already  gone  there.  Why,  the  state  of  Iowa, 
that  wonderful  agricultural  state,  during  the  last  decade  lost 
in  population.  Does  that  mean  that  it  declined  in  prosperity? 
Not  at  all.  It  is  one  of  the  greatest,  and  is  destined  to  con- 
tinue to  be  one  of  the  greatest,  and  richest  agricultural  regions 
in  the  world.  But  young  men  have  gone  from  Iowa  because 
they  could  get  more  land  in  Canada  than  at  home.  The  land 
of  their  own  state  was  all  taken  up.  Suppose  they  shall  found 
upon  the  eastern  slopes  of  the  Canadian  Rockies  a  newer  and 
a  fairer  Iowa?    Who  is  there  who  will  not  wish  them  God- 


464  APPENDIX  E 

speed?  They  go  there  to  win  their  fortunes,  just  as  theii 
fathers  made  their  fortunes,  by  seUing  in  the  open  markets  of 
the  world;  and  if  they  deserve  to  prosper  and  if  the  country 
is  so  favorable  to  agriculture,  they  will  repeat  the  prosperity 
of  their  fathers. 

The  gentleman  from  Maine  [Mr.  Hinds],  in  the  course  of 
his  speech,  alluded  to  the  agricultural  conditions  in  Germany, 
and  to  the  fact  that  Bismarck  established  agricultural  duties 
there.  I  fancy  that  Bismarck  did  not  establish  agricultural 
duties  so  much  for  the  sake  of  agriculture  as  to  placate  the 
powerful  agrarian  element  and  establish  generally  in  Germany 
the  policy  of  protection.  But  they  have  had,  ever  since  the 
time  of  Bismarck,  high  protection  upon  agricultural  products 
in  Germany. 

Let  us  see  what  the  effect  has  been.  There  is  this  singular 
law,  pointed  out  by  Prof.  Fawcett,  of  Cambridge  University, 
England,  that  while  in  a  great  many  articles  of  common  use 
the  demand  does  not  increase  the  price,  yet  in  the  case  of 
agricultural  products  the  demand  does  increase  the  price, 
and  he  reached  that  conclusion  upon  a  line  of  argument 
something  like  this: 

A  man  may  be  producing  manufactures  of  cotton  or  flax 
or  some  other  article  in  which  labor  is  the  chief  element  of 
production,  and  if  there  is  a  demand  for  twice  as  many  goods 
of  the  kind  he  makes,  he  doubles  the  size  of  his  factory  and 
can  manufacture  even  more  cheaply  than  he  could  before. 
But  in  a  country  like  Germany,  which  normally  supports  its 
population,  when  you  come  to  increase  that  population  under 
the  stimulus  of  protection,  by  building  up  great  manufac- 
turing cities  and  making  a  strain  upon  the  resources  of  the 
soil,  there  is  a  greater  demand  for  agricultural  produce  than 
the  farmer  normally  has  raised.  Now,  there  are  in  every 
country  some  lands  that  ordinarily  are  not  cultivated  be- 
causes  prices  do  not  make  it  profitable  to  cultivate  them. 
They  are  called  valueless,  but  when  you  raise  the  price  of  farm 
products  it  pays  to  till  the  best  of  these  lands,  and  the  higher 


MATERIAL  FOR  A  LONG  BRIEF  466 

the  price  the  poorer  the  land  it  will  pay  to  cultivate.  There 
is  an  "oscillating  margin,**  upon  which  you  may  or  may  not 
be  able  profitably  to  raise  farm  produce,  according  as  farm 
produce  is  high  or  low.  The  man  who  cultivates  must  get 
prices  that  will  warrant  him  in  doing  so.  These  prices  enable 
the  man  who  has  fertile  land  to  make  still  more  money,  and 
the  increased  demand  for  agricultural  produce  drives  people 
into  the  cultivation  of  lands  previously  unprofitable,  and  in 
order  to  induce  them  to  do  it  they  must  of  necessity  be  paid 
a  higher  price  for  their  produce. 

Now,  let  us  see  what  has  happened  in  Germany,  which 
relatively  to  us  has  a  very  large  population  per  square  mile 
and  which,  with  a  growing  population,  has  had  high  protec- 
tion in  agriculture  for  a  great  many  years.  The  growing 
demand  for  foodstuffs  has  greatly  increased  prices.  I  no- 
ticed the. other  day  an  address  made  by  the  chancellor  of 
the  German  Empire,  who  is  a  rigid  and  uncompromising 
protectionist.  At  a  meeting  of  the  National  Society  of  Ag- 
riculture he  said: 

I  am  especially  grateful  to  the  president — 

That  is,  the  president  of  that  society — 

for  his  frank  admission  that  the  prices  of  many  farm  products 
have  in  the  past  year  reached  an  unhealthy  height,  burdening 
in  a  deplorable  manner  a  great  number  of  people. 

That  comes  from  the  chancellor  of  the  German  Empire 
with  reference  to  this  artificial  increase  in  the  price  of  food. 
He  declares  that  it  burdens  in  a  deplorable  manner  a  great 
number  of  people. 

Let  us  look  further  at  the  situation  in  Germany.  The 
agrarian  element  there,  who  own  the  land,  are  a  very  power- 
ful element.  They  not  only  enjoy  high  and  unnatural  prices 
for  the  common  articles  of  food,  but  they  have  great  power 
in  directing  the  German  Empire.  As  you  all  know  the  state 
owns  the  railroads.    At  a  certain  time  of  the  year  the  sugar- 


466  APPENDIX  E 

bearing  lands  along  the  Elbe  make  special  demands  for  ag- 
ricultural labor,  and  so  it  used  to  be  the  custom  at  that  time 
of  the  year  for  laborers  living  along  the  Oder  to  go  and  help 
in  the  harvest  of  these  sugar-bearing  lands,  where  they  would 
get  better  wages,  and  then  when  the  harvesting  was  over  to 
come  back  again.  The  German  railroads  gave  them  excursion 
rates.  Those  agrarians  who  lived  along  the  Oder  made  a 
complaint  to  the  German  Government  in  effect  that  they 
had  a  natural  right  to  employ  the  labor  of  their  locality,  and 
that  for  the  Government  to  give  these  laborers  excursion 
rates  made  it  necessary  for  the  agrarians  to  pay  higher  wages 
to  their  men;  and  although  the  minister  of  finance  admitted 
that  it  was  a  good  thing  for  the  German  laborer,  although  it 
gave  him  more  money  temporarily,  although  it  enabled  an 
untraveled  class  to  get  away  from  home  and  to  see  another 
part  of  the  Empire  and  have  their  outlook  broadened,  yet  the 
Government  yielded  to  the  demand  of  the  agrarian  element 
and  refused  longer  to  sell  the  excursion  tickets. 

The  gentleman  from  Maine  [Mr.  Hinds]  alluded  to  the 
law  called  the  Gregory  King  law,  by  which  he  showed  that 
as  the  supply  of  an  article  of  common  use  increased  at  an 
arithmetical  ratio,  the  price  decreased  at  practically  a  ge- 
ometrical ratio. 

That  is,  you  increase  the  surplus  of  a  necessary  article  and 
you  depress  the  price  out  of  all  proportion  to  the  amount  by 
which  you  increase  the  surplus.  It  readily  occurred  to  me 
that  there  is  a  reverse  to  that  law,  and  the  other  side  is  illus- 
trated in  the  case  of  Germany.  If  you  decrease  below  the 
natural  demand  the  supply  of  an  article  of  common  use  in 
an  arithmetical  ratio,  you  increase  the  price  of  that  article 
in  practically  a  geometrical  ratio.  I  think  there  is  no  escape 
from  that  conclusion. 

Then  about  the  static  equilibrium  of  which  he  spoke,  in 
nations  between  agriculture  and  manufactures.  It  is  a  very 
good  thing  if  you  can  secure  the  equilibrium  naturally,  but  it 
is  a  very  bad  thing  to  pay  too  much  for  it.    Suppose  there  is  a 


MATERIAL  FOR  A  LONG  BRIEF  467 

nation  that  has  coal  mines,  iron  mines,  water  powers,  great 
facilities  for  manufacturing,  and  a  poor  soil.  Is  it  wise  for 
her  to  take  her  people  from  the  operation  of  the  great  natural 
resources  and  facilities  for  manufacturing  with  which  she 
has  been  blessed  and  put  them  to  the  cultivation  of  an  infertile 
soil?  Is  it  not  better  for  them  to  work  the  mines,  to  build  up 
manufactures,  and  exchange  their  products  with  some  other 
nation  that  does  not  have  these  resources  but  has  a  fertile 
soil? 

Carry  it  out  to  extremes  on  this  theory  and  every  household 
should  maintain  an  equilibrium,  and  each  should  have  its 
own  blacksmith,  its  own  shoemaker,  and  its  own  spinner. 
The  law  of  modern  trade  is  for  men  and  nations  to  do  the 
things  they  are  best  fitted  to  do  and  to  exchange  products 
with  each  other. 

I  paid  close  attention  to  the  argument  of  the  gentleman 
from  Maine,  because  I  have  a  high  respect  for  him  and  be- 
cause I  was  greatly  attracted  by  his  speech.  There  is  one 
other  thing  to  which  I  wish  to  call  attention.  He  referred  to 
the  British  Tariff  Commission,  and  quoted  them  as  in  favor, 
practically,  of  reenacting  the  corn  laws.  That  would  strike 
an  ordinary  man  as  an  admission  almost  from  the  Cobden 
Club  itself  in  favor  of  the  policy  which  the  gentleman  from 
Maine  was  advocating.  I  thought  from  its  name,  as  very 
likely  the  gentleman  from  Maine  thought,  that  it  must  be  a 
royal  commission,  or  if  not  a  royal  commission  it  must  be  a 
sort  of  government  commission.  I  have  looked  it  up,  and  in 
HazelVs  Annual,  which  tells  you  briefly  everything  about 
the  Empire,  you  will  find  the  British  Tariff  Commission 
tabulated  with  other  similar  organizations.  On  the  one  side 
it  frankly  states  the  organizations  against  Mr.  Chamberlain's 
proposal,  which  was  to  tax  food  coming  into  England,  and 
there  we  have  the  Free  Trade  League  and  the  Cobden  Club 
and  others.  In  the  other  column  they  have  catalogued  the 
organizations  for  Mr.  Chamberlain's  proposal,  and  among 
them  is  the  tariff  commission,  established  by  Joseph  Cham- 


468  APPENDIX  E 

berlain  in  the  beginning  of  1904  in  order  to  push  along  his 
particular  ideas.  That  is  practically  the  protective-tariff 
league  of  the  British  Empire,  and  if  you  read  the  names  you 
will  find  there  a  collection  of  gentlemen,  some  of  them  very 
comfortable  manufacturers,  who  are  deeply  concerned,  as 
are  the  manufacturers  in  this  country,  for  the  poor  farmer. 

I  could  construct  a  tariff  commission  like  that  here,  and 
it  would  be  a  commission  of  more  eminent  ability.  I  would 
put  the  gentleman  from  Illinois  [Mr.  Cannon],  my  distin- 
guished, and  I  may  say  my  illustrious,  friend  at  the  head; 
I  would  put  the  gentleman  from  Pennsylvania  [Mr.  Dalzell] 
upon  it;  I  would  give  a  place  upon  it  to  the  gentleman  from 
Michigan  [Mr.  Fordney] ;  and  then  I  would  add  to  it  the  sec- 
retary of  the  American  Protective  Tariff  League  and  of  the 
Home  Market  Club  of  Massachusetts.  And  we  should  have 
a  fine  collection  of  gentlemen,  of  great  ability  and  great 
knowledge;  but  if  I  wanted  to  hold  forth  anything  they  said 
in  favor  of  protection  as  an  admission  of  an  ancient  enemy 
to  protection  I  think  some  of  our  narrow-minded  partisans 
on  the  other  side  would  reserve  the  right  to  object. 

This  whole  discussion  has  revolved  about  the  price  of 
wheat.  But  first  I  wish  to  say  a  word  about  the  price  of 
land.  I  do  not  think  the  effect  of  this  legislation  is  going  to 
be  to  decrease  the  price  of  land,  but  to  keep  it  from  going 
up  too  rapidly  in  value.  So  far  as  competition  with  Canada 
is  concerned,  if  North  Dakota,  which  has  a  longer  summer 
and  a  shorter  winter  than  Canada,  can  be  a  part  of  the  same 
agricultural  domain  and  can  compete  with  Kansas  and 
Iowa  and  Oklahoma  and  those  wonderfully  rich  lands  to- 
ward the  South,  lands  as  fertile  as  those  in  Campania,  where, 
as  Virgil  said — 

Summer  borrows  months  beyond  her  own; 
Twice  the  teeming  flocks  are  fruitful, 
Twice  the  laden  orchards  groan — 

if  North  Dakota  can  compete  with  lands  like  those,  what 


MATERIAL  FOR  A  LONG  BRIEF  469 

has  she  to  fear  from  the  more  frosty  Alberta?  What  has 
Mimiesota  to  fear  from  Manitoba  when  she  can  prosper 
side  by  side  with  Iowa  and  Nebraska? 

The  debate  has  been  chiefly  about  the  farmer,  and  I 
have  wondered  whether  he  was  really  so  much  agitated 
over  this  bill  as  we  have  been  led  to  believe.  I  have  won- 
dered, since  in  1865  patriotism  was  the  pretext  which  certain 
great  interests  employed  to  terminate  the  Elgin  treaty, 
whether  after  all  there  was  not  something  masked  behind 
the  farmer  here.  People  have  been  industriously  sending 
telegrams  to  members.  Evidently  there  has  been  a  great 
campaign  of  education,  and  the  suspicion  that  the  farmer 
was  being  put  where  he  did  not  deserve  to  be  has  reminded 
me  of  that  old  fort  near  Panama  which  was  captured  from  the 
Spaniards  by  Morgan  and  his  buccaneers,  and  it  is  said  the 
way  they  captured  it  was  to  drive  in  advance  of  their  charg- 
ing columns  the  nuns  and  the  sisters  of  charity.  The 
Spaniards  did  not  wish  to  fire  upon  these  good  women  and  so 
the  buccaneers  captured  the  fortress.  I  do  not  wish  to  say 
that  there  have  been  any  other  gentlemen  behind  the  Ameri- 
can farmer,  but  I  have  had  just  a  suspicion  that  there  were 
some  interests  behind  him  pushing  him  to  the  front  to  take 
the  brunt  of  the  fire  or  to  silence  it. 

But  this  whole  question  revolves  about  wheat,  and  it 
seems  to  me  that  we  can  decide  it  upon  wheat  alone.  I  think 
there  is  no  doubt  that  in  any  country  which  exports  a  consid- 
erable surplus  of  wheat  the  price  is  fixed  in  the  market  that 
takes  the  surplus.  We  have  been  for  many  years  one  of  the 
great  granaries  of  the  world,  selling  in  the  open  market,  and 
our  wheat  has  sold  on  a  parity  and  is  selling  to-day  on  a  par- 
ity, freights  being  adjusted,  with  the  wheat  of  Argentina, 
of  Australia,  of  Canada,  of  India,  and  Russia.  Although  it 
would  seem  hardly  necessary  to  quote  an  authority  upon  so 
clear  a  proposition,  I  have  here  Prof.  Dondlinger's  interesting 
book  on  wheat.  He  has  evidently  written  with  great  sym- 
pathy for  the  farmer,  and  he  lays  down  this  proposition: 


470  APPENDIX  E 

As  soon  as  a  country  has  a  surplus  for  export  and  receives 
more  for  exported  wheat  than  the  home  price,  plus  the  ex- 
porting, the  export  will  increase,  the  home  price  will  rise, 
production  will  increase,  and  the  price  is  no  longer  fixed 
within  the  count^>^  The  country  which  buys  the  export 
may  thus  fix  the  price  of  wheat  for  the  country  which  pro- 
duces it.  .  .  .  It  is  as  a  consumer  of  the  world  surplus  that 
England  has  held  a  position  of  such  commanding  importance 
in  fixing  the  price  of  wheat. 

Gentlemen  present  here  some  discrepancies  in  the  price 
of  wheat  upon  one  side  of  the  line  and  the  other.  I  can  find 
similar  discrepancies  between  neighboring  towns  in  South 
Dakota.  It  depends  upon  elevator  facilities,  it  depends  upon 
competition  in  buying,  and  you  can  find  those  differences  in 
towns  in  the  same  state.  They  are  simply  little  backward 
whirls  and  eddies,  that  you  will  find  in  the  most  rapid  onrushing 
stream.    They  are  simply  the  exceptions  that  prove  the  rule. 

The  man  in  North  Dakota  does  not  compete  with  the 
man  across  the  line  in  Manitoba  directly,  but  he  competes 
with  him  4,000  miles  away  in  the  Liverpool  market.  We 
have  an  exportable  surplus  of  something  like  100,000,000 
bushels  a  year,  and  Canada  has  an  exportable  surplus  of, 
perhaps,  half  that  amount,  and  those  surpluses  are  both 
taken  by  the  Liverpool  market.  It  makes  no  difference 
whether  the  wheat  is  swept  from  Canadian  or  American 
threshing  floors,  when  it  goes  to  Liverpool,  according  to  its 
quality,  one  kind  brings  the  same  price  as  the  other.  And 
so  we  witness  this  spectacle  on  account  of  the  high  tariff 
wall;  we  see  these  two  broad,  golden  rivers  of  wheat  flowing 
in  parallel  lines  upon  either  side  of  the  boundary  and  seeking 
the  level  of  a  common  market.  It  seems  to  me  quite  beyond 
our  capacity  to  understand  that  any  other  law  can  operate 
where  we  export  such  an  enormous  volume  of  this  necessary 
article,  not  controlled  by  a  trust,  than  that  the  price  is  fixed 
in  the  country  which  takes  the  surplus. 


MATERIAL  FOR  A  LONG  BRIEF  471 

Let  us  take  the  reverse  of  that,  and  we  have  an  illustra- 
tion to  prove  the  truth  of  this  rule.  Take  sugar.  We  do  not 
produce  as  much  sugar  as  we  consume.  We  consume  some 
3,500,000  tons  every  year,  and  we  need  to  import  a  great  deal 
from  the  outside  world.  Some  years  ago  we  had  before  this 
House  a  proposition  to  give  a  preferential  duty  of  20  per  cent 
to  Cuban  sugar  over  other  sugars.  It  was  alleged  here  that 
the  Cubans,  for  whom  we  designed  this  arrangement,  would 
get  no  benefit  at  all,  but  that  it  would  go  to  the  Sugar  Trust, 
and  what  do  we  see?  We  see  precisely  the  result  that  the 
advocates  of  that  reciprocity  bill  pointed  out  at  that  time. 

The  sugar  market  of  the  world  is  Hamburg.  The  price 
of  sugar  in  New  York  is  the  Hamburg  price  plus  the  freight 
across  the  ocean  plus  the  full  duty  into  New  York.  And  the 
Cuban  planters,  providing  they  show  reasonable  intelligence 
and  do  not  glut  the  market  at  a  given  time,  can  reckon  on 
the  Hamburg  price  with  the  freight  and  full  duty  added. 
Since  we  have  to  make  up  our  deficiency  in  the  production 
of  sugar  by  large  importations,  our  home  price  is  the  world's 
— or  Hamburg — price  with  the  duty  added,  and  there  is  a 
parity  in  price  between  Hamburg  and  Cuba  and  Sumatra 
when  the  differences  in  duties  and  freights  are  con- 
sidered. 

I  read  this  morning  in  the  New  York  Sun  an  article  upon 
sugar  written,  I  believe,  by  Mr.  Robinson,  one  of  the  most 
accomplished  economic  writers  upon  the  American  press. 
He  took  importations  from  Sumatra  and  from  some  other 
countries  and  he  carried  out  the  prices  into  thousandths,  and 
then  an  importation  from  Cuba,  which  had  a  preferential 
duty.  When  they  were  finally  landed  in  New  York  they  all 
appeared  at  precisely  the  same  price,  each  paying  its  freight 
and  particular  duty.  The  price  is  adjusted,  although  I  am 
not  quoting  him  as  an  authority  upon  that,  with  reference 
to  the  Hamburg  price. 

What  is  going  to  happen  to  wheat  if  this  bill  passes? 
Gentlemen  say,  if  the  effect  is  not  to  decrease  the  price  of 


472  APPENDIX  E 

bread,  why  do  we  want  to  pass  the  bill,  and  if  it  is  going 
to  decrease  the  price  of  bread,  it  will  injure  the  American 
farmer,  and  they  repeat  this  very  ancient  tariff  riddle.  I 
will  tell  you  what  I  think  will  happen.  We  are  going  to 
reach  just  the  same  condition  in  regard  to  wheat  as  we  are 
in  to-day  in  regard  to  sugar.  When  we  cease  to  raise  as 
much  as  we  consume,  and  when  we  shall  have  to  bring 
wheat  in  from  other  nations  for  our  own  consumption,  then 
we  shall  see  the  law  I  have  been  talking  about  illustrated 
from  the  reverse  side. 

Instead  of  our  exporting  at  the  world's  price  to  Liver- 
pool, paying  our  freight,  we  shall  buy  at  the  world's  price 
at  Liverpool  and  pay  in  addition  the  freight  and  the  cost  of 
overcoming  any  other  obstacles  in  order  to  get  into  our  own 
market;  and  when  you  reach  that  point  the  tariff  for  the 
first  time— this  tariff  that  has  looked  so  magnificent  upon 
the  statute  books  to  the  American  farmer — will  become 
operative  to  increase  the  price  of  wheat  above  the  world's 
price.  Now,  is  there  any  American  farmer  who  would 
desire  to  add  to  the  price  he  is  getting  in  Liverpool  25  cents 
a  bushel  of  tariff  plus  the  freight  rate  from  Liverpool  .f*  He 
has  prospered  on  wheat  growing  on  the  basis  of  prices  in 
the  markets  of  the  world.  Do  you  imagine  that  when  the 
time  of  our  scarcity  comes  and  when  we  are  not  raising 
as  much  as  we  consume  that  the  American  farmer  will  de- 
sire to  have  this  price  artificially  raised  in  order  that  he 
may  make  more  money?  He  certainly  will  make  as  much 
then  if  the  tariff  is  not  on  as  he  does  now. 

A  great  deal  has  been  said  about  the  Elgin  treaty.  It  has 
been  argued  that  it  was  unfavorable  to  the  United  States. 
Let  me  call  your  attention  to  this  circumstance,  that  in  1850 
the  trade  going  both  ways  between  Canada  and  the  United 
States  only  amounted  to  about  $5,000,000  a  year.  This 
treaty  was  put  in  force  in  1855  and  remained  in  force  for 
eleven  years,  and  yet  in  that  time  it  covered  nearly  a  half 
billion  of  trade  between  the  two  countries.    Why,  it  practi- 


MATERIAL  FOR  A  LONG  BRIEF  473 

cally  created  trade  between  Canada  and  the  United  States, 
and  Canada  for  a  generation  after  we  abrogated  that  treaty 
stood  in  our  antechambers  asking  that  we  make  another 
reciprocity  arrangement  with  her.  She  continued  to  do  so 
for  thirty  years,  until  at  last  Sir  Wilfrid  Laurier  said,  "No 
more  pilgrimages  to  Washington." 

Sir  John  Macdonald  made  it  the  fundamental  policy  of 
his  party  to  have  reciprocity  with  the  United  States  and, 
at  the  same  time,  incidental  protection.  And  when  he  came 
into  power,  about  1880,  for,  I  think,  the  second  or  third  time, 
he  estabhshed  the  policy  of  protection  for  Canada  and  at- 
tempted to  secure  a  reciprocity  treaty.  That  policy  of  pro- 
tection had  the  effect  of  stimulating  Canadian  manufacture, 
and  in  1893  Sir  Wilfrid  Laurier,  the  present  prime  minister, 
said  that  "If  you  give  us  Liberals  power  we  will  destroy 
protection,  which  is  a  sham  and  a  delusion  and  a  robbery," 
showing  that  there  was  complete  reciprocity  in  political 
rhetoric  and  that  he  had  gotten  that  "free  of  all  duty"  from 
the  Democratic  Party  in  the  United  States. 

Sir  Wilfrid  Laurier  three  years  afterwards  was  intrusted 
with  power.  He  is  a  sound  and  sagacious  statesman,  and  I 
wish  to  call  the  attention  of  my  enthusiastic  friends  upon  the 
other  side  of  the  aisle  to  the  fact  that  he  has  done  nothing 
whatever  to  reduce  protective  duties  in  Canada  except  sim- 
ply to  create  the  British  preferential.  And  I  trust  that  his 
sound  sense  and  moderation  will  be  imitated  by  gentlemen 
upon  the  other  side  if  they  ever  have  the  responsibility  of 
dealing  with  the  tremendous  industries  of  the  United  States. 

I  think  it  is  not  necessary  to  say  anything  upon  the  most- 
favored-nation  aspect  of  this  treaty.  We  heard  a  great  deal 
about  it  when  the  question  was  discussed  in  the  last  Congress, 
and  the  fact  that  that  objection  has  not  been  urged  by  gentle- 
men in  the  present  debate  is  pretty  conclusive  evidence  that 
there  was  no  foundation  whatever  for  their  former  conten- 
tion. I  think,  also,  the  gentleman  from  Ohio  [Mr.  Rowland] 
has  finally  disposed  of  the  argument,  or,  rather,  the  objec- 


474  APPENDIX  E 

tion,  that  we  should  not  have  reciprocity  in  competitive 
articles.        ^ 

I  am  rather  surprised  to  find  gentlemen  representing 
border  states  of  the  Union  opposed  to  this  treaty.  A  high- 
tariff  wall,  however  beneficial  it  may  be  to  a  country  as  a 
whole,  throws  a  very  deep  shadow.  People  can  only  trade 
upon  one  side  of  the  wall.  They  are  shut  out  from  their 
neighbors  upon  the  other  side.  If  the  men  in  North  Da- 
kota would  look  at  this  a  little  more  broadly,  they  would 
see  that  it  would  be  far  better  for  their  state,  for  the  farmers 
there,  to  trade  across  the  line  and  acquire  farms  across  the 
line  and  not  be  upon  the  outer  rim  of  the  country  where  the 
circulation  of  the  trade  current  is  feeble,  as  is  that  of  the  blood 
in  the  extremities  of  the  body.  I  would  suggest  that  they 
should  not  want  to  continue  to  be  the  extremities  of  the  body 
politic,  but  that  they  might  more  profitably  wish  to  annex 
Canada  industrially,  so  that  they  might  trade  and  extend 
their  farms  to  the  north  as  well  as-  to  the  south. 

Now,  it  has  been  denied  that  the  policy  of  reciprocity, 
such  as  this  bill  presents,  is  a  Republican  policy.  We  have 
had  it  shown  in  this  debate  that  the  administration  of  Pres- 
ident Grant,  who  was  a  pretty  good  Republican  and  did 
not  come  from  New  England,  negotiated  a  reciprocity  treaty 
upon  the  lines  of  the  Elgin  treaty.  We  have  seen  that  Gar- 
field, afterwards  President,  was  in  favor  of  the  Elgin  treaty. 
We  had  it  asserted  upon  the  authority  of  Mr.  Curtis  that  Mr. 
McKinley  was  in  favor  of  the  policy.  Certainly  the  amend- 
ment proposed  by  Mr.  Blaine  tended  strongly  to  show  that  he 
was  in  favor  of  the  policy. 

And  now  I  want  to  quote  from  a  veiy  distinguished  man, 
a  man  who  was  governor  of  a  leading  state  and  who  has 
since  succeeded  a  great  statesman  as  the  political  leader 
of  his  state.  I  refer  to  Albert  B.  Cummins,  who  was  at  the 
time  governor  of  Iowa.  I  am  going  to  quote  from  a  speech 
of  Gov.  Cummins,  made  to  the  Boston  Merchants'  Associa- 
tion on  December  10,  1903.    I  will  not  read  all  of  the  extract. 


MATERIAL  FOR  A  LONG  BRIEF  475 

because  it  is  somewhat  long,  but  I  will  read  what  he  says  in 
conclusion: 

Suppose  we  could  to-night  add  Canada,  from  ocean  to 
ocean  and  from  her  southern  line  to  the  North  Pole,  to  the 
territory  of  the  United  States,  so  that  when  some  cour- 
ageous American  explorer  plants  the  banner  of  the  Republic 
upon  the  axis  of  the  world  and  its  beautiful  folds  fill  with 
the  air  of  the  North  it  will  proclaim  the  eternal  sovereignty 
of  the  United  States.  .  .  .  How  many  are  there  here  or  else- 
where who  would  look  upon  this  accession  of  power  and  popu- 
lation upon  land  and  lake  and  sea  as  a  misfortune  to  our 
country  or  a  blow  inflicted  upon  her  prosperity? 

I  go  further  and  eliminate  national  pride.  How  many 
banks  would  fail  on  that  account?  How  many  factories 
would  close  because  the  Stars  and  Stripes  were  flying  over 
this  vast  domain?  What  acre  would  be  worth  less?  What 
man  would  be  without  work  or  receive  less  compensa- 
tion? .  .  . 

Mark  you,  I  am  not  dreaming  of  annexation,  nor  am  I 
advocating  free  trade  with  Canada,  for  the  former  is  more 
remote  than  ever  before,  and  the  latter  is  wholly  imprac- 
ticable. I  have  used  the  figure  only  to  show  that  we  can 
safely  draw  nearer  to  our  neighbor  and  safely  enter  upon 
the  negotiation  of  a  reciprocal  treaty." 

I  commend  that  to  the  attention  of  some  of  our  agricultural 
friends  from  the  West. 

Mr.  Chairman,  it  appears  frona  some  of  the  arguments 
made  in  this  House,  and  from  some  of  the  arguments  that 
are  advanced  in  Canada,  that  this  bill  is  to  be  mutually  de- 
structive to  the  agriculture  of  both  countries,  and  that  the 
deplorable  condition  of  the  American  farmer  under  it  is  only 
to  be  equaled  by  the  wretched  squalor  which  the  Canadian 
farmer  will  have  to  face.  As  the  gentleman  from  Minnesota 
[Mr.  Nye]  so  eloquently  said  yesterday,  this  bill  presents  a 
great  ethical  question.     It  presents  an  enlightened  policy. 


476  APPENDIX  E 

The  President  of  the  United  States  is  simply  asking  this 
country  to  obey  the  laws  of  nature,  which  no  great  nation 
can  violate  with  impunity. 

Here  these  two  countries  lie  side  by  side  for  over  3,700 
miles.  The  lines  of  trade  naturally  run  north  and  south, 
and  we  are  attempting  to  force  them  to  run  east  and 
west. 

And  it  is  the  policy  of  justice.  Remember  that  during 
the  last  dozen  years  our  balance  of  trade  against  Canada 
has  been  nearly  $1,000,000,000.  She  is  buying  of  us  this 
very  year  more  than  $250,000,000  in  value,  and  70  per  cent 
of  that  trade  goes  there  absolutely  free  of  duty.  Her  av- 
erage duty  against  the  goods  that  we  send  her  is  only  half  as 
much  as  the  average  duty  that  we  impose  against  her;  and 
of  this  you  may  be  certain,  that  after  this  bill  shall  pass  the 
average  duty  of  the  United  States  against  Canada  will  still 
be  higher  than  the  average  of  the  duties  levied  by  Canada 
against  the  United  States. 

The  President  is  recognizing  the  laws  of  nature.  The 
fact  that  that  country  buys  from  us  nearly  twice  as  much  as 
she  does  from  all  the  other  nations  of  the  world  shows  most 
powerfully  how  the  ties  of  nature  are  drawing  us  commer- 
cially together.  It  is  not  wise  to  try  to  float  upstream.  We 
should  permit  the  laws  of  nature  to  work  without  obstruc- 
tion, and  they  will  work,  for  the  benefit  of  both  countries. 
The  size  of  our  planet  is  dwindling  every  year.  The  dis- 
covery of  all  of  the  lands  of  the  world,  the  wonderful  inven- 
tions of  the  last  century,  the  railroad  and  the  telephone 
and  the  telegraph  make  this  world  to-day  as  small,  compared 
with  the  world  of  the  time  of  Columbus,  as  one  of  Jupiter's 
satellites  is  as  compared  with  Jupiter.  We  are  rapidly  grow- 
ing smaller,  and  here  is  this  great  neighbor  of  ours  that  is 
industrially  a  part  of  the  United  States.  I  say  it  is  wise  for 
us  to  recognize  that  fact  and  to  pass  this  bill.  It  does  not  go 
far  enough,  but  it  takes  a  long  step  in  the  right  direction. 

I  regret  that  I  have  only  three  minutes  more.    It  is  argued 


MATERIAL  FOR  A  LONG  BRIEF  477 

in  effect  by  the  gentleman  from  Wisconsin  [Mr.  Lenroot] 
in  his  very  able  speech: 

Add  this  farmer's  free  list  to  this  bill.  Load  it  to  the  gun- 
wales with  amendments  and  sink  it  if  you  can. 

Consider  for  a  moment  the  sort  of  a  measure  this  bill 
would  become.  Here  is  a  proposition  to  carry  out  an  in- 
ternational agreement.  The  first  section  of  the  act  saj^s 
that  flour  shall  be  admitted  at  a  certain  rate  of  duty  from 
Canada  when  Canada  shall  admit  flour  at  the  same  rate 
coming  from  this  country,  and  the  same  thing  with  regard 
to  meat  and  other  articles. 

The  trade  is  carefully  carried  out  in  the  first  article.  Then, 
in  the  fourth  article,  with  contemptuous  levity  we  say  that 
all  these  things,  coming  from  all  the  rest  of  the  world,  for 
which  Canadian  statesmen  have  paid  a  consideration  to  get 
a  reduction  of  duty  upon  them,  shall  come  into  our  markets 
free  of  duty.  Webster  said,  "Politics  should  cease  at  the 
water's  edge";  but  this  would  be  playing  politics  upon  an 
international  scale.  It  would  treat  with  levity  the  negotia- 
tions between  the  Canadian  commissioners  and  the  President 
of  the  United  States.  It  would  attest,  at  the  same  time,  their 
inability  to  make  a  bargain  and  the  ability  of  the  President 
of  the  United  States  to  drive  a  hard  bargain,  because,  with- 
out any  consideration  whatever,  in  a  subsequent  section,  we 
freely  give  better  terms  to  the  rest  of  the  world. 

Now,  Mr.  Chairman,  if  I  may  have  just  two  or  three 
minutes  more,  the  boundary  line  between  these  two  countries 
stretches,  as  I  have  said,  for  3,700  miles.  There  is  no  modern 
fort  along  that  line.  After  the  war  of  1812,  by  the  Rush- 
Bagehot  treaty,  we  agreed  to  have  no  further  armaments 
upon  the  Great  Lakes,  although  two  of  the  chief  battles  of 
that  war  had  been  fought  upon  them.  Great  cities,  with 
billions  of  dollars  of  property,  with  fabulous  wealth,  have 
grown  up  along  that  boundary.  They  are  not  defended  by  a 
single  gun,  but  there  are  no  cities  in  all  the  world  that  are 
more  safe,  because  they  are  fortified  and  guarded  by  the  good 


478  APPENDIX  E 

sense,  the  common  interests,  and  the  friendly  sentiments  of 
two  great  nations.  We  have  forts,  it  is  true,  and  guns  along 
that  line,  but  they  are  antiquated  and  the  survivals  of  a  time 
long  past.  And  we  have  made  the  dreams  of  the  poets  come 
true  for  the  boys  wage  mimic  wars  in  the  crumbling  embra- 
sures of  the  forts,  the  birds  build  their  nests  in  the  lips  of  the 
cannon,  and  little  children  play  upon  them  and  clasp  their 
silent  throats.  We  can  just  as  safely  dismantle  the  tariff 
forts  between  the  two  countries.  Canada  is  one  with  us  in 
sentiment.  She  is  one  with  us  in  all  the  strongest  ties  that 
can  draw  nations  together;  and  I  trust  that  this  side  of  the 
House  will  vie  with  that  side  of  the  House  and  support  the 
President  of  the  United  States  in  the  enlightened  and  civil- 
ized policy  proposed  by  this  bill. 


INDEX 


Abbott,  L.,  267 

Accent,  fallacy  of,  174 

Accident,  fallacies  of,  183 

— ,  fallacy  of  converse,  187 

— ,  fallacy  of,  simple,  186 

— ,  fallacy  of,  specific,  184 

Accuracy  of  statement  of  witness, 

109 
Actual  issues,  46,  47 
Adams,  J.  J.,  302,  346,  348,  349 
Adaptation  to   audience,   212,  252, 

283 

—  to  audience,  in  introduction,  314 

—  to  circumstances,  first  negative, 
398 

Adjustment,  negative  case,  378 
Admissibility  of  evidence,  85 
Admissions,  106 
Admitted  issues,  48 

—  matter  in  brief,  229 
Advantages  of  extempore  method, 

436 
AflSrmative  case  and  the  issues,  376 

—  case  in  debate,  376 

—  defense,  35,  378 

— ,  first,  in  debate,  394 

Affirming  the  consequent,  fallacy, 
180 

A  fortiori  argument,  159,  160 

Agreement,  method  of,  124 

Aids  to  unity  and  coherence  in  dis- 
cussion, 329 

Alden,  R.  M.,  11,  309 

Ambiguity  in  propositions,  28 

Ambiguous  middle,  177,  184 

—  use  of  termi,  182 


Amphibology,  fallacy  of,  174 
Amplify  and  diminish  in  conclusion. 

337 
Amplifying  and  diminishing,  416 
Analogy,  162 

—  definition  by,  303 

—  false,  167 

— ,  figurative,  162 

— ,  kinds  of,  162 

— ,  literal,  164 

Analysis  and  exposition  in  rebuttal, 

427 
— ,  definition  by,  307 
Ancestors  of  argumentation,  11 
Answering  too  little,  348 

—  too  much,  346 

—  too  much,  three  objections,  347 

—  yourself,  349 

Answer  whole  case  in  rebuttal,  425 

Antecedent,  defined,  123 

— ,  denying  the,  fallacy  of,  180 

—  probability,  139 

—  probability,  methods  of    attack 
on,  142 

A  posteriori  argument,  146 
Appeal,  emotional,  kind  of,  260 
A  priori  argument,  140,  141 
Arguing  in  a  circle,  fallacy,  190 
Argumentation  and  logic,  9,  115 

—  and  the  forms  of  composition,  10 
— ,  conviction  and  persuasion  in,  3-7 

—  defined,  1 

— ,  emotion  in,  257 
— ,  four  processes  in,  7 
-^,  relation  to  debate,  368 
— f  science  or  art,  10 
— ,  sources  of,  11 


479 


INDEX 


Argument  by  generalization,  155 
— ,  defined,  83 

—  from  analogy,  162 

—  from  authority,  74,  99,  100 

—  from  cause  to  effect,  139 

—  from  effect  to  cause,  146 

—  from  effect  to  effect,  149 

—  from   example,    155 

—  from  example,  cause  and  effect 
in,  168 

— ,  from  sign,  146 

—  in  brief,  231 
Arguments  and  evidence,  74 
— ,  forms  of,  outline,  114-115 

—  from  analogy,  methods  of  at- 
tack, 167 

— ,  in  logic,  115 

— ,  kinds  of,  outline,  114-115 

Argumentum  ad  hominem,  190 

—  ad  ignorantiam,  193 

—  ad  judicium,  193 

—  adpopulum,  190 

—  ad  verecundiam,  193 
Aristotle,  260,  334 
Arnold,  M.,  327 
Arrangement,  8 

— ,  function  of,  197 
Asking  questions  in  debate,  410 
Assertion,  form  of  proposition,  27 
Assertions  and  support,  324 
Assimilation,  77 

Association  of  phenomena  and  gen- 
eralization, 153 

—  of  phenomena  in  the  past,  152 

—  of  phenomena,  methods  of  at- 
tack, 154 

Assumption  of  unproved  premise, 
fallacy,  189 

Assumptio  non  probata,  189 

Attack  on  forms  of  arguments,  ref- 
utation, 356 

Audience,  adaptation  to,  212,  252, 
283 


Audience,  friendly,  292 

— ,  hostile,  293 

— ,  inattentive,  introduction,  319 

— ,  suggestions  for  persuasion,  283 

— ,  well  disposed,  339 

Authority,  argument  from,  74,  99, 

100 
— ,  definition  by,  300 
— ,  test  of,  112 


B 

Baker,  G.  P.,  5,  94,  328 

Baker  and  Huntington,  94,  264,  267, 

271,  278,  296,  297,  350 
Balance  summary,  416 
Baldwin,  J.  M.,  259 
Ballantine,  H.  W.,  37,  211 
Basic  rule  for  all  refutation,  353 
Beach,  W.  A.,  in  North  case,  307 
— ,  on  military  law,  301 
Beecher,  H.  W.,  283,  292,  293-296 
Begging  the  question  fallacy,  188 
Belief  and  will,  258 
Beliefs  of  debates,  374 
Best,  W.  M.,  82,  83,  88,  90,  91,  92, 

93,  95,  105,  106 
Black,  F.  S.,  in  Molineux  case,  143 

—  in  ex  parte  Milligan,  312 

— ,  on  right  to  trial  by  jury,  63,  359 
Blackstone's  commentaries,  302 
Block  system  of  presentation,  439 
Bode,  B.  H.,  9,  15,  116,  135,  181 
Bodkin,  R.  C,  177,  186,  300 
Bradbury,  H.  B.,  315 
Brady,  J.  T.,  in  case  of  Savannah 

privateers,  306 
Brevity,  273 
Brief,  admitted  matter,  229 

—  and  main  speeches,  392 

—  and  outline,  211 

—  and  presentation,  250 

—  and  simple  propositions.  30 


INDEX 


481 


Brief,  clash  of  opinion  in,  229 

— ,  climax  in,  219 

— ,  conclusion,  237 

— ,  complete  sample,  240 

— ,  complete  statements,  216 

— t  coordinate  subheadings,  231 

— ,  defined,  208 

— ,  discussion,  231 

— ,  divisions  of,  214 

— ,  documentation  in,  221 

—  drawing  and  outlining,  208 

—  drawing,  legal,  210 

—  drawing,  rules,  213 

— ,  headings  and  subheadings,  216 
— ,  introduction,  222 

—  is  impersonal,  209 

— ,  issues  and  partition  in,  224 

— ,  main  headings,  231 

— ,  order  in,  219 

— ,  parallel  column,  237 

— ,  purposes  of,  208 

— ,  references  in,  221 

— ,  refutation  in,  234,  235 

— ,  relation  of  discussion  to,  323 

— ,  relations  in,  219 

— ,  single  statements,  217 

— ,  subheadings,  231 

— ,  symbols  in,  220 

Brooks,  P.,  342 

Brown,  D.  P.,  in  Holmes  case,  150 

Buckley,  J.  M.,  436,  438,  439,  440 

Burden  of  proof,  33 

—  of  proof  and  negative  evidence, 
95 

—  and  issues,  51 

—  in  law,  34 

—  in  propositions,  29 
— ,  summary,  38 

—  of  rebuttal,  35 

—  of  rebuttal,  defined,  37 
Burke,    E.,    on    conciliation    with 

America,  155,  320,  363 
— ,  on  duration  of  Parliaments,  336 


Burke,  on  Irish  Catholics,  160 
— ,  on  the  Marriage  act,  313 


Calmness  in  introduction,  314 
Campbell,  G.,  102 
Card  form  for  note,  72 

—  system,  gathering  material,  71 
Case,  aflSrmative  in  debate,  376 
— ,  negative,  four  types,  377 
Casual  evidence,  93,  107 
Categorical  proposition,  176 

—  syllogism,  176 

Cause  adequate  to  produce  effect, 
143 

—  and  effect  connection  complete, 
149 

—  in  argument  from  example,  168 

—  capable  of  being  real  cause,  148 
— ,  defined,  123 

—  to  effect,  139 

Channing,  W.  E.,  in  reply  to  Clay, 

357-358 
— ,  on  slavery,  156 
Characteristics  of  good  propositions, 

27 
Charts  in  presentation,  443 
Chatham,  Lord,  437 
Choate,  R.,  in  Dal  ton  case,  110 
Cicero,  299,  348,  356 
Circulus  in  probando,  90 
Circumstantial    evidence,    40,    88, 

89 
Clark  and  Blanchard,  286 
Clash  of  opinion  in  issues,  43 
• —  of  opinion  in  brief,  229 
Classification  of  emotions,  263 

—  of  fallacies,  171 
Clearness  in  refutation,  353 
Climax  and  comparison,  282 

—  in  brief,  219 
Coarseness  in  debate,  384 


482 


INDEX 


Coherence,  201 

—  and  emphasis,  204 

—  in  discussion,  328 
— ,  summary  of,  203 
CoUins,  J.  C,  109 

Combined  memorizing  and  extempo- 
raneous, 439,  440 
Comparison  and  climax,  282 
Complete  sample  brief,  240 
— ,  statements  in  brief,  216 
Complex  issues,  45 

—  question  fallacy,  194 
Composition,  fallacy,  183 

— ,  principles  of,  in  discussion,  322 
Conclusion,  199,  334 
— ,  amplify  and  diminish,  337 
— ,  conviction  in,  334 

—  in  brief,  237 

—  in  debate,  413 

— ,  irrelevant  fallacy,  190 

— ,  persuasion  in,  339 

— r  purpose  of,  334 

— ,  stirring  emotions  in,  341 

— ,  summaries  in,  334 

— :,  presumptions,  40 

Concomitant  variations,  method  of, 

129 
Concrete  and  specific,  280 

—  and  specific  propositions,  29 
Confusion  in  refutation,  347 
Connection,  in  coherence,  202 

— ,  of  cause  and  effect  complete,  142 
Conscious  practice,  78 
Consequent,  affirming  the,  fallacy, 

180 
— ,  defined,  123 
— ,  false,  fallacy,  194 
Contest  debates,  369 

—  debates,  decision,  53 

—  debates,  preparation  of,  376 
Context,  definition  from,  303 
Conversational  mode  in   introduc- 
tion, 314 


Converse  accident  fallacy,  187 
Conversion,  fallacy  of  illogical,  173 
Conviction  and  persuasion,  251 

—  and  persuasion  and  the  issues,  53 

—  and   persuasion    in  argumenta- 
tion,  3-7 

—  and  persuasion  in  evidence,  81 

—  and  persuasion  in  presentation, 
250 

Conviction  in  conclusion,  334 

— ,  in  introduction,  299 

Convictions  of  debates,  374 

Coordinate  subheadings  in  brief,  231 

Corwin,  T.,  on  General  Crary,  385 

Counter  proposition,  36 

— ,  proposition  and  issues,  51 

— ,  proposition;  negative  case,  378 

Courtesy  in  introduction,  314 

Creighton,  J.  E.,  9,  15,  116,  120,  135, 

136,  137,  171,  173,  183,  193 
Critic's  note  in  contest  debate,  372. 

373 
Curtis,  G.  W.,  331 

D 

Dangers  of  extempore  speaking,  437 
Davis,  W.  H  ,  369 
Debatable  propositions,  30 
Debate,  affirmative  case  in,  376 

—  defined,  8,  367 
— ,  discussion,  404 
— ,  divisions,  393 
— ,  ethics  in,  403 

— ,  first  negative  in,  395 

— ,  introduction,  394 

— J  issues  in,  402 

— t  main  heads  in,  404 

— ,  memorized,  432 

— ,  methods  of  presentation,  431 

— ,  nature  of,  outline,  367 

— ,  partition  in,  403 

— ,  personality  in,  379 

— f  preparation  for,  368 


INDEX 


483 


Debate,  preparatory  practice  for,  393 

— ,  presentation  in,  430 

— ,  questions  in,  410 

— ,  reading  manuscript  in,  431 

— ,  relation  to  argumentation,  368 

Debaters'  beliefs,  374 

—  convictions,  374 

—  opinions,  374 

Debate,  sarcasm  and  ridicule,  385 

Debates,  contest,  369 

— ,  decision  in,  370 

— ,  judging,  370,  371 

— ,  preparation  of  contest,  376 

— ,  purpose  of,  370 

— ,  self-control  in,  384 

— ,  sport  or  game,  373 

— ,  types  of  decisions,  371 

Decision  in  contest  debate,  53 

—  in  debates,  370 
Declarations  against  interest,  106 
Deduction,  117 

Defense  of  present,  negative  case,  377 
Definition  by  analogy,  303 

—  by  analysis,  307 

—  by  authority,  300 

—  by  etymological  derivation,  302 

—  by  exclusion,  306 

—  by  illustration,  305 

—  from  context,  303 

—  in  introduction,  300,  402 

—  of  fallacies,  171 

—  of  terms,  24 

— ,  purposes  q(,  300 

— ,  summary  of  steps  in,  26 

Deliberate  perversion  of  the  truth, 

110 
Delivery  impromptu,  435 
— ,  manuscript,  431 
— ,  memorized,  432 
— ,  notes  in,  441 
— ,  outlines,  430 
— ,  outline  in,  442 
Demosthenes,  342 


Denney,  Duncan,  and  McKinney, 
343 

Denying  the  antecedent,  fallacy  of, 
180 

Detract  interest  from  theme  m  intro- 
duction, 315 

Difference,  method  of,  125 

Digression,  for  emphasis,  326 

Dilemma,  356,  357 

— ,  more  than  two  hours,  359 

Direct  evidence,  88 

—  or  inverted  order,  308 
Discussion,  the,  outline,  322 
— ,  unity  in  the,  200 

— ,  coherence  in,  328 
— t  emphasis  in,  326 

—  in  brief,  231 

—  in  debate,  404 

— ,  partitions  in,  329,  331,  332 

— ,  principle  of  composition  in,  322 

— ,  relations  in,  325 

— ,  relation  to  brief,  323 

— ,  summaries  and  partition  in,  409 

— ,  summaries  in,  329,  330,  332 

— ,  transitions  in,  329,  332 

— ,  unity  in,  328 

— ,  variety  in,  323 

Disjunction,  faulty,  of  dilemma,  360 

— ,   imperfect  fallacy,  181 

Disjunction  syllogism,  181 

Disputable  presumptions,  40 

Distribution  of  terms,  183 

—  of  term,  defined,  133 
Division  exhaustive,  in  method  of 

residues,  361 
— ,  fallacy  of,  183 
Divisions  of  brief,  214 

—  of  the  debate,  393 
Documentation  in  notes,  72 
— ,  in  brief,  221 

—  of  sources,  100 
Double  propositions,  27 
Duty  of  going  forward,  34,  35 


484 


INDEX 


Earnestness  in  persuasion,  266 
Effect  to  cause,  146 

—  to  cause,  methods  of  attack  on 
arguments  from,  148 

—  to  cause  not  part  of  a  'priori  ar- 
gument,  141 

—  to  effect,  149 

—  to  effect  diagram,  150 

—  to  effect,  methods  of  attack,  152 
Eight  suggestions  for  persuasion,  296 
Elevation  of  primary  elements,  202 
Emotion  appeal,  kinds  of,  260 

—  appeal,  prejudice  against,  256 

—  in  argumentation,  257 
Emotions,  classification  of,  263 

—  in  conclusion,  341 
Emphasis,  204 

—  and  coherence,  204 
— ,  digression,  326 

— ,  iteration,  327 

— ,  methods  of,  205 

— ,  methods  of,  in  discussion,  326 

Emphatic  places,  205 

English  composition,  10 

Enthymemes,  135 

Equivocation,  defined,  184 

— ,  fallacies  of,  182 

Ethics  in  debate,  403 

— ,  in  rebuttal,  429 

Etymological  derivation,  definition 

by,  302 
Evarts,  W.  M.,  in  case  of  Savannah 

Privateers,  338 
Evidence,  admissibility  of,  85 

—  and  arguments,  74 
— ,  casual,  93,  107 

— ,  circumstantial,  41,  88,  89 
— ,  consistent  with  human  nature 
and  experience,  101 

—  consistent  with  itself,  104 

—  consistent  with  known  facts,  103 
— ,  defined,  82 


Evidence,  direct,  88 

— ,  exceptionally  valuable  kinds  of, 

106 
— ,  expert,  96,  97 
— ,  hearsay,  89,  91,  92 
— ,  hearsay  test,  105 

—  in  brief,  231 
— ,  indirect,  88,  89 

—  in  general  argumentation,  85 

—  in  law,  83-85 

— ,  kinds  of,  88-101 

— ,  nature  of,  81 

— ,  negative,  94,  95,  96,  107 

— ,  opinion,  96,  97,  98 

— f  opinion  test  of,  112 

— ,  ordinary,  96,  97 

— f  original,  89,  91 

— ,  outline,  80-81 

— ,  personal,  90,  92 

— ,  persuasion  and  conviction  in,  81 

— ,  positive,  94 

— J  pre-appointed,  93 

— f  presumptive,  40,  41,  89 

— ,  real,  90,  92,  107 

— ,  relevancy  of,  85 

— ,  second  hand,  91,  92 

— ,  sources  of,  86 

— ,  tests  of,  101-112 

— ,  test  of  expert,  112 

— ,  tests  of  sources  of,  107 

— ,  undesigned,  107 

— ,  unoriginal,  91 

— ,  unwritten,  90 

— ,  written,  90 

Exaggeration,  thoughtless,  109 

Example,  argument  from,  155 

Excluding  extraneous  matter,  312 

Exclusion,  definition  by,  306 

Exhortation,  261 

Experience,  reference  to,  278 

Experiences,  vivid,  279 

Expert  evidence,  96,  97 

—  testimony,  96,  97 


INDEX 


485 


Expert  vote  in  debate,  373 
— ,  witnesses,  test  of,  112 
Explanation  in  introduction,  308 
Exposition  and  analysis  in  rebuttal, 

427 
Extemporaneous  presentation,  435 
Extempore  method,  advantages  of, 

436 

—  rebuttal,  422 

—  speaking,  dangers  of,  437 
Extraneous  matter,  312 


Facing  the  truth,  persuasion,  289 
"Fact"  witnesses,  tests  of,  107 
Fairness  in  persuasion,  272 

—  in  rebuttal,  429 
Fair  specimens,  161 
Fallacies,  classification  of,  171 
— ,  definition,  171 

— ,  formal,  176 
— ,  hermeneutic,  171 
— ,  logical,  171,  176 
— ,  material,  182 

—  of  equivocation,  182 

—  of  presumption,  188 

— ,  outline,  170-171  j 

— ,  refutation,  356  \ 

— ,  rhetorical,  171,  172 
Fallacy,  accent,  174  , 

— ,  aflSrming  the  consequent,  180 
— ,  amphibology,  174 
— ,  arguing  in  a  circle,  190 
— ,  assumption  of  unproved  prem- 
ise, 189 
— ,  begging  the  question,  188 
— ,  complex  question,  194 
— ,  converse  accident,  187 
— ,  conversion,  173 
— ,  denying  the  antecedent,  180 
— ,  false  cause,  194 
— ,  false  consequent,  194 
— t  four  terms,  176 


Fallacy,  ignoring  the  question,  190 

— ,  illicit  major,  177 

— ,  illicit  minor,  178 

— ,  imperfect  disjunction,  181 

— ,  irrelevant  conclusion,  190, 

— ,  negative  premises,  178 

— ,  obversion,  172 

—  of  composition,  183 

—  division,   183 

— ,  particular  premises,  179 
— ,  simple  accident,  186 
— ,  simple  non  sequitur,  194 
— ,  undistributed  middle,  177 
False  analogy,  167 

—  cause  fallacy,    194 

—  consequent  fallacy,  194 

Field,  D.  D.,  in  U.  S.  vs.  Cniik- 

shank,  310 
Figurative  analogy,  162 
Finding  the  issues,  58-67 
First  aflSrmative  in  debate,  394 
First  negative,  adaptation  to  circum- 
stances, 398 

—  negative  in  debate,  395 
Formal  fallacies,  176 

— ■  summaries,  335 
Form  of  issues,  54 
Forms  of  support,  324 
Formulating  the  proposition,  20-21 
Foster,  W.  T.,  17,  18,  27,  265,  266, 

268,  270,  272,  351,  356,  357,  361, 

365 
Four  processes  in  argumentation,  7 

—  terms,  fallacy,  176 

—  types  of  negative  case,  377 
Fox,  C.  J.,  on  East  India  Bill,  320 
Friendly  audience,  292 
Function  of  law  of  evidence,  84 

—  of  the  introduction,  298 

—  of  witnesses,  87 
Fundamental  points  in  rebuttal,  426 
Funny  stories  in  introduction,  315- 

316 


486 


INDEX 


Game  or  sport,  debate,  373 
Gardiner,  J.  H.,  19,  335 
Gathering  material,  68-79 
General  illustration,  form  of  support, 

325 
Generalization,  155 

—  and  association  of  phenomena, 
153 

—  from  a  single  instance,  161,  166 
— ,  illustrative  and   argumentative, 

157 

—  implied,  153 

— ,  methods  of  attack,  160 
General  refutation,  353 

—  to  specific  in  reading,  75 
Genung,  J.  F.,  94,  159,  328 
"Getting  nearer  to  the  truth,"  in 

contest  debates,  371 
Gough,  H.  B.,  56 
G rattan,    on    Declaration    of    Irish 

Right,  342 
Great  Speeches  by  Great  Lawyers, 

101,  103,  111,  151,  302,  305,  306, 

307,  327,  339,  341,  359 
Greenleaf,  on  evidence,  39,  82,  89, 

92,  94,  95 

H 

Hale,  E.  E.,  444 

Hardwicke,  H.,  342 

Hayne,  R.  Y.,  on  Foote  Resolution, 

389,  398-402 
Headings  and  subheadings,  in  brief, 

216 
Hearsay  evidence,  89,  91,  92 
— ,  evidence  test  of,  105 
Henry,    P.,   confiscation  of   British 

Debts,  101 
Hermeneutic  fallacies,  171 
Hibben,  J.  G.,  120 
Hill,  A.  S.,  157,  270,  273,  278 
Honesty  in  rebuttal,  429 


Hostile  audience,  293 
— ,  introduction,  317 
Hughes,  on  evidence,  89 
Human  nature  and  experience,  evi. 
dence  consistent  with,  101 

—  known  for  persuasion,  265 
Huxley,  T.  H.,  on  evolution,  362 
Hypothetical  propositions,  179 

—  syllogism,  179 

Hyslop,  J.  H.,  18,  116,  123,  171,  181, 
182,  183,  184,  187,  188 

I 

Ignorantio  elenchi,  190 

Ignoring  the  question  fallacy,  190 

Illicit  major  fallacy,  177 

—  minor  fallacy,  178 
Illustration  and  argumentative  ex- 
amples of  generalization,   157 

Illustration,  definition  by,  305 
Imperfect  disjunction  fallacy,  181 

—  induction,  121 
Impersonal,  brief,  209 
Implied  generalization,  153 
Impromptu  debating,  435 
Inattentive    audience,  introduction, 

319 
Inconsistency  in  debate,  388 
— ,  personal,  in  contest  debate,  390 
Indirect  appeal,  286 

—  evidence,  88,  89 
Induction,  117 

—  imperfect,  121 

—  kinds  of,  120 

—  methods  of,  123 

—  perfect,  121 
Inference,  essence  of,  118 

—  object  of  in  induction  and  deduc- 
tion, 119 

—  process  of  in   induction  and  de- 
duction, 118 

Inferences  in  quantitative  relations, 
134 


INDEX 


487 


Informal  summaries,  336 
Interesting  propositions,  31 
Interest,  undue  in  case,  110 
Internal  summaries,  409 
Interpretation,  errors  in,  171 
Introducing  refutation,  353 
Introduction  and  unity,  199 

—  conversational  mode,  314 

—  conviction  in,  299 

—  debate,  394 

—  definition  in,  300,  402 

—  detract  from  theme,  315 

—  explanation  in,  308 

—  function  of,  298 

—  hostile  audiences,  317 

—  inattentive  audience,  319 

—  issues  and  partition,  308 

—  stories  in,  316 

—  strange  audience,  317 

—  temper  in,  318 

—  the,  outline,  298 

—  to  brief,  222 
Invention,  7 

—  and  selection,  68 

—  summarized,  66 
Inverted  or  direct  order,  308 
Irrelevant  conclusion  fallacy,  190 
Issue,  complex,  45 

—  actual,  46,  47 

—  potential,  47,  48,  51 

—  single,  45 

—  stock,  56 

—  and  winning  and  losing,  53 
Issues  defined,  43 

—  emphasized,  312 
— ,  finding  the,  58 
— ,  form  of,  54 

—  in  debate,  402 

—  in  general  discussion,  44 

—  in  introduction,  308 

—  in  law,  43 

— ,  necessity  of  knowing,  49 
— ,  number  of,  54 


Issues,  primary,  45,  46,  47 
— ,  subordinate,  45,  46,  47 
— ,  summary  of  method  of  finding, 

66 
— ,  terminology,  45 
— ,  theory  of,  43 
— ,  two  or  more,  parallel  partition, 

311 

—  the,  outline,  42 

—  admitted,  48 

— ,  and  aflSrmative  and  negative,  51 

—  and  burden  of  proof,  51 

—  and  conviction  and  persuasion,  53 

—  and  counter  proposition,  51 

—  and  partition  in  brief,  224 

—  and  proposition,  50 
Iteration,  emphasis,  327 


James,  W.,  254,  291 

Jevons,  W.  S.,  9,  10,  15,  116,  131, 

133,  174,  176,  178,  179,  184 
Joint  method,  126 
Judging  debate,  53,  370,  371 

—  expert  judge,  373 

—  the  critic's  vote,  373 

—  the  juryman's  vote,  372 

—  the  legislator's  vote,  372 

—  three  types  of  decisions,  371 
Judgment,  defined,  15 
Juryman's  vote,  371,  372 


K 


Ketcham,  V.  A.,  27 
Kinds  of  arguments,  outline,   114- 
115 

—  in  rhetoric,  138 

—  emotional  appeal,  260 

—  evidence,  88-101 

—  induction,  120 

—  summaries,  335 


488 


INDEX 


Know  other  side  in  rebuttal,  423 
Known  effect  due  to  other  cause,  148 
—  facts,  evidence  consistent  with, 
103 


Lamb,  C,  Popular  Fallacies,  158 

Lamont,  H.,  280 

Law,  brief  drawing  in,  210 

—  of  evidence,  83-85 

—  function  of,  84 

—  source  of  argumentation,  11 
Legal  brief  drawing,  210 
Legislator's  vote,  371,  372 
Lincoln,  A.,  at  Cooper  Union,  364 
Lincoln-Douglas  debates,  351,  360, 

380,  381,  389,  396,  403,  405,  407, 

411,  417 
Lists  of  propositions,  32 
Literal  analogy,  164 
Logic  and  argumentation,  9,  115 

—  defined,  9 

—  science  or  art,  9-10 

—  source  of  argumentation,  11 
Logical  fallacies,  171,  176 

of  time  in  refutation,  347 


M 

Mcintosh,  Sir  J.,  in  Peltier  case,  267 
Macaulay,  T.  B.,  357 
Main  headings  in  brief,  231 

—  heads  in  debate,  404 

—  points,  43 

—  speeches  and  brief,  392 

—  speeches,  outline,  392 
Major  premise,  defined,  132 

—  term,  defined,   132 
Marshall,  J.,  in  McCuUoch vs.  Mary- 
land, 156 

Material  fallacies,  182 

—  gathering,  68-79 
Matthews,  B.,  267 


Maxcy,  C.  L.,  210,  211,  232 
Memorized  delivery,  432 

—  rebuttal,  423 

—  speeches,  place  for,  433 

—  in  debate,  376 
Memorizing  in  debate,  432 
Memory  of  witness,  108 
Merits  of  the  question,  53 
Method,  joint,  126 

—  in  gathering  material,  70 

—  in  rebuttal,  429 

—  of  agreement,  124 

—  of  concomitant  variations,  128 

—  of  difference,  125 

—  of  residues,  128,  361 

Methods  of   attack  on   antecedent 
probability,  142 

—  of  attack  arguments  from  anal- 
ogy, 167 

—  association  of  phenomena,  154 

—  of    attack    on    arguments   from 
effect  to  cause,  148 

—  of  attack  on  effect  to  effect  ar- 
gument, 152 

—  of  attack  on  generalization,  160 

—  of  emphasis,  205 

—  of  emphasis  in  discussion,  326 

—  of  induction,  123 

—  of  presentation  in  debate,  431 

—  of  presenting  definitions,  300 

—  of  refutation,  355 
Middle,  ambiguous,  177, 184 
— ,  undistributed,  177 

—  term,  defined,  132 
Mill,  J.  S.,  185,  191 
Minor  premise  defined,  132 

—  term,  defined,  132 
Minto,  on  analogy,  164 
Modesty  in  persuasion,  268 
Monotony,  281 

—  of  form  in  extempore  speaking, 
438 

Morally  qualified  witness,  110 


INDEX 


489 


Mutual  dependence  of  induction  and 
deduction,  120 

N 

Natural  presumptions,  41 
Nature  of  evidence,  81 

—  of  persuasion,  253 

—  of  refutation,  344 
Negative  case,  adjustment,  378 

—  case,  counter  proposition,  378 

—  case,  defense  of  present,  377 

—  case,  four  types,  377 

—  case,  pure  refutation,  377 

—  evidence,  94,  95,  96,  107 

—  persuasion,  260 

—  premises  fallacy,  178 

—  propositions,  29 

—  testimony,  94 

New  arguments  in  rebuttal,  414 
Newcomer,  A.  G.,  281 
New  constructive  points  in  rebuttal, 
421 

—  English  dictionary,  5 
Newman,  J.  H.,  83,  172,  278 
Newspaper  reading,  75 

Non  sequitur,  194 

North,  J.  H.,  in  Rex  vs.  Forbes,  102 
Note  book  system  gathering  mate- 
rial, 71 

—  taking  system,   gathering  ma- 
terial, 70 

Notes,  use  of  in  presentation,  441 
Number  of  issues,  54 


Object  of  inference  in  induction  and 

deduction,  119 
Obversion,  fallacy  of  illogical,  172 
O'Grady,  H.,  276,  277 
Opening  speech  in  debate,  394 
—  speech,  negative,  395 
Operation  of  other  causes,  144 


Opinion,  clash  of  in  brief,  229 

—  evidence,  96,  97,  98 

—  evidence,  test  of,  112 
Opinions,  as  evidence,  74 

—  of  debaters,  374 
Opportunity  for  getting  the  truth, 

111 
Oral  presentation  in  debate,  430 

—  style,  11 

Oratory,  source  of  argumentation,  11 
Order,  direct  or  inverted,  308 

—  in  coherence,  201 

—  of  headings  in  brief,  219 
Ordinary  evidence,  96,  97 
Original  evidence,  89,  91 
Outline  from  brief,  211-212 

—  use  of  presentation,  441,  442 


Parallel  column  brief,  237 
Particular  premises,  fallacy,  179 
Partition  and  issues,  54 

—  and  issues  in  brief,  224 

—  and  subordinate  issues,  47 

—  in  debate,  403 

—  in  introduction,  308 
— ,  parallel  to  issues,  311 

—  and  summaries  in  discussion,  409 

—  in  discussions,  329,  331,  322 
Patee,  G.  K.,  19,  299 

Peel,  Sir   R.,  on  disabilities  of  the 

Jews,  416 
Pelsma,  J.  R.,  56 
Perfect  induction,  121 
Personal  attitude  in  debate,  379 

—  evidence,  90,  92 

—  inconsistency,  388 

—  tone  in  debate,  379 
Personality,  78,  266 

—  in  debate,  379 
Persuasion  and  conviction,  251 

—  and  conviction,  and  the  issues,  53 


490 


INDEX 


Persuasion  and  conviction  in  argu- 
mentation, 3-7 

—  and  conviction  in  evidence,  81 

—  and  conviction  in  presentation, 
250 

— ,  defined,  253 

— ,  eight  suggestions  for,  296 

—  in  argumentation,  254 

—  in  conclusion,  339 

—  in  the  introduction,  313 
— ,  nature  of,  253 

— ,  negative  and  positive,  260 
— ,  outline,  249-250 
— ,  practical  suggestions  for,  264 
— ,   suggestions    in    regard    to    the 

speaker,  265 
— ,  the  subject,  272 
Persuasive  summaries,  336 
Petitio  principii,  188 
Petti  t.  Senator,   on  Fugitive  Slave 

Law,  383 
Phelps,  A.,  277 
Phenomenon,  defined,  124 
Phillips,  A.  E.,  278,  324 
Phillips,  W.,  on  Daniel  O'Connell, 

336 
Pillsbury,  W.  B.,  258 
Pinckney,  W.,  in  Hodges  case,  305 
— ,  in  Maryland  Assembly,  317 
Pitt,  W.,  436 
Plan  to  follow  in  gathering  material, 

75 
Platform  hints,  443 
Plunkett,  W.  C,  in  Rex  vs.  Forbes, 

326 
Position  of  refutation,  352 
Positive  evidence,  40,  94 

—  persuasion,  260 

Post  hoc,  ergo  propter  hoc,  194 

Potential  issue,  47,  48,  51 

Practical  suggestions  for  persuasion, 

264 
Practice  and  assimilation,  78 


Practice,  debates,  376,  393 

—  in  debate,  443 
Pre-appointed  evidence,  93 
Prejudice  against  emotional  appeal, 

256 
Prejudiced  propositions,  28 

—  witnesses,  87 
Preliminary  reading,  63 
Preparation,    advance   of   rebuttal, 

422 

—  of  contest  debates,  376 

—  of  rebuttal,  421 

—  for  debate,  368 

—  for  debate,  writing  as,  434 
Preparatory  practice  in  debate,  393 
Presentation,  8 

—  and  the  brief,  250 
— ,  charts  in,  443 

— ,  conviction    and    jjersuasion    in, 

250 
— ,  extemporaneous,  435 
— ,  impromptu,  435 

—  in  debate,  430 
— ,  notes  in,  441 

— ,  specific  suggestions  for,  441 
— ,  use  of  outline  in,  441,  442 
Presumption,  fallacies  of,  188 

—  in  propositions,  29 
Presumptions,  artificial,  41 
— ,  conclusive,  40 

— ,  disputable,  40 
— ,  legal,  41 
— ,  natural,  41 

—  of  fact,  40 

—  of  law,  39,  40 
Presumptive  evidence,  40,  41,  89 
Prima  facie  case,  34,  35,  37,  39 

—  facie  case,  defined,  35 
Primary  elements,  elevation  of,  202 

—  issues,  45,  46,  47 

Principles    of    composition    in    the 

discussion,  322 
Probability,  antecedent,  139 


INDEX 


491 


Process  of  inference  in  induction  and 

deduction,  118 
Proof,  defined,  82 
— ,  positive  and  refutation,  352 
Proposition  and  issues,  50 
— ,  assertion,  27 
— ,  categorical,  176 
— ,  counter,  and  issues,  51 
— ,  defined,  15 
— ,  disjunctive,  181 
—.double,  27 
— ,  formulating  the,  20-21 
— ,  in  a  club,  16 
— ,  in  court  of  law,  16 
— ,  in  deliberative  assembly,  17 
— ,  in  public  discussions,  17 
Propositions,      advantage     of,      to 

bearer  and  speaker,  18 
— ,  ambiguity  in,  28 
— ,  as  subjects  of  argumentation,  14 

—  brief  and  simple,  30 
— ,  burden  of  proof,  29 

— ,  characteristics  of  good,  27 

— ,  classifications  of,  18 

— ,  concrete  and  specific,  29 

— ,  debatable,  30 

— ,  hypothetical,  179 

— ,  interesting,  31 

— ,  list  of,  32 

— ,  necessity,  16 

— ,  negative,  29 

—  not  always  expressed,  18 

—  of  fact,  19 

—  of  policy,  19 
— ,  prejudiced,  28 

— ,  presumptions  in,  29 

— ,  single,  27 

— ,  simple  and  brief,  30 

— ,  simple  and  concrete,  29 

— ,  testing  the,  23 

— ,  two  at  once,  36 

— ,  two-sided,  30 

— ,  unambiguous,  28 


Propositions,  unprejudiced,  28 
Pure  refutation,  negative  case,  377 
Purposes  of  brief,  208 

—  of  conclusion,  334 

—  of  debating,  370 

Q 

Quality,  fallacies  of  equivocation, 
183 

— ,  of  evidence,  test  of,  101 

Quantitative  relations,  inferences  in, 
134 

Quantity,  fallacies  in  equivocation, 
183 

Quarterly  Journal  of  Public  Speak- 
ing, 369 

Question,  begging  the,  fallacy,  188 

— ,  complex,  fallacy,  194 

— ,  ignoring  the,  fallacy,  190 

— ,  real,  21-22 

— ,  rhetorical,  328 

Questions  in  debate,  410 

— ,  for  definite  answers,  410 

— ,  to  force  dilemma,  411 

— ,  to  waste  time,  411 

Quinctilian,  349 

Quotations  and  statistics  in  de- 
livery, 442,  443 


Reading  manuscript,  in  debate,  431 

— ,  newspaper,  75 

— ,  preliminary,  69 

Real  evidence,  90,  92,  107 

"  Real  life  "  debates,  369 

— ,  question,  21-22 

Reason  and  emotion,  in  argumentar 

tion,  3 
— ,  Newman's  definition  of ,82 
Reasoning,  form  of  support,  325 
— ,  refutation,  350 
— ,  science  of,  9 
— ,  syllogistic,  136 


492 


INDEX 


Rebuttal  and  refutation,  420-421 

— ,  answer  whole  case,  425 

— ,  eflfect  of  time  limit,  425 

— ,  ethics  in,  429 

— ,  explained,  420 

— ,  exposition  and  analysis  in,  427 

— ,  extempore,  422 

— ,  fairness  in,  429 

— ,  fundamental  points  in,  426 

—  in  law,  420 

— ,  know  other  side,  423 

— ,  memorized,  423 

— ,  method  in,  429 

— ,  new  arguments  in,  414 

— ,  new  points  in,  421 

— ,  outline,  420 

— ,  preparation  of,  421 

— ,  prepared  in  advance,  422 

— ,  strategy  in,  421 

— ,  surprises  in,  424 

— ,  vital  points  in,  426 

Redfield,  H.  S.,  210 

Reductio  ad  absurdum,  356 

Reference  to  experience,  278 

References  in  brief,  221 

—  in  material  used,  72 
Refutation  and  positive  proof,  352 

—  and  rebuttal,  420-421 
— ,  answering  too  little,  348 
— ,  answering  too  much,  346 
— ,  answering  yourself,  349 

— ,  attack  on  forms  of  arguments, 

356 
— ,  basic  rule  for  all,  353 
— ,  clearness  in,  353 
— ,  confusion  in,  347 
— ,  fallacies,  356 
— ,  general,  353 

—  in  brief,  234,  235 
— ,  introducing,  353 
— ,  loss  of  time,  347 
— ,  methods  of,  355 
— ,  nature  of,  344 


References,  outline  of,  344 

— ,  position  of,  352 

— ,  pure,  negative  case,  377 

— ,  reasoning,  350 

— ,  research,  350 

— ,  rhetoric,  351 

— ,  rhetorical  devices,  356 

— ,  special,  353 

— ,  statement  of,  353 

— ,  strategy  in,  414 

— ,  straw  men,  349 

— ,  tests  of  evidence,  356 

— ,  three  requirements  of,  350 

— ,  turning  the  tables,  363 

Refute,  what  to,  345 

Reid,  on  analogy,  165 

Relation  of  discussion  to  brief,  323 

Relations  in  brief,  219 

• —  in  discussion,  325 

Relevancy  of  evidence,  85 

*' Repairs"  case,  negative,  378 

Repetition,  in  discussion,  407 

— ,  in  extempore  speaking,  437 

Requirements,  three,  of  refutation, 

350 
Research,  refutation,  350 
Reserve  force,  269 
Residues,     method     of    refutation, 

356,  361 
— ,  division  exhaustive,  361 
— ,  method  of,  induction,  128 
Responsibility,  persuasion,  289 
Restatement,  form  of  support,  325 
Rhetorical  devices,  refutation,  356 

—  fallacies,  171,  172 

—  principles,    special    importance, 
in  argument,  206 

—  principles,  three  great,  198 

—  question,   328 

Rhetoric,  kinds  of  arguments  in,  138 

—  reasoning,  351 

—  source  of  argumentation,  11 
Ridicule  in  debate,  385 


INDEX 


493 


Ringwalt,  R.  C,  328,  337 

Risk  of  the  proposition,  34 

Robinson,  F.  B.,  237,  269,  299 

— ,  L.,  158 

— ,  W.  C,  45,  263 

Rule,  basic  for  all  refutation,  353 

Rules  for  brief  drawing,  213 

—  of  the  syllogism,  131 


Sample  brief,  complete,  240 
Sarcasm  in  debate,  385 

—  in  refutation,  348 
Schurz,  C,  328 

Science  or  art,  argumentation,  10 
Secondary  elements,  subordination 

of,  201 
Second-hand  evidence,  91,  92 
Selection,  7,  69 
Self-control  in  debate,  384 

—  in  persuasion,  269 

Seward,  W.,  in  Freeman  case,  147, 

304 
Shifting  on  the  burden  of  proof,  35, 37 
Sidgwick,  A.,  116,  138,  139,  142 
Sign,  argument  from,  146 

—  kinds  of  argument  from,  146 
Simple  non  sequitur  fallacy,  194 

—  and  brief  propositions,  30 

—  accident,  fallacies,  186 
Simplicity,  in  persuasion,  275 
Sincerity,  in  persuasion,  266 
Single,  characteristic  of  good  propo- 
sition,   27 

Single  issues,  45 

—  issue,  45 

—  statements  in  brief,  217 
Skill  of  debaters,  53 
Sorites,  133 

Sources,  documentation  of,  100 

—  of  argumentation,  11 

—  of  evidence,  86 

—  of  material,  75 


Special  refutation,  353 
Specific  accident,  fallacy  of,  184 

—  and  concrete  propositions,  29 

—  and  concrete  terms,  280 

—  instance,  form  of  support,  325 
Specimens,  enough  observed,  161 

—  fair  in  respect  of  point  in  issue, 
161 

Speech  style,  11 
Spencer,  H.,  273 
Sport  or  game,  debate,  373 
Standard  dictionary,  5 
"Stand  pat"  case,  378 
Statement,  defined,  15 

—  of  refutation,  353 

Statistics    and    quotations,    in    de- 
livery, 442-443 
Stephen  on  Pleading,  20 
Stephens.  Sir  J.  F.,  158,  190 
Stirring  emotions,  in  conclusion,  341 
Stock  issues,  56 

Stories  in  the  introduction,  315-316 
Strange  audience,  introduction,  317 
Strategy  in  conclusion,  414 

—  in  rebuttal,  421 
Straw  men,  349 
Style,  oral,  11 
Subheadings,  in  brief,  231 
Subject-matter,    handling,  for  per- 
suasion, 273 

Subject,  persuasion  suggestions,  272 
Subjects,  for  argumentation,  14 
Subordinate  issues,  45,  46,  47 
Subordination    of    secondary    ele- 
ments, 201 
Substitute  argument,  from  cause  to 

effect,  144 
Suggestions,   eight,   for  persuasion, 
296 

—  for  persuasion,  in  regard  to  au- 
dience, 283 

—  for  persuasion,  in  regard  to  sub- 
ject, 272 


494 


INDEX 


Suggestions  for  presentation,  441 
— ,  practical,  for  persuasion,  264 
Summaries  and  partitions,   in  dis- 
cussion, 409 
— ,  formal,  335 

—  in  conclusion,  334,  415 

—  in  discussion,  329,  330,  332 
— ,  informal,  336 

— ,  internal,  409 
— ,  kinds  of,  335 
— ,  persuasive,  336 
Summary,  balanced,  416 

—  of  arguments,  from  example,  166 

—  of  coherence,  203 

Sumner,     C,     on     Crime     against 

Kansas,  404,  407 
Support,  forms  of,  324 
Surprises,  in  rebuttal,  424 
Syllogism,  categorical,  176 

—  defined,  131 

—  disjunctive,  181 

—  hypothetical,  179 

—  rules  of,  131 

—  weakness  of  in  general  argumen- 
tation, 137 

Syllogistic  reasoning,  136 
Symbols,  in  brief,  220 


Tests  of  ordinary  witnesses,  107 

—  of  quality  of  evidence,  101 

—  of  sources  of  evidence,  107 
Thayer,  J.  B.,  33,  37,  39,  40,  41,  83, 

84,  90,  91,  97,  99 
Theory  of  issues,  43 
Thoughtless  exaggeration,    109 
Three  fundamental  requirements  of 

refutation,  350 

—  objections     to     answering     too 
much,  347 

Time  limit,  effect  of,  in  rebuttal,  425 
Transitions  in  discussion,  329,  332 
Turning  the  tables,  356,  363 
Two  propositions  at  once,  36 
Two-sided  propositions,  30 
Types  of  negative  c^se,  377 


Unambiguous  propositions,  28 
Undesigned  evidence,  107 
Undistributed  middle,  fallacy,  177 
Undue  interest  in  case,  110 
Unity  in  composition,  198 
—  in  discussion,  328 
Unoriginal  evidence,  91 
Unprejudiced  propositions,  28 
Unwritten  evidence,  90 


Tact,  284 

—  and  talent,  285 
Temper,  in  debate,  384 

—  in  introduction,  318 
Term,  defined,  15 
Terminology,  in  issues,  45 
Testimony,  expert,  96,  97 

—  form  of  support,  325 

—  negative,  94 

—  of  silence,  94 
Testing  the  proposition,  23 
Tests  of  evidence,   101-112 

—  of  evidence,  refutation,  356 

—  of  expert  witnesses,  112 


Variations,  method  of  concomitant, 

129 
Variety,  in  persuasion,  281 
— ,  in  discussion,  323 
Vital  points,  in  rebuttal,  426 
Vividness,  in  persuasion,  278 
Vivid  experiences,  279 

W 

Ward,  J.>  50, 189,  330,  348 
Weakness  of  syllogism,  in  general 
"  argumentation,  137 


INDEX 


495 


Webster,  D.,  350 

— ,  in  Dartmouth  College  case,  270 

— ,  in  Gibbons  vs.  Ogden,  332 

— ,  in  Girard  Will  case,  364 

— ,  in  Luther  vs.  Borden,  59,  331 

— ,  in  Ogden  vs.  Saunders,  190,  303, 

328,  335,  354 
— ,  in  Prov.  R.  R.  vs.  Boston,  360 
— ,  in  Reply  to  Calhoun,  318,  354 
— ^,in  Reply  to    Hayne,  318,  422, 

423,  427 

—  in  White  Murder  case,  62,  93, 
104,  108,  140,  191 

—  on  eloquence,  265 

Well     disposed,     audience    toward 

speaker,  339 
Whately,  R.,  4,  155,  162,  186,  261, 
■     282,  283,  286,  289 
What  plan  to  follow  in  gathering 

material,  75 

—  to  look  for  in  gathering  material, 
73 

—  to  refute,  345 

Where  to  look  in  gathering  material, 

75 
Wilkinson,  E.  C,  in  Prentiss  case, 

339 
Will  and  belief,  258 
Williston,  S..  20 


Wilson,  J.,  in  Pennsylvania  conven- 
tion, 358 
Wilson,  W.,  259 
Winans,  J.,  9,  46,  254,  256,  257,  264, 

273,  289,  315 
Winning  and  losing,  and  the  issues, 

53 
Wirt,  William,  in  Gibbons  vs.  Ogden, 

61 
Witness,  accuracy  of  statement  of, 

109 
— ,  expert,  96,  97 
— ,  expert,  test  of,  112 
Witness,  memory  of,  108 
— ,  mentally  qualified,  108 
— ,  morally  qualified,  110 
— ,  opportunity  for  getting  the  truth, 

111 
— ,  ordinary,  96 

Witnesses,  "fact,"  tests  of,  107 
— ,  function,  87 
— ,  ordinary,  tests  of,  107 
— ,  physically  qualified,  107 
— ,  prejudiced,  87 
Writing  as  preparation  for  debate, 

434 
—  speeches  for  debate,  393 
Written  evidence,  90 


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